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Abstract 
This thesis investigates the modelling of house prices in China. The first empirical chapter 
(Chapter 4) scrutinises the determinants of property prices in seven districts of Beijing, China. 
While the house prices of the panel model, noted in recent literature (Huang et al., 2017), are 
confirmed in the case of flat-related factors. Chapter 4 also reveals several new flat-related 
factors, such as directions of house facing (orientation) and house floor level, influencing 
house prices that have not been presented in previous studies (e.g., Hyuna and Milchevab, 
2018 and Yang et al., 2019). However, as well as these flat-related factors, this investigation 
also incorporates macroeconomic factors, such as GDP, inflation, income, unemployment 
rates, mortgage rates and factors of fiscal policy. The application of panel analysis extends 
the current literature by taking into account endogeneity in the GMM framework with 
instrumental variables. 
The second empirical chapter (Chapter 5) investigates the spatial statistics of house prices in 
Beijing. This chapter examines whether house prices in one region are affected by house 
prices in neighbouring regions. This investigation also analyses how house prices in one 
region are affected by unknown characteristics of the neighbouring regions. It explores 
whether the explanatory factors of house prices in one region are affected by explanatory 
factors of house prices in neighbouring regions. In addition, this chapter investigates the spill-
over effects of explanatory factors on house prices. This investigation also examines the 
partitioning of direct effect and indirect effect from the impacts of the neighbouring factors 
on house prices. Chapter 5 overcomes the shortcomings of the previous studies ((Mussa et al., 
2017) by extending the range of examining spatial models, providing reasonable spatial 
model selection procedures, and employing improved spatial weights to analyse spill-over 
effects of explanatory factors. 
Finally, the thesis investigates real options with the spatial analysis in the Chinese real estate 
markets (Chapter 6). This investigation extends the real options method with the spatial 
Durbin model (SDM), making this the first study in which real option forecast have been 
assessed in a spatial case. This method improves the accuracy of predicting house prices by 
considering neighbouring house prices. Chapter 6 measures the degree of price uncertainty by 
a generalised autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (GARCH) model. The Black-
Scholes’ (1973) pricing model is employed to explore the option premium of land value. 
Evidence is found in this chapter provides there are real options in China’s real estate markets. 
Uncertainty about future house prices of neighbouring regions drives up land prices in China. 
The results suggest that uncertainty about future house prices in neighbouring regions 
decreases investment activity in the current period; and uncertainty about future house prices 
in neighbouring regions increases land prices. Market house prices in neighbouring regions 
reflect a premium for optimal development. The likelihood of developing the land is lower in 
terms of the increase of one-standard-deviation. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
The purpose of this thesis is to explain the factors influencing the housing market in China 
from 2000 to 2015, including house characteristics, regional identities and economic 
fundamentals and how they impact on house price, geographic variation in house price and 
profits of housing investments.  
The thesis main objectives are provided in three folds. First to provide a quantitative analysis 
on house pricing, in particular to examine how house attributes, regional economic condition 
and regional identities affect house price, taking into account geographical interrelations, 
between 2002 and 2014 in Beijing, China. Second to extend current literature by 
investigating and formulating new factors that affect house prices in terms of demand and 
supply for housing, in the context of advanced spatial panel analysis techniques and real 
options methodology in Beijing and China from 2000 to 2015. Third to examine and extend 
real option methodology, by developing models that examine the mechanisms and compute 
the factors that affect real option premium in the above mentioned, integrated, context. 
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 1.1 reviews the background, 
highlights the research problems, hence, the need and motivation of this thesis. Section 1.2 
presents the main research questions. Methodologies implemented is presented in Section 1.3. 
Section 1.4 summarises the findings and contributions of each chapter. Then, Section 1.5 
concludes by the overall structure of the thesis. 
 
1.1 Research Background and Motivation 
The housing market has been involved in a significant transformation on real estate model 
over the past forty years in China. China’s house prices were increasing rapidly from ¥503 in 
1988 to ¥6,793 in 2015. The house prices of Tier 1 cities (i.e. Beijing, Shanghai, Shenzhen 
and Guangzhou) were continually rising, even though after the implementing of housing 
policies1 (e.g. implements regulations of housing construction and house structures), and 
monetary policies2 (e.g. controlled banks with real estate development loans, land loans, loan 
payments and personal housing loans), which proposing to curb the irrational increasing 
                                                          
1 See housing policies (“217th policy” in 2001, “8th policy” in 2004 and “6th policy” in 2006) in Chapter 2.2.1. 
2 See monetary policies (“121st policy” in 2003, “18th policy” in 2004, “Notice on Strengthening Commercial 
Real Estate Credit Management” in 2007 and “10th policy” in 2010) in Chapter 2.1.1. 
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house prices. Accordingly, the sustaining increase of house prices in China, especially in Tier 
1 cities, provide the opportunities for the real estate investors with irrational speculation. 
While the rapidly increasing house prices may raise a number of concerns on the unbalanced 
relationship between the demand for houses and that of supply and the risk of the implication 
of housing bubbles (Black et al., 2006; Chang et al., 2008; Cheng et al., 2014; Himmelberg et 
al., 2005; Hui and Yue, 2006; Smith and Smith, 2006). 
There are concerns that the transformation of the Chinese real estate model has increased 
motivation for rapid increasing house prices in China, especially in Tier 1 cities since 1998 
(Gan et al. 2010). The housing privatisation stimulates the household’s housing consumption 
and then increases equilibrium housing demand in China (Wang, 2011). Regarding the 
diversifications from housing allocation system, the Chinese citizens were required to 
purchase housing on the market at the family. This situation unleashed a flood of private 
housing demand and prompted a significant increase in the cost of commodity residential 
housing in China (Chen et al., 2012). The house attribute can be regarded as the house 
characteristics, which has the implicit value (Rosen, 1974). It is evident that house 
characteristics importance of house price has attracted attention from researchers (Bajari et al., 
2012; Jim and Chen, 2009; Malpezzi, 2002; Rosen, 1974; Wong et al., 2005). Rosen (1974), 
who factor consumer behaviour into a hedonic regression, establishes the relationship 
between the product’s price and its attributes.3 In practice, the regression coefficients are 
generally regarded as implicit or “hedonic” prices (Bajari et al., 2010). The implicit price can 
be described as the additional value of a product when individual attributes are increased 
while all other attributes remain fixed. For instance, in China’s land market, the land with 
water facility is more expensive than that of without water facility, when the other attributes 
remain the same, such as size and other facilities. This is because the land with water facility 
has a particular attribute, which is the additional value of this land. Rosen (1974) established 
the hedonic regression to provide the house price based on utility-maximising behaviour. The 
estimate of implicit prices proposes that the consumer’s willingness to pay for a small 
alteration in a particular attribute is marginal. Moreover, “these implicit prices can be used to 
recover marginal willingness to pay functions for use in valuing larger changes in attributes” 
(Bajari et al., 2010).  
                                                          
3 For studies investigating hedonic regressions, see, for instance, Rosen (1974); Bajari et al. (2012); Carrillo et al. 
(2014). 
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As previously discussed above, the house characteristics have to be provided as much 
detailed as possible in order to accurately estimate the implicit values of the house. However, 
it is uncertain whether there are ‘omitted variables’ leading to biased estimates of the implicit 
prices. When applied to real data, several ‘omitted house characteristics variables’ seem to be 
significant in the theoretical models. Jim and Chen (2009) suggested that daylight and views 
from houses are significant factors affecting house prices. The previous studies ignore the 
condition of the room, which also can be the endogenous variables of house prices. This 
investigation tests these endogenous variables through the numbers of rooms with 
orientations, including room conditions that proxy daylight and natural ventilation in order to 
contribute the previous studies in term of introducing new flat-related factors that affect 
house prices. 
Collectively, given the fixed-hold attributes of houses, the house price is variationally in 
terms of the external influences such as the supply of housing. Review the housing policies 
from China’s government, which attempts to regulate housing construction and house 
structures to adjust the supply of house and indirectly restrict the rapid increasing house price. 
The market response to these policies was negative for Beijing. Therefore, it is crucial to 
figure out the reasons why these policies are ineffective. 
House had been regarded as a primary source of investment for individuals in China, which 
allows the investors to achieve potential profit with speculative and alternative incomes. In 
2017, housing sales achieved 13.37 trillion RMB accounting for 16.4% of China’s GDP (Liu 
and Xiong, 2018). This situation provides maximum stimulation to encourage investors to 
make a decision on their own deal. An individual property transaction is dominated by what 
the investor believes will happen to the market in the future without regard to any possible 
distortions (Cheng et al., 2014). Regarding the theory of ‘distortions beliefs’, the investors 
ignored the risk of low demand, referred to income, may have fostered the financial 
circumstances that enabled property prices to rise alongside credit expansion, and 
subsequently spark the crisis (Gennaioli et al., 2013). Though the theory of ‘distortions 
beliefs’ illustrates the irrational increase of China’s house prices, another reason of irrational 
increase of house prices can be also attributed to Naylor (1967), who illustrates that the fiscal 
policy influences the housing demand indirectly. The increasing tax rates reduce the 
aggregate demand for GDP; subsequently, the changes in aggregate demand for GDP will 
indirectly influence housing demand by the diversities of intermediate economic factors, such 
as income, employment and prices (Naylor, 1967). In other words, the endogenous variables 
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for housing demand influence house prices directly. Naylor (1967) also provides that an 
increase of investment in fixed assets will lead to a rise in GDP so that increase the prices of 
goods. 
To date, there is a substantial literature on the influencing economic factors to house prices in 
China and foreign countries, for instance, income (Capozza et al., 2004; Chen and Patel, 1998; 
Hui and Gu, 2009; Milne, 1991; Riddel, 2011; Shen and Liu, 2004, Zhang and Yi, 2017), 
mortgage payments (Kohn and Bryant, 2010; Lee, 1997; Li and Chand, 2013; Mints, 2007, 
2008; Yu, 2010), inflation (Gan et al., 2012; Horioka and Wan, 2007; Irving, 1911), fiscal 
policy (Feltenstein and Farhadian, 1987; Naylor, 1967; Taylor, 2000), housing starts (Maisel, 
1963). Regarding the rapid development of economy in China, it is suggested that the 
accurate measurement of house prices is essential to monitor economic fundamentals (Hui 
and Gu, 2009; Li et al., 2018; Li and Chand, 2013; Shen and Liu, 2004; Yu, 2010) and 
investment behaviour (Huang and Yin, 2015; Wong et al., 2005; Zhang and Yi, 2017). While 
the endogenous variables of housing demand are not mentioned in the previous studies. The 
method of defining the housing demand is not unique. In this investigation, the housing 
demand is identified by housing starts multiple floor level of the house. The housing starts is 
a potential standard which decides the final housing demand in terms of ‘a theory of 
fluctuation in residential construction starts’ (Maisel, 1963). Whereas the housing starts is the 
size of building permission, the investigation improved the housing demand factor in terms of 
relating to floor level, which makes housing demand into underlying units. Findings of this 
investigation suggests there is an inverse U-shape relationship between housing demand and 
house prices, which is consistent with the theory of ‘conventional wisdom’ (Galbraith, 1958). 
This research also tests the endogenous economic fundamentals for house price in order to 
explore the economic variables influencing house price indirectly. This research regards the 
housing demand and mortgage payment rates as endogenous variables referred to the 
previous studies and China’s government monetary policies. To do this, the previous model is 
improved by taken account into instrumental variables. 
There is a possible reason for the rapid increasing house price in Tier 1 of China which is 
spill-over effects. Chow et al. (2016) investigate house price convergence in 34 Chinese cities. 
They apply convergence model with contemporaneous spatial dependence in house prices 
and find that price convergence and positive spatial spill-over are both present. The spill-over 
narrows the gaps between the growth paths of house prices in neighbouring cities. Zhang et al. 
(2015) examine the house price spill-over effect with capital cities of Yangtze River Delta 
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Economic Zone in China. Shanghai, Hangzhou, Nanjing, Hefei’s house prices index is tested 
over the period 2001-2014. They find the house price spill-overs in the Yangtze River Delta 
Economic Zone because of high market integration, but the direction and speed of spill-over 
are different. The spill-over effects are also the essential influencing factors for the foreign 
countries. Holly et al. (2011) find that the dynamic spill-over affects house prices in the 
neighbouring areas. Van Dijk et al. (2011) examined two groups of regions in the Netherlands 
and found that house prices within the same group had the same dynamics across time, while 
the dynamics were different across different groups. The spatial heterogeneity which exists is 
based on the different demand and supply of house price across clusters (Dieleman et al., 
2000). Abate (2017) indicated a rising spatial correlation in house prices and income in the 
USA during the period in question. The evidence indicate that house price has geographical 
variation. The house price could be influenced by interactions with the neighbouring regions. 
The changes in population and information asymmetries cause the ripple effects of house 
prices (Pijnenburg, 2017). The increasing demand that occurs as a result of migration to 
regions where house prices are comparably low results in an increase in house prices. The 
spatial dependence is caused by information asymmetries suggested that new information 
referred to the housing market in one area is transported gradually to other submarkets (Meen, 
1999). Wood (2003) provided that spatial heterogeneity is caused based on the speed of 
responses of national economic shocks in one region, where the housing market is more 
liquid and where new information affects house prices more rapidly than in the neighbouring 
regions. Meen (1999) argues that heterogeneity arises because of variations in household 
behaviours and household compositions. While the Chinese housing market is significantly 
different from the other countries’ housing market in terms of the development levels. Thus, 
the spatial autoregressive and spatial error component are essential to be investigated in 
understanding the spatial spill-overs of house prices in China. 
Burgess (1925) argued that ‘the ideal construction of the tendencies of any town or city to 
expand radially from its central business district (CBD), which is encircling the downtown 
area’. A third area is dwellings for the workers in industries who desire to live within easy 
access of their work with good house conditions. ‘Residential area’ of high-class apartment 
buildings is constructed belonging to this zone. However, Alonso (1964) considers that the 
increasing population and old residential property limited the implementation of this theory in 
the real world. Hoyt (1939) provided that ‘the pattern of residential location could be 
explained in terms of sectors’. As the population increased, there is enough space to live in 
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this area. However, the people worked in CBD represent the highest income group. There are 
no houses above them abandoned by another group. These customers must build new houses 
on vacant land in the other area, which causes the movement of the high-rent area. 
Richardson (1971) describes a trade-off theory, which ‘assumes household find its optimal 
location relative to the centre of the city by trading off travel costs’.  This theory denotes that 
through increasing the distance from city centre, the rent of houses or the house costs would 
be declined. The household through maximising the utility of house location balances the 
costs of the house and satisfies more space for living (Richardson, 1971). 
The evidence has increased motivation for investigating the spatial analysis of house prices in 
Tier 1 cities of China. Because Tier 1 cities have more CBDs which have the higher house 
prices than that of surroundings based on Burgess (1925). The interactions of house price in 
CBD and surroundings will encourage the continued increases in house prices. However, the 
previous studies did not provide the degree of second-order or higher-order neighbouring 
effects. This investigation finds that house prices in one district and the surrounding districts 
exist the significance of spatial autocorrelation in Beijing. The results reveal strong house 
price spill-overs when the increase in house price, size of building started, average wage, 
income, tax, and a population of the neighbouring regions is taken into account. This 
investigation overcomes the previous studies in terms of providing the partitioning spill-over 
effects on house prices based on the regional information asymmetries. In the findings, the 
significance of the partitioned spill-over effects on urban population and GDP are in the 
second-order surrounding regions. This result is consistent with and contributed to the ‘sector 
theory’ (Hoyt, 1939), which the differences in household income cause the changes of 
residential location and house prices. Thus, it is valuable information for the regulators of real 
estate market. Because the appropriate distribution of submarket of CBD reduces the degree 
of income differences, so that decreases the geographical house price variation. 
Reviewed the previous policies and studies (Pindyck, 1991; Razak et al., 2018), which are 
analysing the past events in the housing market, the future performance of housing market 
and the forecasting profits for the investors motivated this thesis to explore. According to 
classical economic theory, it is recommended to make an investment when the net present 
value is positive. However, the previous scholars (McDonald and Siegel, 1986; Titman, 1985) 
proposed in their theoretical work, that if the future is unclear and investments cannot be 
reversed, the ability to change to alternative investments at a future date has economic value. 
This is referred to as a “real option”. According to Myers (1977), real options are the right for 
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the investor to buy or sell a physical asset after they have purchased that asset. In the same 
way that a financial option allows a person to purchase a security at a predetermined price at 
some point in the future, real options permit future investment, dependent on new 
information. This suggests that real options should increase the value of assets and slow 
down or postpone investment. It is recommended to estimate the use of real options in the 
real estate market. The land on which a house or other property is built is valued as an option, 
while the underlying or primary asset is the building itself. There is considerable evidence, as 
well as developments in modified models, to support the application of real options in 
evaluating real estate markets (Chiang et al., 2006; Grovenstein et al., 2011; Tsekrekos and 
Kanoutos, 2013; Razak et al., 2018).  
Whether the application of real options is appropriate for China’s real estate market has been 
suggested by the previous studies (Huang and Rong, 2017; Hui and Fung, 2009; Li et al., 
2014; Shi et al., 2015; Tang and Wang, 2017; Wang et al., 2016; Zeng and Zhang, 2011).The 
uncertainties of various control policies, most of which are administrative and quite volatile, 
are always affecting China’s real estate market between 2005 and 2011; and found a one-
standard-deviation increase in the volatility of M2 change rate and interest rate lowers the 
likelihood of land development by 13.39 % and 16.51 % (Wang et al., 2016). The incomplete 
information is a real estate market characteristic in China’s real estate market, and it 
influences the development of land in the urban city from 2002 to 2010 (Tang and Wang, 
2017). The factors influencing the public rental housing fraud are analysed in the real estate 
market in China (Zeng et al., 2017). The uncertainty of apartments’ physical attributes, firms’ 
financial position and other economic conditions influencing apartment price is analysed by 
Shi et al. (2015). The uncertainty of the real estate market in China should be explained in an 
appropriate method based on China’s real estate market characteristics. However, the 
previous studies on real options of real estate markets focused on the uncertainty of future 
house prices are applied by OLS estimator, which does not consider the effects of 
neighbouring regional influences (Cunningham, 2006; Quigg, 1993; Titman, 1985). This 
investigation overcomes the previous studies in terms of the methodology implemented. In 
this research, the effects of price uncertainty on neighbouring regions are considered by the 
spatial model. The method of this investigation employs to accomplish this is the spatial 
Durbin model, making this the first time that real option forecast has been tested in a spatial 
context. Spatial analysis improves the accuracy of predicting the value of house prices and 
considers the surrounding regions’ house prices and their effects on the house prices of a 
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particular region (Muss et al., 2017). The SDM model includes spatial fixed measures, time 
fixed measures, and spatial and time fixed measures of anticipated future prices and price 
uncertainty. This approach provides a basis for testing the main expectations of real options 
with regard to land development: namely, that neighbouring house price uncertainty should 
delay building activities and increase the value of vacant land. This context appropriately 
solves the agency problem based on investment timing (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). When 
the shareholder and agents capture the information of surroundings at the same time and plan 
the investment of options, the information asymmetric and timing of investment are solved in 
order to establish an optimal capital structure and maximise the shareholder’s value. 
 
1.2 Research Questions 
The main purpose of the first empirical chapter is to evaluate the determinants of property 
price with house characteristics and economic fundamentals in seven districts of Beijing, 
China between 2002 and 2014. This investigation has three main objectives. First to provide a 
quantitative analysis of house transactions to examine whether the house characteristics and 
economic fundamentals influence the house prices significantly. Second to investigate 
whether there are ‘omitted variables’ that lead to biased estimates of the implicit house prices. 
Third to explore whether endogenous economic fundamentals and house characteristics 
variables are leading to biased estimates of house prices. In doing so, this chapter overcomes 
the omitted variables of house characteristics, leading to biased estimates of the implicit 
house price, compared with the previous studies (Rosen, 1974; Bajari et al., 2010). The 
endogenous economic fundamentals, which are leading to incorrect biased estimates of 
coefficients and result in an inefficient model, are tested, based on the ‘quantity theory of 
money’ (Irving, 1911), the theory of ‘conventional wisdom’ (Galbraith, 1958), ‘a theory of 
fluctuation in residential construction starts’ (Maisel, 1963), and consumer behaviour on 
house price (Rosen, 1974). 
This second empirical chapter investigates the spatial statistics of house prices in Beijing 
from 2003 to 2013. It examines whether house prices in one region are affected by house 
prices in neighbouring regions. It also analyses how house prices in one region are affected 
by unknown characteristics of the neighbouring regions. Research exploring the spatial 
analysis of house prices can be divided into two areas. First, the spatial autoregressive model 
can assess the value of houses. Second, the regression approaches with geographical weights 
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can analyse the spatial heterogeneity. When examining regional data with house price, the 
two specific spatial aspects need to be considered, namely spatial dependence and spatial 
heterogeneity (Anselin, 1988).4 The transportation of the house prices across space is the 
spatial dependence, and the difference of house prices in the dynamics is called spatial 
heterogeneity (Pijnenburg, 2017).5 Chapter 5 considers this spatial dependence is referring to 
the information asymmetries which cause the spatial spill-overs of house prices. It explores 
whether the explanatory factors of house prices in one region are affected by explanatory 
factors of house prices in neighbouring regions. In addition, this chapter investigates the spill-
over effects of explanatory factors on house prices. This investigation evaluates this not only 
by different regional economic factors but also with respect to the intensity of spill-overs in 
order to assess the range of spill-overs, which examines the partitioning of direct effect and 
indirect effect from the impacts of the neighbouring factors on house prices. This research 
aims to overcome the shortcomings of the previous studies by extending the range of 
examining spatial models, providing reasonable spatial model selection procedures, and 
employing improved spatial weights to analyse spill-over effects of explanatory factors. 
This third empirical chapter investigates real options with the spatial analysis in China’s real 
estate markets. This investigation extends the real options method with the Spatial Durbin 
Model (SDM), making this the first study in which real option forecast have been assessed in 
a spatial case. In contrast, Chapter 6 does not rely on micro-data but instead employs new 
detailed macro-level datasets for 31 provinces in China between 2000 and 2015. This is 
because of the determinants of house prices, such as neighbouring house price effects and 
neighbouring unobserved characteristics. Previous studies on real options of real estate 
markets focused on the uncertainty of future house prices are applied by OLS estimator, 
which does not consider the effects of neighbouring regional influences (Cunningham, 2006; 
Quigg, 1993; Titman, 1985).  Chapter 6 considers the underlying asset of land as well as 
neighbouring house prices, neighbouring unobserved characteristics and economic conditions. 
This investigation evaluates this by real options in a spatial manner, which improves the 
accuracy of predicting the value of house prices and considers the neighbouring regions 
house prices. It measures the degree of price uncertainty by a generalised autoregressive 
conditional heteroskedasticity (GARCH) model. The Black-Scholes’ (1973) pricing model is 
employed to explore the option premium of land value. This chapter investigates whether the 
                                                          
4 For studies investigating spatial analysis, see, for instance, Anselin (1988); Anselin et al. (2003); Anselin et al. 
(2008). 
5 See Pijnenburg (2017) for spatial analysis of US house prices. 
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uncertainty about future house prices in neighbouring regions influence investment activity in 
the current period. It also examines whether the uncertainty about future house prices in 
neighbouring regions influence land prices. This research explores whether the market house 
prices in neighbouring regions reflect a premium for optimal development in terms of the 
likelihood of developing the land. 
 
1.3 Research Methodologies 
This thesis deals with numerous topics in the field of real estate markets. The investigation 
undertakes within this thesis a wide variety of econometric methodologies, such as the 
optimal method of determinants influencing house prices, the need to capture house price 
spill-overs, and the uncertainty of house price on real options.  
The literature with regard to analysing the determinants of house prices has employed a wide 
range of statistical estimators and tests. The estimator is illustrated by OLS regression 
technique as implemented by (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009). The Breusch-Pagan test is 
employed to explore the existence of homoscedasticity or heteroscedasticity in the OLS 
estimator. The Breusch-Godfrey LM test explores whether there are conditionally 
uncorrelated observations or not. This investigation also applies panel data regression with 
fixed effects and random effects. Panel data analysis is conducted by taking account of group 
effects and time effects. Based on the implementation of the Hausman Test, the appropriate 
model (i.e. fixed effects or random effects) are selected. The Wooldridge test is applied to test 
the conditionally uncorrelated observations in the panel models. The heteroscedasticity test 
(likelihood-ratio test) is implemented in terms of testing the conditional homoscedasticity in 
the panel models. The Friedman test aims to explore the cross-sectional correlation. Given 
the nature of this research, least squares estimation methods generate biased and inconsistent 
estimates (Baltagi, 2001). To address this concern, this investigation implements the 
generalised method of moments (GMM) method, which accounts for endogeneity by using 
alternative independent variables that are suspected to suffer from endogeneity. Baltagi (2001) 
argued that employing the values of the other variable regressors as instruments can increase 
consistency and efficiency of the model. The IV-GMM method restricts unobserved 
heterogeneity and limited the consistency of the dependent variable. The Hausman tests are 
applicated to explore the presence of endogenous variables. The Sargan test of the 
instrumental variables is implemented to illustrate whether the instrumental variables are 
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relative to the error of regression. The first-stage test of GMM aims to test whether the 
instrumental variables are relative to endogenous variables. These econometric techniques are 
appropriate to achieve the investigation of the determinants of house prices. 
The second empirical chapter investigates the spatial statistics of house prices in Beijing. To 
address this, the research incorporates various methodologies to capture house price spill-
overs. The creating of the spatial matrix is applicated in terms of the identifying the 
neighbours of regions with specific contiguity. The spatial autocorrelation tests are 
implemented with Global Moran’s I in order to confirm the spatial dependence. Through the 
Lagrange Multiplier diagnostics (LM tests) and robust LM tests, the type of spatial 
dependence (i.e. spatial error or spatial lag) is explored. Regarding the type of spatial 
dependence, the appropriate spatial model is recognised, including spatial autoregressive 
model (SAR), spatial Durbin model (SDM), spatial autoregressive model with autoregressive 
disturbances (SAC) and spatial error model (SEM).6 In the panel models, Hausman test, 
Breusch-Godfrey LM test, Breusch-Pagan test are implemented, which is similar to the 
investigation of the determinants of house prices. This investigation applies Wooldridge LM 
test and Breusch-Pagan test in the spatial model in order to explore the presence the 
autocorrelation and homoscedasticity respectively. Moreover, this research implements the 
partitioning spill-over effects techniques, which is advanced in the area of spatial analysis. 
LeSage and Pace (2010) provide that the empirical results of spatial models are analysed by 
direct effects, indirect (spill-over) effects and total effects in the further research. The reason 
is due to “the change in a single observation (region) associated with any given explanatory 
variable will affect the region itself (a direct impact) and potentially affect all other regions 
indirectly”. This chapter also applies the statistic of the likelihood ratio test the best fit 
models for testing spill-over effects (Klugman, Panjer and Willmot, 2012). 
The final empirical chapter investigates real options with the spatial analysis in China’s real 
estate markets. The Black-Scholes’ (1973) pricing model is employed to explore the option 
premium of land value. The spatial Durbin model (SDM) is implemented in terms of 
forecasting the future house prices in this area, comprehensively the neighbouring 
information and the neighbouring house prices, which improved the accuracy of forecasted 
house prices. This investigation measures the degree of price uncertainty by a generalised 
autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (GARCH) model. The future price uncertainty 
                                                          
6 See Figure 3.3 for process of choosing spatial models. 
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suggests that developers’ confidence in their predicted price forecast depends on the 
availability of forecast prices in the recent past (Cunningham, 2006). Combining the GARCH 
model and real options approaches, the investigation employs variance of GARCH model as 
house price volatility in the real options approaches.  
 
1.4 Summary of Findings and Contributions 
This thesis deals with numerous topics in the field of real estate markets. It addresses various 
models of house prices to analyse issues such as the optimal method of determinants 
influencing house prices, the need to capture house price spill-overs, and the uncertainty of 
house price on real options. Following is a detailed description of each chapter. 
 
1.4.1 Findings and Contributions of Chapter 4 
Chpater 4 evaluates the determinants of property price with house characteristics and 
economic fundamentals in seven districts of Beijing, China between 2002 and 2014. The 
findings confirm that economic factors have influenced the property price based on the 
economic theories (Cheng et al., 2014; Maisel, 1963). The mortgage down payment rates 
influence house prices negatively and significantly referring to economic fundamentals which 
is in line with Yu (2010) and Li and Chand (2013). This result implies that the policy of 
mortgage down payments is efficient to restrain the rapid growth of house prices. When the 
housing market investors persistent in buying houses, ignoring the high degree of mortgage 
payment rates, the demand for houses contains at a high level encouraging the house price to 
increase in terms of the speculation. When the supply exceeds the demands, the house prices 
remain high level would cause housing bubbles; which is consistent with finding of Cheng et 
al. (2014) in terms of ‘distortions beliefs’. The findings also provide that the increasing 
average income rise property prices. This finding is in line with Hui and Gu (2009) and Shen 
and Liu (2004). It implies there is a higher possibility of housing bubbles with more 
speculative investors, who have more salaries. This investigation finds there is an inverse U-
shape relationship between housing demand (housing starts*floor level) and house prices. 
This is similar to Li et al. (2018), which means the higher housing starts, the higher demand 
on houses so that increases the house prices in Beijing. However, this investigation suggests 
house price increases when the demand is lower than supply, and the excess supply of houses 
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decreases the prices. This shows consistent finding with Maisel (1963) in terms of ‘a theory 
of fluctuation in residential construction starts’. The property characteristics have influenced 
the property price significantly, which indicates that consumer behaviour is an essential 
aspect of housing market (Rosen, 1979). Home size influences house price positively, which 
is in line with Fang et al. (2016) in terms of costs of China’s characterised consumer 
behaviour of households. It implies that the larger home size in China increases the demand 
for housing.  The higher floor level of houses, the higher prices. Whereas, in a tall building, 
the increasing prices from the lower floor level to the middle floor level; from the middle 
floor level to the upper floor level, the floor level influences house prices negatively. This 
result is similar to a previous study (Wong et al., 2005), which suggests the higher demand 
for middle floors. The number of bedrooms has a significant negative influence on property 
prices, which result is consistent with the find of Fahey (2016) in terms of privacy. The 
houses facing north and south is significant and positive for the prices. This is because houses 
facing north and south have better natural ventilation and more daylight, which improves the 
natural quality of a house and its energy efficiency. This result is never found in previous 
studies (Bajari et al., 2010; Huang and Yin, 2015; Rosen, 1974; Zhang and Yi, 2017).  
In terms of the endogenous effects on house price, the central bank interest rates, money 
supply, local government revenue, local government expenditure and total investment in 
fixed assets indirectly influence house price negatively, when the factor of mortgage payment 
rates is an endogenous variable. This is not in line with Taylor (2000) and Galbraith (1958). 
In the ‘conventional wisdom’ (Galbraith, 1958) the decreasing spends of government 
decrease the aggregate demand for GDP; subsequently, the decline of aggregate demand for 
GDP will decrease the price of goods. This may be because of China’s rapid economic 
growth. As the good condition of economic growth, the decreasing government spends 
cannot restrain the demand for investments in the housing market. The investment in fixed 
assets and the local government general budgetary revenue affects housing demand 
negatively and significantly, which is in line with the finding of Naylor (1967) and Galbraith 
(1958). This result implicates that the house price could be decreased through restrain 
investments and increase government revenue indirectly because investments and 
government revenue influence the demand for houses in Beijing. The investigation also finds 
that the more bedrooms that are facing southeast and southwest or that are facing southwest 
and northwest with higher floor level, the higher house price. The more living rooms that are 
facing west or east with higher floor level, the higher house price. This is because the house 
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facing south and west have more extended daylight, which increases the temperature of the 
room, so that increase the electrical efficiency. However, the bedrooms facing southwest, 
southeast or northwest not only keeps daylight but also reduces west sunburn and improves 
natural ventilation to improve sleeping context. The living room improves west sunburn 
increasing the whole house temperature so that increase house efficiency. Moreover, the 
higher floor level of houses, the more efficient daylight and natural ventilation. These results 
are in line with Zhang and Yi (2017), who find the house characteristics influences the house 
prices in Beijing. Thus, this investigation finds the more numbers of rooms with proper 
orientation, the better condition of the room is which has good daylight and better natural 
ventilation. These results implicate that the government illustrate the policies about relating 
house structure is efficient. 
This chapter overcomes the previous studies in terms of the introduction of new flat-related 
variables. Compared with the previous studies (Bajari et al., 2010; Huang and Yin, 2015; 
Rosen, 1974; Zhang and Yi, 2017), the flat-related factors, such as directions of house facing 
(orientation) and square of floor level, 𝐹𝑅2 , are never found. Without these factors, the 
implicit house price could be biased estimated. The essential finding of these new flat-related 
factors provides there is an inverse U-shape relationship between floor level and house prices. 
This investigation illustrated house orientation influences the condition of the bedroom and 
the condition of living room significantly and indirectly affects the house price in IV-GMM 
analyses, which improved the theoretical standpoint to understand the relationship between 
house characteristics and house prices. 
In addition to the above, previous economic research has considered the variable of house 
demand that was designed primarily to determine the house prices. Based on the economic 
theory of supply and demand, excessive demand encourages the investor to have more 
confidence in investing in the property so that this increases the house prices (Rosenthal et al., 
1991). Previous studies have found that the income elasticity of demand for housing is well 
below one (Carrillo et al., 2014; Glaeser et al., 2008; Hoyt and Rosenthal, 1990; Rosen, 1974; 
Rosenthal et al., 1991). In contrast, the present investigation applies housing starts multiple 
by floor level, 𝐻𝑃𝑃 ∗ 𝐹𝑅, as property demand. This is because to housing starts is a potential 
standard which decides the final housing demand (Maisel, 1963) in terms of ‘a theory of 
fluctuation in residential construction starts’. Moreover, this investigation employed the IV-
GMM model to test the endogeneity of housing supply for the property prices respected to 
the instrumental variables with investment in fixed assets and local governments general 
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budgetary revenue. This approach provides the determination of supply for houses be flexible 
with the economic conditions. 
In an attempt to fill the gaps from previous studies, this investigation extends previous 
research in terms of the data sample. This investigation examines an extended period (2002-
2014), which provides a sample with the advantage of 17,143 transacted property records 
with detailed information, from the Beijing core real estate area. This chapter linked 
transacted property records with property addresses to track the regional effects. 
The application of panel analysis (i.e. fixed effects and random effects) extends the current 
literature by taking into account endogeneity in the IV-GMM framework with instrumental 
variables. In this regard, this investigation conceptually resembles Bajari et al. (2012), who 
investigate property prices the role of air pollution with hedonic regression. Empirical testing 
of the aforementioned issues provides a valuable tool for regulators in the Beijing area, 
because, to the best of our knowledge, it is the first study of its kind that examines all the 
above; it can also be useful for regulators in other industries, such as banking and insurance. 
In this chapter, the assessment and remediation of house price will depend on the 
understanding of their influencing factors. 
 
1.4.2 Findings and Contributions of Chapter 5 
Chpater 5 finds that house prices in one district and the surrounding districts exists the 
significance of spatial autocorrelation. The results reveal strong house price spill-overs when 
the increase in house price, size of building started, average wage, income, tax, and a 
population of the neighbouring regions is taken into account. The evidence for the disposition 
effect is based on the below results. 
The house price spill-overs in Beijing area exist when there is an increase in the population of 
the neighbouring regions, significant upper house price spill-overs are detected in terms of 
increasing house prices in the neighbouring regions. This result is similar to Zhang et al. 
(2015) and Chow et al. (2016), which means the urban population influence house prices 
positively and significantly in Beijing. This finding is in line with Alonso (1964), who 
provides the population is a significant factor in the economic analysis, because the 
population changes the demand for the number of houses. In the theory of ‘the concentric 
zone’ (Burgess, 1925), the development of ideal construction of the city expands from its 
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CBD. The workers live near CBD aims to easy access to their work. Thus, the demand for 
house surrounding CBD is high, which causes the increase in house price. The findings of 
this analysis are also in line with Burgess’s theory (1925) that the distance from district to 
CBD influenced the house price significantly and negatively. This encourages the regulators 
of Beijing housing market to establish the rational distribution of fixed assets effectively 
deter the unstable house price variation referred to the population changes. 
The differences in household income cause changes in residential location and house prices 
based on the ‘sector theory’ (Hoyt, 1939). This result is in line with Shen and Liu (2004). The 
income significantly influences the house price in Beijing and changes the distribution of 
house prices. This investigation provides a similar result to Hoyt’s theory (1939), which the 
average wage of employees in the real estate market leads to an increase in house price. This 
finding is also in line with the theory of ‘the concentric zone’ (Burgess, 1925), which 
presents the high-income group ‘who have escaped from the area of deterioration’ changes 
the demand of residential location. This encourages the regulators of Beijing housing market 
to establish the subsidiary CBD in Beijing in order to arrange rational distribution of fixed 
assets. 
Evans (1973) found that there is an equilibrium relationship between the density and revenue 
of houses in ‘the theory of the supply of space’. Thus, even though there is enough space for 
construction, the irrational density of buildings leads to lower revenues of the house. Size of 
building starts, which instead of the supply of houses, influences house prices positively. This 
result is in line with Hanink et al. (2012) and Zhang et al. (2018) who provide house starts is 
a potential determination of new construction rate which reflects the supply of housing 
market in Beijing. However, the result is not very significant. The result is similar to Evans 
(1973), who suggests a rational space and density of constructions are significant to 
households. Thus, it encourages the regulators of Beijing housing market to control the 
building permits and continue updating the policy of construction so that rationally monitor 
the supply of houses. 
The research found the taxes and other charges on principal business of enterprises for real 
estate development lead to an increase in house price significantly. This result is similar to 
the previous studies (Li and Chand, 2013; Liu, 2013), which means the taxes and other 
charges on principal business of enterprises for real estate development influence house 
prices negatively and significantly in Beijing. Based on the trade-off theory (Evans, 1973), 
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the maximum utility of the household is the objective of the choice of location. The 
increasing tax added the costs of construction, and then the developers will increase the house 
selling price so that balance the costs. When the household considers the house price, they 
will change the location of living so that the patterns of residential location changes. Thus, it 
encourages the regulators of Beijing housing market to control the tax rates, so that have a 
rational distribution of constructions. 
The results of partitioning analyses are appropriately explaining the effects of surroundings, 
which can approach the utilities. Because of loss aversion, homeowners who intend to sell 
their properties will not lower their asking price, even when they see house prices declining 
in neighbouring regions. Loss aversion reduces the number of transactions in the housing 
market and, reduces the amount of house price spill-over. Results of this study are similar to 
previous findings (Genesove and Mayer, 2001; Engelhardt, 2003; Anenberg, 2011) with 
regards to loss aversion in the housing market. This result is also in line with the Yang et al. 
(2015), who show that the results of significant levels of the partitioned indirect effects in the 
second order are higher than those of the other order neighbours, which are referred to in the 
complicated estimation process in spatial Durbin dodel. Thus, it is suggested that the 
regulators of Beijing housing market should monitor the economic factors and population in 
the different order regions in order to adjust the house prices. 
The evidence is found for spatial dependence of house prices: house prices in one region are 
influenced by the house prices in neighbouring regions, positively and significantly in Beijing. 
The evidence is found for spatial heterogeneity of house prices across space: house price 
spill-over is greater in neighbouring regions when neighbouring house prices are increasing 
than when neighbouring house prices are declining. The evidence is found for spatial spill-
over effects of explanatory factors: increases of the average wage, income, tax, urban 
population and house price of last year increase the house price positively in neighbouring 
regions; a decrease of unemployment drives down the house prices in neighbouring regions. 
These factors have spill-over effects across space. 
From the theoretical standpoint, these findings are likely to contribute to the theory of “the 
concentric zone’ Burgess (1925) that the information will expand radially from its central 
place or the city leading to information asymmetries in the surroundings. Consistent with this 
view, the findings reveal that the house prices in Beijing have a geographical variation and 
expand radially from CBD. This encourages the city planner of Beijing to simulate the 
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regulation of the United States, which predicts the future pattern of land use in order to 
decide the optimal distribution of fixed assets investments. The rational distribution of fixed 
assets effectively averse the unstable house price variation referred to the information 
asymmetries.  
This investigation is the first study to provide the partitioning spill-over effects on house 
prices based on the regional information asymmetries. In the findings, the significance of the 
partitioned spill-over effects on urban population and GDP are in the second-order 
surrounding regions. This result is consistent with and contributed to the ‘sector theory’ 
(Hoyt, 1939), which the differences in household income cause the changes of residential 
location and house prices. Thus, it is valuable information for the regulators of real estate 
market. Because the appropriate distribution of submarket of CBD reduces the degree of 
income differences, so that decreases the geographical house price variation. 
This chapter extends previous research in terms of the data sample and independent variables 
used, and by combining methods used in economics and geography. In particular, this 
investigation examines 15 regions of Beijing over an extended period (2002-2014). It 
contains detailed information, building on and extending the work of Bhattacharjee et al. 
(2016), who analysed spatial heterogeneity and endogenous spatial dependence in Portugal. 
Regional house price records are linked with the coordinates of regions to track the spatial 
heterogeneity of house prices, and the region-related factors are employed in Beijing. Most of 
the previous empirical studies that combined geographic factors focused on the area of 
environment, health outcome, crimes and policy analyses (Gelfand, 2014; Hund et al., 2015; 
Neelon and; Seliske et al., 2016; Terán-Hernández et al., 2016). These factors can be 
extended by our method with spatial partitioning, which can analyse the intensity of spill-
over effects of explanatory factors. 
 
1.4.3 Findings and Contributions of Chapter 6 
Chapter 6 investigates real options with the spatial analysis in China’s real estate markets. 
The findings suggest that it is more appropriate to employ a spatial model rather than a non-
spatial model in forecasting the underlying assets based on the Lagrange Multiplier (LM) 
tests. The results illustrate that neighbouring house prices affected house prices in this region, 
supporting the idea that house price has a ripple effect (Pijnenburg, 2017). Similar empirical 
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results were obtained by Farlow (2004), who found that house prices were higher in cities 
with increased income and lower CPI and unemployment rates. In the spatial Durbin model 
(SDM) analysis of underlying house price, this study found an increase in income equivalent 
of 1% is associated with a 41.2% rise in house prices. This result is in line with Tang and 
Wang (2017), who suggest income increases the house price in China. Moreover, the 
unemployment rate and CPI is negatively correlated with house prices. Similar empirical 
results were obtained by Harris et al. (2013) and Farlow (2004), who found that house prices 
were higher in cities with increased income and lower CPI and unemployment rates in China. 
On the other hand, the spatial fixed model is the first time applied in the following analysis 
(real options). Thus, there is no previous studies’ results. The results of implied volatility 
analysis provide that house price in China has ARCH effects. This result is in line with Wang 
et al. (2016), who found ARCH effects for house prices in Hangzhou housing market, China. 
It is also similar to the study of Cunningham (2006), who found ARCH effects for house 
prices in Seattle. Based on the results, the standard deviation of residential housing market in 
China ranges from 2.14% to 23.49%, depending on the time series of house prices. This 
result is in line with Wang et al. (2016), who provide a one-standard-deviation residential 
housing market in Hangzhou ranges from 13.39 % and 16.51 %. Referred to the results of 
uncertainty and timing of land development, it is found that uncertainty delayed land 
development, as the coefficient of uncertainty was negative (-1.101). This result is in line 
with Tang and Wang (2017), who suggest the rising housing demand is accompanied by 
developers' strategic delay of land development in China. It provides the uncertainty of future 
information delay the land development in China based on land flexibility. The results also 
provide the similar results to Wang et al. (2016), who found the uncertainty delay the land 
development by 42% in Hangzhou, China. Based on the analyses, the results provide that the 
uncertainty affected land value by 1.82% significantly and positively. The unemployment 
rate influences the land value by 40.2%, significantly and negatively. These results are in line 
with Tang and Wang (2017) and Shi et al. (2015), who suggest the uncertainty increases the 
land value. 
Market prices indicate a premium for optimal development of land, which according to our 
estimates has a mean of 16.28% of the land value. A one-standard-deviation increase in 
uncertainty reduces the likelihood of development by 1.101%. These results differ from those 
of previous studies. Wang et al. (2016) found the real-option premium 9.76% in housing 
market in Hangzhou, China. Yao and Pretorius (2004) found the real-option premium 11.75% 
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in housing market in Hongkong, China. Quigg (1993) found a real-option premium of 6% on 
undeveloped land that is relative to the deterministic price. Cunningham (2006) posited a 
one-standard-deviation increase in the vacant land price of 1.6% in Seattle. This research also 
estimates that standard deviation of real estate asset values in China ranges from 2.14% to 
23.49%, which relies on the time series of property prices. Wang et al. (2016) provide a one-
standard-deviation residential housing market ranges from 13.39 % and 16.51 % in Hangzhou, 
China. 
This context appropriately solves the agency problem based on investment timing (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976). When the shareholder and agents capture the information of 
surroundings at the same time and plan the investment of options, the information 
asymmetric and timing of investment are solved in order to establish an optimal capital 
structure and maximise the shareholder’s value. Regarding the evaluation of land price, the 
increasing one-standard-deviation in price uncertainty raises the land price. If there is a 
greater level of price uncertainty according to the economic information, then the vacant land 
will be traded at a premium above discounted future rents in current low capital use. 
The results of this study suggest that investors in China’s real estate do take note of real 
options, even in sectors such as new home construction that is highly competitive and 
economically important. That real options are present in land markets is further evidence for 
the need to include real options in capital investment models. Real options have wider 
implications concerning the importance of price stability and the need for consistent 
government policy to stimulate fixed investment. 
Most research in this area has focused on the house price uncertainty in a panel dataset. This 
approach provides a basis for testing the main expectations of real options with regard to land 
development: namely, that neighbouring house price uncertainty should delay building 
activities and increase the value of vacant land. This investigation extends the real options 
method with the spatial Durbin model (SDM), making this the first study in which real option 
forecast have been assessed in a spatial case. The evidence of this research links spatial 
analysis and GARCH analysis, which adds to the overall understanding of house price 
uncertainty. This investigation overcomes the prior studies by extended sample with three 
datasets have been assembled for this investigation: house price files, land price files and GIS 
files for each location. When they are combined, these records produce a data set of 496 
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average house prices and average land prices in 31 provinces of China, for the period 2000 to 
2015. 
Rather than extracting expectations from subsequently reported advantages, this investigation 
uses the Black-Scholes’ (1973) pricing model to explore the option premium of land value, 
which concerns current stock price, time until option exercise, option striking price, risk-free 
interest rates and standard deviation. For the conception of real options, the analyses 
considered market land value as current stock price, future house price as option striking 
price, and house price volatility as standard deviation (Quigg, 1993) in order to determine the 
land option premium. 
 
1.5 Overall Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis is organised by one chapter of literature review, one chapter of the Chinese 
housing market background, three empirical investigations and one chapter of conclusion. 
Detailed structure is as follows: 
Chapter 2 critically reviews the previous studies related to spatial analysis and real options in 
the housing market. 
Chapter 3 presents the development of the Chinese housing market from 1978 to 2015.  
Chapter 4 introduces the first empirical investigation “An Empirical Analysis of the Effect of 
Housing Characteristics on Property Price in Beijing”. This chapter is structured by the 
introduction, theoretical framework, the hypotheses, methodology and data, empirical 
findings and conclusion. 
Chapter 5 presents the second empirical investigation “The Spatial Analysis and Spill-Over 
Effects of House Price in Beijing”. This chapter is structured by the introduction, theoretical 
framework, the hypotheses, methodology and data, empirical findings and conclusion. 
Chapter 6 discusses the third empirical investigation “The uncertainty of house prices and 
real options in China”. This chapter is structured by the introduction, theoretical framework, 
the hypotheses, the model, robustness of findings and conclusion. 
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Chapter 7 reviews the empirical chapter. It summarises the main findings of three empirical 
investigations and general conclusion for the thesis. It also offers a further path in this line of 
research.  
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Chapter 2 Literature Review 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The objectives of this chapter are to examine the spatial effects on Chinese house prices and 
to motivate the models of real options that will be employed in this thesis. Section 2.2 
reviews the spatial characteristics of house prices in China. In particularly, Section 2.3 
highlights the spatial econometrics in house prices with univariate models (Section 2.3.1) and 
multivariate models (Section 2.3.2) of spatial effects on house prices. Section 2.4 includes a 
summary review of spatial econometrics in house prices and a general discussion about the 
gaps existing in the current literature. Section 2.5 reviews the characteristics of real options in 
the real estate market. In principally, Section 2.6 highlights the real options approach applied 
to the real estate market. Section 2.7 reviews the real options approach applied to other 
sectors of economy based on the classifications of real options. Section 2.8 includes a 
conclusion of real options applied to the real estate market and a general discussion about the 
gaps between various methodologies. 
 
2.2 Spatial Characteristics of House Prices 
Several studies found that house prices are characterised by spatial correlations, meaning that 
prices in one area are affected by prices or unknown characteristics in nearby areas (Holly et 
al., 2011; Pijnenburg, 2017). To examine the spatial correlations, we must define, 
methodologically, what are the neighbouring areas. To imposes a data structure through 
neighbouring areas we use spatial weight matrix methodology based on two major 
approaches. First, by modelling the spatial correlations as a distance-based approach, such as 
inverse distance, fixed distance and K nearest neighbours. Second, by using contiguity-based 
spatial weight matrices, mainly based on polygon or lattice data (Cliff and Ord, 1973). In this 
study, we use contiguity-based methods, because they limit the dimensions of the spatial 
matrices, and spatial correlations of house prices become non-stochastic, making spatial 
weight matrix more easily applicable.  Contiguity-based methods are employed in this study 
also due to the different city sizes of polygons in China territory. The contiguity-based spatial 
weight matrix as given by the following equation: 
𝑊 = ∑ ∑ 𝑊𝑖𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1
𝑛
𝑖=1                                                 (2.1) 
24 
 
where n provides the number of observations for the whole regions. 𝑖 and 𝑗 represent the 
region 𝑖 and region 𝑗. 𝑊𝑖𝑗 is an element in the spatial weight matrix, representing the spatial 
weight between region 𝑖 and region 𝑗. 
Previous studies suggest that Chinese house prices have spatial effects in terms of spatial 
dependence (Chow et al., 2016; Yang et al., 2017).7 The spatial dependence is characterised 
as prices are dependent on prices or unknown characteristics in neighbouring regions. In 
other words, the house prices are spatially correlated with prices or errors in nearby regions 
(Anselin et al., 2008). In this circumstance, spatial dependence can be detected through the 
robust Lagrange Multiplier lag or error test (Elhorst, 2010). By modelling the spatial 
dependence, not only house prices contain neighbourhood relations but also spatial lag model 
(SAR) or spatial error model (SEM) is applicable. A stationary house pricing model includes 
price spatial dependency with a form of spatial lag dependence (Equation 2.2) or spatial error 
dependence (Equation 2.4) as given by the following equation: 
𝑃 = 𝜌𝑊𝑃 + 𝛽𝑋 +                                                   (2.2) 
where 𝑃 is a 𝑁 × 1 vector of house price. 𝜌 is a spatial correlation parameter. 𝑊 is a 𝑁 × 𝑁 
spatial weight matrix. 𝛽 provides the 𝐾 × 1 vector of regression coefficients. 𝑋 represents an 
𝐾 × 1 vector of explanatory variables.  is a 𝑁 × 1 vector of error. 𝑁 and 𝐾 are the number 
of observations. 
  𝑃 = 𝛽𝑋 + ν                                                          (2.3) 
ν = 𝜆𝑊ν +                                                        (2.4) 
where 𝑃  is a 𝑁 × 1  vector of house price. 𝛽  provides the 𝐾 × 1  vector of regression 
coefficients. 𝑋  represents an 𝐾 × 1  vector of explanatory variables. ν  is assumed to be a 
𝑁 × 1 vector of independent and identically distributed errors. 𝑊 is a 𝑁 × 𝑁 spatial weight 
matrix. 𝜆 is spatial autoregressive coefficient. 
Extensive studies illustrate that Chinese house prices in space exhibit spatial effects in terms 
of spatial heterogeneity (Wen and Tao, 2015; Yang et al., 2018; Zhang et al., 2017).8 Spatial 
heterogeneity implies the structural instability or non-stationarity of parameters or 
determinants across space and is present in alternative forms which can be split into two 
                                                          
7 Generally, spatial dependence is the spatial relationship of variable values or locations (Anselin, 2002). 
8 Spatial heterogeneity is a property generally ascribed to a landscape or to a population referred to the uneven 
distribution of various concentrations of each species within an area. For instance, regarding spatial 
heterogeneity of burglary risk, if all geographic areas in a study region have the same risk of burglary then we 
say that the risk is homogeneous. If there are areas with significantly higher risk than others (e.g. urban areas 
may have a higher risk of burglary than rural areas) then such a map displays heterogeneity (of risk). 
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categories. First, if the house prices in nearby areas are affected in a different way by the 
same factors, spatial heterogeneity is present in terms of spatially varying coefficients. 
Second, the circumstance, that house prices are characterised by different distributions (e.g., 
with a different mean or variance) for distinct regions, which is known as spatial regimes, 
occurs spatial heterogeneity in terms of structural differences across space (Anselin, 2017). 
Accordingly, spatial heterogeneity illustrates that the effects of spatial dependence or 
determinants on prices are different from that of in nearby regions (Anselin et al., 2008). 
Spatial heterogeneity is present in the form of non-constant error variances 
(heteroscedasticity) or the variable regression coefficients in the regression model based on 
Chow test (Baltagi, 2013, pp. 319-320; Chow, 1960). By incorporating the spatial 
heterogeneity, house prices become stationary structure across space and spatial fixed effect 
model is applicable, which is expressed as: 
𝑃 = (𝜄𝑇 ⊗ 𝛼) + 𝛽𝑋 +                                                (2.5) 
where 𝑃 is a 𝑁 × 1 vector of house price. 𝛼 is a 𝑁 × 1 vector of individual fixed effects, with 
the constraint that 𝛼′𝜄𝑁 = 0  and stacked by 𝑇  times, and, as before, 𝐸[
′] = 𝜎𝜀
2𝜄𝑁𝑇 . 𝛽 
provides the 𝐾 × 1  vector of regression coefficients. 𝑋  represents an 𝐾 × 1  vector of 
explanatory variables.  is a 𝑁 × 1 vector of error. 
In order to successfully model house prices in space it is essential that the spatial 
characteristics of the data are examined by the various models under consideration. 
Modelling empirical spatial effects of house prices such as spatial dependence spill-overs and 
spatial heterogeneity spill-overs are mentioned in previous studies (Hyuna and Milchevab, 
2018; Meen, 1999; Wang et al., 2017). Contributory to such modelling has been the Maron’s 
I model, spatial autoregressive model (SAR), spatial error model (SEM), spatial 
autoregressive model with autoregressive disturbances (SAC) and spatial Durbin model 
(SDM). There are numerous applications of these models to modelling economic data 
including estimating and forecasting house prices spill-overs in terms of spatial dependence 
and heterogeneity (Brady, 2014; Costello et al., 2011; Fereidouni et al., 2016; Holly et al., 
2011; Hyuna and Milcheva, 2018; Teye and Ahelegbey, 2017). However, there is no 
unanimous method that the most appropriate modelling approach deals with the spatial 
dependence and heterogeneity on house prices in the Chinese housing market (Chow et al., 
2016; Zhang et al., 2015; Zhang et al., 2017). A conventional approach a researcher has to 
employ is to examine various models and evaluate them, both in-sample and out-of-sample. 
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In remainder of this chapter, several conditional spatial dependence and heterogeneity models 
and partitioning technique are presented. 
 
2.3 Spatial Econometrics in House Prices 
Referred to the theoretical and empirical literature (see in Section 2.3), various models are 
appropriate to examine spatial effects on house prices, and several models are employed in 
real options. These models are divided into univariate and multivariate frameworks. The 
univariate models focus on the form of spatial pattern (e.g., clustering or dispersed or random) 
in mapped house prices due to geographical proximity. The multivariate models deal with the 
specified spatial autoregressive models based on the rejection of the null hypothesis (e.g., 
spatial lag or spatial error) and demonstrate the spatial partitioning technique with the spill-
over effects on price determinants. 
 
2.3.1 Univariate Models of Spatial Effects on House Prices 
Several studies have documented the spatial autocorrelation characteristics of house prices 
which can be generated by spatial dependence and heterogeneity (Wang and Gao, 2014; 
Zhang et al., 2015).9 According to these studies, spatial autocorrelation is present in house 
prices which represents prices are likely to be similar to that of nearby areas. This assumption 
is known as the first law of geography which defines “everything is related to everything else, 
but near things are more related than distant things” (Tobler, 1970). Accordingly, it implies 
that the spatial observations, such as house price, are improbable to be independent 
statistically (Doh and Hahn, 2008). Such a phenomenon can be detected by Moran’s I 
statistical test which provides the presence or absence of spatial autocorrelation. 
Global Moran’s I model determines the existence of the spatial autocorrelation in the model 
residuals. Global Moran’s I model aims to measure the average level of spatial 
autocorrelation, which can be written as: 
𝐼 =
𝑛 ∑ ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑗(𝑥𝑖−?̅?)(𝑥𝑗−?̅?)
𝑛
𝑗=1
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝑊 ∑ (𝑥𝑖−?̅?)
2𝑛
𝑖=1
                                             (2.6) 
𝑊 = ∑ ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1
𝑛
𝑖=1                                                   (2.7) 
                                                          
9 Spatial autocorrelation assesses the variable correlation which is relative to this variable’s spatial location. It 
approaches the variable features and the spatial attributes for the locations (LeSage, 2010). 
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?̅? =
1
𝑛
∑ 𝑥𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1                                                      (2.8) 
where 𝑥𝑖 represents the attribute value in region 𝑖. 𝑛 provides the number of observations for 
the whole regions. 𝑖 and 𝑗 represent the region 𝑖 and region 𝑗. ?̅? is the mean value of variable 
𝑥. 𝑊𝑖𝑗  is an element in the spatial weight matrix, representing the spatial weight between 
region 𝑖 and region 𝑗. The row standardised spatial weights matrix is provided in equation 2.8. 
The null hypothesis of Moran’s I model represents that the absence of spatial autocorrelation 
of observations in the spatial pattern (e.g., distuibution of observation is random, 𝐼 = 0). 
Positive spatial autocorrelation is present when high or low values tend to cluster in space 
(0 < 𝐼 < 1). Negative spatial autocorrelation denotes the values of observation are dispersed 
(−1 < 𝐼 < 0) and considers the spatial heterogeneity.  
Several limitations restrict the application of Global Moran’s I model for the examination of 
spatial autocorrelation. Moran’s I model determines the absence or presence of spatial 
autocorrelation but not specified what form or process (Ismail, 2006). Global Moran’s I 
model provides a misleading result when the spatial structure of a process varies from one 
area to another because it measures the average level of spatial autocorrelation across the 
obtained insights (Lloyd, 2007). Global Moran’s I model has limited the approaches to the 
specified attribute value of that region and cannot represent the situation in the attribute value 
of it (Fotheringham et al., 2000). Accordingly, the purpose of spatial heterogeneity test has 
transferred from identifying and interpreting global regularities to characteristics across space 
and local privileges (Fotheringham et al., 2000). 
Local Moran’s I model emphasises the heterogeneity of spatial data and the direction to show 
spatial non-stationarity (Goodchild, 2009). In contrast with the global model which measures 
of the average level of spatial autocorrelation, local model runs a circular window over the 
obtained insight and computes the value of the statistic in each window based on the 
characteristics (Boot and Okabe, 2007). One simple method to associate the geographical 
information at the local level is to specify regional dummy variable or regional interaction 
terms as spatial components in regression. The value of Local Moran’s I model equation is 
written as: 
𝐼 = ∑
𝐼𝑖
𝑁𝑖
                                                              (2.9) 
𝐼𝑖 =
𝑋𝑖
𝑚
∑ 𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑋𝑗𝑗                                                     (2.10) 
𝑚 =
∑ 𝑋𝑖
2
𝑖
𝑁
                                                           (2.11) 
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Lloyd (2007) illustrates that the application of the local models is more complex than the 
global model which factors of the size of a circular window or type of transformation 
influence the result values. Therefore, Local Moran’s I model provides geographical 
problems to the discrete nature of approaches (Clark, 2007). Anselin et al. (2013) argues that 
geographically weighted regression approaches for exploring local spatial autocorrelation are 
appropriate to deal with discrete nature. Geographically weighted regression clarifies the 
distinct nature in terms of incorporating the modelling variation in spatial relations between 
multiple variables. 
Index Moran’ I is generally employed in spatial econometrics to test the similarity or 
dissimilarity (positive correlation, negative correlation) of house prices in spatial analysis 
(Helbich et al., 2014). This is because house prices have spatial autocorrelation in space 
(Baumont, 2004). For instance, Yang et al. (2017) employing eight group metrics data from 
31 provinces in China between 1998 and 2011, suggest that a Moran’ I model is needed to 
capture the spatial autocorrelation in house prices. They find that Moran's I index is 
significant and positive which represents house prices in Chinese provinces are not randomly 
distributed in space but clustered. Wang and Gao (2014) employs two cross-section data from 
2005 to 2012 in Beijing and find that the null hypothesis of no spatial autocorrelation in 
house prices is rejected. In the USA, Cohen (2016) using a panel dataset of annual house 
prices from 363 Metropolitan Statistical Areas between 1975 and 2013, provides that Moran’ 
I model is applicable to test whether house prices spatial effects are more pronounced 
following the crisis. In this thesis, the Moran’ I model will be one of the competing models, 
although we look forward to including specified spatial autoregressive models which reject 
the null hypothesis (e.g., spatial lag or spatial error). 
  
2.3.2 Multivariate Models of Spatial Effects on House Prices 
Our multivariate framework is three-fold. First, the models focus on the spatial dependence 
of house price based on the rejection of the null hypothesis (e.g., spatial lag or spatial error). 
Second, the models address the spatial heterogeneity of house price and its determinants. 
Third, the models deal with the spatial partitioning technique with the spill-over effects on 
price determinants. These models are discussed in sections 2.3.2.1, 2.3.2.2 and 2.3.3.3, 
respectively. The spatial partitioning models differ from the other two in terms of the 
transformation of spatial weight matrices. Spatial partitioning models employ higher orders 
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of neighbourhood effects of prices and determinants as spatial correlation intensity rather 
than unique neighbourhood effects from first order neighbours. For further discussion, see 
below. 
 
2.3.2.1 Models to Examine Spatial Dependence of House Prices 
A large number of empirical evidence documents that house prices have spatial effects in 
terms of spatial dependence (see Chow et al., 2016, among others). The stationary spatial 
models exhibit the spatial dependence of prices depending on the formal structure of 
hypotheses in omitted spatially lagged dependent variable (SAR) or error variance (SEM). In 
the former test (Lagrange Multiplier spatial lag or error test), the null hypotheses for spatial 
dependence are specified as: 
𝐻0: 𝜌 = 0,     𝐻𝑎: 𝜌 ≠ 0                      (SAR in Equation 2.2 for spatial lag dependence) 
𝐻0: 𝜆 = 0,     𝐻𝑎: 𝜆 ≠ 0                   (SEM in Equation 2.4 for spatial error dependence) 
Through obtaining spatial dependence, house prices contain neighbourhood relations in space 
and then the spatial correlation is not present in the SAR or SEM. It implies house prices 
have spatial effects in terms of spatial dependence. Therefore, the distinguish of spatial 
dependence is a starting point. 
Spatial econometrics considered spatial effects involves the spatial autoregressive modelling 
which are the spatial lag model (SAR), the spatial error model (SEM), and the joined 
approach accommodating both spatial lag and spatial lag operations (SAC). These spatial 
econometric models establish assumptions for the formation of spatial correlation in the 
sample depending on where the autoregressive process is to present (Kissling and Carl, 2008). 
The general spatial autoregressive model with spatial autoregressive errors is given by: 
𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜏𝑃𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜌 ∑ 𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑃𝑗𝑡
𝑁
𝑗=1 + 𝛽𝑘 ∑ 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝑘
𝑘
𝑘=1 + 𝜈𝑖𝑡                    (2.12) 
𝜈𝑖𝑡 = 𝜆 ∑ 𝑊𝑖𝑗𝜈𝑖𝑡
𝑁
𝑗=1 + 𝑖𝑡                                                (2.13) 
where 𝑃𝑖𝑡 is a 𝑁 × 1 vector containing one observation of the dependent variable for each 
spatial element (𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑁). 𝑁 is the number of regions. 𝑡 represents the observation at time 
𝑡. 𝑃𝑖𝑡−1 is the value of dependent variable for last year. 𝜌 provides the parameters of spatial 
lag. 𝜆  illustrates the parameters of spatial error. 𝑋𝑖𝑡  represents the vector of explanatory 
variables. The vector 𝑋𝑖𝑡 consists of a 𝑁 × 𝐾 matrix. 𝐾 is the number of explanatory variables. 
𝛽 provides the coefficient of 𝐾 explanatory variable. 𝑊 is a 𝑁 × 𝑁 spatial weight matrix. 
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The spatial autoregressive model assumes that the autoregressive process occurs in the 
response variable. In SAR, 𝜆 is equal to zero and 𝜌 is unequal to zero (Equation 2.12 and 
2.13). In SEM, it is assumed that spatial dependence is present in the error term, where 𝜌 is 
equal to zero and 𝜆  is unequal to zero (Equation 2.12) and the error terms, 𝜐𝑖𝑡 , are 
independent and identically distributed (Equation 2.13). Nevertheless, in the spatial 
autoregressive model with autoregressive disturbances (SAC), 𝜆 and 𝜌 are both unequal to 
zero, which assumes spatial dependence is present in both the error term and the response 
variable. 
The neglect of spatial effects on OLS regression leads to the unbiased results but inefficient 
parameter estimators and biased variance estimators (Anselin, 2014). Regarding this 
circumstance, estimated parameters are in the incorrect confidence intervals leading to 
incorrect predicted house prices (Basu and Thibodeau, 1998). The frequent development in 
publication involving spatial effects has been perceived after the 1990s (Alselin et al., 2004) 
although spatial autocorrelation has been analysed for a period of time (Cliff and Ord, 1970). 
Spatial autoregressive models (e.g., SAR, SEM and SAC), in general terms, seems to be 
appropriate in terms of examining effects of house prices and unknown characteristics on 
neighbouring regions and explaining spatial characteristics of house prices such as spatial 
dependence (Mussa et al., 2017). 
The empirical applications of the spatial autoregressive models in house prices are plentiful. 
Baltagi et al. (2014) examine the annual house price variation from across 353 local authority 
districts in England 2000 to 2007 and finds spatial lag term (in SAR) is present on house 
prices implying a positive correlation between house price locally and that in neighbouring 
districts. DeSilva et al. (2012) examine the effects of Blacks and Hispanics on house prices in 
the U.S. and find the influences of Blacks in a neighbourhood is smaller in spatial methods 
(SEM and SAR) than that employing simple OLS and Hispanics have no significant 
influences on house prices by spatial methods. The advance of the spatial autoregressive 
model, in the field of house prices, compared to the OLS model derives from the 
consideration of spatial dependence being able to examine the dependencies in the higher-
order spatial dimension. 
The spatial dependence on house prices is also known as spill-over effects in the housing 
market (Pijnenburg, 2017). The empirical evidence for spatial spill-overs of house prices is 
the UK housing market, which provides the spatial and temporal diffusion of shocks are 
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dominant for London and propagated contemporaneously and spatially to other regions in the 
UK (Holly et al., 2011). Across the U.S. states, the spatial diffusion regarding impulse 
response functions is statistically significant for approximately three to four years due to the 
increase of house prices over a period from 1975 to 2011 (Brady, 2014). Cohen et al. (2016) 
investigates spatial effects in house price dynamics with 363 Metropolitan Statistical Areas 
data across the US from 1996 to 2013 and finds the growth rates of urban house prices show 
the spatial diffusion patterns. Teye and Ahelegbey (2017) illustrate that the temporal 
dependence and house price diffusion patterns are present from distinct provincial housing 
sub-markets in the Netherlands. In Australian, the capital city house prices forecasts can be 
improved by employing house prices from neighbouring cities 1984Q3 to 2008Q2 (Costello 
et al., 2011). In South Korea, the spatial dependence of house prices is more significant in a 
rising housing market than in a falling market in Seoul between 2006 and 2015 (Hyuna and 
Milcheva, 2018).  Fereidouni et al. (2016) examine house price diffusion among Malaysia’s 
major economic regions (Kuala Lumpur, Selangor, Pulau Pinang and Johor) and between 
each of these regions and neighbouring Singapore from 2000Q1 to 2011Q1. They find the 
ripple effect of house prices is present among Malaysia’s major economic regions.  
For China, empirical evidence regarding spatial spill-overs of house prices is substantial, 
which examine the capital cities of Yangtze River Delta Economic Zone (e.g., Shanghai, 
Hangzhou, Nanjing and Hefei) from 2001 to 2014 and find the house prices spill-overs are 
due to the high market integration but the direction of spill-over are different (Zhang et al., 
2015).  Chow et al. (2016) provide that both house price convergence and positive spatial 
spill-over are present in 34 Chinese cities. The house prices spill-overs narrow the gaps 
between the growth paths of house prices in one region and that of neighbouring cities. Zhang 
et al. (2017) investigate the ripple effect of house prices between 35 metropolitans by spatial 
location and regional economic level in China from 2006 to 2012 and find the house prices 
diffusion path is present between economic regions. The spill-over effects of the housing 
market in China are significantly different from that of other countries in terms of the 
different city sizes of polygons and the varying development states of cites across the country. 
In this thesis, the spatial autoregressive and spatial error component are essential to be 
examined in understanding the spatial spill-overs of house prices in China.  
The extension of the spatial autoregressive model is spatial Durbin model (LeSage and Pace, 
2009). Spatial Durbin model (SDM) is a generalisation of SAR or SEM model which also 
includes spatial correlation of explanatory variables, and is written as: 
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𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜌 ∑ 𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑃𝑗𝑡
𝑁
𝑗=1 + 𝛽𝑘 ∑ 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝑘
𝑘
𝑘=1 + 𝜃𝑘 ∑ ∑ 𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑋𝑗𝑡𝑘
𝑁
𝑗=1
𝑘
𝑘=1 + 𝜐𝑖𝑡         (2.14) 
𝜈𝑖𝑡 = 𝜆 ∑ 𝑊𝑖𝑗𝜈𝑖𝑡
𝑁
𝑗=1 + 𝑖𝑡                                               (2.15) 
where 𝑃𝑖𝑡 is a 𝑁 × 1 vector containing one observation of the dependent variable for each 
spatial element (𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑁). 𝑁 is the number of regions. 𝑡 represents the observation at time 
𝑡. 𝜌 provides the parameters of spatial lag. 𝜆 illustrates the parameters of spatial error. 𝑋𝑖𝑡 
represents the vector of explanatory variables. The vector 𝑋𝑖𝑡 consists of a 𝑁 × 𝐾 matrix. 𝐾 is 
the number of explanatory variables. 𝛽 provides the coefficient of 𝐾 explanatory variable. 𝜃𝑘 
represents the parameters of spatial lag of explanatory variables. 𝑊 is a 𝑁 × 𝑁 spatial weight 
matrix. 
The spatial Durbin model (SDM) investigates more spatial interactions rather than the spatial 
hedonic model or SAR or SEM (Mussa et al., 2017). LeSage and Pace (2009) introduce the 
SDM which incorporates the SAR and the SEM in terms of the spatial lags of both the 
dependent variables and explanatory variables. It states very well in terms of examining the 
explanatory variables in nearby regions and explains the spatial characteristics of spill-over 
effects of explanatory variables in neighbouring areas on house prices. Regarding the more 
flexible in establishing alternative aspects of spatial dependence, the SDM allows capturing 
direct, indirect and total marginal effects for the explanatory variables representing a more 
detailed relationships between spatial dependence and explanatory variables. The SDM is 
more appropriate for establishing the relationships between economic fundamentals and 
house prices in a spatial circumstance rather than a spatial hedonic model which addresses the 
house characteristics. 
The empirical evidence of advanced performance on SDM in house prices is voluminous 
(Mou et al., 2018). Osland and Thorsen (2013) investigate the relationship between travel 
time from the central business district, labour market accessibility and house prices. They 
find SDM is an appropriate method to link the effects of independent variables in 
neighbouring regions and house prices. Basu and Thibodeau (1998) illustrate that house 
prices are correlated spatially in terms of location amenities (e.g., police department, public 
schools, population with a college degree and distance to employment). Spatial Durbin model 
is essential for estimating the relationship between economic fundamentals and house prices 
characterised as spatial data generating processes incorporating spatial dependence among 
observations (Mussa et al., 2017). Meen (1999) suggest that the fundamentals of migration, 
equity transfer, information asymmetries and the spatial patterns within house prices are 
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essential in terms of the spill-overs of house prices. Migration or equity assigns to the regions 
where house prices are comparably low could result in a ripple effect in terms of the 
increasing demand for houses and thereby house prices (Wang et al., 2017 and Zhang et al., 
2014). Information asymmetries illustrate that new information referred to the housing 
market in one area is transported gradually to other submarkets (Hyuna and Milchevab, 2018). 
The spill-over effects represent that the explanatory variables of house prices provide a 
spatial pattern (Mou et al., 2018). However, the application of SDM in the housing market is 
scarce. House prices are influenced by the determinants in neighbouring areas, but the 
hedonic method fails to further examine this feature (Huang et al., 2017; Hyuna and 
Milchevab, 2018; and Yang et al., 2019). 
The application of SDM is essential in the Chinese housing market. This is because the 
explanatory variables of spatial dependence for house prices are different from the other 
countries due to the transitional economy (e.g., from planning economy to a market-
orientated economy). For instance, the abolishment of the Hukou system has encouraged 
labour mobility between areas and consequently urbanisation caused the equity transfer 
among regions, and therefore the spatial lag of equity transfer occurs the spatial dependence 
(Gong et al., 2016). There are other fundamentals affecting the spatial dependence and the 
spatial patterns of house prices, such as income (Abate, 2017), supply for house (Van Dijk et 
al., 2011) and unemployment rate (Kondo, 2015), are scarce in the literature of the Chinese 
housing market (Zhang et al., 2015). In this thesis, research on the driving forces behind the 
fundamentals of house prices and spatial patterns would be useful in understanding the spatial 
effects in terms of explanatory variables spill-overs. 
 
2.3.2.2 Models to Capture Spatial Heterogeneity 
The existing literature denotes evidence of spatial heterogeneity in the housing market (Meen, 
1999; Wood, 2003). The spatial heterogeneity of house price could be caused by spatially 
varying coefficients across space or spatial regimes (Anselin, 2017). Wood (2003) provides 
that spatial heterogeneity is caused based on the speed of responses of national economic 
shocks in one region, where the housing market is more liquid and where new information 
affects house prices more rapidly than in the neighbouring regions. Accordingly, spatial 
heterogeneity illustrates that the effects of spatial dependence or determinants on prices are 
different from that of in nearby regions (Anselin et al., 2008). Therefore, by incorporating the 
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spatial heterogeneity, house prices become stationary structure across space and spatial fixed 
effect model is applicable. 
According to Pijnenburg (2017), given a region specific fixed effects, 𝛼, and time period 
specific effects, 𝜉, the spatial autoregressive model is sutural stationary incorporating fixed 
intercepts and time period effects, which is specified as: 
𝑃 = 𝛼𝐼𝑛 + 𝜌𝑊𝑃 + 𝛽𝑋 + 𝜉𝐼𝑛 +                                       (2.16) 
where 𝑃 is an 𝑁 × 1 vector of house price. 𝛼 is the region specific fixed effects vector of 
individual fixed effects, with the constraint that 𝛼′𝐼𝑁 = 0 and stacked by 𝑛 times, and, as 
before, 𝐸[ ′] = 𝜎𝜀
2𝐼𝑁𝑇. 𝜉 are time period specific effects. 𝐼𝑛 is an 𝑁 × 1 vector of ones. 𝛽 
provides the 𝐾 × 1  vector of regression coefficients. 𝑋  represents an 𝐾 × 1  vector of 
explanatory variables. ~𝑁(0, 𝜎2𝐼𝑛). 𝑊 is a 𝑁 × 𝑁 spatial weight matrix. 
The spatial fixed effect model is efficient restricting spatial heterogeneity in terms of the 
fixed region and time period specific effects. For example, Cohen (2016) finds the house 
prices spill-overs are different between crises times and normal times. Normal times are 
examined by relatively normal average house price developments, while crisis times are 
provided by increases or decreases in house prices. The changes of house prices in the 
alternative time period causes the spatial heterogeneity, which is in line with Wood (2003) 
providing that spatial heterogeneity is caused by the speed of responses of national economic 
shocks in one region. On the other hand, spatial heterogeneity is caused by spatially varying 
distribution of house prices (e.g., with a different mean or variance). Spatial fixed effect 
model with the fixed region specific effects appropriately decreases the spatial heterogeneity 
in terms of random effects of house prices. 
The extension of the spatial fixed effects model is spatial fixed effects incorporating SDM, 
which is known as spatial Durbin fixed effect model (Mussa et al., 2017). The spatial Durbin 
fixed effect model allows for the explanatory variables to capture direct (feedback) effect and 
indirect (spill-over) effect (Mussa et al., 2017), meaning that the explanatory variables not 
only have effects from proximity regions but also include effects from distant regions. The 
spatial Durbin fixed effect model can be defined by: 
𝑃 = 𝛼𝐼𝑛 + 𝜌𝑊𝑃 + 𝛽𝑋 + 𝜃𝑊𝑋 + 𝜉𝐼𝑛 +                                (2.17) 
The reduced form of the extended model is given by: 
𝑃 = (𝐼𝑛 − 𝜌𝑊)
−1(𝛼𝐼𝑛 + 𝛽𝑋 + 𝜃𝑊𝑋) + (𝐼𝑛 − 𝜌𝑊)
−1𝜉 + (𝐼𝑛 − 𝜌𝑊)
−1        (2.18) 
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where 𝑃  is an 𝑁 × 1  vector of house price. 𝜃  represents the parameters of spatial lag of 
explanatory variables. 𝛼 is the region specific fixed effects vector of individual fixed effects, 
with the constraint that 𝛼′𝐼𝑁 = 0 and stacked by 𝑛 times, and, as before, 𝐸[
′] = 𝜎𝜀
2𝐼𝑁𝑇. 𝜉 
are time period specific effects. 𝐼𝑛 is an 𝑁 × 1 vector of ones. 𝛽 provides the 𝐾 × 1 vector of 
regression coefficients. 𝑋  represents an 𝐾 × 1  vector of explanatory variables. 
~𝑁(0, 𝜎2𝐼𝑛). 𝑊 is a 𝑁 × 𝑁 spatial weight matrix. 
The spatial Durbin fixed effect model not only restricts spatial heterogeneity in terms of the 
fixed region and time period specific effects but also capture direct (feedback) effect by 𝛽𝑋 
and indirect (spill-over) effect by 𝑊𝑋  (Equation 2.18), which in turn restricts spatial 
heterogeneity in terms of the spatially varying coefficients of explanatory variables. For 
example, spatial heterogeneity is caused by spatially varying coefficients of determinants, 
such as income (Abate, 2017). It implies that the effects of income on house prices in one 
region are different from that in other regions across space. The spatial Durbin fixed effect 
model appropriately decreases the spatial heterogeneity in terms of spatially varying 
coefficients of explanatory variables. In this thesis, the spatial Durbin fixed effect model is 
employed in evaluating uncertainty of house price for the real options valuation. 
In the housing market, the spatial heterogeneity can be examined by the spatial fixed effects 
model in terms of time period specific fixed effects, spatially varying coefficients of 
explanatory variables and region specific fixed effects. Wood (2003) provides that spatial 
heterogeneity is caused based on the speed of responses of national economic shocks in one 
region, where the housing market is more liquid and where new information affects house 
prices more rapidly than in the neighbouring regions. By obtaining time period specific fixed 
effects, the spatial heterogeneity can be examined and spatial fixed effects model is 
applicable. Meen (1999) argues that heterogeneity arises because of variations in household 
behaviours and household compositions. Through introducing spatially varying coefficients 
of explanatory variables, the spatial heterogeneity can be settled and spatial fixed effects 
model is appropriate. 
According to the spatial heterogeneity in terms of spatially varying coefficients of 
explanatory variables, there is enormous evidence that fundamentals cause the spatial 
heterogeneity of the house prices and which could be examined by spatial Durbin fixed effect 
model. The literature analysing the spatial heterogeneity of house prices in terms of 
unemployment rate provides that the municipal unemployment rates denote significant 
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positive spatial correlation across space (Kondo, 2015). The movement of the population 
leads to the spill-over effect of the house price which causes the spatial heterogeneity (Zhang 
et al., 2015). It is mentioned that local government tax is a significant factor to the house 
price when considering the spatial analysis of house price in China (Liu, 2013). Abate (2017) 
indicated a rising spatial correlation between house prices and income. Accordingly, 
fundamentals of house prices cause the spatial correlation of house prices and possibly cause 
spatial heterogeneity that different effects of same fundamental on house prices in alternative 
regions across space based on Chow test (Chow, 1960). Therefore, the examination of spatial 
heterogeneity in terms of spatially varying coefficients of explanatory variables is essential to 
establish a stationary spatial house pricing model with spatial Durbin fixed effect 
methodology.  
Spatial fixed effect model with region specific fixed effects is employed appropriately to the 
problems of spatial heterogeneity due to the supply for housing. Meen (1999) illustrates that 
the spatial heterogeneity of house prices is present due to the supply for housing which is 
constrained by planning limitations or by geographical restraints by landscape (e.g., lakes, 
park and rivers). In China, the entire landscape of activity locations decreases the supply for 
housing but increases the house prices and therefore the spatial heterogeneity is caused by the 
different distribution of supply for housing across space (Du and Huang, 2018). The distance 
to the lake influences the house prices significantly and negatively and causes the spatial 
heterogeneity in West Lake of Hangzhou (Wen and Jia 2004), South Lake of Wuhan (Zhong 
et al., 2009) and Mouchou Lake in Nanjing (Wu et al., 2008). The spatial heterogeneity due 
to the supply for housing is also mentioned in distance to the Huangxing Park in Shanghai 
(Shi and Zhang, 2010), wide port landscape in Hong Kong (Jim and Chen, 2009), 
accessibility and visibility in Shenzhen (Chen and Jim, 2010) and river accessibility in 
Guangzhou (Jim and Chen, 2006). The above studies examine the landscape effects on house 
prices, while the problem that the increasing spatial heterogeneity of house prices in terms of 
the increasing the housing supply constraints is not mentioned. Therefore, this thesis applies 
the housing starts as the supply for housing and employs spatial fixed effect model with 
region specific fixed effects to examine the spatial heterogeneity. In this way, the spatial 
house prices model is stationary in terms of the introduction of region specific fixed effects in 
the spatial fixed effect model. 
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2.3.2.3 Models to Develop Spatial Partitions Techniques 
In spatial Durbin model, the explanatory variables can be constructed by direct (feedback) by 
𝛽𝑋 and indirect (spill-over) effects by 𝑊𝑋 (see Equation 2.18; LeSage and Pace, 2009). The 
direct effect is present due to the house prices are affected by determinants in the closed 
nearby regions (e.g., first order neighbourhood). The indirect effect derives from the house 
prices are affected by determinants in the distant regions (e.g., higher order neighbourhood). 
However, the influences of explanatory variables are not constructed into a specified order of 
neighbours in spatial Durbin model. 
To deal with this, LeSage and Pace (2010) segmented the influences of direct and indirect 
effects by partitioning technique which provides a significant impact on spatial econometrics. 
Jensen and Lacombe (2012) developed this partitioning equation in terms of the spatial model, 
which is expressed as: 
𝜕𝑌𝑖𝑡
𝜕𝑋𝑘𝑡
= (𝐼 − 𝜌𝑊𝑌𝑖𝑡)
−1
(𝛽𝑘 + 𝑊𝜃𝑘)                                     (2.19) 
where 
(𝐼 − 𝜌𝑊𝑌𝑖𝑡)
−1
= 𝐼 + 𝜌𝑊 + 𝜌2𝑊2 + 𝜌3𝑊3 + ⋯ + 𝜌𝑁𝑊𝑁                 (2.20) 
The impacts are relative to each order neighbourhood can be given by: 
(𝐼 − 𝜌𝑊𝑌𝑖𝑡)
−1
(𝛽𝑘 + 𝑊𝜃𝑘)
= (𝐼𝛽𝑘 + 𝑊𝜃𝑘) + (𝜌𝑊𝛽𝑘 + 𝜌𝑊
2𝜃𝑘) + (𝜌
2𝑊2𝛽𝑘 + 𝜌
2𝑊3𝜃𝑘) + ⋯ 
W(1)                                    W(2)                                               W(3)                         (2.21) 
𝑊(𝑖) represents the spatial weight matrix of 𝑖(𝑡ℎ) order neighbours. Regarding to the order of 
neighbourhood, the lower order 𝑊(𝑖)  illustrates the closed neighbours, such as first-order 
neighbours 𝑊(1) (Figure 5.3). The higher order 𝑊(𝑖) indicates the distant neighbours, such as 
third-order neighbours 𝑊(3).  
LeSage and Pace (2009) provide that the distinctions between direct and indirect effects rely 
on the degree of influence in one region and that of the neighbouring regions, which is in line 
with the interpretation by Won et al. (2003). In other words, it considers the influences of 
explanatory variables on house prices from different orders of neighbours. The partitioned 
direct effects clarify a picture of the spatial feedback effects (Elhorst, 2014). The components 
of the direct and indirect effects are the essential elements of diagonal matrix (Lesage & Pace, 
2010; Elhorst, 2014). 
38 
 
Partitioning technique fills the knowledge gap by exploring the neighbour spatial spill-over 
effect of determinants on house prices. The previous studies provide the determinants of 
house prices such as income (Liu and Xiong, 2018), housing supply (Fang et al., 2016), 
unemployment rate (Drachal, 2016), urbanisation (Garriga et al., 2017) and local government 
tax (Shi and Lee, 2017). However, these studies have overlooked the spatial spill-over effects 
of determinants. House prices are affected by determinants of neighbouring price, but the 
SDM fails to further capture the spatial spill-overs in different order neighbourhood.  
The partitioned spill-over effect of determinants on house prices is significant due to two-fold. 
First, partitioning spill-over effect denotes an in-depth examination into the effects of 
determinants in different order neighbours on house prices. This examination helps explain 
the spill-over effects of spatial heterogeneity in terms of spatially varying coefficients. This is 
because spatially varying coefficients are distributed across space which may spillovers to 
other regions and causes the possible situation that effects of determinants in higher order 
neighbourhood on house prices are more significant than that of lower order neighbourhood. 
Second, the partitioned spill-over effect of determinants on prices contributes the valuable 
information for housing market regulators. Due to spatially varying coefficients of 
determinants, such as household income (demand) and building starts (supply), the housing 
market regulators could adjust the regional demand and supply for housing in order to 
suggest a stationary development of housing market and encourage the developer to provide a 
rational house price. Therefore, it is valuable to capture the determinants of house prices in 
terms of the measures within different geographical regions to the regulators of the housing 
market. In this thesis, the method employed with partitioned spill-over effect of determinants 
on house prices is applied to help explain the spill-over effects on spatial heterogeneity. 
 
2.4 Concluding Remarks for Spatial Econometrics in House Prices 
A literature review relevant to spatial effects with a focus on house prices is presented. 
Several studies found that house prices are characterised by spatial correlations, meaning that 
prices in one area are affected by prices or unknown characteristics in nearby areas (Holly et 
al., 2011; Pijnenburg, 2017). To examine the spatial correlations, the neighbouring areas are 
defined by contiguity-based approaches. Two types of spatial effects were found in the 
Chinese housing market. First, spatial dependence effect on house prices was found that 
house prices depend on prices or unknown characteristics in neighbouring regions. Second, 
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spatial heterogeneity effect on prices was captured in terms of prices in nearby areas are 
affected in a different way by the same factors. 
Regarding univariate models of spatial effects on house prices, Global Moran’s I model 
determines the existence of the spatial autocorrelation in the model residuals. However, 
Global Moran’s I model provides a misleading result when the spatial structure of a process 
varies from one area to another because it measures the average level of spatial 
autocorrelation across the obtained insights (Lloyd, 2007). Therefore, the purpose of spatial 
heterogeneity test has transferred from Global Moran’s I model to Local Moran’s I model 
which examines characteristics across space and local privileges. Index Moran’ I is generally 
employed in spatial econometrics to test the similarity or dissimilarity (positive correlation, 
negative correlation) of house prices in spatial analysis (Helbich et al., 2014). This is because 
house prices have spatial autocorrelation in space (Baumont, 2004). In this thesis, the Moran’ 
I model will be one of the competing models, although we look forward to including 
specified spatial autoregressive models which reject the null hypothesis (e.g., spatial lag or 
spatial error). 
In terms of the multivariate models of spatial effects on house prices, the SAR, SEM and 
SAC models examine the spatial dependence of house prices depending on where the 
autoregressive process is to present. These models overcome the OLS regression in terms of 
the efficient spatial parameter estimators and unbiased spatial variance estimators. This 
circumstance provides the correct confidence intervals based on estimated parameter and 
variance leading to correct predicted house prices. In this thesis, the spatial autoregressive 
and spatial error component are essential to be examined by SAR and SEM in understanding 
the spatial spill-overs of house prices in China. This is because spatial dependence of house 
prices is also known as spill-over effects referred to the literature of spill-over effects in the 
Chinese housing market (see in section 2.3.2). The spill-over effects of housing market in 
China are significantly different from that of other countries in terms of the different city 
sizes of polygons and the varying development states of cites across the country. 
The extension of the spatial autoregressive model is spatial Durbin model (SDM) which is a 
generalisation of SAR and SEM model which also includes spatial correlation of explanatory 
variables. The SDM investigates more spatial interactions rather than spatial hedonic model 
or SAR or SEM in terms of the additional spatial lags of explanatory variables. Regarding the 
more flexible in establishing alternative aspects of spatial dependence, the SDM allows 
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capturing direct, indirect and total marginal effects for the explanatory variables representing 
a more detailed relationships between spatial dependence and explanatory variables. The 
SDM is more appropriate for establishing the relationships between economic fundamentals 
and house prices in a spatial circumstance rather than a spatial hedonic model which 
addresses the house characteristics. In this thesis, SDM is employed in the house prices 
investigation in China due to the driving forces behind the fundamentals of house prices and 
spatial patterns, which is valuable in understanding the spatial effects in terms of explanatory 
variables spill-overs.  
Spatial fixed effect model is applicable to capture the spatial heterogeneity in terms of the 
fixed region specific effects and time period specific effects. However, spatial fixed effect 
model fails to examine spatial heterogeneity in terms of the spatially varying coefficients of 
housing determinants. The extension of the spatial fixed effects model is spatial Durbin fixed 
effect model which additionally allows for the explanatory variables to capture direct 
(feedback) effect and indirect (spill-over) effect. In this way, the spatial Durbin fixed effect 
model appropriately decreases the spatial heterogeneity in terms of fixed region specific 
effects, time period specific effects and spatially varying coefficients. In this thesis, the 
spatial Durbin fixed effect model is employed in evaluating uncertainty of house price for the 
real options valuation. 
Partitioning technique fills the knowledge gap by exploring the neighbour spatial spill-over 
effect of determinants on house prices. House prices are affected by determinants of 
neighbouring price, but the SDM fails to further capture the spatial spill-overs in different 
order neighbourhood. The partitioned spill-over effect of determinants on house prices is 
significant due to two-fold. First, partitioning spill-over effect denotes an in-depth 
examination into the effects of determinants in different order neighbours on house prices. 
Second, the partitioned spill-over effect of determinants on prices contributes the valuable 
information for housing market regulators. In this thesis, the method employed with 
partitioned spill-over effect of determinants on house prices is applied to help explain the 
spill-over effects on spatial heterogeneity. 
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2.5 Characteristics of Real Options in the Real Estate Market 
Several studies have provided that real options help evaluate investments in land 
development whenever there is uncertainty that can affect investment decisions, at the same 
time, there is flexibility to alter or to expand this investment (Čirjevskis and Tatevosjans, 
2015; Rocha et al., 2007; Ross, 1978). The uncertainty in vacant land development was found 
in the Chinese real estate market in terms of the underlying house price on vacant land. The 
flexibility in uncertainty about underlying house price on vacant land was revealed such as 
effects of risk or underlying building units. Uncertainty about underlying house price 
decreases investment activity in the current period but increases the land value (Razak et al., 
2018; Sing and Patel, 2001). 
Previous studies have suggested the characteristics of real options in vacant land development 
in terms of uncertainty (Capozza and Schwann, 1990; Titman, 1985). Referred to these 
studies, the uncertainty is due to the underlying house price. For example, underlying house 
price can be affected by unsystematic risks (Capozza and Schwann, 1990) and underlying 
building units (Quigg, 1993) which are flexible and drives the uncertainty. The underlying 
house price must be estimated because the price is intangible for the future building on vacant 
land (Quigg, 1993). The uncertainty about underlying house price, 𝜎𝜀′
2 , can be measured 
based on the prior house prices determinants by OLS method, which is given as: 
𝑃 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑋 +                                                  (2.22) 
~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝜀
2)                                                      (2.23) 
where 𝑃 is house price. 𝛼 is an intercept. 𝛽 provides the 𝐾 × 1 vector of parameter of house 
prices determinants. 𝑋  represents an 𝐾 × 1  vector of explanatory variables.  is a 𝑁 × 1 
vector of error. 𝑁 and 𝐾 are the number of observations. The contributions of house price, 𝛽, 
are allowed to vary time and region, respectively. According to the resulting parameter 𝛽, the 
prediction of the underlying house price is specified as: 
𝑃′ = ?̂? + ?̂??̅? + ′                                               (2.24) 
′~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝜀′
2 )                                                    (2.25) 
where 𝑃′  is underlying house price. ?̅?  is a vector of house price determinants. ?̂?  is an 
estimator of intercept. ?̂? is an estimator of coefficients. 
The flexibility in uncertainty about underlying house price on land development is various. 
For instance, Cunningham (2007) provides that the quality-adjust house prices can be 
estimated (e.g., transformation of ?̅? with region and land characteristics in Equation 2.22) in 
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contrast with the underlying house price with OLS estimator. Capozza and Schwann (1990) 
illustrates that the influences of systematic and unsystematic risk (e.g., transformation of ?̅? 
with risk-adjusted growth rate) are significant on underlying house price for converting 
agricultural land. Quigg (1993) suggests that the flexibility of the underlying building units 
(e.g., transformation of ?̅? with height and size of underlying building) differs the price of 
underlying constructions. These studies have approved the applications of the flexibility in 
uncertainty about underlying house price, meaning that the less confident developers become 
about the underlying house prices, the greater the gap will be between future profits from 
building at the actual price and those from building at the expected price (Yu and Hui, 2018). 
The uncertainty about underlying house price on land development decreases the investment 
activity in the current period (e.g., Razak et al., 2018; Sing and Patel, 2001). Deferring land 
development may reveal further information which will affect the underlying house price 
(Childs et al., 2002). Once the future information is received and the uncertainties are 
identified, the optimal decision can be made by investment (Fan et al., 2018). For this reason, 
the proportional hazard model evaluating the timing of land development function is defined 
by: 
ℎ(𝑡) = ℎ0(𝑡)exp (𝛿𝐿)                                        (2.26) 
𝛿𝐿 = 𝛼 + 𝛾𝐸[𝑃′] + 𝜑𝜎𝜀
2 + 𝛽𝑋 + 𝜈                              (2.27) 
where the expected house price is 𝐸[𝑃′].  𝜎𝜀
2 represents the price uncertainty. 𝑋 is the vector 
of explanatory variables. 𝜈 is an error term. The null hypothesis is that price uncertainty does 
not affect the timing of land development, which is present 𝐻0: 𝛾 = 0; and the alternative 
hypothesis is that price uncertainty defers the timing of land development, presenting 𝐻𝑎: 𝛾 <
0. 
Several studies have documented that the uncertainty about underlying house price increases 
the land value (Grovenstein et al., 2011; Tsekrekos and Kanoutos, 2013). Price uncertainty 
increases the option premium on land and causes the land to be more valuable with 
alternative uses than it does for immediate development (Quigg, 1993). If there is a greater 
level of price uncertainty according to the further information, then the vacant land will be 
traded at a premium above discounted future rents in current low capital use (Cunningham, 
2006). To test the effects of price uncertainty on land value, a regression model of vacant 
land is specified as: 
𝐿 = 𝛼 + 𝛼1𝜎𝜀′
2 + 𝛼2𝐸[𝑃
′] + 𝛽𝑋 + 𝜐                                (2.28) 
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where 𝐿 is vacant land price. The expected house price is 𝐸[𝑃′].  𝜎𝜀
2  represents the price 
uncertainty. 𝑋 is the vector of explanatory variables. 𝜈 is an error term. 
With respect to successfully apply real options into land development investment it is 
suggested that the uncertainty about underlying house price are examined by the various 
models under the flexibility. Modelling empirical price uncertainty are mentioned in prior 
studies (Titman, 1985; Cunningham, 2006; Capozza and Helsley 1990; Capozza and 
Schwann 1990; Quigg, 1993). Such modelling has been contributed in terms of hedonic 
model, adjusted house price model, proportional hazard model, GARCH model and OLS 
model. There are numerous applications of these models to modelling house and land data 
including estimating and forecasting underlying house price and its uncertainty (Chiang et al., 
2006; Cunningham, 2006; Grovenstein et al. 2011; Quigg, 1993; Razak et al., 2018; Shi et al., 
2015; Tsekrekos and Kanoutos, 2013). However, there is no undisputed method that deals 
with uncertainty about underlying house price in the most appropriate approach in the 
Chinese real estate market (Chiang et al., 2006). A typical approach suggests that various 
models are critically examined and evaluated, both in-sample and out-of-sample. In 
remainder of this chapter, several models of real options valuation, underlying house price, 
uncertainty and timing of land development are presented. Moreover, the application of real 
options in other sectors of economy (e.g., agriculture, R&D-intensive, pharmaceuticals, 
natural-resource, electricity and investment appraisal) is reviewed, although we do focus on 
real options approach applied to the real estate market. 
 
2.6 Real Options Approach in the Real Estate Market 
Based on the theoretical and empirical literature (see in Section 2.6), various models are 
capable to examine the uncertainty about underlying house prices and its effects on the timing 
of land development and land prices. These models are appropriately motivated to value the 
real options premium in terms of uncertainty and flexibility. 
 
2.6.1 Model of Land Development 
Cunningham (2006) provides a framework to explain the decision on land development in 
terms of the future use of land. The profit of new land development is specified as: 
𝜋 = 𝑃𝑖 − 𝐶𝑖 − 𝑅                                                 (2.29) 
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where 𝜋 is the profit of a new development of land. 𝑃𝑖 is the house price at location 𝑖. 𝐶𝑖 is 
cost the of house location 𝑖. 𝑅 is the land rent. In order to deal with the optimum amount of 
land capital at location 𝑖 , 𝑅𝑖  estimates the equilibrium land ren oft. When the profit is 
equative to zero, the modified formula of land rent is written as: 
𝑅𝑖 = 𝑃𝑖 − 𝐶𝑖                                                     (2.30) 
When the land value at location 𝑖, which has newly established houses, is more than the value 
of land as it is currently used, the land will be developed for construction. The landowner 
makes a decision as below: 
                                                if  𝑅𝑖 ≥ 𝑅𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡,             build 
(2.31)                                                 if  𝑅𝑖 < 𝑅𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡,             do not build 
Regarding the purpose of this model, 𝑅𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 is concerned as the discounted future rent of 
land. However, if the future house price at location 𝑖 is uncertain, the optimal land capital, 𝑚, 
will be referred to today’s price information. The current house prices in the neighbouring 
regions have an ability to inform the level of investment in the future. When the market 
values this information, there should remain a real-option premium, 𝐶 (Equation 2.42), on 
undeveloped land. These option premiums may delay the building activity. Accordingly, the 
modified decision with option premium by landowner is written as: 
                                            if  𝑅𝑚 ≥ 𝑅𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 + 𝐶,           build 
(2.32)                                             if  𝑅𝑚 < 𝑅𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 + 𝐶,           do not build 
where 𝑅𝑚 represents the land rent at the optimal land capital. Thus, the increase of option 
premium delays the building activity, while the decrease of option premiums encourages the 
land development. However, to successfully determine the presence of real options premium 
requires predictions of underlying house prices and examinations of uncertainty about 
underlying house prices.  
 
2.6.2 Models of House Price Uncertainty 
There is no unanimous method that the most appropriate modelling approach deals with the 
uncertainty about underlying house prices. The previous studies examine the observed 
volatility of house prices over the recent past based on the flexibility of underlying house 
prices (Tsekrekos and Kanoutos 2013; Yao and Pretorius, 2011). We applied a similar 
approach but our analysis is further complicated in two-fold.  First, the estimation of the 
underlying house prices considers the effects of neighbouring determinants with spatial 
Durbin fixed effect model. Second, the observed volatility of house prices is transformed into 
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implied volatility of underlying house prices with a generalized autoregressive conditional 
heteroskedasticity (GARCH) model. 
 
2.6.2.1 Forecasting Underlying House Prices 
To measure the house price uncertainty, the underlying house price must be estimated firstly 
because the price is intangible for the future building on vacant land (Quigg, 1993). In order 
to consider the effects of neighbouring determinants on underlying house prices, the spatial 
Durbin fixed effect model (Equation 2.17) is applicable, which contains the parameters of 
neighbouring house prices, neighbouring explanatory variables, neighbouring unknown 
characteristics and region and time period specific effects. Based on the estimation of 
parameters (in Equation 2.17), the formulation of underlying house prices is expressed as: 
𝑃𝑖𝑡
′ = 𝛼𝐼?̂? + ?̂? ∑ 𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑃𝑖𝑡
𝑁
𝑗=1 + 𝛽?̂? ∑ 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝑘
𝑘
𝑘=1 + 𝜃?̂? ∑ ∑ 𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑋𝑗𝑡𝑘
𝑁
𝑗=1
𝑘
𝑘=1 + 𝜉𝐼?̂? + 𝜐𝑖?̂?     (2.33) 
𝜐𝑖?̂?~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝜐𝑖𝑡
2 𝐼𝑛)                                                  (2.34) 
𝜈𝑖?̂? = ?̂? ∑ 𝑊𝑖𝑗𝜈𝑖𝑡
𝑁
𝑗=1 + 𝑖𝑡                                           (2.35) 
𝑖𝑡~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝜀𝑖𝑡
2 )                                                  (2.36) 
where 𝑃𝑖𝑡
′  is a 𝑁 × 1 vector containing one observation of the dependent variable for each 
spatial element (𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑁). 𝑁 is the number of regions. 𝑡 represents the observation at time 
𝑡. ?̂? provides the estimator of spatial lag parameter. ?̂? illustrates the estimator of spatial error 
parameter. 𝑋𝑖𝑡 represents the vector of explanatory variables and consists of a 𝑁 × 𝐾 matrix. 
𝐾  is the number of explanatory variables. 𝛽?̂?  provides the estimators of 𝐾  explanatory 
variable coefficients.  𝜃?̂?  represents the estimator of parameters of explanatory variables 
spatial lag.  𝐼𝑛  is an 𝑁 × 1 vector of ones. 𝛼  is the region specific fixed effects vector of 
individual fixed effects. 𝜉 are time period specific effects. 
The spatial Durbin model applied to underlying house prices is due to the price determinants 
in nearby areas (spatial lags of explanatory variables) which are mentioned in forecasting 
house prices (Case and Shiller, 1989; Cunningham, 2006). The advanced spatial Durbin fixed 
effect model not only incorporates the SAR and the SEM in terms of the spatial lags of both 
the dependent variables and explanatory variables but also captures spatial heterogeneity in 
terms of spatially varying coefficients within region and time period specific effects (see 
details in Section 2.3.2.1 and 2.3.2.2). In contrast with the prior studies, the OLS estimator is 
applied to the underlying house prices (Capozza and Helsley, 1990; Capozza and Schwann, 
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1990; Grovenstein et al., 2011; Razak et al., 2018). The neglect of spatial lags on OLS 
regression leads to the unbiased results but inefficient parameter estimators and biased 
variance estimators (Anselin, 2014). In this thesis, the spatial Durbin fixed effect model is 
applied to underlying house prices in order to forecast the house price within a spatial 
consideration.  
 
2.6.2.2 Measuring Uncertainty about Underlying House prices 
The GARCH model is appropriate to measure the volatility of house prices (Lee and Reed, 
2013; Miles, 2008, 2011; Willcocks, 2010). Proposed by Bollerslev (1986), the GARCH 
model allows the error variance to depend on its own lags and lags of the squared error. By 
this way, the conditional variance follows an Auto Regressive Moving Average (ARMA) 
process. In a special case, GARCH(1,1) model can be processed due to the assumption that 
current volatility is affected by previous innovation to volatility (Miles, 2008). By obtaining 
the conditional variance process, the volatility of house prices become stationary. The mean 
equation of GARCH model is given by: 
𝑃𝑖𝑡
′ = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑃𝑖𝑡−1
′ + 𝑖𝑡                                          (2.37) 
where 𝑃𝑖𝑡
′  is underlying house prices. 𝛼𝑖  is a intercept. 𝑡 is the house price at time 𝑡. The 
uncertainty about underlying house price, 𝜎𝑖𝑡
2 , which is provided by the error variance 
equation of GARCH(1,1) model, is expressed as: 
𝜎𝑖𝑡
2 = 𝑎 + 𝛾 𝑖𝑡−1
2 + 𝜃𝜎𝑖𝑡−1
2                                        (2.38) 
where 𝜎𝑖𝑡
2  and 𝑖𝑡
2  are the conditional variance process.10 
The influence of the GARCH model in forecasting house prices volatility is abundant. 
Cunningham (2006) provides that the price uncertainty ( 𝜎𝑖𝑡
2 ) increases when GARCH 
estimation includes the one-year-ahead house price. Enormous studies including Lee and 
Reed (2013) and Willcocks (2010) have suggested similar conclusions. The investors’ 
confidence in the one-year-ahead price forecast is stipulated on the accuracy of price 
forecasts in the recent past. The estimation of the error variance of residuals suggests the 
developers have additional information that is influencing the price (Lee and Reed, 2013). 
The factor, which is leading market house price, might be recognised more by developers 
through 𝜎𝑖𝑡
2  (Miles, 2008). The advance of the GARCH model, in the field of house prices, 
                                                          
10 For a survey of the detailed and more available GARCH models and their extensions, see Bauwens et al. 
(2006). 
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compared to the ARCH model is present in terms of the more restricted lag structure 
successfully capturing the dependencies in the conditional moments (Miles, 2011). Regarding 
the real options approaches, this thesis employs 𝜎𝑖𝑡
2  of GARCH model as house price 
volatility.  
 
2.6.3 Price Uncertainty and Timing of Land Development 
The previous studies suggest that the proportional hazard model is appropriately employed to 
examine the effects of house price uncertainty on the timing of land development (Bulan et 
al., 2009; Cunningham, 2006; Shi et al., 2015). The proportional hazard model examines the 
function of timing of land development ℎ(𝑡). In other words, the land will ‘dies’ when a 
building is constructed on it. The length of time, which is from presale permit to developers 
to put the houses on the market for sale, depends on the baseline hazard model assumption, 
ℎ0(𝑡), and a vector of covariates, 𝑍. Regarding the spatial lags of land prices and explanatory 
variables, this thesis incorporates the spatial Durbin model into the proportional hazard model, 
which is specified as: 
ℎ(𝑡) = ℎ0(𝑡)exp (𝛿𝑍)                                           (2.39) 
where the baseline hazard, ℎ0(𝑡), is shifted by a vector of covariates, 𝑍. The covariates are 
specified as: 
𝛿𝑍 = 𝛾𝐸[𝑃′] + 𝜑𝜎𝜀
2 + 𝜌𝑊𝐿 + 𝛽𝑋 + 𝜃𝑊𝑋 + 𝜉𝐼𝑛                     (2.40) 
where 𝐸[𝑃′] is underlying house prices. 𝜎𝜀
2 is uncertainty about underlying house price. 𝜌 is 
the spatial lag parameter of land prices. 𝛽 represents the coefficients of explanatory variables. 
𝜃 is the spatial lag parameter of explanatory variables. 𝑊 is a 𝑁 × 𝑁 spatial weight matrix. 𝐿 
is land price. 𝑋 represents a vector of land price explanatory variables.  𝜉 are time period 
specific effects. 𝐼𝑛 is an 𝑁 × 1 vector of ones.  
The empirical application of the proportional hazard model to the timing of land development 
is voluminous (see for example Bulan et al., 2009). Bulan et al. (2009) employing 1214 land 
transaction data in Canada from 1979 to 1998 finds a one-standard-deviation leads to a 13% 
decline in the likelihood of land development. Cunningham (2006) examines the real estate 
transaction data based on GIS records between 1982 and 2002 in Seattle and provides the 
increase of a one-standard-deviation declines the likelihood of development by 11%. Shi et al. 
(2015) using 281,405 apartments transaction data in Beijing between 2006 and 2008 provides 
a one-standard-deviation will defer apartment to sale by 0.56%. However, these studies did 
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not consider the spatial effects on land prices. Basu and Thibodeau (1998) illustrate that lack 
of spatial effects leads to the inefficient parameter estimators and biased variance estimators. 
In this circumstance, estimated parameters are in the incorrect confidence intervals. Therefore, 
this thesis contributes to the proportional hazard model in terms of the incorporation of 
spatial Durbin model which not only considers the time specific fixed effects but also 
contains the spatial lags of land price and its explanatory variables. 
 
2.6.4 Uncertainty and Land Prices 
To test the presence of real options in land markets, the effects of underlying house price and 
its uncertainty on land prices are examined by OLS estimator, which is given by: 
𝐿 = 𝛼 + 𝛼1𝐸[𝑃
′] + 𝛼2𝜎𝜀
2 + 𝛽𝑋 +                                     (2.41) 
where 𝐿 is land price. 𝛼 is an intercept. 𝛼1, 𝛼2, and 𝛽 are regression coefficients. 𝑋 represents 
a vector of explanatory variables.  is an error term. 
Referred to Equation 2.32, the uncertainty about underlying house prices increased the option 
premium on land providing the current (e.g., non-housing) use more valuable than immediate 
building activities. If there is a greater level of price uncertainty according to the economic 
information, then the vacant land will be traded at a premium above discounted future rents in 
current low capital use, 𝑅𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡. 
The empirical evidence that uncertainty about underlying house price increases land value is 
plentiful (see for example, Cunningham, 2006, among others). Yu and Hui (2018) employs 
house and land data from 1995 to 2016 in Hong Kong and finds that the investment that 
operates a real asset can increase the underlying value which also raises the value of land. 
The similar conclusion is expressed by Chiang et al. (2006), Grovenstein et al. (2011), Quigg 
(1993), Razak et al. (2018), Sing and Patel (2001), Tsekrekos and Kanoutos (2013) and 
Yamaguchi et al. (2000). In this thesis, the OLS estimator is applied to test the relationship 
between uncertainty about underlying house prices and land prices. 
 
2.6.5 Model of Real Options Valuation 
The European-style options pricing equilibrium model is first developed by Fischer Black 
(1973) and Myron Scholes (1973), which is called ‘Black-Scholes’ model (Cox et al., 1979). 
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This model is appropriately employed to deal with real options premium with an underlying 
asset (Vahdatmanesh and Firouzi, 2017). Black and Scholes adopt the valuation of European 
call and put options on the potential future values of the underlying asset in terms of a 
‘Weiner process’ and ‘Geometric Brownian Motion’ (Crundwell, 2008; Lander and Pinches 
1998). Developing vacant land at a premium is analogical to exercise a call option (Dixit and 
Pindyck, 1994; Pindyck, 1991; Razak et al., 2018). Thus, the valuation equation of a 
European call option is employed, which can be expressed as: 
𝐶 = 𝑆𝑁(𝑑1) − 𝑁(𝑑2)𝐾𝑒
−𝑟𝑡                                       (2.42) 
𝑑1 =
ln(
𝑆
𝐾
)+(𝑟+
𝜎2
2
)𝑡
𝜎∗√𝑡
                                                (2.43) 
𝑑2 = 𝑑1 − 𝜎 ∗ √𝑡                                                (2.44) 
where 𝐶 is call option premium. 𝑆 represents the value of the underlying asset. 𝑡 is time until 
option exercise. 𝐾  provides option striking price. 𝑟  is the risk-free interest rate. 𝑁  is the 
cumulative standard normal distribution. 𝑒  is the exponential term. σ  is the volatility of 
underlying asset price. 𝑙𝑛 is a natural log.  
Ross (1978) and Rocha et al. (2007) provide that Black-Scholes model valuing the real 
options premium on vacant land overcomes the traditional capital budget (e.g., forecast the 
expected cash flows, discount cash flow at the cost of capital and subtract the amount of the 
investment). The assumptions of the DCF method suggest the estimated future cash flows can 
be estimated on the premise of future certainty, which is short-sighted decisions, 
underinvestment and loss of competitive position in terms of the lack of uncertain strategic 
considerations (Keswani and Shackleton, 2006; Trigeorgis and Mason, 1987; Zeng and 
Zhang, 2011). In contrast, Black-Scholes model for real options has been applied to land 
development to account for the uncertainty based on the flexibility, volatility of uncertainty 
and timing of land development, where the traditional DCF is unable to do so (Tsekrekos and 
Kanoutos, 2013). For instance, Patel and Sing (2000) incorporate the house price uncertainty 
on the decision of land development and demonstrate that the traditional DCF model tends to 
encourage the building activity at the premature time; however, real options model inspires 
that the development should be postponed in terms of the uncertainty about underlying house 
price. In this thesis, the Black-Scholes model is employed to value the real options premium 
on vacant land. 
The empirical evidence that land has a premium in the real options valuation is voluminous in 
various countries. Quigg (1993) employing the real estate transaction data between 1976 and 
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1979 and in Seattle finds that there is a 6% option premium on undeveloped land. 
Cunningham (2006) examines the real estate transaction data based on GIS records between 
1982 and 2002 in Seattle and provides the increase of a one-standard-deviation raises vacant 
land prices by 1.6%. Chiang et al. (2006) using 58 lands auctions and 3,500 real estate 
transactions from 1995 to 2001 in Hong Kong illustrate the option premium on vacant land 
varies between 2.33% and 69.1%, with an average of 7.75%. Grovenstein et al. (2011) 
provide that the premium is 6.6% in the option to delay using 2,034 properties transactions 
data and 836 vacant land transactions data from 1986 to 1993 in Chicago. Tsekrekos and 
Kanoutos (2013) investigate the real estate market in Greece between 2004 and 2007 and 
show a premium on the option to wait is between 26.66% and 52.38%, especially in the west 
and north suburbs of Athens. Razak et al. (2018) investigate the option of speculative 
behaviour for vacant land delays the building activity in Malaysia by 254 vacant land plots 
and 3,681 houses in Malaysia from 2010 to 2013 and finds the option premium on vacant 
lands ranges from 8% to 20% across all areas in Selangor, Malaysia. The option premium has 
been found to be 16% to 28% in the United Kingdom between 1984 and 1997 (Sing and Patel, 
2001), 18.5% and 36.5% for Tokyo from 1986 to 1993 (Yamaguchi et al., 2000). However, 
the empirical evidence of option premium on land is lack. In this thesis, we incorporate the 
models mentioned above to examine the option premium on land in the Chinese real estate 
market. 
 
2.7 Real Options Approaches in Various Industries 
Schwartz and Trigeorgis (2004) suggest that there are six categories of real options 
approaches under conditions of uncertainty and differences in flexibility, which are option to 
defer, time-to-build option, option to alter operating scale, option to abandon, option to 
switch and corporate growth option. According to the categories of real options, this section 
reviews the real options approaches applied to the various sectors of the economy. 
 
2.7.1 Option to Defer Investment 
Trigeorgis (1996, p. 10) describes the option to defer investment as an option to buy valuable 
land or resources. This option allows the developers to wait 𝑥 years in order to explore the 
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justification between the output prices and development costs. The value of investment 
opportunity 𝐶 is given by: 
𝐶 = max (𝑉 − 𝐼𝑥, 0)                                             (2.45) 
where 𝑉 is the value of project. 𝐼 represents the project’s outlays. The option to defer is thus 
similar to call option on gross present value, 𝑉 , with strike price, 𝐼𝑥  (Titman, 1985). 
Trigeorgis (1993) emphasises that the additional investment opportunity in the NPV rule 
decrease the value of option the to wait unless the value of cash flows, 𝑉, exceeds the outlays, 
𝐼𝑥, by a substantial premium in terms of the uncertain characteristic.
11 
In terms of the option to defer, Bernanke (1983) illustrates that the uncertainty of investment 
delays the investment activity, particularly on real asset investment due to the type of 
investment is irreversible. Dixit (1989) and Dixit and Pindyck (1994) provide a similar 
conclusion to Bernanke (1983). Titman (1985) establishes the option pricing model, which 
was initially employed by Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1973), to investigate the 
option value of vacant plots of land under the uncertainty about underlying house price due to 
the flexibility the underlying building units. It is found that the uncertainty decreases the 
investment activity in the current period resembles Bernanke (1983). Ingersoll and Ross 
(1992) provide that the investment should not be undertaken until the project rate of return is 
substantially exceed of its break-even rate in terms of the uncertain interest rate. 
Agriculture decisions have the option to defer based on the investment is essentially 
irreversible or severe to be changed once have been made. (Köppl-Turyna and Köppl, 2013). 
Sanderson et al. (2015) treat transformations and infrastructure as underlying assets, which 
are irreversible, and investigate real options of Australian wheat production under climate 
change. They find that the option to defer is valuable under uncertainty about the climate 
which delays the adaptation and transformation of agricultural systems. An application to 
greenhouse construction provides strong support for the implementation of 2328/91 EU 
regulation in real options, as the adoption of new technology in greenhouse building is 
inefficient without regulation (Tzouramani and Mattas, 2004). It implies that the real options 
change the investment decisions in terms of the regulatory uncertainty and greenhouse 
construction (irreversibility) in the agricultural industry.  
                                                          
11 Net Present Value (NPV) rule is “invest when the value of a unit of capital is at least as large as the purchase 
and installation cost of the unit” (Pindyck, 1998). 
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Köppl-Turyna and Köppl (2013) overview the studies of the applications of real options in 
agriculture and provide that policymakers should improve the method of cost-benefit analysis 
(e.g., sunk costs) because these policies influence the flexibility and uncertainty about outputs 
volatility.12 Seyoum and Chan (2012) investigate wine grape farm investment in North West 
Victoria and demonstrate that the sunk costs and volatile seasonal revenues for wine grape 
farming have a significant option value in waiting. Coratoa and Brady (2019) also consider 
that sunk investment costs and uncertain about returns increase the value of option to wait 
based on the effects of decoupled payments on the optimal timing of agricultural land 
development. 13  The results provide that decoupled payments stimulate the activity of 
development while passive farming increases. In other words, decoupled payments influence 
the managerial flexibility in terms of the option to wait. It also suggests that policymaker 
should regulate passive farming based on supporting optimal returns for the investors and 
decreasing the potential capitalisation of the Basic Payment Scheme (BPS) payments in land 
values and rental prices. 
 
2.7.2 Time-to-Build Option 
The time-to-build option is described as the option to default during staged construction 
(Trigeorgis, 1996, p. 11). The staging investment as a series of outlays creates options to 
abandon at any stage. Each stage of the capital investment is treated as an option on the value 
of subsequent stages by instalment-cost outlay or for the next stage. In this process, the 
option is valued as a compound option resembles options on options. Carr (1988) examines 
sequential compound options and suggested the time-to-build option resembles the options to 
acquire subsequent options to exchange an asset for another asset. Majd and Pindyck (1987) 
examine the time-to-build option for an irreversible investment which has an option to 
postpone at each stage of the project. The optimal decision at each period is either to invest at 
a maximum rate or wait for an improvement in external conditions. 
Time-to-build option has flexibility on each stage decision in R&D-intensive industries, 
particularly in pharmaceuticals. Hartmann and Hassan (2006) provide that the real options 
approach emphasises in the clinical phases by the pharmaceutical companies and is different 
                                                          
12 Pindyck (1991) provides that cost of investment can be a sunk cost, which is unrecovered. 
13 “Decoupled payments are budgetary payments paid to eligible recipients which are not linked to current 
production of specific crop or livestock numbers or the use of specific factors of production” (Coratoa and 
Brady, 2019). 
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from financial service firms who focus on the pre-clinical phase. Real options provide a more 
holistic project analysis in terms of flexibility in the strategic phases. Within clinical phases, 
the pharmaceutical companies have the opportunities to capture future uncertain characters 
based on which to make the next strategic investment decision.  
Time-to-build option is also valuable in a new technological area which is affected by the 
scope of the technological opportunity, the competition in the area, and a firm’s past 
investment behaviour (Baranova and Muzykob, 2015; Hamill et al., 2013; McGrath and 
Nerkar, 2004). McGrath and Nerkar (2004) suggest that time-to-build option is essential in 
the U.S. pharmaceutical industry in terms of the uncertainty about next stage in a new 
technological area because there are advantages on past investment behaviour and reduced 
competition decreases the cost of new technological investment. The uncertainty about next 
stage increases the value of option to develop the investment. The investment in next stage is 
more profitable due to the last investment. Baranova and Muzykob (2015) evaluate a 
methodological approach on the influence of venture capital investments in innovative 
projects in pharmaceutical industry and provide that the compound real option raises the 
overall value of the innovative project based on the factor of staged investment and a 
possibility to stop financing. Hamill et al. (2013) examine the shareholder wealth effects on 
the United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA) for firms and provide that the FDA 
for drug approvals significantly increase shareholder wealth. The increase in shareholder 
wealth is due to the enhancements of existing drugs and information leakage. These studies 
demonstrate the uncertainties (e.g., new technological area and information leakage) have a 
positive impact on the option value in pharmaceutical R&D-intensive industry.  
In terms of long-term projects, the time-to-build option has a value in terms of capital 
budgeting on each stage. Karami and Farsani (2011) illustrate that the real options method 
shows lower the escalation of commitment (EC)14 for a failed project than those who merely 
use the net present value method. It implies that employing the real options on capital 
budgeting of each stage can influence investors’ behaviour and decisions in terms of better 
decision-making in long-term projects. 
                                                          
14 See ‘real option method and escalation of commitment in the evaluation of investment projects’ by Karami 
and Farsani (2011). 
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2.7.3 Option to Alter Operating Scale 
Based on the expected market conditions, there are the options for the firms which can 
expand the scale of production and advance the resource utilisation or reduce the scale of 
operations or shut down and restart the project due to the risk and uncertainty (Trigeorgis, 
1996, pp. 11-12). 
 
2.7.3.1 Option to Expand 
When the market conditions are more favourable than expected, there is an option to expand 
the scale of operation (by 𝑥%) with a subsequent cost (𝐼𝐸). Trigeorgis and Mason (1987) 
noted the option to expand is analogous as a call option which stock price is the sum of base-
scale value and additional part (𝑥%) and the exercise price is (𝐼𝐸). The value of investment 
opportunity, 𝐶, is expressed as: 
𝐶 = 𝑉 + max(𝑥𝑉 − 𝐼𝐸 , 0)                                     (2.46)  
The option to expand is valuable in the oil industry. The management applied a more 
expensive technology to expand production in terms of built-in flexibility such as oil (Sabet 
and Heaney, 2017). Sabet and Heaney (2017) examine the link between oil (gas) firm share 
price and crude oil (natural gas) return, volatility and drilling activity. They provide that real 
options influence the drilling by gas firms. Also, the exercise of option to expand has affected 
the firm share price. This result supports the possibility of compound option effects referred 
to the built-in flexibility between drilling and firm share price. 
The option to expand is essential to strategic operations, particularly if it enables the firm to 
capitalise on future growth opportunities if future market developments yield favourable 
(Trigeorgis, 1990). Trigeorgis (1996, p. 11) finds that an option for future growth is 
significant in terms of buying vacant land to position the advantages of developing market 
share. 
 
2.7.3.2 Option to Contract 
The option to contract occurs that the management reduce the scale of the project (by 𝑐%) 
with saving part of the planned investment outlays (𝐼𝐶) when the market conditions is weaker 
than expected. Trigeorgis (1996, p. 11) provides the options to contract resembles the option 
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to expand in terms of the flexibility to mitigate loss the of a project, which the stock price is 
the base-scale project minus mitigate part (𝑐%) and treat the potential cost savings (𝐼𝐶) as the 
exercise price. The option premium, 𝑃, can be given by: 
𝑃 = max (𝐼𝐶 − 𝑐𝑉, 0)                                             (2.47) 
In contrast with the option to expand, the option to contract is significant to the project for 
introducing new products in uncertain markets (McGrath and Nerkar, 2004). The option to 
contract is emphasised in choosing among technologies or plants with alternative ratios of 
construction cost to maintenance cost. It is appropriate to construct a plant with lower initial 
development costs and higher maintenance expenditures due to the flexibility on contract 
operations when the market conditions go down (Fonseca et al., 2017). 
 
2.7.3.3 Option to Shut Down and Restart Operations 
In terms of the option to shut down and restart operations, the operation in each year is 
regarded as a call option to acquire that year's cash revenues (𝐶) by paying the variable costs 
of operating (𝐼𝑉 ) as exercise price (Trigeorgis, 1996, p 11). The option premium, 𝑃 , is 
expressed as: 
𝑃 = max (𝐶 − 𝐼𝑉, 0)                                              (2.48) 
Option to shut down and restart operations is the right to acquire each year’s cash revenues 
by paying the variable costs of operating and then achieve the optimal premium (Fonseca et 
al., 2017). It is typically found in natural-resource industries. A seminal study examining the 
option value on a copper mining project with high-risk cash flow provides that the 
uncertainty is considered in the payoff (Brennan and Schwartz, 1985). The results provide 
that the continues time arbitrage and stochastic control theory are applicable to determine the 
optimal decisions for developing, managing or abandon. Fonseca et al. (2017) incorporate 
managerial flexibility on an African oil exploration project and demonstrate that the 
uncertainty about oil price volatility decreases the optimal returns in a Monte Carlo 
simulation (MCS). While the result considering managerial flexibility in the binomial model 
provides that the uncertainty about oil price volatility increases value for the project. It 
implies that the option to shut down and restart operations achieve the optimal premium in 
terms of the uncertainties about cash income in the oil industry. 
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2.7.4 Option to Abandon for Salvage Value 
Trigeorgis (1996, p. 12) concludes that management owns the right to abandon current 
operations permanently and comprehend the resale value of capital assets on second-hand 
markets for its salvage value in terms of the option to abandon when the market conditions 
decline significantly. This option can be treated as an American put option on the current 
value of the project (𝑉) with an exercise price the salvage or best-alternative-use value (𝐴). 
The option premium, 𝐶, is given by: 
 𝐶 = 𝑉 + max(𝐴 − 𝑉, 0)                                            (2.49) 
or 
𝐶 = max(𝑉, 𝐴)                                                   (2.50) 
Clark et al. (2010) employing an option-pricing model for valuing the abandonment option 
from UK divestitures from 1985 to 1991 find the abandonment option to investors is based on 
private information, which is the actual exit value. It suggests overpricing is associated with 
the premature investment. 
Valuable abandonment options are found in the capital-intensive industries (Myers and Majd, 
1990). Capozza and Li (2002) explore the land development decisions with the consideration 
of capital intensity (e.g., current yield and internal rate of return, IRR) and find there is the 
optimal investment when the current yield is equative to the cost of capital plus uncertainty 
premium in the real options valuation. The IRR balanced the sum of the cost of capital and 
the uncertainty premium of cash flows’ growth rate. The increase of interest rate decreases 
the optimal capital intensity in terms of the positive response of project IRR and accelerates 
the investment activity. It implies that the growth of cash flows delays the optimal projects 
which are influenced positively under the growth of uncertainty and decreases the optimal 
capital intensity in terms of an option to abandon for salvage value. 
 
2.7.5 Option to Switch Use 
If there are changes in prices or demand, management can change the facility output mix 
(product flexibility); alliteratively, the same outputs can be produced using different types of 
inputs (process flexibility, Trigeorgis, 1994). 
In terms of the option to switch in workforce expansion, treating shifts on workforce 
expansion is an investment opportunity (Fernandes et al., 2013). Referred to the traditional 
57 
 
DCF, the decision on increasing shifts by employing temporary workers or hiring permanent 
employees is at risk because the idiosyncrasies in shift management are captured slightly. In 
contrast, real options provide the maximum level of flexibility under conditional uncertainty 
to make switch decisions by quantified ability manager. It implies that the option value on 
labour shifts is based on the increase of additional shifts and the consideration of appropriate 
timing to shift.  
Regarding the option to switch in electricity markets, the option using on wind generation 
assets is affected by the switchable tariff (Yu et al., 2006). Yu et al. (2006) provide that the 
fixed tariff creates a higher priority to the quantity of wind generation. The time-varying and 
location-dependent electricity prices differ the wind energy and provide higher priority to the 
quality of wind generation. It implies that the switching tariff reduces the risk exposures of 
wind generators and creates more value to wind generators based on the flexibility of 
switching and accuracy of short-term forecasts.  
 
2.7.6 Corporate Growth Options 
Trigeorgis (1996, p. 12) describes that an early investment (e.g., in R&D, lease on 
undeveloped land or oil reserves and strategic acquisition) is a link in a chain of interrelated 
projects, providing the future growth opportunities. The option value of the early projects 
derives slightly from the expected directly measurable cash flows due to future growth 
opportunities (Pindyck, 1988). Corporate growth options establishing future opportunities are 
considerable in strategic importance (Myersn, 1977; Trigeorgis, 1988).  
Chung and Charoenwong (1991) provide that certain enterprises could not take place in 
investment opportunities when the value of growth opportunities is recognised by future 
investment. It implies the value of the firm include the existing internal asset value and the 
value of future growth opportunities due to the corporate growth options. Kellogg and 
Charles (2000) provide that the high-tech biotechnology companies have a high stock price 
due to the products from early stages of development, although no product revenue. When 
applying the decision-tree method and binomial-lattice method to value the share price of 
high-tech companies, the real options evaluation methods reflect the early value of the high-
tech companies is essential with a corporate growth option. The infrastructure and experience 
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gained from the initial investment can address the firm at a competitive advantage, which 
reinforces itself if learning-cost-curve effects are present (Kim et al., 2017).  
 
2.8 Concluding Remarks for Real Options in Real Estate Market 
A literature review relevant to real options approach applied in the real estate market is 
presented. Several studies have provided that real options help evaluate investments in land 
development whenever there is uncertainty that can affect investment decisions, at the same 
time, there is flexibility to alter or to expand this investment (Čirjevskis and Tatevosjans, 
2015; Rocha et al., 2007; Ross, 1978). 
Regarding the model of land development (Equation 2.32), the increase of option premium 
delays the building activity, while the decrease of option premiums encourages land 
development. In order to successfully determine the presence of real options premium 
requires the predictions of underlying house prices and examinations of uncertainty about 
underlying house prices. 
To measure the house price uncertainty, the underlying house price must be estimated firstly 
because the price is intangible for the future building on vacant land (Quigg, 1993). In this 
thesis, the spatial Durbin fixed effect model is applied to underlying house prices in order to 
forecast the house price within a spatial consideration. This is because spatial Durbin fixed 
effect model not only incorporates the SAR and the SEM in terms of the spatial lags of both 
the dependent variables and explanatory variables but also captures spatial heterogeneity in 
terms of spatially varying coefficients within region and time period specific effects. In 
contrast with the prior studies, the OLS estimator is applied to the underlying house prices 
(e.g., Capozza and Helsley, 1990; among others). The neglect of spatial lags on OLS 
regression leads to the unbiased results but inefficient parameter estimators and biased 
variance estimators. 
To measure the uncertainty about underlying house prices, this thesis employs the GARCH 
model due to the assumption that current volatility is affected by previous innovation to 
volatility (Miles, 2008). The advance of the GARCH model, in the field of house prices, 
compared to the ARCH model is present in terms of the more restricted lag structure 
successfully capturing the dependencies in the conditional moments. 
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To investigate the relationship between the price uncertainty and timing of land development, 
the proportional hazard model is applicable based on the previous studies (see, for example, 
Cunningham, 2006, among others). However, these studies did not consider the spatial effects 
on land prices. Basu and Thibodeau (1998) illustrate that lack of spatial effects leads to the 
inefficient parameter estimators and biased variance estimators. In this thesis, the 
proportional hazard model incorporating spatial Durbin model is employed to examine the 
effects of price uncertainty on timing of land development. By this way, the transformed 
model not only considers the time specific fixed effects but also contains the spatial lags of 
land price and its explanatory variables. 
In order to test the presence of real options in land markets, the effects of underlying house 
price and its uncertainty on land prices are examined by OLS estimator in this thesis. 
Referred to Equation 2.32, the uncertainty about underlying house prices increased the option 
premium on land providing the current (e.g., non-housing) use more valuable than immediate 
building activities. If there is a greater level of price uncertainty according to the economic 
information, then the vacant land will be traded at a premium above discounted future rents in 
current low capital use, 𝑅𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡. 
Regarding the model of real options valuation, the Black-Scholes model valuing the real 
options premium on vacant land overcomes the traditional capital budget. This is because the 
Black-Scholes model for real options have been applied to land development to account for 
the uncertainty based on the flexibility, volatility of uncertainty and timing of land 
development, where the traditional DCF is unable to do so (Tsekrekos and Kanoutos, 2013). 
In this thesis, the Black-Scholes model is employed to value the real options premium on 
vacant land. 
Last but not least, this section reviews the real options approaches applied to the various 
sectors of the economy, such as agriculture, R&D-intensive, pharmaceuticals, natural-
resource, electricity and investment appraisal, based on the categories of real options. The 
real options approach providing the optimal option values under the uncertainty with 
alterative flexibilities contributes the investment decision-making to the various industries.    
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Chapter 3 The Development of Housing Market in China 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The housing market in China is a significant part of the Chinese economy. In 2017, housing 
sales achieved 13.37 trillion RMB accounting for 16.4% of China’s GDP (Liu and Xiong, 
2018). China’s average house prices were increasing rapidly from ¥503 in 1988 to ¥6,793 in 
2015, which encourages this chapter to review the effective fundamentals and policies 
debates regarding the Chinese housing market in the development literature. In this chapter, 
Section 3.2 reviews the characteristics of the Chinese housing market. Section 3.3 
demonstrates the emergence of a real estate market in China in terms of housing reform, 
urbanisation and circumstance of “ghost towns”. In particularly, Section 3.4 highlights the 
implications of household behaviours on house prices in terms of income, price-to-income 
ratio, home size and down payments. Section 3.5 highlights the implications of land supply 
on house prices in terms of the fiscal revenues and debt of local government in China. 
Section 3.6 addresses the participatory methodologies to the house prices assessment. Section 
3.7 includes a summary review of the related literature for the Chinese housing market and 
general discussion about the gaps existing in the current literature. 
 
3.2 Characteristics of Chinese Housing Market 
The transformation of Chinese real estate model has increased motivation to review the 
effective fundamentals and policy debates of house prices regarding the Chinese housing 
market development literature (Chen et al., 2015; Gan et al., 2010; Koss and Shi, 2018; Wang, 
2011). The housing privatisation, derived from housing reform, stimulates the household’s 
housing consumption and then increases equilibrium housing demand in China (Gan et al. 
2010 and Wang, 2011). 
The urbanisation simulated the demand for housing in the urban area significantly for the last 
three decades. The reasons are in two-fold. First, the relaxation of the Hukou system 
implemented population migration and raised in rural-to-urban migration and the new urban 
centre's development after 1978. Second, China developed 10th Five-Year Plan in 2001 which 
regarded the urbanisation as a national strategy to stimulate demand and encourage the 
housing market to be a significant factor in China’s economic growth. The urbanisation rate 
drives up the construction of new homes. However, it is mentioned that the construction 
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boom was caused in the Chinese housing market and was featured as a high vacancy rate in 
cities and then lead to “ghost towns”. Accordingly, the supply of land plays a significant role 
in the Chinese urbanisation process. 
The housing assets accounted for 66% of household wealth in China in 2016 (Liu and Xiong, 
2018). The steady growth in per capita income drives property prices up in China (Chen and 
Li, 2011); however, the house transaction price has been growing much faster than the 
average income from 1997 to 2017 (Ge and Wu, 2017). Fang et al. (2016) argue that the 
rapidly increasing house price in China is also contributed by the households in the low-
income from purchasing houses. Liu and Xiong (2018) provide several factors that explain 
the willingness of low-income households to afford financial burdens of purchasing houses.  
Due to the Budget Law, the Chinese local governments expend the fiscal capacity by non-
budgetary funding sources such as land sales. The mixture of local government fiscal policies 
in China causes corruption in the Chinese land market (Cai et al., 2017 and Chen and Kung, 
2018). The “Local Government Financing Platform” (LGFP) arranges contrary progress of 
Budget Law to constrict the budget restraint issues of local governments leads to the growth 
in debt by local governments (Bai et al., 2016).  
In order to investigate the Chinese housing market systematically, it is essential to capture the 
house prices for major cities in China. The difficulty in capture a house price is present 
because the house price requires to compare the prices of the same houses over time. Hedonic 
price regression focuses on the unobserved and time-varying characteristics which result in 
biased estimates of the house price (Bajari et al., 2010). The IV-GMM method restricts 
unobserved heterogeneity and limited the consistency of the dependent variable (Baltagi, 
2001). 
 
3.3 The Emergence of a Real Estate Market in China 
3.3.1 Housing Reforms 
Under the centrally planned economy, urban housing belonged to a portion of the socialist 
welfare system was called “welfare housing” in 1978 (Chen et al. 2015). Based on this 
scheme, the central government assigned land to work units (Danwei in Chinese) which then 
developed these lands into houses that were provided to their employees.15  Bray (2005) 
                                                          
15 Central government represents the state council, ministries, and the China Banking Regulatory Commission. 
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describes Danwei as the working place in China. 16  Dan Wei provides employees with 
housing and medical supplies, which are not covered by the employee’s salary (Chai, 1996). 
Welfare housing denoted the benefits for employees and the justice of socialism. However, 
equalitarian allocation was compound, and the scarcity of housing and weak housing 
conditions were problems (Chen et al. 2015). 
Housing commercialisation and privatisation were facilitated since 1990 referred to the first 
national conference on the housing market which reformed the Chinese housing market for a 
second time.17 Regarding the consideration on stabilisation of housing market development, 
the housing reform was implemented critically in step-by-step increments in China.18 The 
inceptive housing reform was characterised by slight enhancement on increasing rent and 
improvement of housing expenditure to individual workers due to the gradual housing 
commercialisation (Chen et al., 2015). Market-orientated reforms were implemented to 
accelerate the transition of housing from a welfare provision to a commodity (Koss and Shi, 
2018).19 Regarding the diversifications from housing allocation system, the Chinese citizens 
were required to purchase housing on the market at the family. This situation unleashed a 
flood of private housing demand and prompted a significant increase in the cost of 
commodity residential housing in China (Chen et al., 2012). 
The privatisation of housing has a significant impact on China’s economy. Before the 
abolishment of welfare housing, more than 90% of housing investment was from central 
government or state-owned enterprises. In contrast, the central government investment 
declines to less than 50% after the privatisation of housing. The rate of privatisation for urban 
housing had already increased to 80% in most provinces and almost 100% in Shanghai until 
2001 (Chen et al. 2011). The housing privatisation stimulates the household’s housing 
consumption and then increases equilibrium house prices in China (Gan et al. 2010 and Wang, 
                                                          
16 See Bray (2005) for social space and governance in urban china: the Danwei system from origins to reform. 
17 Before 1978, China did not have a private urban housing market. The national state owned the land use rights. 
In 1980, Beijing Municipal Commission of Housing and Urban-Rural Development set up the urban 
development plans, which began the comprehensive development of real estates.  
18 In 1981, experimental projects for the development of commercial buildings were started in Shenzhen and 
Guangzhou. Shenzhen was an initial pilot city of housing privatisation before applying the changes to other 
areas of China. In 1992, Deng Xiaoping inspected Shenzhen and found there was a significant improvement in 
economic conditions after housing reform. Deng Xiaoping believed that the experience of Shenzhen was worth 
promoting nationally. Subsequently, China's real estate development started in earnest in the coastal cities, such 
as Hainan, Beihai and Guangzhou. In 1994, the central government allowed state-sector employees to purchase 
full or partial property rights to their current apartment units at subsidised prices. In July 1998, the Chinese 
government announced the termination of “Welfare Housing” and the cancellation of limits for house prices 
(Koss and Shi, 2018). 
19 In 1980, chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, Deng Xiaoping, defined the 
house as a commodity. 
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2011). The dramatic transformation of housing from privatisation stimulates entrepreneurship 
in China by alleviating credit constraints (Wang, 2012). The housing privatisation is relative 
to substantial increases in income inequality in China (Novokmet et al., 2018). The 
abolishment of welfare housing system introduces the residential mortgage loans to the 
Chinese housing market and impacts on bank systems in terms of mortgage down payment 
and mortgage interest rates (Koss and Shi, 2018).  
Therefore, the housing demand for households and enterprises have been influenced 
significantly due to the housing reforms and then affect the house price. In this thesis, the 
housing fundamentals (e.g., income, mortgage down payment rates, fiscal policy) and their 
influences are investigated in order to examine the house prices in the Chinese housing 
market. 
 
3.3.2 Urbanisation 
China’s urbanisation process has experienced a meandering exploration course. In 1978, the 
huge population and poor agrarian economy haunted China. China implemented strict 
regulations on rural-to-urban migration, known as the Hukou system, to provide a stable food 
supply and adequate public services to urban citizens. Hukou system not only perverted 
China’s labour market but also limited the Chinese housing market development before 1978 
(Chan and Zhang, 1999). 
The relaxation of the Hukou system implemented population migration and raised in rural-to-
urban migration and the new urban centre’s development after 1978. The population 
migration is mentioned by the previous studies which are the migration pattern leading to the 
new urban centres (Ma, 2002, 2003). Chen et al. (2011) mentioned that the most migration 
from countryside to city is unofficial migration without Hukou transfer before 2001, although 
population migration in China is regulated as official migration.20 They suggest that urban 
housing growth is based on not only the rapid Chinese urbanisation but also the massive 
migration with the transfer of household registration (floating population).21 The floating 
population mainly results in prosperous housing demand in the urban area. It is recommended 
that the official urbanisation data in China has a lower level than that in a realisation. 
                                                          
20 The official migration is with Hukou transfer (or permanent migration) and unofficial migration is without 
Hukou transfer (or temporary migration) (Chen et al. 2011). 
21  Migrants without the official transfer of household registration are called the floating population, or 
temporary migrants, and are usually excluded from urban population statistics (Chen et al. 2011). 
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China developed 10th Five-Year Plan in 2001 which regarded the urbanisation as a national 
strategy to stimulate demand and encourage the housing market to be a significant factor of 
China’s economic growth. In terms of cooperating this strategy, the State Council issued a 
policy that allowed free rural-to-urban migration for counties and small towns and completely 
abolished urban-to-rural divide in Hukou system in 2014. Chinese citizens are unlimited to 
urban areas, except several Tier 1 cities such as Beijing and Shanghai. The growth in the 
urbanisation rate from 1990 to 2016 is provided in Figure 3.1. The urbanisation growing in a 
stabilisation simulated the demand for housing in the urban area significant. The urbanisation 
process accounts for about 80% of the growth in China’s urban house prices (Garriga et al., 
2017). Therefore, it is recommended that the urbanisation process influence urban house 
prices significantly. The variations in the number of births over time result in large and 
predictable changes in the demand for housing (Mankiw and Weil, 1989). Due to the Chinese 
large population base, the high urbanisation rate represents the essential demand for housing 
in the urban area and then influences the urban house prices significantly. 
Figure 3.1 China’s Urbanisation Process 
 
                                                  Source: Liu and Xiong (2018) 
Urbanisation is still going on in China. By 2016, there are more than 40% of Chinese citizens 
living in rural areas (Liu and Xiong, 2018). The completion of new homes achieved a 
balanced point compared to growth in the urbanisation rate in 2011 (Figure 3.1). Construction 
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of new homes exceeded urbanisation rate after 2012 and declined in 2015, indicating a 
slowdown in the construction boom. In other words, in the Chinese property market, 
insufficient supplies coexist with steady increases in urbanisation rate between 1990 and 
2011; and the construction boom exists between 2011 and 2015. Essentially, it implies that 
the urbanisation rate drives up the construction of new homes between 1990 and 2011; 
however, it is mentioned that construction boom may feature a high vacancy rate in cities and 
then lead to a housing bubble. Accordingly, the supply of land plays a significant role in the 
Chinese urbanisation process. In this thesis, the supply of land and population are involved in 
the models in order to examine the relationships between house prices and them.  
 
3.3.3 Ghost Towns 
The “ghost towns” could be found mostly in empty urban districts with newly constructed in 
areas far away from the central business district (CBD). The noted cases contain Ordos in 
Inner Mongolia and Zhengdong New District in Henan Province. In other words, China’s real 
estate market features a high vacancy rate in cities (Liu and Xiong, 2018). Glaeser et al. 
(2017) provide that the housing vacancy rate increased rapidly after 2009 across Tier 1 to 4 
cities (Figure 3.2). Therefore, it is recommended to explore whether the “ghost towns” caused 
the housing bubbles in China and the effects of “ghost towns”. 
Figure 3.2 Vacancy Rates for Chinese Cities, 2001-2012 
 
Source: Glaeser et al. (2017) 
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A high vacancy rate is an essential indicator of a housing bubble (Glaeser et al., 2017). Liu 
and Xiong (2018) explain the process of the high vacancy rate in China’s housing market 
which is occurred by the low occupancy rate of completed residential properties and the long 
duration of an occupied new district. They also provide that the influencing factors of the 
process are land sale revenue and the outflow of residents to Tier 1 and 2 cities for the lower 
Tiers cities. Zhang, Jia, and Yang (2016) consider high vacancy rates in China’s cities have 
increased income inequality, measured by the income GINI index. Anglin et al. (2014) and 
Wang et al. (2018) illustrated that the local government officials, China’s land leasehold 
system and fiscal system are the essential factors for the high vacancy rate in China. Thus, the 
rapid development of housing in China is at a crossroads. It implies that it is valuable to 
evaluate what are the main economic fundamentals influenced by the real estate boom and 
then how to balance these fundamentals in order to achieve a relatively balanced economic 
condition. 
 
3.4 Housing market and Households 
3.4.1 Household Income and Price-to-Income Ratio 
Housing assets have been a significant part of household wealth in China. The housing assets 
accounted for 66% of household wealth in China in 2016 (Liu and Xiong, 2018). Household 
demand is an essential factor in the Chinese housing market fundamentals and is mentioned 
by enormous academic literature. Wang and Zhang (2014) illustrate that the citizen income, 
urban population, urban land supply and construction costs are significant fundamentals in 
the Chinese housing market. Chen and Li (2011) find that housing-price growth is closely 
related to demand-side variables, such as increases in household income, employing national 
and province-level panel data. Thus, it is valuable to investigate the household income in 
China in terms of the contributions and effects on the housing demand. 
Most studies suggest that the relationship between income and house price is positive in 
China (Chen and Li, 2011; Fang et al., 2016; Hillebrand and Kikuchi, 2015; Kim, 2018). 
Fang et al. (2016) argue that the rapidly growing house price in China is also contributed by 
the households in the low-income from purchasing houses. Figure 3.3 provides the time 
series of the household income of p10 and p50 for first-, second-, and third-tier cities.22 The 
                                                          
22 Percentile ratios - an alternative way of looking at inequality is to compare incomes at different points along 
the income distribution (e.g., how much more income is received by those near the top compared with people at 
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household incomes of mortgage borrowers with p10 and p50 increase in a stabilisation across 
the three tiers of cities. This growth is in line with the income growth of the overall urban 
citizens (Per Capita GDP in Table 3.1). The relatively wealthy of the citizens represent the 
median-income p50. The low-income households, p10, represents the 25th percentile of the 
citizens in Tier 1 cities and the 30th percentile in Tier 2 cities. It implies that mortgage 
borrowers come from not only top-income households but also low-income. The house 
purchasing power in the Chinese housing market is influenced by not only the household with 
high-level incomes but also the household with low-level incomes. Therefore, the price-to-
income ratio is applicable to analyse the housing demand in the Chinese housing market 
because it represents a measure of the financial burdens for the households who are 
purchasing a home (Zhang, 2015). 
The steady growth in per capita income drives property prices up in China; however, the 
house transaction price has been growing much faster than the average income from 1997 to 
2017 (Ge and Wu, 2017). Shen and Liu (2004) provide per capita disposable income 
significantly influence about 60% of the house price in China with panel data on 14 cities in 
China from 1995 to 2002. Fang et al. (2016) provide that the price-to-income ratios for the 
low-income household group are above 8 in the three tiers cities in 2003, particularly a peak 
of 10.7 in 2011 in Tier 1 cities. The price-to-income ratio for the middle-income group has an 
analogous pattern over time across the three tiers cities, which performs around 6 in 2003 to a 
peak of around 8 in 2011 and then decreases to around 6.6 in 2012. It indicates that the house 
price and housing affordability is inequality in China. In other words, the financial burdens 
affordability of household in China is unequal to the distribution of individual wealth. The 
willingness of low-income households affording the financial burden of buying homes should 
be mentioned for housing demand. 
Liu and Xiong (2018) argue that the consumption motives cannot represent the willingness of 
low-income households to afford financial burdens of purchasing houses. Regarding their 
suggestions, renting homes is significantly cheaper than buying homes in terms of the rental 
yields of housing in Tier 1 cities are lower than the yield of China’s one-year Treasury bonds 
in July 2018. Liu and Xiong (2018) provide several factors that explain the willingness of 
low-income households to afford financial burdens of purchasing houses. First, the Chinese   
                                                                                                                                                                                    
the middle or the low). The p90/p10 ratio means someone at the 90th percentile had a household income under 
four times larger than someone at the 10th percentile. Similarly, the p90/p50 ratio compares the 90th percentile 
with the 50th percentile (i.e. the median). The p50/p10 ratio compares the median with the 10th percentile 
(McGuinness and Harari, 2019). 
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Figure 3.3 Annual Income of Mortgage Borrower 
 
 
 
                                              Source: Fang et al. (2016)  
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Table 3.1 GDP and Average House Price in China 
  
GDP (100 
million yuan) 
Per Capita GDP 
(yuan) 
House Price 
(yuan/sq m) 
House Price 
Change (%) 
House Price 
Index 
1987 12174.6 1123 408 0 100 
1988 15180.4 1378 503 23.3 123.3 
1989 17179.7 1536 573 13.9 140.4 
1990 18872.9 1663 703 22.7 172.3 
1991 22005.6 1912 786 11.8 192.6 
1992 27194.5 2334 995 26.5 243.9 
1993 35673.2 3027 1291 29.8 316.4 
1994 48637.5 4081 1409 9.1 345.3 
1995 61339.9 5091 1591 12.9 389.9 
1996 71813.6 5898 1806 13.5 442.6 
1997 79715 6481 1997 10.6 489.5 
1998 85195.5 6860 2063 3.3 505.6 
1999 90564.4 7229 2053 -0.1 503.2 
2000 100280.1 7942 2058 0.2 504.4 
2001 110863.1 8717 2170 5.4 531.9 
2002 121717.4 9506 2250 3.7 551.5 
2003 137422 10666 2359 4.8 578.2 
2004 161840.2 12487 2714 15 665.2 
2005 187318.9 14368 3167 16.7 776.2 
2006 219438.5 16738 3367 6.3 825.2 
2007 270232.3 20505 3864 14.8 947 
2008 319515.5 24121 3800 -1.6 931.4 
2009 349081.4 26222 4681 23.2 1147.3 
2010 413030.3 30876 5032 7.5 1233.3 
2011 489300.6 36403 5377 6.8 1317.9 
2012 540367.4 40007 5791 7.7 1419.4 
2013 595244.4 43852 6237 7.7 1528.7 
2014 643974 47203 6323 1.38 1549.8 
2015 689052.1 50251 6793 7.43 1665 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China 
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households have a higher saving rate relative to developed countries because the ratio of 
aggregate savings by households and firms stands the national GDP by 35% in the 1980s and 
gradually increased to over 50% in the 2000s (Fang et al., 2016). Second, the few investment 
assets for households and firms to invest the savings referred to the Chinese relatively 
underdeveloped financial markets. The central government implements the severe capital 
regulation which forbids investing the savings into global financial markets, which 
encourages housing to be the investment assets instead of consumer products. Third, the 
largely unbalanced gender ratio in China represents that male confronts competition in the 
marriage market. As homeownership is treated as an important status symbol, the competition 
in the marriage market gains the demand for housing (Wei et al., 2012). 
In this thesis, household income is treated as an important fundamental to the house price 
based on the above arguments. Thus, the GMM model is employed to examine the 
endogenous influences of household income on house prices in the Chinese housing market. 
 
3.4.2 Home Size 
Home size is significant on the consumption value of a home. Fang et al. (2016) provide that 
despite the critical financial burdens afforded by the households, the home size is spacious 
which is more than the standards of most metropolitan areas in the world such as London, 
Hong Kong, Singapore, New York and Tokyo. The low -income borrowers in Tier 1 cities, 
which house prices are the highest in the Chinese housing market, purchased the smallest 
homes. The average home size of the low-income mortgage borrowers in Tier 1 cities is in a 
range between 71 and 81 square meters between 2005 and 2015. For a family of three people 
(a couple with one child based on the Chinese birth control policy), the home size for per 
person is about 25 square meters (Fang et al., 2016). Though low-income borrowers in Tier 1 
cities own the smallest home sizes in China, these home sizes are even more than standards 
of most metropolitan areas. Thus, home size in China influences the housing demand in terms 
of China’s characterised consumer behaviour of households. In this thesis, the hedonic model 
is employed to examine the relationship between house prices and house characteristics. 
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3.4.3 Mortgage Down Payment 
In the Chinese housing market, the mortgage down payment, imposed by the People’s Bank 
of China (PBC), plays an essential role to regulate the real estate market conditions by the 
Chinese government. Mortgage down payment is a significant fundamental preventing bank 
against defaulting on the loans when the future housing market is unfavourable (Benito, 
2006). In China, the high levels of down payment represent the strict mortgage policies on 
banks implemented by PBC.23 Fang et al. (2016) provide that down payment rates in the 
mortgage are above 30% in most cities of China between 2013 and 2012. The average down 
payment ratio divided into income levels demonstrates that the lowest income-level 
borrowers are more than middle-quintile income level borrowers in Tier 1 and Tier 2 cities. 
The house price is restrained influenced by the high-level down payments referred to the 
previous studies. For example, Yu (2010) applied panel data econometrics to achieve the 
conclusion that the mortgage down payment has a negative effect on house prices from 1998 
to 2007. Li and Chand (2013) employ annual data with 29 provinces of China from 1998 to 
2009 and provide that the mortgage down payment influence China’s urban house prices by 
about 0.5% negatively. The high levels of down payments in China not only reduced the risk 
of household default for the bank but also declined the housing demand significantly.  
The Chinese high-levels of mortgage down payment are in contrast to the zero down payment 
and negative amortisation mortgage in the US during the housing bubble between 2003 and 
2006. Mayer et al. (2009) demonstrate that the subprime households are generally provided 
by down payment between zero and 5% in terms of the home purchases financing in the US. 
The negative amortizations are accepted in several mortgages. These borrowers tend to 
default on their mortgage loans aggravating the US housing market decline when the US 
house prices decrease after 2006. However, the Chinese high levels of down payments (e.g., 
30% of total payments) prevent banks against defaulting on the loans when the future housing 
                                                          
23 In June 2003, the Chinese government implemented “121st policy”, which controlled banks with real estate 
development loans, land loans and personal housing loans. The down payment for householders purchasing the 
second house was increased. At the end of 2003, the “18th policy” relaxed the banks. The mortgage down 
payment for household purchasing second house was decreased. In 2007, the "Notice on Strengthening 
Commercial Real Estate Credit Management" specified the mortgage down payment could not less than 40% of 
the property. The mortgage down payment rates increased by 1.1 times. The policy also stated that projects, for 
which the capital raised does not reach 35% of the total cost, are not eligible for a loan. In 2009, the Chinese 
government issued a package of economic stimulus programs with ¥4 trillion in capital to stimulate the supply 
of houses. The mortgage down payment rate on houses was reduced to 20%. In 2010, the “10th policy” 
stipulated that the mortgage down payment increased from 20% to 30%. The mortgage down payment for 
second-house buyers were not allowed to be less than 50%. In early 2013, the General Office of the State 
Council released national policy known as the “National 5”, which is “Notice on Further Improving Regulations 
of the Real Estate Market” by requiring high down payment rate (first home 30% and second home 70%) (Sohu, 
2017). 
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market is unfavourable. It implies that the Chinese mortgage borrowers will not tend to 
default on the loans excepting that there is a 30% decrease in the house prices of China. 
Additionally, the mortgage loans in China resembles recourse loans which warrant a right for 
lenders to withdraw other real assets from the borrowers in terms of mortgage defaults. China 
reduces the risk of subprime credit crisis which resembles the US housing bubbles. 
In this thesis, mortgage down payment is regarded as an important fundamental to the house 
price based on the above arguments. The endogenous influences of mortgage down payment 
on house prices in the Chinese housing market are examined by the GMM model. 
 
3.5 Land Sales and Debt of Local Governments 
Land sale revenues represent a significant contribution to the local governments’ budgets in 
China (Fang et al. 2016). In 1994, the fiscal reform, known as Tax-sharing Reform, regulates 
that the central government substitutes local governments as its tax agencies in order to 
reallocate tax revenues to the less developed areas.24 The transformation of fiscal incentives 
may occur a shift of local governments that developing industry of “urbanising” (e.g., 
develop the real estate and construction sector; Kung et al., 2009). Due to the Budget Law, 
local governments expend the fiscal capacity by non-budgetary funding sources such as land 
sales.25 Fang et al. (2016) provide the share of land revenues in city fiscal budgets is 68% in 
2003, 42% in 2008 and 70% in 2010 and 2011, respectively, at the national level. Regarding 
the budgetary deficits, land is sold for free or at a discount to firms who has potential projects 
in the cities and support local industrial policies. The mixture of local government fiscal 
policies in local housing markets implies that the financial distress of local governments and 
defaults by local governments may occur due to the decline in land or house prices. However, 
the Budget Law increases the supply for land to a certain extent to the Chinese housing 
market. 
Fang et al. (2016) provide that the belief of households contributes the increased Chinese 
housing demand within the last decade. Due to the mixture of local government fiscal 
policies with local housing markets, enormous households consider the housing market will 
                                                          
24 The local governments are forbidden to levy local income taxes, property taxes, or sales taxes, which are 
essential revenues for local government in western countries. Whilst the local governments in China are 
interrupted by issuing debt to obtain capital projects (Han and Kun, 2015). 
25 In 1995, the Chinese government enacts Budget Law in that enable the local governments to obtain external 
financing or operate budgetary deficits (Fang et al. 2016). 
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not be unfavourable because the central government will be encouraged to implement 
policies to develop the housing market. The households’ reliance on local governments on 
land-sales revenue for the fiscal budgets influence the Chinese housing market and then 
increase the house price. 
Many previous studies illustrate that the mixture of local government fiscal policies in China 
causes the corruption in the Chinese land market (Cai et al., 2013; Chen and Kung, 2016; Cai 
et al., 2017; and Chen and Kung, 2018). In terms of this situation, the central government 
enacted the statutes that the lowest price for industrial land and investment intensity for the 
alternative cities and counties referred to the development levels and geographic locations. In 
2012, the regulation enacted the statutes that the leasehold sales for commercial and 
residential developments apply the open auctions.26 The land transactions, which employed 
open auctions, increase from less than 20% in 2000 to over 90% in 2012 (Liu and Xiong, 
2018). This regulation not only adjusts the land market chaos but also provides an adequate 
supply of land. 
Land sales revenues are regarded as significant collaterals for local governments to increase 
debt financing in China (Liu and Xiong, 2018). In 2009, the Chinese government issued a 
package of economic stimulus programs with 4 trillion RMB in capital, which is equivalent 
to 12.5% of GDP in China, to stimulate mostly infrastructure projects in order to prevent the 
spill-over effects of the world financial crisis. The central government enables local 
governments to implement the “Local Government Financing Platform” (LGFP) to increase 
debt because it is inaccessible for local government to regular land sales within a short 
period. 27  The LGFP arranges contrary progress of Budget Law to constrict the budget 
restraint issues of local governments leads to the growth in debt by local governments (Bai et 
al., 2016). When the central government tightens monetary policy to limit debt accumulation 
by local governments, LGFP has been regulated.  
In this thesis, the fiscal measures and monetary policy instruments are treated as instruments 
of mortgage down payment. This is because they influence the Chinese house price indirectly 
through the loan of the bank system based on the above literature reviews.  
                                                          
26 Regulation represents the No. 11 regulation “Regulation on the Transaction Method of Leasehold Sale of 
Land by Local Government,” issued by the Ministry of Land and Resource. 
27 “In a typical arrangement to support a certain infrastructure project, a local government creates an LGFP and 
injects land reserves or future land sale revenues as capital into the LGFP, which in turn can apply for bank 
loans” (Liu and Xiong, 2018). 
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3.6 Examining House Prices in China 
In order to investigate the Chinese housing market systematically, it is essential to capture the 
house price for major cities in China. The difficulty in capture a house price increases 
because the house price requires to compare the prices of the same houses over time. This 
problem is more severe in emerging housing markets than that in mature markets because of 
the alternative characteristics of house and time-varying buildings (Fang et al., 2016). 
Hedonic price model is applicable to value the house price based on the hypothesis that goods 
are valuable due to their utility characteristics and determination of a set of choices made by 
consumers and producers under market clearing conditions. Rosen (1974), who factor 
consumer behaviour into a hedonic regression, establishes the relationship between the 
product’s price and its attributes. In practice, the regression coefficients are generally 
regarded as implicit or “hedonic” prices (Bajari et al., 2010). The hedonic price model can be 
expressed as: 
𝑃 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑋 +                                                    (3.1) 
where 𝑃 is the price of goods. 𝑋 represents a vector of goods attributes. 𝛽 represents a vector 
of the attributes coefficients.  is an error term. 
The implicit price can be described as the additional value of a product when individual 
attributes are increased while all other attributes remain fixed. The estimate of implicit prices 
proposes that the consumer’s willingness to pay for a small alteration in a particular attribute 
is marginal. “These implicit prices can be used to recover marginal willingness to pay 
functions for use in valuing larger changes in attributes” (Bajari et al., 2010). The accuracy of 
hedonic price regression depends on the data characteristics and qualities. The advantages of 
hedonic price regression focus on the unobserved and time-varying characteristics which 
result in biased estimates of the price. 
The hedonic pricing model is appropriate for the capture of the house price. In the housing 
market, house is a commodity with attributes due to its characteristics, such as size, floor 
level, number of rooms and orientation. However, the hedonic pricing model ignores the 
consideration of economic fundamental effects on house prices. In this thesis, we incorporate 
economic fundamentals into the hedonic pricing model in order to examine the house price 
not only individually but also macro-economically. 
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Baltagi (2001) argues that employing the values of the other variable regressors as 
instruments can increase consistency and efficiency of the model. The generalised method of 
moments with instrumental variables (IV-GMM) method restricts unobserved heterogeneity 
and limited the consistency of the dependent variable. The IV-GMM method can be specified 
as: 
𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖𝑡
′ + ∑ 𝜆𝑖𝑍𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 + 𝑖𝑡                                      (3.2) 
𝑋𝑖𝑡
′ = [𝑦2𝑖
′  𝑥1𝑖
′ ]                                                       (3.3) 
𝑧𝑖
′ = [𝑥1𝑖
′  𝑥2𝑖
′ ]                                                       (3.4) 
where 𝑖 denotes an individual property. 𝑡 represents the date of property transacted. 𝑃𝑖𝑡 is the 
house price. 𝑋𝑖𝑡
′  combines endogenous variables and exogenous variables and the dependent 
variable is denoted by 𝑦  rather than 𝑦1 . 𝑍𝑖  is used as a vector representing the control 
variables, 𝜆𝑖 is an estimated coefficient for control variables, and 𝑖𝑡 is the random error. 
The Hausman tests are applicated to explore the presence of endogenous variables. The 
Sargan test of the instrumental variables is implemented to illustrate whether the instrumental 
variables are relative to the error of regression. The first-stage test of GMM aims to test 
whether the instrumental variables are relative to endogenous variables. Regarding the 
complex relationship between housing fundamentals, economic fundamentals and financial 
fundamentals in the Chinese housing market the combination of the hedonic pricing model 
and IV-GMM method is an appropriate econometric technique for achieving the investigation 
of the determinants of house prices. 
 
3.7 Conclusion 
The housing market has a significant impact on the Chinese economy. The dramatic 
transformation of housing from state-owned to private stimulates the demand for housing in 
terms of consumption of households and investment on housing by enterprises (Chen et al., 
2015; Gan et al. 2010; Koss and Shi, 2018; Wang, 2011, 2012). The housing 
commercialisation influences the supply for land in terms of fiscal reforms (e.g., tax-sharing 
reform and budget law) and LGFP (Bai et al. 2016; Fang et al., 2016; Liu and Xiong, 2018). 
In other words, the real estate assets contribute to the wealth of households for housing 
demand and provide the essential platform of local governments and enterprises to increase 
debt financing for land supply. The housing market in China is treated as an essential part of 
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China’s financial market due to the resource loans are associated with real estate directly and 
indirectly. 
The literature review of development in the Chinese housing market has shown that, despite 
the demand for housing is stimulated by consumption of households and the supply for land 
is illustrated by fiscal reforms, there are still different areas of contention regarding both the 
theoretical correctness and fundamental implications related to the house prices in China as 
followings. 
First, the discussions of demands for households have gradually narrowed the levels of 
investigation to individual households. However, there are still several gaps in terms of house 
characteristics, such as directions of house facing (orientation), floor level of house or 
endogenous variables of house characteristics; also, in terms of income, such as endogenous 
variables of income (e.g., mortgage, CPI, interest rate, unemployment). Regarding the supply 
for land, although the influences of land reforms are mentioned, there are still the open 
debates in terms of recent fiscal changes, such as tax; in terms of the relationship between 
local government fiscals and bank system, such as endogenous variables of housing 
completed permissions and endogenous variables of the mortgage.  
Second, consolidating these factors into a theoretical framework has been attended to be 
challenging because of the endogenous fundamentals upon which different house 
characteristics, household income, local government fiscals and bank system in the Chinese 
housing market are evaluated. The hedonic model emphasises house characteristics 
embedded in tradition and culture that not only establishes the relationship between the house 
prices and house characteristics but also focus on time-varying characteristics resulting in 
biased estimates of the house price (Rosen, 1973). Employing the values of the other variable 
regressors as instruments can increase the consistency and efficiency of the model (Baltagi, 
2001). The generalised method of moments (GMM) method accounts for endogeneity by 
using alternative independent variables that are suspected of suffering from endogeneity. The 
IV-GMM method restricts unobserved heterogeneity and limited the consistency of the 
dependent variable. Regarding the complex relationship between housing fundamentals, 
economic fundamentals and financial fundamentals, the combination of the hedonic pricing 
model and IV-GMM method is an appropriate econometric technique for achieving the 
investigation of the determinants of house prices. 
77 
 
Third, the scarcity of theories has generated a challenge to assess the enquiry of house prices 
in the Chinese housing market and the use for the purposes of investments, in terms of the 
mixture of consumer behaviour theory, economic theory and financial theory. 28  The 
application of enormous theories and measures of house prices, hence, tends to the risk of 
infiltrating into significant conflict reasoning issues. 
Fourth, studies regarding the house characteristics, consumer behaviour of households, local 
government fiscals, bank systems of house price for investment purposes, particularly 
following empirical frameworks, have yet to be fully qualified in terms of the influencing 
factors in the Chinese real estate market. In this respect, significant fundamentals in 
discussion, such as the relationship between house price and house orientation, the effects of 
house condition on house price, the indirect impacts of fiscal measures on house price and the 
relationships between consumer behaviour of households, local government fiscals and bank 
systems, are still limited in empirical literature on the Chinese housing market, including the 
emerging related studies on Zhang and Yi (2017). 
 
  
                                                          
28 For example, consumer behaviour theory due to the consumer’s willingness to pay for a small alteration in a 
particular attribute is marginal. Economic theory due to an individual property transaction is dominated by what 
the investor believes will happen to the market in the future without regarding any possible distortions. Financial 
theory due to when the money supply increases, the price of goods turns upwards, referred to the decreasing 
value of the currency. 
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Chapter 4 An Empirical Analysis of the Effect of Housing Characteristics 
on Property Price in Beijing 
 
4.1 Introduction 
There is a concern that the transformation of Chinese real estate model has increased 
motivation for rapid increasing house prices in the whole country, especially in Tier 1 cities. 
The housing privatisation stimulates the household’s housing consumption and then increases 
equilibrium housing demand in China (Wang, 2011). Regarding the diversifications from 
housing allocation system, the Chinese citizens were required to purchase housing on the 
market at the family. This situation unleashed a flood of private housing demand and 
prompted a significant increase in the cost of commodity residential housing in China (Chen 
et al., 2012). The adjustment of house price due to two major reasons, which are the value of 
the attribute from the house itself and the factors from the external influences (e.g., economic 
factors or regional identities; Fang et al., 2016). The house attribute can be regarded as the 
house characteristics, which has the implicit value (Rosen, 1974). It is evident that house 
chrematistics importance of house price has attracted attention from researchers (Bajari et al., 
2012; Jim and Chen, 2009; Malpezzi, 2002; Rosen, 1974; Wong et al., 2005). The essentials 
of economic factors influencing house prices are illustrated by the previous studies (Capozza 
et al., 2004; Kohn and Bryant, 2010; Riddel, 2011; Shiller, 2007).  
Rosen (1974), who factor consumer behaviour into a hedonic regression, establishes the 
relationship between the product’s price and its attributes. In practice, the regression 
coefficients are generally regarded as implicit or “hedonic” prices (Bajari et al., 2010). The 
implicit price can be described as the additional value of a product when individual attributes 
are increased while all other attributes remain fixed. For instance, in the Chinese land market, 
the land with water facility is more expensive than that of without water facility, when the 
other attributes remain the same, such as size and other facilities. This is because the land 
with water facility has a particular attribute, which is the additional value of this land. Rosen 
(1974) established the hedonic regression to provide the house price based on utility-
maximising behaviour. The estimate of implicit prices proposes that the consumer’s 
willingness to pay for a small alteration in a particular attribute is marginal. Moreover, “these 
implicit prices can be used to recover marginal willingness to pay functions for use in valuing 
larger changes in attributes” (Bajari et al., 2010).  
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As previously discussed above, the house characteristics have to be provided as much 
detailed as possible in order to accurately estimate the implicit values of the house. However, 
it is uncertain whether there are ‘omitted variables’ leading to biased estimates of the implicit 
prices. When applied to real data, several ‘omitted house characteristics variables’ seem to be 
significant in the theoretical models. Jim and Chen (2009) suggested that daylight and views 
from houses are significant factors affecting house prices. The previous studies (e.g., Chen et 
al., 2012 and Fang et al., 2016) ignore the condition of the room, which also can be the 
endogenous variables of house prices. This investigation tests these endogenous variables 
through the numbers of rooms with orientations, including room conditions that proxy 
daylight and natural ventilation in order to contribute the previous studies in term of 
introducing new flat-related factors that affect house prices. 
House property had been regarded as a primary source of investment for individuals in China, 
which allows the investors to achieve potential profit with speculative and alternative 
incomes. This situation provides maximum stimulation to encourage investors to make a 
decision on their own deal. An individual property transaction is dominated by what the 
investor believes will happen to the market in the future without regard to any possible 
distortions (Cheng et al., 2014). Based on the theory of ‘distortions beliefs’ (Cheng et al., 
2014), the investors ignored the risk of low demand, referred to income, may have fostered 
the financial circumstances that enabled property prices to rise alongside credit expansion, 
and subsequently spark the crisis (Gennaioli et al., 2013). Though the theory of ‘distortions 
beliefs’ illustrates the irrational increase of Chinese house prices, another reason of irrational 
house price can be also attributed to this. Naylor (1967) illustrates that the fiscal policy 
influences the housing demand indirectly. The increasing tax rates reduce the aggregate 
demand for GDP; subsequently, the changes in aggregate demand for GDP will indirectly 
influence housing demand by the diversities of intermediate economic factors, such as 
income, employment and prices (Naylor, 1967). In other words, the endogenous variables for 
housing demand influence house prices directly. Naylor (1967) also provides that an increase 
of investment in fixed assets will lead to a rise in GDP so that increase the prices of goods. 
To date, there is a substantial literature on the influencing economic factors to house prices, 
for example, income (Capozza et al., 2004; Riddel, 2011; Hui and Gu, 2009; Milne, 1991; 
Chen and Patel, 1998), mortgage payments (Kohn and Bryant, 2010; Lee, 1997; Mints, 2007, 
2008), inflation (Irving, 1911), fiscal policy (Naylor, 1967), housing starts (Maisel, 1963). 
However, the endogenous variables of housing demand are not mentioned in the previous 
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studies. The method of defining the housing demand is not unique. In this investigation, the 
housing demand is identified by housing starts multiple floor level of the house. According to 
(Maisel, 1963) housing starts is a potential standard which decides the final housing demand 
in terms of ‘a theory of fluctuation in residential construction starts’. Whereas the housing 
starts is the size of building permission, the investigation improved the housing demand 
factor in terms of relating to floor level, which makes housing demand into underlying units. 
Findings of this investigation suggests there is an inverse U-shape relationship between 
housing demand and house prices, which is consistent with the theory of ‘conventional 
wisdom’ (Galbraith, 1958). This research also tests the endogenous economic fundamentals 
for house price in order to explore the economic variables influencing house price indirectly. 
This research regards the housing demand and mortgage payment rates as endogenous 
variables referred to the previous studies and Chinese government monetary policies. To do 
this, the previous model is improved by taken account into instrumental variables. 
This study overcomes the previous studies in terms of the introduction of new flat-related 
variables. Compared with the previous studies (Rosen, 1974; Bajari et al., 2010), the flat-
related factors, such as directions of house facing (orientation) and square of floor level 
(FR^2) are never found. Without these factors, the implicit house price could be biased 
estimated. The essential finding of these new flat-related factors provides there is an inverse 
U-shape relationship between floor level and house prices. This investigation illustrated 
house orientation influences the condition of the bedroom and the condition of living room 
significantly and indirectly affects the house price in IV-GMM analyses, which improved the 
theoretical standpoint to understand the relationship between house characteristics and house 
prices. 
In addition to the above, previous economic research has considered the variable of house 
demand that was designed primarily to determine the house prices. Based on the economic 
theory of supply and demand, excessive demand encourages the investor to have more 
confidence in investing in the property so that this increases the house prices (Rosenthal et al., 
1991). Previous studies have found that the income elasticity of demand for housing is well 
below one (Rosen, 1974; Hoyt and Rosenthal, 1990; Rosenthal et al., 1991; Glaeser et al., 
2008; Carrillo et al., 2014). In contrast, the present investigation applies housing starts 
multiple by floor level (HPP*FR) as property demand. This is because to housing starts is a 
potential standard which decides the final housing demand (Maisel, 1963) in terms of ‘a 
theory of fluctuation in residential construction starts’. Moreover, this investigation employed 
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the IV-GMM model to test the endogeneity of housing demand to the property prices 
respected to the instrumental variables with investment in fixed assets and local governments 
general budgetary revenue. This approach provides the determination of demand for houses 
be flexible with the economic conditions. 
The application of panel analysis (i.e. fixed effects and random effects) extends the current 
literature by taking into account endogeneity in the IV-GMM framework with instrumental 
variables. In this regard, this investigation conceptually resembles and Bajari et al., (2012), 
who investigate property prices the role of air pollution with hedonic regression. Empirical 
testing of the aforementioned issues provides a valuable tool for regulators in the Beijing area, 
because, to the best of our knowledge, it is the first study of its kind that examines all the 
above; it can also be useful for regulators in other industries, such as banking and insurance. 
In this study, the assessment and remediation of house price will depend on the understanding 
of their influencing factors. 
In an attempt to fill the gaps from previous studies, this investigation extends previous 
research in terms of the data sample. This investigation examines an extended period (2002-
2014), which provides a sample with the advantage of 17,143 transacted property records 
with detailed information, from the Beijing core real estate area. We linked transacted 
property records with property addresses to track the regional effects. Key in this research is 
the possibility – hitherto empirically unaccounted for by the previous studies – that 
influencing factors that affect property prices performance include factors ignored in previous 
studies such as floor level of property and orientation of property. In this regard, our study 
conceptually resembles (Bajari et al., 2012), who investigate within property prices with 
hedonic regression and the role of air pollution. Empirical testing of the aforementioned 
issues provides a valuable tool for regulators in the Beijing area, because it is the first study 
of its kind, to the best of our knowledge, that examines all the above; it can also be useful for 
regulators in other industries, such as banking and insurance. In this study, the assessment 
and remediation of house prices will depend on the understanding of their influencing factors. 
 
4.1.2 Research Objectives 
The main purpose of this chapter is to evaluate the determinants of property price with house 
characteristics and economic fundamentals in seven districts of Beijing, China between 2002 
and 2014. This investigation has three main objectives. First to provide quantitative analysis 
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of house transactions to examine whether the house characteristics and economic 
fundamentals influence the house prices significantly. Second to investigate whether there are 
omitted variables that lead to biased estimates of the implicit house prices. Third to explore 
whether endogenous economic fundamentals and house characteristics variables are leading 
to biased estimates of house prices. 
 
4.1.3 Summary of Findings and Contributions 
Regarding Figure 4.1, the results indicate that economic factors have influenced the property 
price based on the economic theories (Cheng et al., 2014; Maisel, 1963). The mortgage down 
payment rates influence house prices negatively and significantly referring to economic 
fundamentals which is in line with Yu (2010) and Li and Chand (2013). This result implies 
that the policy of mortgage down payments is efficient to restrain the rapid growth of house 
prices. If the housing market investors persistent in buying houses, ignoring the high degree 
of mortgage down payment rates, would causes housing bubbles. This shows consistent 
finding with Cheng et al. (2014) in terms of ‘distortions beliefs’. The House Price Index has a 
positive influence on property prices. This indicates that the general directions of housing 
market tend to be good, increasing the confidence of investors. The findings also provide that 
the increasing average income rise property prices which is in line with Fang et al. (2016) and 
Hui and Gu (2009). This implies that there is a higher possibility of housing bubbles with 
more speculative investors, who have more salaries. The investigation finds that housing 
starts affect house price positively, which indicates that the higher demand for houses 
increases the prices. This is in line with Li et al. (2018), which means the higher housing 
starts, the higher demand on houses so that increases the house prices in Beijing. This 
investigation also finds there is an inverse U-shape relationship between variable of housing-
starts with floor-level and house prices. This suggests house price increases when the demand 
is lower than supply, and the excess supply of houses decreases the prices. This shows 
consistent finding with Maisel (1963) in terms of ‘a theory of fluctuation in residential 
construction starts’.  
83 
 
Figure 4.1 Outline of Findings in OLS and Panel Model  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In Figure 4.1, the property characteristics have influenced the property price significantly, 
which indicates that consumer behaviour is an essential aspect of housing market (Rosen, 
1979). Home size influences house price positively, which is in line with Fang et al. (2016) in 
terms of costs of China’s characterised consumer behaviour of households. It implies that the 
larger home size in China increases the demand for housing.  The higher floor level of houses, 
the higher prices. Whereas, in a tall building, the increasing prices from the lower floor level 
to the middle floor level; from the middle floor level to the upper floor level, the floor level 
influences house prices negatively. This result is similar to a previous study (Wong et al., 
2005), which suggests the higher demand for middle floors. The number of bedrooms has a 
significant negative influence on property prices, which result is consistent with the find of 
Fahey (2016) in terms of privacy. The number of living rooms is not significant on property 
price in a fixed effects estimator of panel model. The houses facing north and south is 
significant and positive for the prices. This is because houses facing north and south have 
better natural ventilation and more daylight, which improves the natural quality of a house 
and its energy efficiency. This result is never found in previous studies (Bajari et al., 2010; 
Huang and Yin, 2015; Rosen, 1974; Zhang and Yi, 2017). 
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Figure 4.2 Outline of Findings in IV-GMM 
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positively, which is contrary to the ‘conventional wisdom’ (Galbraith, 1958) and the ‘quantity 
theory of money’ (Irving, 1911). It is not similar to Taylor (2000). This is because of China’s 
rapid economic growth. As the good condition of economic growth, the increasing 
government revenue cannot restrain the demand for investments in housing market. The 
increase of government revenue means upward pressure on mortgage payment rates. Though 
the money supply increases, the aggregate demand for GDP is increasing rapidly so that this 
exceeds the amount of money supply, caused the increase of interest rate. After adding these 
instrumental variables, the investigation found that the coefficients of mortgage payment 
rates are increased respectively. These results implicate that the policy of fiscal deficit from 
Chinese government is efficient to indirectly restrain the rapid growth of house prices.  
The investment in fixed assets and the local government general budgetary revenue affects 
housing demand negatively and significantly, which is in line with the finding of Naylor 
(1967) and Galbraith (1958) in terms of the theory of ‘conventional wisdom’. After adding 
the instrumental variables, the investigation found that the coefficient of housing demand is 
decreased. This result implicates that the house price could be decreased through restrain 
investments and increase government revenue indirectly because investments and 
government revenue decreased the demand for houses. 
Regarding Figure 4.2, house orientation influences the condition of the bedroom and the 
condition of living room significantly, which is in line with findings of Rosen (1974) in terms 
of the effects of house characteristics on the prices. The orientation factors of SE NW WE 
and SW negatively influence the number of bedrooms, respectively. The orientation factors 
of W negatively influence the number of the living rooms significantly. The orientation 
factors of WE affect the number of living rooms positively. This result is never been found in 
previous studies (Bajari et al., 2010; Huang and Yin, 2015; Zhang and Yi, 2017). After 
adding the instrumental variables in different models, the investigation found that the 
coefficients of BR are decreased. The coefficient of LR is increased. However, when the 
investigation considers the factor of floor level with number of bedrooms, the factor of 
Bedroom*Floor influences house prices positively and significantly with instruments of SE 
SW and SW NW respectively. The coefficient of Living_room*Floor increases. This means 
the more bedrooms that are facing southeast and southwest or that are facing southwest and 
northwest with higher floor level, the higher house price. The more living rooms that are 
facing west or east with higher floor level, the higher house price. This is because the house 
facing south and west have more extended daylight, which increases the temperature of the 
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room, so that increase the electrical efficiency. However, the bedrooms facing southwest, 
southeast or northwest not only keeps daylight but also reduces west sunburn and improves 
natural ventilation to improve sleeping context. The living room improves west sunburn 
increasing the whole house temperature so that increase house efficiency. Moreover, the 
higher floor level of houses, the more efficient daylight and natural ventilation. Thus, this 
investigation finds the more numbers of rooms with proper orientation, the better condition of 
the room is which has good daylight and better natural ventilation. These results implicate 
that the government illustrate the policies about relating house structure is efficient. 
This chapter overcomes the omitted variables of house characteristics, such as directions of 
house facing (orientation), house floor level (FR) and square of floor level (FR^2), which are 
never found in previous studies, leading to biased estimates of the implicit house price, 
compared with the previous studies (Rosen, 1974; Bajari et al., 2010). This research found 
there is an inverse U-shape relationship between floor level and house prices. Moreover, this 
investigation illustrated house orientation influences the condition of the bedroom and the 
condition of living room significantly and indirectly affects the house price in IV-GMM 
analyses, which improved the theoretical standpoint to understand the relationship between 
house characteristics and house prices. 
In addition to the above, previous economic research has considered the variable of house 
demand that was designed primarily to determine the house prices. Based on the economic 
theory of supply and demand, excessive demand encourages the investor to have more 
confidence in investing in the property so that this increases the house prices (Rosenthal et al., 
1991). Previous studies have found that the income elasticity of demand for housing is well 
below one (Rosen, 1974; Hoyt and Rosenthal, 1990; Rosenthal et al., 1991; Glaeser et al., 
2008; Carrillo et al., 2014). In contrast, the present investigation applies Floor Space under 
Construction data of property land, which is housing starts multiple by floor level (HPP*FR), 
interpretation of property demand. This is because to housing starts is a potential standard 
which decides the final housing demand (Maisel, 1963) in terms of ‘a theory of fluctuation in 
residential construction starts’. Moreover, this investigation employed the IV-GMM model to 
test the endogeneity of housing demand to the property prices respected to the instrumental 
variables with investment in fixed assets and local governments general budgetary revenue. 
This approach provides the determination of demand for houses be flexible with the 
economic conditions. 
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This investigation extends previous research in terms of the data sample, which provides an 
extended period (2002-2014) and a sample with the advantage of 17,143 transacted property 
records with detailed information, which linked transacted property records with property 
addresses to track the regional effects.  
The application of panel analysis (i.e. fixed effects and random effects) extends the current 
literature by taking into account endogeneity in the IV-GMM framework with instrumental 
variables. In this regard, this investigation conceptually resembles Bajari et al., (2012), who 
investigate property prices the role of air pollution with hedonic regression. Empirical testing 
of the aforementioned issues provides a valuable tool for regulators in the Beijing area, 
because, to the best of our knowledge, it is the first study of its kind that examines all the 
above; it can also be useful for regulators in other industries, such as banking and insurance. 
In this chapter, the assessment and remediation of house price will depend on the 
understanding of their influencing factors. 
 
4.1.4 Structure of This Chapter 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows: Section 4.2 denotes the theory 
framework; Section 4.3 formulates the hypotheses that are tested in this chapter; Section 4.4 
outlines the methodology and data; Section 4.5 analyses the estimation results; and Section 
4.6 presents the concluding remarks. 
 
4.2 Theoretical Framework 
With the market-orientated economy in China in the recent past, houses are defined as 
commodities. Rosen (1974), who factor consumer behaviour into a hedonic regression, 
establishes the relationship between the product’s price and its attributes. In practice, the 
regression coefficients are generally regarded as implicit or “hedonic” prices (Bajari et al., 
2010). The implicit price can be described as the additional value of a product when 
individual attributes are increased while all other attributes remain fixed. For instance, in 
China’s land market, the land with water facility is more expensive than that of without water 
facility, when the other attributes remain the same, such as size and other facilities. This is 
because the land with water facility has a particular attribute, which is the additional value of 
this land. Rosen (1974) established the hedonic regression to provide the house price based 
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on utility-maximising behaviour. The estimate of implicit prices proposes that the consumer’s 
willingness to pay for a small alteration in a particular attribute is marginal. Moreover, “these 
implicit prices can be used to recover marginal willingness to pay functions for use in valuing 
larger changes in attributes” (Bajari et al., 2010). However, it is uncertain whether there are 
omitted variables leading to biased estimates of the implicit prices. When applied to real data, 
several omitted house characteristics variables seem to be significant in the theoretical 
models. Moreover, Jim and Chen (2009) suggested that daylight and views from houses are 
significant factors affecting house prices. However, the previous studies ignore the condition 
of the room, which are the endogenous variables of house prices. This investigation tests 
these endogenous variables through the numbers of rooms with orientations, in order to 
explain the condition of the room which has good daylight and better natural ventilation. 
The economic fundamentals have an essential relationship with the house prices. However, 
the endogenous economic fundamentals are leading to incorrect biased estimates of 
coefficients and result in an inefficient model. Mortgage payment rates could be regarded as 
an endogenous variable for house prices. The interest rates or mortgage payment rates are 
applied to adjust the inflation based on the ‘quantity theory of money’ (Irving, 1911). 
Moreover, interest rates will be influenced by fiscal policy referred to the theory of 
‘conventional wisdom’ (Galbraith, 1958). The empirical endogenous tests of mortgage 
payment are scarce in the previous studies. The prior studies provide that income and 
unemployment rates are significant factors for the house prices. The property is an investment 
that allows the investors to achieve potential profit from the real estate market, with 
speculative and alternative incomes. This situation provides maximum stimulation to 
encourage investors to make a decision on their own deal. An individual property transaction 
is dominated by what the investor believes will happen to the market in the future without 
regard to any possible distortions (Cheng et al., 2014). Based on the theory of ‘distortions 
beliefs’ (Cheng et al., 2014), the investors ignored the risk of low demand, referred to income 
and unemployment rates, may have fostered the financial circumstances that enabled property 
prices to rise alongside credit expansion, and subsequently spark the crisis (Gennaioli et al., 
2013). However, the previous studies neglect the endogenous of income. Based on the time 
value of money, the money supply influences the nominal value of the money referred to the 
inflation. If a person’s wage is fixed or the rate of increase is small for a long-term, the 
inflation would have a significant effect on the living standards. According to ‘a theory of 
fluctuation in residential construction starts’ (Maisel, 1963), housing starts is a potential 
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standard which decides the final housing demand. However, referred to Naylor (1967), fiscal 
policy influences the housing starts indirectly based on ‘conventional wisdom’ (Galbraith, 
1958). However, the previous studies neglect the endogenous of housing starts. 
 
4.3 Literature Review and Hypotheses 
In China, the accurate measurement of house prices is essential to monitor economic 
fundamentals (Hui and Gu, 2009; Li and Chand, 2013; Li et al., 2018; Shen and Liu, 2004; 
Yu, 2010) and investment behaviour (Huang and Yin, 2015; Wong et al., 2005; Zhang and Yi, 
2017). Zhang and Yi (2017) provide that the rising house prices may cause a symptom of a 
housing bubble. Gennaioli et al. (2013) illustrated the investors ignored the risk of low 
demand, referred to income and unemployment rates, may have fostered the financial 
circumstances that enabled property prices to rise alongside credit expansion, and 
subsequently spark the crisis. Chen et al. (2012) applied economic fundamentals such as 
interest rates, inflation, and cost of supply to investigate whether a bubble existed in the 
Beijing housing market from 1998 to 2010. They revealed that the Beijing house price index 
was more significant than the equilibrium value, based on the relative economic fundamental 
variables from 2004 to 2007. Therefore, it is valueable to provide an empirical analysis of the 
effect of housing fundamentals on property price in beijing. 
The previous study employs a house price index of Beijing on hedonic models (Zhang and Yi, 
2017), which explore the relationship between house attributes and house price. They find 
that most housing attributes are valued differently across the distribution of house prices, and 
the distribution of house prices changes based on the different value of housing attributes. 
Huang and Yin (2015) find the house price was affected by house characteristics significantly 
between 2000 and 2007 in Wuhan, China. Moreover, Zhang and Yi (2018) employ a 
comprehensive housing transaction dataset and analyse the house price between 2012 and 
2015 in China. These studies confirm house characteristics causes the changes of the house 
price. 
 
4.3.1 Economic Fundamentals Determinants 
Referred to Wen and Goodman (2013), house price is determined by economic fundamentals 
in a city level. The previous empirical studies applied with supply and demand, and they use 
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macroeconomic variables, such as income, mortgage payment rates, and house starts to 
explain the house prices. Because these economic fundamentals are relative to the supply and 
demand of the local housing market, which has impacts on house prices. 
According to Milne (1991), there is a positive correlation between income level and house 
prices. Capozza et al. (2004) suggest that real incomes are the essential factors that are 
determinants of real house prices. Shiller (2007) suggests that interest rates, income levels 
and inflation influence house prices. Chen and Patel (1998) find that house prices and income 
exist in a state of equilibrium in Taipei. Through analysing the Spanish property price 
proportion, Fernández-Kranz and Hon (2006) suggest that income is the most influential 
factor in house prices. Riddel (2011) argues that contagious price and income growth 
resulting from native expectations have effects on the Las Vegas housing market. In China, 
Ge and Wu (2017) demonstrate the relationship between per capita income and the house 
prices in China. They find the steady growth in per capita income may drive property prices 
up; however, the house transaction price has been growing much faster than the average 
income from 1997 to 2017. The price-to-income ratio sharply increased from 6.6 in 2003 to 
7.9 in 2005, and there is a decline from 7.2 in 2008 to 8.5 in 2009. The results indicate that 
the rapidly increasing house prices in China are due to the unequal distribution of individual 
wealth. Hui and Gu (2009) conclude that income is a significant factor affecting house price 
levels, causing a bubble of real estate activity in October 2007 at around 43% of the housing 
market price in Guangzhou city. Shen and Liu (2004) provide per capita disposable income 
significantly influence about 60% of the house price in China with panel data on 14 cities in 
China from 1995 to 2002. Thus, this investigation has a hypothesis that states: 
H1. The income does not affect the property prices. 
Kohn and Bryant (2010) finds that mortgage payment rates had a significant impact on the 
real estate market within the long-term analysis from 1990 to 2007 in the US economy. Lee 
(1997) studied a test bubble and suggested that irrational mortgage down payment and money 
supply drove up house prices in Korea between 1964 and 1994. Mints (2007) suggested that 
mortgage payment rates are an essential influence on the housing bubble in the Russian 
housing market. The determinant of defaulting on loans and the prepayments for housing 
loans could cause the volatility of house prices (Miles, 2008). For China, the down payments 
in mortgage sample had been consistently above 30% across Tier 1-3 cities in China (Fang et 
al., 2016). They also find that the average down payment ratio of mortgage loans made to the 
group with income in the lowest 10% of all mortgage borrowers was even slightly higher 
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than that of the group with income in the middle quintile of all mortgage borrowers. Qi and 
Cao (2007) investigate the relationship between property prices and bank lending in China 
over the period 1999Q1–2006Q2. They find short- and long-term causality from bank lending 
to property prices. Peng et al. (2005) model 31 Chinese provinces and major cities from 1998 
to 2004 and find that credit expansion by the four large state-owned banks does not feed 
property-price inflation. Yu (2010) applies panel data econometrics to achieve the conclusion 
that the mortgage payment rate has a negative effect on house prices from 1998 to 2007. Li 
and Chand (2013) employ annual data with 29 provinces of China from 1998 to 2009 and 
provide that the mortgage payment rate influence China’s urban house prices by about 0.5% 
negatively. Thus, this research has a hypothesis that states: 
H2. Mortgage payment rates do not influence property prices. 
According to Kohn and Bryant (2010), excessive demand for housing causes house price 
volatility in the US economy. Case and Shiller (2003) maintain that buyer expectations lead 
to higher prices and are a predictor of the future of a housing market, which emphasises the 
correlation between house demand and house prices. Mayer and Quigley (2003) agree with 
many of the conclusions of Case and Shiller (2003). Smith and Smith (2006) conclude that 
the dramatic increase in house prices as well as in the expectations of buyers in 2005 was in 
response to the promising investment opportunities found in home ownership and not the 
existence of a house price bubble. Referred to Maisel (1963), housing starts are a potential 
standard which decides the final housing demand in terms of ‘a theory of fluctuation in 
residential construction starts’. In this research, the investigation uses floor space of property 
under construction, which is the size of started buildings, instead of the demand quantity of 
properties. For China, Ge and Wu (2017) examine the relationship between the net supply 
and the real transaction price from 1991 to 2011 in China. They detect the excess supplies 
coexisted with steady increases in real transaction prices. It implies that the price mechanism 
failed to clear out supply and demand in the market. Li et al. (2018) provide that the ratios of 
residential floor space under construction to floor space sold have been increasing since 2004 
in Beijing and Beijing’s commodity housing average sale price increased by 15.5 per cent 
each year after 2004. Thus, this chapter has a hypothesis that states: 
H3. The property demand has no effects on property prices. 
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4.3.2 House Characteristics Determinants 
Rosen (1974) suggests that structural characteristics of the house, such as size, number of 
rooms, the location within the market and the time value of properties influence the property 
prices. Malpezzi (2002) and Bajari et al. (2012) also illustrate that the hedonic model is 
appropriate for estimating the coefficients of valuing implicit prices. This investigation also 
considers the omitted variables of implicit prices with orientation and floor level of the 
property. Wong et al., (2005) suggest that the highest demands are for properties located on 
the middle floors of tall buildings. Jim and Chen (2009) suggest that daylight and views from 
houses are significant factors affecting house prices. Regarding the previous studies in China, 
Wilson and Parisi (2006) provide that south-facing apartment increases housework efficiency 
such as drying the clothes. Yao (2014) detects that the south-facing house saved facilitates 
energy by keeping the indoor area warm during winter. Zhang and Yi (2017) employ a 
comprehensive micro-level dataset of newly-built residential housing units in Beijing from 
2013 to 2015 with OLS estimation quantile regression and found the number of bedroom and 
number of living room increase house price by 9.77% and 14.47% respectively. They also 
provide there is a positive relationship between house price, size of living area and floor level. 
Accordingly, this chapter examines the determinants of changes in Beijing property prices in 
the context of property characteristics factors and the following hypothesis: 
H4. Property size does not influence the property prices. 
H5. Number of bedrooms does not influence the property prices. 
H6. Number of living rooms does not influence the property prices. 
H7. The floor level of the property does not influence the property prices. 
H8. The orientation of the property does not influence the property prices. 
Meen (1996) finds that house-price movements are unidirectional, spreading from urban 
centres to the periphery. Larraz-Iribas and Alfaro-Navarro (2008) provide evidence of co-
integration among regional prices, with physical proximity increases the likelihood of price 
co-integration. Oikarinen (2006) illustrates that the increase in Finland’s house prices began 
in Helsinki, the political and economic centre of the country, and then expanded to outlying 
areas. For China, Huang and Yin (2015) provide that house characteristics, environmental 
sustainability elements had the impacts on house prices. The home buyers are willing to pay 
more for housing clusters with proximity to the city centre (Huang and Yin, 2015). Thus, this 
investigation uses the cross-sectional study with regional clusters to analyse the changes in 
the house prices. 
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4.3.3 Endogenous Variables and Instruments 
4.3.3.1 Mortgage Payment Rates and Inflation 
Regarding the ‘quantity theory of money’ (Irving, 1911), the inflation is decided by money 
supply and money demand. When the money supply increases, the price of goods turns 
upwards, referred to the decreasing value of the currency. According to Irving (1911), the 
central banks are generally under a fractional-reserve banking system which increases the 
interest rate in order to be against the irrational rise of inflation. In other words, the 
correlation between interest rates and inflation are inverse. Diversely, the inflation has a 
relationship to the mortgage payments. If a person borrowed a fixed amount of money, the 
increasing inflation helps this person pay back a lesser amount of money. The mortgage 
payments are the costs of borrowing to funds. The mortgage payment rates generally 
resemble the interest rates against the inflation under the banking system. For China, Gan et 
al. (2012) employ a proprietary dataset from branches of the Construction Bank of China 
from 2004 to 2009 and provide the mortgage payment rate is influenced by interest rate by 
1.2% positively and significantly. Thus, this investigation has hypotheses that: 
H9. The central bank interest rates (IR) do not influence the mortgage payment rates (MR). 
H10. The inflation (CPI) does not influence the mortgage payment rates (MR). 
 
4.3.3.2 Income and Inflation 
The central bank interest rates and inflation are significant factors to the income of persons. 
Referred to Irving (1911), the money supply influences the nominal value of the money 
referred to the inflation. If a person’s wage is fixed or the rate of increase is small for a long-
term, the inflation would have a significant effect on the living standards. Meanwhile, the 
inflation is relative to the interest rates. For China, Deng et al. (2018) detect that the 
overheating in real estate markets are influenced by the movements in bank credit. The 
income of the household, representing a fundamental of house prices, provides a bound on 
the latter in an economy without financial markets. However, the mortgage loans employed 
to finance housing purchases, which may disconnect house prices from the household-income 
fundamental. Horioka and Wan (2007) conduct a dynamic panel analysis of the determinants 
of the household saving rate in China between 1995 and 2004. They find the real interest rate 
has a significant positive impact on the household saving rate, which is the difference 
between income and expenses, suggests that the interest elasticity of saving is positive and is 
consistent with the permanent income. Thus, this investigation has hypotheses that: 
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H11. The central bank interest rates (IR) do not influence the income (IC). 
H12. The inflation (CPI) does not influence the income (IC). 
 
4.3.3.3 Fiscal Policy and Mortgage Down Payment 
Referring to the theory of ‘conventional wisdom’ (Galbraith, 1958), the increased spending of 
government increases the aggregate demand for GDP; subsequently, the rise of aggregate 
demand for GDP will increase the price of goods. The interest rates will be increased, when 
the price increases, to be against the irrational rise of inflation Irving (1911). The interest 
rates have a positive relationship with mortgage payment rates. Thus, this investigation 
hypothesis that the fiscal policy does not influence the mortgage payment rates. Regarding 
Irving (1911), money supply and money demand influence the interest rate. The money 
supply affects mortgage payment rates referred to interest rates. Feltenstein and Farhadian 
(1987) illustrate that changes in the money supply are explained by the government deficit, 
the wage bill of the government and state enterprises in China. Taylor (2000) provide the 
instruments of fiscal policy change aggregate demand and influence the monetary policy 
indirectly. Land sales revenues are regarded as significant collaterals for local governments to 
increase debt financing in China (Liu and Xiong, 2018). Regarding the fiscal measures and 
monetary policy instruments influence the Chinese housing market indirectly through the 
loan of the bank system, this investigation has hypotheses that: 
H13. Total investment in fixed assets in the whole country (IFA) does not influence the 
mortgage payment rates (MR). 
H14. Money supply (MS) does not influence the mortgage payment rates (MR). 
H15. Local government general budgetary revenue (GR) does not influence the mortgage 
payment rates (MR). 
H16. Local government general budgetary expenditure (GE) does not influence the mortgage 
payment rates (MR). 
 
4.3.3.4 Fiscal Policy and Housing Starts 
According to Naylor (1967), the fiscal policy influences the housing starts indirectly. Local 
revenue policies regulate the tax rate of income, company’s profit, business or contributions 
to social insurance, to adjust the economic conditions. Based on the theory of ‘conventional 
wisdom’ (Galbraith, 1958), the increasing tax rates reduces the aggregate demand for GDP; 
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subsequently, the changes in aggregate demand for GDP will indirectly influence housing 
starts by the diversities of intermediate economic factors, such as income, employment and 
prices (Naylor, 1967). Referred to ‘a theory of fluctuation in residential construction starts’ 
(Maisel, 1963), housing starts is a potential standard which decides the final housing demand. 
On the other hand, Naylor (1967) suggests that an increase of investment in fixed assets will 
lead to a rise in GDP, referred to conventional wisdom. The changes of GDP influence the 
housing starts, which is regarded as the housing demand. For China, Koss and Shi (2018) 
mentioned that the central government policies, such as “freeze” in transactions, the purchase 
restrictions and increased land supplies, cannot be regarded as these measures have changed 
the fundamentals of the residential housing market, particularly with regards to damping the 
speculative fervour. This is because these policies curbed the house prices in short-term but 
did not correct the fundamental mismatch in the market between supply and demand or cool 
the enthusiasm of property speculators in the over-heated cities. In this research, the 
investigation uses floor space of property under construction (HPP), which is the size of 
started buildings, instead of the demand quantity of properties. Thus, this chapter has a 
hypothesis that states: 
H17. Total investment in fixed assets in the whole country (IFA) does not influence house 
demand (HPP FRHPP FR2HPP). 
H18. Local government general budgetary revenue (GR) does not influence house demand 
(HPP FRHPP FR2HPP). 
 
4.3.3.5 Property Characteristics 
Rosen (1974) suggested that structural characteristics of the house, such as size, number of 
rooms, the location within the market and the time value of properties influence the property 
prices. Malpezzi (2002) and Bajari et al. (2012) also found that the hedonic model is 
appropriate for estimating the coefficients of valuing implicit prices. This investigation also 
considers the omitted variables of implicit prices with orientation and floor level of the 
property. Jim and Chen (2009) suggested that daylight and views from houses are significant 
factors affecting house prices in Hong Kong. Thus, the more numbers of rooms with an 
appropriate orientation, the better condition of the room are which has good daylight and 
better natural ventilation. Accordingly, this chapter examines the following hypothesis: 
H19. House orientation (Orien) does not influence the condition of the bedroom (BR BRFR) 
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H20. House orientation (Orien) does not influence the condition of the living room (BR 
BRFR) 
 
4.3.4 Methodology Review 
With regard to other methods of analysing house prices, Case and Shiller (1989, 1990) find 
that forecast errors in house prices follow an autoregressive process. Bourassa et al. (2009) 
and Hui and Yue (2006) study the influences on house prices using different compositions of 
fundamental supply-side and demand-side price factors. Mankiw et al. (1985) suggest that 
modified volatility tests are sufficient for the real estate market. Diba and Grossman (1998) 
illustrate unit-root tests, and Black et al. (2006) illustrated VAR models on the valuation of 
house prices. Himmelberg et al. (2005) improve house pricing models with growth rates in 
property prices, price-to-rent ratios, and price-to-income ratios. Campbell and Shiller (1987) 
tested the presence of a bubble in the equity market with the co-integration methodology, 
which was developed by Granger and Engle (1987). While the hedonic pricing model is 
appropriate for the capture of the Chinese housing market price. In terms of the rapid 
extension of Chinese cities, new apartments or houses have been built dispersed from the city 
centre. The developed urban area at the national level expanded from 19,844 square 
kilometres in 2003 to 34,867 square kilometres in 2013 (Fang et al., 2016). This significant 
increase of urban residential land parcels implies that unobserved time-varying characteristics 
in terms of urban area growth dispersed from the city centre result in biased house price. 
Regarding this situation, it is suggested to employ the hedonic pricing model to capture the 
Chinese housing market price. 
 
4.4 Methodology and Data 
4.4.1 Methodology 
This investigation explores the underlying relationship between property characteristics and 
the economic forces that determine them, and their impact on property prices. It will draw 
upon previous studies which have revealed relevant information in this area (Case and Shiller, 
1989, 1990; Himmelberg et al., 2005; Hui and Yue, 2006; Mankiw et al., 1985). The property 
price equation is employed to determine whether property characteristics and economic 
performance are influencing property prices (Equation 4.1). Coefficients for variables are 
estimated using the ordinary least-square (OLS) regression. 
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                                         𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝑎1𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎2𝐶𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝜆𝑖𝑍𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 + 𝑖𝑡                                (4.1) 
where 𝑖 denotes an individual property; 𝑡 represents the date of property transacted; i refers to 
the region where Pit is a house price measure; and Eit represents the economic fundamental 
variables that is hypothesised to influence property prices. Cit represents the property 
characteristics variables. Zi is used as a vector representing the control variables, 𝜆i is an 
estimated coefficient for control variables, and it is the random error. 
Panel data analysis is conducted by taking account of group effects and time effects. Initially, 
fixed effects and random effects are examined. The decision to select the appropriate model 
is based on the implementation of the Hausman Test. To examine property price determinants, 
the investigation uses the general panel data regression model, in the following equations: 
𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝑎1𝐴𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎2𝐹𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎3𝐹𝑅𝑖𝑡
2 + 𝑎4𝐵𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎5𝐿𝑅𝑖𝑡 + +𝑎6𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐻𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎7𝐹𝑅𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐻𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑡 +
𝑎8𝐹𝑅𝑖𝑡
2 ∗ 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐻𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎9𝐻𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎10𝑀𝑅𝑖𝑡 + +𝑎10𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐼𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝑑1𝑂𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛 + 𝑑2𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝑑3𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟              
(4.2) 
and fixed effects: 
                                                                 𝑖𝑡 = 𝜇𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡                                                    (4.2.1) 
and random effect: 
                                                            𝜇𝑖 ~ 𝑖. 𝑖. 𝑑. 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝜇
2)                                               (4.2.2) 
                                                           𝑣𝑖𝑡  ~ 𝑖. 𝑖. 𝑑. 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑣
2)                                               (4.2.3) 
where it is the subscript indicating property 𝑖 at time 𝑡. P is used as dependent variables to 
represent the 10-3 times of property price. Regarding independent variables that this 
investigation uses to test for property characteristics, these include property size in square 
metres (AS), floor level of the property (FR), number of bedrooms in the property (BR), 
number of living rooms in the property (LR), dummy variable for the window orientation of 
the property (O), dummy variable for the region in which the property belongs, and the year 
in which the property was transacted. The mortgage payment rates (MR), house price index 
(HPI) and income (IC), are treated as the economic factors that influence property prices. In 
fixed effect, 𝜇𝑖 are regions of property defined and time-invariant effects. In addition, random 
effect assumes that two error components are independent from each other. 
It is worth mentioning that, this investigation estimates the factors with the square of floor 
level (𝐹𝑅𝑖𝑡
2 ) and interactions between floor level and house planned permissions (𝐹𝑅𝑖𝑡 ∗
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𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐻𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑡). Based on Wong et al. (2005), the greatest demand for houses is located on the 
middle floor levels of tall buildings. In the past, middle floor level houses were popular 
because the price was not as high when compared to the top floor level houses. Meanwhile, 
daylight and views of houses located on middle floor levels is similar to house on top floor 
levels (Jim and Chen, 2009). Thus, the demand for houses located on middle floor levels 
increased, causing prices for those properties to rise. In the recent period, houses located on 
middle floor levels have the highest price in a tall building. Thus, this research estimates 𝐹𝑅𝑖𝑡
2  
to represent the influence of floor level to house prices and estimated 𝐹𝑅𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐻𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑡  to 
represent the interactions between floor levels and house demands. 
Given the nature of this research, least squares estimation methods generate biased and 
inconsistent estimates (Baltagi, 2001). Additionally, a number of explanatory variables are 
endogenous. To address these concerns, this investigation uses the generalised method of 
moments (GMM) method, which accounts for endogeneity by using alternative independent 
variables that are suspected to suffer from endogeneity. To examine property price 
determinants, this investigation employs the following equations: 
                                                  𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖𝑡
′ + ∑ 𝜆𝑖𝑍𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 + 𝑖𝑡                                      (4.3) 
                                                            𝑋𝑖𝑡
′ = [𝑦2𝑖
′  𝑥1𝑖
′ ]                                                      (4.3.1) 
                                                               𝑧𝑖
′ = [𝑥1𝑖
′  𝑥2𝑖
′ ]                                                      (4.3.2) 
where 𝑖 denotes an individual property; 𝑡 represents the date of property transacted; Pit is 
property prices. 𝑋𝑖𝑡
′  combines endogenous variables and exogenous variables and the 
dependent variable is denoted by 𝑦 rather than 𝑦1. This investigation similarly combines the 
instruments for these variables (Equation 4.3) which is hypothesised to influence property 
prices with indirect effects. Zi is used as a vector representing the control variables, 𝜆i is an 
estimated coefficient for control variables, and it is the random error. 
It is important that this chapter estimates the interactions between the number of bedrooms 
and floor level (𝐵𝑅 ∗ 𝐹𝑅); and the interactions between the number of living rooms and floor 
level (𝐿𝑅 ∗ 𝐹𝑅) in the models respectively. This is because the investigation wants to control 
the floor level effects when the investigation analyses the influences of orientation effects for 
house prices. 
Baltagi (2001) argued that employing the values of the other variable regressors as 
instruments can increase consistency and efficiency of the model. The IV-GMM model 
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employed the instrumental variables to improve the efficiency of the model. Meanwhile, the 
IV-GMM method restricts unobserved heterogeneity and limited the consistency of the 
dependent variable 29 . To deal with this, the independent variables employed in this 
investigation refer to the existing literature. Subsequently, the hypotheses are examined by 
the endogenous test. In the hypotheses, the coefficients of the independent variables are not 
significant and are individually equal to zero. If the null hypothesis is not rejected, the model 
is not efficient so that to modify the equation. With regards to the efficient model, the null 
hypothesis should be rejected so that the independent variables are significant in the general 
regression. Alternatively, the investigation could reduce the number of non-significant 
variables to estimate a confining hypothesis. Such estimations yield consistent estimations of 
the parameters. The coefficients of independent variables are respectable, and refer to the 
restriction for the number of independent variables. 
 
4.4.2 Data 
Beijing is located in the northwest region of China, between longitude 115°25’-117°30’E and 
latitude 39°28’-41°05’N and covers an estimated area of 1.6 × 104 km2. In its examination of 
real estate development and the limited data that is available, this investigation addresses the 
area of Beijing which the government has demarcated as the city’s core area. In the empirical 
analysis for this study, a sample of 17,143 transacted property records have been examined, 
fulfilling the requirements for this investigation. The sample period spans 2002 to 2014. The 
data have been retrieved from the largest available real estate information websites: Soufang 
DataStream and the Beijing municipal commission on house and urban-rural development 
website. The numbers of property transaction records shown are as follows: 
Table 4.1 Number of Property Transaction Records 
Year 200
2 
200
3 
200
4 
200
5 
200
6 
200
7 
200
8 
200
9 
201
0 
201
1 
201
2 
201
3 
201
4 Sample
s 
434 642 734 814 880 937 951 105
8 
101
6 
101
2 
105
5 
370
0 
391
0  
This chapter investigates the determinants of property price in seven districts of Beijing. The 
transacted property records include the longitude and latitude, in order to track the records 
respectively in alternative areas. 
                                                          
29 See Baltagi (2001) for econometric analysis of panel data. 
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Figure 4.3 Beijing Map and Study Area 
            
                      Map of Beijing                                                            Study Area 
 
Figure 4.3 illustrates the map of Beijing with the whole city view and the study area which 
includes seven Beijing urban core districts: Dongcheng district, Xicheng district, Xuanwu 
district, Chongwen district, Haidian district, Chaoyang district and Fengtai district. Several 
significant residential areas have been included in this study area. The points on the map in 
Figure 4.3 are the locations of property transactions which have the coordinate records. 
Table 4.2 provides the descriptive statistics for 17,143 house transactions in Beijing.  Mean 
of the variables, standard deviation of the variables, minimum of the variables and maximum 
of the variables are employed in this table. House price is the dependent variable, and the 
other samples are independent variables. In order to refrain from the influence of collinearity 
issue, the investigation established collinearity diagnostics. Table 4.3 summarises the 
coefficients of pairwise correlations including the endogenous variables and exogenous 
variables in this investigation. 
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Table 4.2 Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
House Price 17,143 36.87 24.74 0.27 937.5 
Size 17,143 122.9 64.13 16.36 656 
Floor Level 17,143 19.51 9.24 1 66 
Number of Bedrooms 17,143 2.22 0.96 1 8 
Numbers of Living rooms 17,143 1.47 0.64 0 4 
House Planning Permissions 17,143 4.07 0.07 3.88 4.14 
House Completed Permissions 17,143 3.44 0.05 3.35 3.58 
House Price Index 17,143 109.8 7.08 97.4 122 
Mortgage Payment Rates 17,143 0.07 0.00 0.058 0.078 
Unemployment Rates 17,143 0.01 0.00 0.012 0.021 
Income 17,143 4.73 0.16 4.32 4.89 
Central Bank Interest Rates 17,143 0.06 0.005 0.053 0.075 
Consumer Price Index 17,143 102.2 1.76 98.2 105.6 
Gross Regional Product 17,143 4.14 0.21 3.63 4.33 
Total Investment in Fixed Assets in the Whole Country 17,143 3.70 0.17 3.25 3.84 
Local Governments General Budgetary Revenue 17,143 3.37 0.27 2.73 3.60 
Local Governments General Budgetary Expenditure 17,143 3.42 0.26 2.80 3.66 
Gross Output Value of Construction 17,143 3.67 0.27 3.02 3.91 
Money Supply 17,143 5.82 0.26 5.20 6.08 
South 17,143 0.14 0.35 0 1 
North 17,143 0.07 0.26 0 1 
East 17,143 0.10 0.29 0 1 
West 17,143 0.07 0.26 0 1 
Southeast 17,143 0.11 0.31 0 1 
Southwest 17,143 0.08 0.27 0 1 
Northeast 17,143 0.05 0.21 0 1 
North and South 17,143 0.32 0.47 0 1 
West and East 17,143 0.03 0.17 0 1 
Region ID 17,143 4.78 1.40 1 7 
Year 17,143 2010 3.7 2002 2014 
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Table 4.3 Coefficients of Correlation 
  Price Size 
Floor_le
vel 
Bedroom_
nums 
Livingroom
_nums 
House_planning_
permissions 
House_price
_index 
Mortgage_payment
_rate 
Income 
           
Price 1         
Size 0.0452 1        
Floor_level 0.0451 -0.0016 1       
Bedroom_nums -0.0054 0.7939 -0.1626 1      
Livingroom_nums 0.0148 0.6031 -0.0412 0.6361 1     
House_planning_per
missions 
0.5959 -0.094 0.0557 -0.0844 -0.0581 1    
House_price_index 0.2446 -0.035 0.0322 -0.0366 -0.0325 0.312 1   
Mortgage_payment_r
ate 
0.1495 -0.0075 0.0115 -0.0131 -0.008 0.2786 0.149 1  
Income 0.6255 -0.0918 0.0554 -0.0895 -0.0571 0.9123 0.3044 0.3131 1 
Mean VIF 2.93         
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4.5 Empirical Findings 
4.5.1 OLS and Panel Results 
The results of the examination of the determinants in the property sector are presented in the 
OLS and panel data-property regression models and are analysed by using different 
estimators. 
This model has estimated OLS regression, cross-sectional regression with fixed effects and 
cross-sectional regression with random effects in Table 4.4. The robust regressions are 
represented in columns with “_r”. The fixed effects estimation and the random effects 
estimation is employed in the data with time series in the panel structure. Year effects are 
attributed to apprehend the changes in house price appropriately across time. The Breusch-
Pagan test shows the value with 9.66 and 0 of the p-value, which strongly rejects the null 
hypothesis. This means there is heteroscedasticity in the OLS estimator indicating the 
regression is not efficient. The Breusch-Godfrey test shows the value with 130.6 and 0 of the 
p-value, which rejects the null hypothesis that there are conditionally uncorrelated 
observations. In order to select an appropriate model between fixed effects regression and 
random effects regression, the estimations of regressions show that the F-statistic for fixed 
effects is significant at 1% and Wald chi2 is significant at 1% for random effects, implying 
that the model is good and coefficients in the model are different from zero. The p-value of 
the Hausman test is zero; this means that the fixed effects regression is more appropriate for 
this model. The Wooldridge test is applied to test the conditionally uncorrelated observations 
in the panel models. With the values of 0.67 and 0.45 of the p-value, the result accepted the 
null hypothesis that there are conditionally uncorrelated observations. The heteroscedasticity 
test (likelihood-ratio test) suggests the value of 3999 and p-value of 0, which strongly rejects 
the null hypothesis that there is conditional homoscedasticity. This suggests that there is 
conditional heteroscedasticity in the panel model. According to the Friedman test, the 
statistics are distributed by chi-square. The result of the Friedman test suggests that there is a 
cross-sectional correlation, which rejects the null hypothesis with 0 of the p-value.  
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Table 4.4 Regression Results Using OLS, Fixed Effect and Random Effect with Tests for 
House Prices 
          
  
  
        
  OLS OLS_r Newey Fixed Fixed_r Random Random_r 
Size 
0.0548*** 0.0548*** 0.0548*** 0.0617*** 0.0617*** 0.0548*** 0.0548*** 
(14.14) (4.10) (12.75) (16.58) (3.78) (14.14) (4.10) 
Floor_level 
21.70*** 21.70 21.70*** 22.41*** 22.41 21.70*** 21.70 
(8.52) (1.61) (7.55) (9.29) (1.84) (8.52) (1.61) 
Floor_level^2 
-0.316*** -0.316 -0.316*** -0.304*** -0.304 -0.316*** -0.316 
(-5.63) (-1.63) (-5.85) (-5.72) (-1.87) (-5.63) (-1.63) 
Bedroom_nums 
-2.101*** -2.101*** -2.101*** -2.630*** -2.630*** -2.101*** -2.101*** 
(-7.67) (-5.31) (-8.14) (-10.08) (-6.50) (-7.67) (-5.31) 
Livingroom_nums 
0.164 0.164 0.164 0.447 0.447 0.164 0.164 
(0.55) (0.50) (0.54) (1.60) (0.89) (0.55) (0.50) 
House_planning_perm
issions 
118.2*** 118.2** 118.2*** 118.0*** 118.0** 118.2*** 118.2*** 
(14.54) (2.60) (11.11) (15.31) (2.98) (14.54) (2.60) 
Floor*House_permissi
ons 
-5.495*** -5.495 -5.495*** -5.594*** -5.594 -5.495*** -5.495 
(-8.78) (-1.63) (-7.67) (-9.43) (-1.84) (-8.78) (-1.63) 
Floor^2*House_permi
ssions 
0.0815*** 0.0815 0.0815*** 0.0777*** 0.0777 0.0815*** 0.0815* 
(5.90) (1.70) (6.06) (5.95) (1.92) (5.90) (1.70) 
House_price_index 
0.201*** 0.201*** 0.201*** 0.193*** 0.193*** 0.201*** 0.201*** 
(9.46) (10.13) (7.18) (9.62) (11.27) (9.46) (10.13) 
Mortgage_payment_ra
te 
-292.0*** -292.0** -292.0*** -278.7*** -278.7** -292.0*** -292.0*** 
(-9.58) (-3.46) (-12.59) (-9.70) (-3.64) (-9.58) (-3.46) 
Income 
77.10*** 77.10*** 77.10*** 79.38*** 79.38*** 77.10*** 77.10*** 
(35.48) (11.62) (38.05) (38.70) (10.91) (35.48) (11.62) 
North & South 
2.318*** 2.318 2.318*** 2.478*** 2.478 2.318*** 2.318* 
(6.25) (1.84) (4.67) (7.01) (1.78) (6.25) (1.84) 
Time Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 
-809.2*** -809.2*** -809.2*** -823.9*** -823.9*** -809.2*** -809.2*** 
(-27.99) (-3.99) (-19.82) (-29.97) (-4.38) (-27.99) (-3.99) 
N 17143 17143 17143 17143 17143 17143 17143 
R-square 0.43 0.43   0.462 0.462 0.43 0.43 
Breusch-Pagan test 9.66             
p-value 0             
Breusch-Godfrey LM 
test 
130.6             
p-value 0             
Hausman test       679.9       
p-value       0       
Wooldridge test       0.67       
p-value       0.45       
Likelihood-ratio test       3999       
p-value       0       
Friedman's test       264.5       
p-value       0       
* p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01 
T-statistic are in parenthesis 
AS=the size of property, FR=the floor level of property located, BR=number of bedroom, LR=number of living room, 
HPP=floor space under construction of Beijing land, HPI=house price index, MR=monthly mortgage payment rates, 
IC=Income, Orien=dummy for property orientation. 
 
  
𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝑎1𝐴𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎2𝐹𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎3𝐹𝑅𝑖𝑡
2 + 𝑎4𝐵𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎5𝐿𝑅𝑖𝑡 + +𝑎6𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐻𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎7𝐹𝑅𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐻𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑡
+ 𝑎8𝐹𝑅𝑖𝑡
2 ∗ 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐻𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎9𝐻𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎10𝑀𝑅𝑖𝑡 + +𝑎10𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐼𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝑑1𝑂𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛 + 𝑑2𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝑑3𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 
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Based on the results of the fixed effects regression, the size of the property leads to an 
increase of 0.062% in property prices. Thus, the hypothesis H4 is rejected, which means 
property size influences the property price. This result is in line with Zhang and Yi (2017) 
who find there is a positive relationship between house price and size of living area in Beijing. 
It implies that the larger-size house increases the demand for housing in the Beijing housing 
market. Home size in China influences the housing demand in terms of China’s characterised 
consumer behaviour of households (Fang et al., 2016). In respect of the floor level (FR) of 
the property, there is a significant positive relationship between property prices with 22.4% 
and negative relationship on property prices with FR2. The hypothesis H7 is rejected. This 
means the floor level influences the house price positively from the lower floor level to the 
middle floor level in a tall building. However, from the middle floor level to the upper floor 
level, the floor level influences house prices negatively. This result is similar to a previous 
study (Wong et al., 2005). It implies that the household in Beijing preferred to buy a similar 
condition house with the lower price. The number of bedrooms has a significant negative 
influence on the property prices with 2.63%. The hypothesis H5 is rejected. This situation 
may be based on privacy. According to Fahey (2016), one-bedroom rents are more expensive 
than rents for two-bedrooms. The number of living rooms is not significant on property prices 
in a fixed effects estimator. The hypothesis H6 is accepted. This result is not in line with 
Zhang and Yi (2017). This may be because most of houses in Beijing contains only one 
bedroom, which is not a significant factor to the house price. Regarding the property 
orientation as a vector dummy variable, the north and south factor is significant and positive, 
which means that houses facing north and south have an increased price of 2.48%. The 
hypothesis H8 is rejected. This result is found in the previous studies (Jim and Chen, 2009). 
However, this increase is because houses facing north and south have better natural 
ventilation and more daylight, which improves the natural quality of the house as well as its 
energy efficiency. Thus, it is similar to Jim and Chen, (2009) who suggested that daylight and 
views from houses are significant factors affecting house price. In terms of the economic 
factors, the mortgage payment rates have a significant negative influence on property prices 
with 278.7%. Thus, hypothesis H2 is rejected. This result is similar to that of Fang et al. 
(2016), who find mortgages are necessary for many households in China, and Kohn and 
Bryant (2010), who find that the mortgage payment rates have a significant negative 
relationship to property price. This result also confirms that of Yu (2010) and Li and Chand 
(2013), who provided the mortgage payment rate influence China’s urban house prices 
negatively by data between 1998 and 2009. The House Price Index (HPI) has a 0.19% 
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positive influence on property prices. The average income of citizens influences the property 
prices significantly and positively with 79.4%. Thus, the hypothesis H1 is rejected. This 
result is in line with Hui and Gu (2009) and Shen and Liu (2004), who provide income 
significantly influence the house price in China. The demand quantity of properties 
(Floor*House_permissions) has an inverse U-shape relationship with house prices. Thus, the 
hypothesis H3 is rejected. This result is not similar to Li et al. (2018), who provide the ratios 
of residential floor space under construction to floor space increase house price by 15.5 per 
cent each year after 2004. This is because the thesis improved the method of calculating 
house demand, which is more flexible with an inverse U-shape relationship to explore the 
house price and house demand. It implies that price mechanism failed to clear out supply and 
demand in Beijing housing market (Ge and Wu, 2017). The factors are related to economic 
performance in terms of property price and are statistically significant, as well as consistent 
with previous studies (Antolin and Bover, 1997; Lee, 1997; Chen and Patel, 1998; Shiller, 
2007; Mints, 2007; Miles, 2008). Although some studies were undertaken in different 
countries, all of the results corresponded with economic theory. Based on such findings, 
economic factors have a significant influence on property prices in Beijing.  
 
4.5.2 Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) 
Regarding the test of error terms unrelated to regressors, the null hypothesis is rejected, 
meaning that the regressors have endogeneity. With respect to linear instrumental variables 
regression, this investigation applies and tests the instrumental variables and endogeneity in 
order to establish IV-GMM models. 
In order to identify the relationship between mortgage payment rates (MR) and house prices, 
this research employs mortgage payment rates as an agent variable, and employs central bank 
interest rates and CPI as the instrumental variables by an endogenous variable of MR. Based 
on the empirical results of first stage regression referred to IV-GMM, the central bank 
interest rates (IR) influence the mortgage payment rates (MR) positively and significantly, 
which p-value of IR is 0 (Table A.9). According to the results, when the interest rates have an 
increase of 1%, the mortgage payment rates will be increased by 0.95%. The hypothesis H9 is 
rejected. This result is similar to Irving (1911), who provide the mortgage payment rates 
generally resemble the interest rates against the inflation under the banking system. It implies 
that the mortgage payment rate is influenced by interest rate positively and significantly, in 
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line with Gan et al. (2012). The inflation (CPI) influences the mortgage payment rates (MR) 
negatively and significantly, which p-value of CPI is below 0.05 (Table A.9). Thus, the 
hypothesis H10 is rejected. This result provides that if inflation decreases by 100%, the 
mortgage payment rates will increase by 0.004%. These results confirm the ‘quantity theory 
of money’ (Irving, 1911), which means the mortgage payment rates and the central bank 
interest rates moves correlatively and positively. The mortgage payment rates increase in 
order to against the irrational rise of inflation causes referred to the fractional-reserve banking 
system. The result also confirms the mortgage payment rate is influenced by interest rate 
positively and significantly in China, consisted with Gan et al. (2012). 
After adding the instrumental variables (IR and CPI), the investigation found that the 
coefficient of the mortgage payment rate increases to -244.4, and the coefficient of the 
income increases to 79.02 (Table 4.5 GMM_Fixed). These results reject the general 
hypotheses of economic fundamentals (chapter 4.3.1) based on the more reasonable results. 
Thus, IR and CPI are the valuable instruments for the endogenous variable of MR. 
Based on Hausman tests, the investigation rejects the null hypothesis which refers to p-value 
as zero. This means the regression has a presence of endogenous variables. The Sargan test of 
the instrumental variables suggests that the null hypothesis is accepted, whereby the 
instrumental variables are not relative to the error of regression, with a p-value of 0.9. The 
endogenous test suggests that the instrumental variables are relative to endogenous variables, 
referring to the p-value being close to 0. Meanwhile, the results of the 2SLS estimator are 
similar to GMM estimator. As there is heteroscedasticity in the model, the GMM model is 
more efficient than the 2SLS model. The mortgage payment rates influence the house price 
significantly and positively. This result is similar to that of the previous study (Kohn and 
Bryant, 2010), in which the result is satisfactory for the economic theory. Moreover, the level 
of inflation rate affects the mortgage payment rates in the economic theory (Miles, 2008). 
According to the changes in the central bank interest rate (IR), the demand for investment 
changes is leading to the variation of mortgage payment rates (Shiller, 2007). Thus, H2 is 
rejected. This means the increase of mortgage payment rates decreases house prices. 
Moreover, the central bank interest rate and inflation rate (CPI) are relative to the mortgage 
payment rates. This result is similar to the previous studies (Kohn and Bryant, 2010; Li and 
Chand, 2013; Miles, 2008; Shiller, 2007; Yu, 2010). 
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Table 4.5 Regression Results Using IV-GMM (OLS and Panel) for House Price Using 
Mortgage Payment Rates as Endogenous Variables 
   
       
       
              
  OLS 2SLS_OLS GMM_OLS Fixed 2SLS_Fixed GMM_Fixed 
Size 
0.055*** 0.055*** 0.055*** 0.062*** 0.062*** 0.062*** 
(14.14) (14.12) (13.07) (16.58) (16.57) (16.57) 
Floor_level 
21.70*** 21.69*** 21.57*** 22.41*** 22.40*** 22.40*** 
(8.52) (8.52) (8.17) (9.29) (9.28) (9.28) 
Floor_level^2 
-0.316*** -0.316*** -0.315*** -0.304*** -0.304*** -0.304*** 
(-5.63) (-5.63) (-6.66) (-5.72) (-5.73) (-5.73) 
Bedroom_nums 
-2.101*** -2.101*** -2.101*** -2.63*** -2.63*** -2.63*** 
(-7.67) (-7.68) (-8.28) (-10.08) (-10.08) (-10.08) 
Livingroom_nums 
0.164 0.165 0.145 0.447 0.447 0.447 
(0.55) (0.56) (0.48) (1.60) (1.60) (1.60) 
House_planning_permissions 
118.2*** 118.3*** 118.0*** 118.0*** 118.0*** 118.0*** 
(14.54) (14.55) (12.57) (15.31) (15.32) (15.32) 
Floor*House_permissions 
-5.495*** -5.493*** -5.462*** -5.594*** -5.590*** -5.590*** 
(-8.78) (-8.78) (-8.30) (-9.43) (-9.43) (-9.43) 
Floor^2*House_permissions 
0.082*** 0.082*** 0.081*** 0.078*** 0.078*** 0.078*** 
(5.90) (5.91) (6.90) (5.95) (5.96) (5.96) 
House_price_index 
0.201*** 0.200*** 0.202*** 0.193*** 0.192*** 0.192*** 
(9.46) (9.39) (8.79) (9.62) (9.55) (9.55) 
Mortgage_payment_rate 
-292.0*** -254.4*** -252.9*** -278.7*** -244.4*** -244.4*** 
(-9.58) (-8.28) (-14.06) (-9.70) (-8.44) (-8.44) 
Income 
77.10*** 76.70*** 76.46*** 79.38*** 79.02*** 79.02*** 
(35.48) (35.31) (53.31) (38.70) (38.52) (38.52) 
North & South 
2.32*** 2.33*** 2.33*** 2.48*** 2.49*** 2.49*** 
(6.25) (6.28) (4.74) (7.01) (7.03) (7.03) 
Time Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 
-809.2*** -809.9*** -808.3*** -823.9*** -823.9*** -823.9*** 
(-27.99) (-28.02) (-22.36) (-29.97) (-29.97) (-29.97) 
N 17143 17143 17143 17143 17143 17143 
R-square 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.43 
Instrumented   MR   MR 
Instruments   
AS FR FR2 BR LR HPP 
FRHPP FR2HPP HPI IC 
NS IR CPI 
  
AS FR FR2 BR LR HPP 
FRHPP FR2HPP HPI IC NS 
IR CPI 
Breusch-Pagan test 9.66          
p-value 0          
Breusch-Godfrey LM test 130.6           
p-value 0           
Wooldridge test       0.67     
p-value       0.45     
Likelihood-ratio test       3999     
p-value       0     
Friedman's test       264.5     
p-value       0     
Hausman test   91.26     85.7   
p-value   0     0   
Sargan test   0.24     0.03   
p-value   0.63     0.9   
Endogenous test   513003     170000   
p-value   0     0   
* p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01 
T-statistic are in parenthesis 
AS=the size of property, FR=the floor level of property located, BR=number of bedroom, LR=number of living room, 
HPP=floor space under construction of Beijing land, HPI=house price index, MR=monthly mortgage payment rates, 
IC=Income, Orien=dummy for property orientation, IR=central bank interest rate, CPI= consumer price index. 
 
𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝑏𝑖𝑡(𝐴𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝐹𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝐹𝑅𝑖𝑡
2 + 𝐵𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝐿𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐻𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝐹𝑅𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐻𝑃𝑃 + 𝐹𝑅𝑖𝑡
2 ∗ 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐻𝑃𝑃 + 𝐻𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐼𝐶𝑖𝑡)
+ 𝑏𝑗𝑡𝑀𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝑑1𝑂𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛 + 𝑑2𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝑑3𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 
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This investigation estimates an IV-GMM regression with endogenous variables of MR and IC 
(Table 4.6, Table 4.7, Table 4.8 and Table 4.9). Moreover, this investigation made each 
column for GMM regression with instrumental variables of IR CPI GDP, IR CPI MS, IR CPI 
GR and IR CPI GE, respectively. The results provide that the central bank interest rates (IR) 
significantly influence the income (IC) positively, which p-values of IR are 0. Thus, the 
hypothesis H11 is rejected. The inflation (CPI) influences the income (IC) negatively and 
significantly, which p-values of CPI are below 0.05 (Table A.16, Table A.23, Table A.30, 
Table A.37 and Table A.44). The hypothesis H12 is rejected. The results provide that the 
income is increased by 1.32% when the central bank interest rates increase by 100% (Table 
A.16). The income is decreased by 0.84% when there is an increase of CPI by 100% (Table 
A.16). This means the adjustments of central bank interest rates affect the employees’ living 
standards referred to the prices of goods. These results are similar to Irving (1911), which 
provides that monetary policy be relative to people’s financial station. Meanwhile, this result 
confirms that of Horioka and Wan (2007). It implicates that the real interest rate has a 
significant positive impact on the household income in Beijing. Because the mortgage loans 
employed to finance housing purchases, which may disconnect house prices from the 
household-income fundamental. After adding the instrumental variables (IR CPI and GRP), 
the investigation found that the coefficients of income are increased by 4.6% (Table 4.8 
GMM). This result rejects H1, which means the income increases the property prices more 
influentially in IV-GMM model and is in line with Shen and Liu (2004). Thus, IR and CPI 
are the valuable instruments for the endogenous variable of IC. 
This investigation found that total investment in fixed assets in the whole country (IFA) 
(Table A.23), money supply (MS) (Table A.30), local government general budgetary revenue 
(GR) (Table A.37) and local government general budgetary expenditure (GE) (Table A.44) 
influence mortgage payment rates significantly and positively. The investment in fixed assets 
affects the mortgage payment rates by 0.35% significantly, which p-value of IFA is 0. Thus, 
the hypothesis H13 is rejected. When there is an increase in money supply by 100%, the 
mortgage payment rates will be increased by 0.138% significantly which p-value of MS is 0. 
The hypothesis H14 is rejected. If the local government general budgetary revenue increases 
by 100%, the mortgage payment rates will be increased by 0.163% significantly which p-
value of GR is below 0.05. The hypothesis H15 is rejected. The mortgage payment rates will 
be increased by 0.163% significantly when the local government general budgetary 
expenditure increases by 100%, which p-value of GE is 0. The hypothesis H16 is rejected. 
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Based on these results, IFA and GE influence mortgage payment rates positively, which is in 
line with the theory of ‘conventional wisdom’ (Galbraith, 1958). The results also are in line 
with Taylor (2000), who provide the instruments of fiscal policy change aggregate demand 
and influence the monetary policy indirectly in China. However, the results, which MS and 
GR influence mortgage payment rates positively is contrary to the ‘conventional wisdom’ 
(Galbraith, 1958) and the ‘quantity theory of money’ (Irving, 1911). The reason of that may 
be referred to China’s rapid economic growth. As the good condition of economic growth, 
the increasing government revenue cannot restrain the demand for investments in the housing 
market. The increase of government revenue means upward pressure on mortgage payment 
rates. Though the money supply increases, the aggregate demand for GDP is increasing 
rapidly so that exceed the amount of money supply, caused the increase of interest rate.  
Based on Hausman test (p<0.05), Sargan test (p>0.05) and endogenous test (p<0.05), the 
model is efficient. After adding the instrumental variables (IFA, MS, GR and GE respectively) 
in the different models, the investigation found that the coefficients of mortgage payment 
rates are increased to -247.5, -261.8, -252.3 and -253.7 respectively (Table 4.8 GMM and 
Table 4.9 GMM). This result rejects H2, which means the mortgage payment rates influence 
property prices negatively and significantly in the more efficient model of IV-GMM and is 
consistent with Li and Chand (2013), who provide the mortgage payment rate influence 
China’s urban house prices negatively from 1998 to 2009. Thus, IFA MS GR and GE are the 
valuable instruments for the endogenous variable of MR. 
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Table 4.6 Regression Results Using IV-GMM (OLS) for House Price Using Mortgage 
Payment Rates and Income as Endogenous Variables 
 
 
 
  OLS 2SLS GMM 2SLS GMM 
Size 
0.0548*** 0.0547*** 0.0547*** 0.0547*** 0.0549*** 
(14.14) (14.10) (13.00) (14.11) (13.05) 
Floor_level 
21.70*** 21.78*** 21.75*** 21.73*** 21.65*** 
(8.52) (8.56) (8.25) (8.54) (8.20) 
Floor_level^2 
-0.316*** -0.319*** -0.318*** -0.317*** -0.316*** 
(-5.63) (-5.67) (-6.75) (-5.65) (-6.70) 
Bedroom_nums 
-2.101*** -2.086*** -2.085*** -2.095*** -2.094*** 
(-7.67) (-7.62) (-8.21) (-7.65) (-8.25) 
Livingroom_nums 
0.164 0.160 0.154 0.163 0.148 
(0.55) (0.54) (0.51) (0.55) (0.49) 
House_planning_permissions 
118.2*** 110.4*** 110.3*** 115.0*** 114.8*** 
(14.54) (13.54) (11.79) (13.99) (12.30) 
Floor*House_permissions 
-5.495*** -5.516*** -5.508*** -5.502*** -5.483*** 
(-8.78) (-8.81) (-8.37) (-8.79) (-8.33) 
Floor^2*House_permissions 
0.0815*** 0.0821*** 0.0820*** 0.0818*** 0.0815*** 
(5.90) (5.95) (6.99) (5.92) (6.94) 
House_price_index 
0.201*** 0.198*** 0.199*** 0.199*** 0.201*** 
(9.46) (9.31) (8.65) (9.35) (8.77) 
Mortgage_payment_rate 
-292.0*** -260.3*** -260.0*** -256.9*** -256.0*** 
(-9.58) (-8.47) (-14.40) (-8.34) (-14.16) 
Income 
77.10*** 80.67*** 80.62*** 78.33*** 78.24*** 
(35.48) (36.71) (58.83) (34.57) (57.23) 
North & South 
2.318*** 2.324*** 2.326*** 2.326*** 2.330*** 
(6.25) (6.27) (4.73) (6.28) (4.74) 
Time Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 
-809.2*** -796.1*** -795.6*** -804.2*** -802.9*** 
(-27.99) (-27.52) (-22.03) (-27.74) (-22.27) 
N 17143 17143 17143 17143 17143 
R-square 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.43 
Instrumented   MR IC 
Instruments  
AS FR FR2 BR LR HPP FRHPP 
FR2HPP HPI NS IR CPI GRP 
AS FR FR2 BR LR HPP FRHPP 
FR2HPP HPI NS IR CPI IFA 
Breusch-Pagan test 9.66         
p-value 0         
Breusch-Godfrey LM test 130.6         
p-value 0         
Hausman test   274   143.8   
p-value   0   0   
Sargan test   0.02   0.12   
p-value   0.9   0.73   
Endogenous test   
MR 353266 MR 380600 
IC 259215 IC 69458 
p-value   0 0 
* p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01 
T-statistic are in parenthesis 
AS=the size of property, FR=the floor level of property located, BR=number of bedroom, LR=number of living room, 
HPP=floor space under construction of Beijing land, HPI=house price index, MR=monthly mortgage payment rates, 
IC=Income, Orien=dummy for property orientation, IR=central bank interest rate, CPI= consumer price index, GRP=gross 
regional product, IFA=total investment in fixed assets in the whole country, MS=money supply, GR=local governments 
general budgetary revenue, GE=local governments general budgetary expenditure. 
 
  
𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝑏𝑖𝑡(𝐴𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝐹𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝐹𝑅𝑖𝑡
2 + 𝐵𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝐿𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐻𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝐹𝑅𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐻𝑃𝑃 + 𝐹𝑅𝑖𝑡
2 ∗ 𝐻𝑃𝑃 + 𝐻𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡) + 𝑏𝑗𝑡(𝑀𝑅𝑖𝑡
+ 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐼𝐶𝑖𝑡) + 𝑑1𝑂𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛 + 𝑑2𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝑑3𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 
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Table 4.7 Regression Results Using IV-GMM (OLS) for House Price Using Mortgage 
Payment Rates and Income as Endogenous Variables 
              
  
  
 
  
        
  2SLS GMM 2SLS GMM 2SLS GMM 
Size 
0.0545*** 0.0541*** 0.0546*** 0.0546*** 0.0546*** 0.0546*** 
(14.04) (12.84) (14.09) (12.97) (14.08) (12.96) 
Floor_level 
21.97*** 22.10*** 21.82*** 21.82*** 21.84*** 21.85*** 
(8.62) (8.38) (8.57) (8.27) (8.58) (8.29) 
Floor_level^2 
-0.323*** -0.325*** -0.319*** -0.319*** -0.320*** -0.320*** 
(-5.75) (-6.93) (-5.69) (-6.78) (-5.70) (-6.80) 
Bedroom_nums 
-2.055*** -2.056*** -2.080*** -2.080*** -2.077*** -2.077*** 
(-7.50) (-8.09) (-7.60) (-8.19) (-7.59) (-8.18) 
Livingroom_nums 
0.150 0.174 0.158 0.158 0.157 0.160 
(0.50) (0.57) (0.53) (0.52) (0.53) (0.53) 
House_planning_permissions 
94.94*** 95.24*** 107.7*** 107.7*** 105.9*** 106.0*** 
(11.54) (10.17) (13.20) (11.52) (12.97) (11.37) 
Floor*House_permissions 
-5.561*** -5.596*** -5.524*** -5.524*** -5.529*** -5.533*** 
(-8.88) (-8.51) (-8.83) (-8.40) (-8.83) (-8.41) 
Floor^2*House_permissions 
0.0832*** 0.0838*** 0.0823*** 0.0823*** 0.0824*** 0.0825*** 
(6.02) (7.17) (5.96) (7.03) (5.97) (7.04) 
House_price_index 
0.195*** 0.191*** 0.197*** 0.197*** 0.197*** 0.197*** 
(9.14) (8.31) (9.28) (8.61) (9.26) (8.57) 
Mortgage_payment_rate 
-272.0*** -273.7*** -262.4*** -262.4*** -263.7*** -263.9*** 
(-8.85) (-15.06) (-8.54) (-14.52) (-8.58) (-14.60) 
Income 
88.49*** 88.75*** 82.04*** 82.04*** 82.93*** 82.96*** 
(39.23) (62.25) (37.22) (61.24) (37.51) (61.83) 
North & South 
2.320*** 2.312*** 2.324*** 2.324*** 2.323*** 2.322*** 
(6.26) (4.70) (6.27) (4.72) (6.27) (4.72) 
Time Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 
-768.9*** -770.8*** -791.3*** -791.3*** -788.2*** -788.5*** 
(-26.51) (-21.35) (-27.35) (-21.91) (-27.23) (-21.87) 
N 17143 17143 17143 17143 17143 17143 
R-square 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.43 
Instrumented MR IC 
Instruments 
AS FR FR2 BR LR 
HPP FRHPP FR2HPP 
HPI NS IR CPI MS 
AS FR FR2 BR LR 
HPP FRHPP FR2HPP 
HPI NS IR CPI GR 
AS FR FR2 BR LR 
HPP FRHPP FR2HPP 
HPI NS IR CPI GE 
Hausman test 398.6   313.8   316.6   
p-value 0   0   0   
Sargan test 0.34   0.21   0.01   
p-value 0.56   0.99   0.94   
Endogenous test 
MR 334158 MR 350513 MR 347080 
IC 72924 IC 199022 IC 163986 
p-value 0 0 0 
AS=the size of property, FR=the floor level of property located, BR=number of bedroom, LR=number of living 
room, HPP=floor space under construction of Beijing land, HPI=house price index, MR=monthly mortgage 
payment rates, IC=Income, Orien=dummy for property orientation, IR=central bank interest rate, CPI= 
consumer price index, GRP=gross regional product, IFA=total investment in fixed assets in the whole country, 
MS=money supply, GR=local governments general budgetary revenue, GE=local governments general 
budgetary expenditure. 
  
𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝑏𝑖𝑡(𝐴𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝐹𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝐹𝑅𝑖𝑡
2 + 𝐵𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝐿𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐻𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝐹𝑅𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐻𝑃𝑃 + 𝐹𝑅𝑖𝑡
2 ∗ 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐻𝑃𝑃 + 𝐻𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡)
+ 𝑏𝑗𝑡(𝑀𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐼𝐶𝑖𝑡) + 𝑑1𝑂𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛 + 𝑑2𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝑑3𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 
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Table 4.8 Regression Results Using IV-GMM (Panel) for House Price Using Mortgage 
Payment Rates and Income as Endogenous Variables 
 
 
 
  Fixed 2SLS GMM 2SLS GMM 
Size 
0.0617*** 0.0616*** 0.0616*** 0.0616*** 0.0616*** 
(16.58) (16.56) (16.56) (16.56) (16.56) 
Floor_level 
22.41*** 22.50*** 22.50*** 22.45*** 22.45*** 
(9.29) (9.33) (9.33) (9.31) (9.31) 
Floor_level^2 
-0.304*** -0.306*** -0.306*** -0.305*** -0.305*** 
(-5.72) (-5.77) (-5.77) (-5.75) (-5.75) 
Bedroom_nums 
-2.630*** -2.619*** -2.619*** -2.624*** -2.624*** 
(-10.08) (-10.03) (-10.03) (-10.05) (-10.05) 
Livingroom_nums 
0.447 0.442 0.442 0.445 0.445 
(1.60) (1.58) (1.58) (1.59) (1.59) 
House_planning_permissions 
118.0*** 110.1*** 110.1*** 114.0*** 114.0*** 
(15.31) (14.25) (14.25) (14.62) (14.62) 
Floor*House_permissions 
-5.594*** -5.615*** -5.615*** -5.603*** -5.603*** 
(-9.43) (-9.47) (-9.47) (-9.45) (-9.45) 
Floor^2*House_permissions 
0.0777*** 0.0783*** 0.0783*** 0.0780*** 0.0780*** 
(5.95) (6.00) (6.00) (5.98) (5.98) 
House_price_index 
0.193*** 0.190*** 0.190*** 0.191*** 0.191*** 
(9.62) (9.46) (9.46) (9.51) (9.51) 
Mortgage_payment_rate 
-278.7*** -250.4*** -250.4*** -247.5*** -247.5*** 
(-9.70) (-8.64) (-8.64) (-8.52) (-8.52) 
Income 
79.38*** 83.03*** 83.03*** 81.09*** 81.09*** 
(38.70) (40.02) (40.02) (37.89) (37.89) 
North & South 
2.478*** 2.486*** 2.486*** 2.487*** 2.487*** 
(7.01) (7.03) (7.03) (7.03) (7.03) 
Time Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 
-823.9*** -823.9*** -823.9*** -823.9*** -823.9*** 
(-29.97) (-29.97) (-29.97) (-29.97) (-29.97) 
N 17143 17143 17143 17143 17143 
Instrumented   MR IC       
Instruments  
AS FR FR2 BR LR HPP 
FRHPP FR2HPP HPI NS IR 
CPI GRP 
AS FR FR2 BR LR HPP 
FRHPP FR2HPP HPI NS IR 
CPI IFA 
Wooldridge test 0.67         
p-value 0.45         
Likelihood-ratio test 3999         
p-value 0         
Friedman's test 264.5         
p-value 0         
Hausman test   291.5   151.4   
p-value   0   0   
Sargan test   0.3   0.13   
p-value   0.59   0.72   
Endogenous test   17000   16000   
p-value   0   0   
* p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01 
T-statistic are in parenthesis 
AS=the size of property, FR=the floor level of property located, BR=number of bedroom, LR=number of living room, 
HPP=floor space under construction of Beijing land,  HPI=house price index, MR=monthly mortgage payment rates, 
IC=Income, Orien=dummy for property orientation, IR=central bank interest rate, CPI= consumer price index, GRP=gross 
regional product, IFA=total investment in fixed assets in the whole country, MS=money supply, GR=local governments 
general budgetary revenue, GE=local governments general budgetary expenditure. 
  
𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝑏𝑖𝑡(𝐴𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝐹𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝐹𝑅𝑖𝑡
2 + 𝐵𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝐿𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐻𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝐹𝑅𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐻𝑃𝑃 + 𝐹𝑅𝑖𝑡
2 ∗ 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐻𝑃𝑃 + 𝐻𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡)
+ 𝑏𝑗𝑡(𝑀𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐼𝐶𝑖𝑡) + 𝑑1𝑂𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛 + 𝑑2𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝑑3𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 
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Table 4.9 Regression Results Using IV-GMM (Panel) for House Price Using Mortgage 
Payment Rates and Income as Endogenous Variables 
 
 
 
 
  2SLS GMM 2SLS GMM 2SLS GMM 
Size 
0.0616*** 0.0616*** 0.0616*** 0.0616*** 0.0616*** 0.0616*** 
(16.54) (16.54) (16.56) (16.56) (16.56) (16.56) 
Floor_level 
      22.69*** 22.69*** 22.53*** 22.53*** 22.56*** 22.56*** 
(9.40) (9.40) (9.34) (9.34) (9.35) (9.35) 
Floor_level^2 
-0.311*** -0.311*** -0.307*** -0.307*** -0.307*** -0.307*** 
(-5.85) (-5.85) (-5.79) (-5.79) (-5.80) (-5.80) 
Bedroom_nums 
-2.597*** -2.597*** -2.615*** -2.615*** -2.612*** -2.612*** 
(-9.94) (-9.94) (-10.02) (-10.02) (-10.01) (-10.01) 
Livingroom_nums 
0.433 0.433 0.441 0.441 0.439 0.439 
(1.54) (1.54) (1.57) (1.57) (1.57) (1.57) 
House_planning_permissions 
95.20*** 95.20*** 107.6*** 107.6*** 105.8*** 105.8*** 
(12.21) (12.21) (13.90) (13.90) (13.66) (13.66) 
Floor*House_permissions 
-5.662*** -5.662*** -5.623*** -5.623*** -5.629*** -5.629*** 
(-9.54) (-9.54) (-9.48) (-9.48) (-9.49) (-9.49) 
Floor^2*House_permissions 
0.0794*** 0.0794*** 0.0785*** 0.0785*** 0.0786*** 0.0786*** 
(6.08) (6.08) (6.02) (6.02) (6.03) (6.03) 
House_price_index 
0.187*** 0.187*** 0.189*** 0.189*** 0.189*** 0.189*** 
(9.29) (9.29) (9.43) (9.43) (9.41) (9.41) 
Mortgage_payment_rate 
-261.8*** -261.8*** -252.3*** -252.3*** -253.7*** -253.7*** 
(-9.03) (-9.03) (-8.71) (-8.71) (-8.75) (-8.75) 
Income 
90.61*** 90.61*** 84.33*** 84.33*** 85.23*** 85.23*** 
(42.54) (42.54) (40.51) (40.51) (40.83) (40.83) 
North & South 
2.481*** 2.481*** 2.485*** 2.485*** 2.484*** 2.484*** 
(7.01) (7.01) (7.02) (7.02) (7.02) (7.02) 
Time Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 
-823.9*** -823.9*** -823.9*** -823.9*** -823.9*** -823.9*** 
(-29.97) (-29.97) (-29.97) (-29.97) (-29.97) (-29.97) 
N 17143 17143 17143 17143 17143 17143 
Instrumented MR IC 
Instruments 
AS FR FR2 BR LR HPP 
FRHPP FR2HPP HPI NS 
IR CPI MS 
AS FR FR2 BR LR 
HPP FRHPP FR2HPP 
HPI NS IR CPI GR 
AS FR FR2 BR LR 
HPP FRHPP FR2HPP 
HPI NS IR CPI GE 
Hausman test 424.6   330.4   337.6   
p-value 0   0   0   
Sargan test 1.61   0.45  0.57   
p-value 0.2   0.5  0.45   
Endogenous test 16000   17000   17000   
p-value 0   0   0   
* p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01 
T-statistic are in parenthesis 
AS=the size of property, FR=the floor level of property located, BR=number of bedroom, LR=number of living 
room, HPP=floor space under construction of Beijing land, HPI=house price index, MR=monthly mortgage 
payment rates, IC=Income, Orien=dummy for property orientation, IR=central bank interest rate, CPI= 
consumer price index, GRP=gross regional product, IFA=total investment in fixed assets in the whole country, 
MS=money supply, GR=local governments general budgetary revenue, GE=local governments general 
budgetary expenditure. 
  
𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝑏𝑖𝑡(𝐴𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝐹𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝐹𝑅𝑖𝑡
2 + 𝐵𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝐿𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐻𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝐹𝑅𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐻𝑃𝑃 + 𝐹𝑅𝑖𝑡
2 ∗ 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐻𝑃𝑃 + 𝐻𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡)
+ 𝑏𝑗𝑡(𝑀𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐼𝐶𝑖𝑡) + 𝑑1𝑂𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛 + 𝑑2𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝑑3𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 
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The factor of HPP*Floor, which represents the demand for property in this research. In Table 
4.10, it is suggested that HPP*Floor is an inverse U-shape factor relative to property prices. 
Referring to the housing demand (HPP*Floor), total investment in fixed assets in the whole 
country (IFA) influences house demand significantly and negatively which p-value of IFA is 
0; local government general budgetary revenue (GR) influence house demand negatively and 
significantly as well which p-value of GR is 0 (Table A.51). Thus, the hypothesis H17 and 
H18 are rejected. These results provide the investment in fixed assets stimulate the housing 
demand, which is in line with the previous study (Naylor, 1967) and confirms the 
conventional wisdom (Galbraith, 1958). The local government general budgetary revenue 
(GR) decreases the housing demand, which is in line with Naylor (1967). This is in line with 
Koss and Shi (2018), who mentioned that the central government policies, such as “freeze” in 
transactions, the purchase restrictions and increased land supplies, cannot be regarded as 
these measures have changed the fundamentals of the residential housing market, particularly 
with regards to damping the speculative fervour. This is because these policies curbed the 
house prices in short-term but did not correct the fundamental mismatch in the market 
between supply and demand or cool the enthusiasm of property speculators in the over-heated 
cities. After adding the instrumental variables (IFA and GR), the investigation found that the 
coefficient of housing demand is decreased to -6.557 (Table 4.10 GMM_Fixed). This result 
implicates that the house price could be decreased through restrain investments and increase 
government revenue indirectly. Because investments and government revenue decreased the 
demand for houses. 
Through the analysis, the results provide that HPP has a higher correlation with investment in 
fixed assets (IFA) and government revenue (GR). In order to satisfy the valid instrumental 
variables, the test of correlation between instrumental variables and endogeneity is applied, 
which p-value is zero. On the other hand, the Sargan test of the instrumental variables 
provides that the null hypothesis is accepted. Thus, all the instrumental variables are not 
relative to regression error, based on the p-value of which is 0.89. The Hausman test shows 
the regression has a presence of the endogenous variables, based on p-value is zero. The 
investigation finds that the coefficients of floor level, house price index, income and 
orientation factor increase after adding the instrumental variables. As the model is efficient, 
H3 is rejected, which means the demand for property increase the value of the house. This is 
similar to the previous studies (Kohn and Bryant, 2010; Case and Shiller, 2003; Li et al., 
2018) that suggest house demand caused house price volatility in China (Li et al., 2018).  
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Table 4.10 Regression Results Using IV-GMM (OLS and Panel) for House Price Using 
House Planning Permissions as Endogenous Variables 
       
               
         
  OLS 2SLS_OLS GMM_OLS Fixed 2SLS_Fixed GMM_Fixed 
Size 
0.0548*** 0.0514*** 0.0530*** 0.0617*** 0.0587*** 0.0587*** 
(14.14) (13.00) (12.54) (16.58) (15.45) (15.45) 
Floor_level 
21.70*** 25.58*** 25.77*** 22.41*** 26.34*** 26.34*** 
(8.52) (8.41) (9.66) (9.29) (9.12) (9.12) 
Floor_level^2 
-0.316*** -0.430*** -0.437*** -0.304*** -0.409*** -0.409*** 
(-5.63) (-6.25) (-8.90) (-5.72) (-6.28) (-6.28) 
Bedroom_nums 
-2.101*** -1.936*** -1.945*** -2.630*** -2.489*** -2.489*** 
(-7.67) (-6.94) (-7.48) (-10.08) (-9.35) (-9.35) 
Livingroom_nums 
0.164 0.114 -0.00257 0.447 0.399 0.399 
(0.55) (0.38) (-0.01) (1.60) (1.40) (1.40) 
House_planning_permissions 
118.2*** -0.400 -4.987 118.0*** 3.930 3.930 
(14.54) (-0.03) (-0.45) (15.31) (0.32) (0.32) 
Floor*House_permissions 
-5.495*** -6.446*** -6.491*** -5.594*** -6.557*** -6.557*** 
(-8.78) (-8.62) (-9.74) (-9.43) (-9.23) (-9.23) 
Floor^2*House_permissions 
0.0815*** 0.110*** 0.111*** 0.0777*** 0.103*** 0.103*** 
(5.90) (6.48) (9.09) (5.95) (6.46) (6.46) 
House_price_index 
0.201*** 0.249*** 0.261*** 0.193*** 0.239*** 0.239*** 
(9.46) (11.33) (10.93) (9.62) (11.53) (11.53) 
Mortgage_payment_rate 
-292.0*** -308.5*** -308.7*** -278.7*** -295.1*** -295.1*** 
(-9.58) (-9.93) (-15.62) (-9.70) (-10.06) (-10.06) 
Income 
77.10*** 126.5*** 127.8*** 79.38*** 127.5*** 127.5*** 
(35.48) (29.72) (51.89) (38.70) (31.72) (31.72) 
North & South 
2.318*** 2.452*** 2.602*** 2.478*** 2.629*** 2.629*** 
(6.25) (6.49) (5.39) (7.01) (7.29) (7.29) 
Time Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 
-809.2*** -563.6*** -552.9*** -823.9*** -823.9*** -823.9*** 
(-27.99) (-14.57) (-14.34) (-29.97) (-29.97) (-29.97) 
N 17143 17143 17143 17143 17143 17143 
R-square 0.43 0.409 0.407 0.46 0.44 0.44 
Instrumented   HPP FRHPP FR2HPP   HPP FRHPP FR2HPP 
Instruments   
AS FR FR2 BR LR HPI 
MR IC NS IFA GR IFAFR 
IFAFR2 GRFR GRFR2 
  
AS FR FR2 BR LR HPI MR 
IC NS IFA GR IFAFR 
IFAFR2 GRFR GRFR2 
Breusch-Pagan test 9.66           
p-value 0           
Breusch-Godfrey LM test 130.6           
p-value 0           
Wooldridge test       0.67     
p-value       0.45     
Likelihood-ratio test       3999     
p-value       0     
Friedman's test       264.5     
p-value       0     
Hausman test   200     212.21   
p-value   0     0   
Sargan test   2.89     0.63   
p-value   0.41     0.89   
Endogenous test 
  849(HPP) 3686(HPPFR) 
5847(HPPFR2) 
  
3926.7 
  
      
p-value   0   0   
* p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01 
T-statistic are in parenthesis 
AS=the size of property, FR=the floor level of property located, BR=number of bedroom, LR=number of living room, 
HPP=floor space under construction of Beijing land, HPI=house price index, MR=monthly mortgage payment rates, 
IC=Income, Orien=dummy for property orientation, IR=central bank interest rate, CPI= consumer price index, IFA=total 
investment in fixed assets in the whole country, GR=local governments general budgetary revenue. 
𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝑏𝑖𝑡(𝐴𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝐹𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝐹𝑅𝑖𝑡
2 + 𝐵𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝐿𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝐻𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝑀𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐼𝐶𝑖𝑡)
+ 𝑏𝑗𝑡(𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐻𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝐹𝑅𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐻𝑃𝑃 + 𝐹𝑅𝑖𝑡
2 ∗ 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐻𝑃𝑃) + 𝑑1𝑂𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛 + 𝑑2𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝑑3𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 
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Referring to the relationship between property characteristics and property prices, the 
investigation finds that the floor level of a property, the number of bedrooms (BR), and the 
number of living rooms (LR) influence the property price significantly. The results provide 
the house orientation (Orien) influence the condition of the bedroom and the condition of 
living room positively and significantly (Table A.65, Table A.68, Table A.73, Table A.76, 
Table A.81 and Table A.84). According to the results, the orientation factors of SE NW WE 
and SW negatively influences the number of bedrooms by 0.174, 0.252, 0.155 and 0.019 
respectively and significantly which p-values of these orientation factors are 0. The 
hypothesis H19 is rejected. The orientation factor of W negatively influences the number of 
living rooms by 0.225 significantly which p-values of these orientation factors are 0. The 
hypothesis H20 is rejected. However, the orientation factor of WE affects the number of 
living rooms positively by 0.048 significantly which p-value of WE is 0. These results are 
similar to Rosen (1974), which illustrates that the house characteristics influence house prices. 
The results of this study are in line with Jim and Chen (2009), who suggested that daylight 
and views from houses are significant factors affecting house prices. After adding the 
instrumental variables (orientation factors) in different models, the investigation found that 
the coefficients of BR are decreased to -31.54, -18.95 and -20.68 respectively (Table 4.12 
GMM and Table 4.13 GMM). The coefficient of LR is increased to 5.938 (Table 4.14 GMM). 
These results are in line with Rosen (1974). However, when the investigation considers the 
factor of floor level with the number of bedrooms, the factor of Bedroom*Floor influences 
house prices positively and significantly with instruments of SE SW and SW NW by 0.55 and 
0.398 respectively. The coefficient of Living_room*Floor increases to 0.617. This means the 
more bedrooms are facing southeast and southwest or facing southwest and northwest with 
higher floor level, the higher house price. The more living rooms are facing west or east with 
higher floor level, the higher house price. Generally, the house facing south and west have 
more extended daylight, which increases the temperature of the room, so that increase the 
electrical efficiency. However, the bedrooms facing southwest, southeast or northwest not 
only keeps daylight but also reduces west sunburn and improves natural ventilation to 
improve sleeping context. The living room improves west sunburn increasing the whole 
house temperature so that increase house efficiency. Moreover, the higher floor level of 
houses, the more efficient daylight and natural ventilation. Thus, this investigation found the 
more numbers of rooms with proper orientation, the better condition of the room is which has 
good daylight and better natural ventilation. Therefore, the factors of orientation influences 
house prices, which rejects H8. This result is never been found in previous studies. 
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Table 4.11 Regression Results Using IV-GMM (OLS) for House Price Using Bedroom_nums 
as Endogenous Variables 
             
      
           
  OLS 2SLS GMM 2SLS GMM 
Size 
0.0560*** 0.171*** 0.203*** 0.0473 0.0405 
(14.46) (3.63) (4.18) (0.69) (1.04) 
Floor_level 
23.11*** 15.63*** 13.49*** 20.91*** 29.58*** 
(9.03) (3.36) (2.79) (3.00) (5.36) 
Floor_level^2 
-0.338*** -0.236*** -0.208*** -0.305*** -0.436*** 
(-6.01) (-2.96) (-2.78) (-2.67) (-4.89) 
Bedroom_nums 
0.0619 -16.55** -21.12*** -1.643 -7.941 
(0.15) (-2.26) (-2.71) (-0.27) (1.53) 
Bedroom*Floor 
-0.103*** 0.170 0.242 0.0411 0.453 
(-6.20) (1.02) (1.42) (0.09) (-1.47) 
Livingroom_nums 
0.363 4.255*** 5.371*** -0.0581 0.0666 
(1.22) (2.64) (3.23) (-0.02) (0.04) 
House_planning_permissions 
121.6*** 108.0*** 102.9*** 116.6*** 134.3*** 
(14.91) (9.55) (8.21) (6.78) (9.45) 
Floor*House_permissions 
-5.781*** -4.171*** -3.704*** -5.353*** -7.090*** 
(-9.20) (-4.03) (-3.42) (-3.83) (-6.13) 
Floor^2*House_permissions 
0.0866*** 0.0623*** 0.0555*** 0.0793*** 0.109*** 
(6.26) (3.26) (3.10) (3.11) (5.30) 
House_price_index 
0.201*** 0.205*** 0.202*** 0.204*** 0.197*** 
(9.47) (9.06) (8.36) (9.14) (8.66) 
Mortgage_payment_rate 
-296.5*** -296.1*** -296.5*** -295.0*** -294.7*** 
(-9.73) (-9.16) (-13.47) (-9.52) (-15.47) 
Income 
77.37*** 73.91*** 73.31*** 77.29*** 78.10*** 
(35.60) (27.07) (33.26) (30.54) (47.30) 
Time Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 
-828.4*** -734.9*** -705.1*** -801.1*** -902.3*** 
(-28.45) (-13.06) (-11.40) (-9.38) (-13.01) 
N 17143 17143 17143 17143 17143 
Instrumented   BR BRFR 
Instruments  
AS FR FR2 LR HPP 
FRHPP FR2HPP HPI MR 
IC SE NW FRSE FRNW 
AS FR FR2 LR HPP 
FRHPP FR2HPP HPI MR 
IC NW NE FRNW FRNE 
Breusch-Pagan test 9.22 
   p-value 0 
Breusch-Godfrey LM test 130.6 
  p-value 0 
Hausman test   6.89 37.96 
p-value   0.03 0 
Sargan test   5.86 3.22 
p-value   0.05 0.2 
Endogenous test 
  BR 36.8 BR 198.1 
  BRFR 122.8 BRFR 195.5 
p-value   0 0 
* p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01 
T-statistic are in parenthesis 
AS=the size of property, FR=the floor level of property located, BR=number of bedroom, LR=number of living 
room, HPP=floor space under construction of Beijing land, HPI=house price index, MR=monthly mortgage 
payment rates, IC=Income, Orien=dummy for property orientation. 
 
𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝑏𝑖𝑡(𝐴𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝐹𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝐹𝑅𝑖𝑡
2 + 𝐿𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐻𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝐹𝑅𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐻𝑃𝑃 + 𝐹𝑅𝑖𝑡
2 ∗ 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐻𝑃𝑃 + 𝐻𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝑀𝑅𝑖𝑡
+ 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐼𝐶
𝑖𝑡
) + 𝑏𝑗𝑡(𝐵𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵𝑅𝐹𝑅𝑖𝑡) + 𝑑1𝑂𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛 + 𝑑2𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝑑3𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 
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Table 4.12 Regression Results Using IV-GMM (Panel) for House Price Using 
Bedroom_nums as Endogenous Variables 
        
    
  
   
  Fixed 2SLS GMM 
Size 
0.0628*** 0.258*** 0.258*** 
(16.89) (5.31) (5.31) 
Floor_level 
23.51*** 10.41** 10.41** 
(9.69) (2.17) (2.17) 
Floor_level^2 
-0.321*** -0.142* -0.142* 
(-6.03) (-1.72) (-1.72) 
Bedroom_nums 
-0.889** -31.54*** -31.54*** 
(-2.30) (-3.87) (-3.87) 
Bedroom*Floor 
-0.0778*** 0.550*** 0.550*** 
(-4.93) (2.76) (2.76) 
Livingroom_nums 
0.628** 6.686*** 6.686*** 
(2.24) (4.39) (4.39) 
House_planning_permissions 
121.0*** 96.34*** 96.34*** 
(15.64) (8.14) (8.14) 
Floor*House_permissions 
-5.823*** -3.077*** -3.077*** 
(-9.78) (-2.89) (-2.89) 
Floor^2*House_permissions 
0.0818*** 0.0398** 0.0398** 
(6.25) (2.00) (2.00) 
House_price_index 
0.194*** 0.201*** 0.201*** 
(9.66) (8.39) (8.39) 
Mortgage_payment_rate 
-283.5*** -289.5*** -289.5*** 
(-9.86) (-8.45) (-8.45) 
Income 
79.55*** 75.27*** 75.27*** 
(38.75) (28.11) (28.11) 
Time Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 
-839.6*** -839.6*** -839.6*** 
(-30.34) (-30.34) (-30.34) 
N 17143 17143 17143 
Instrumented   BR BRFR 
Instruments  
AS FR FR2 LR HPP FRHPP FR2HPP 
HPI MR IC SE SW FRSE FRSW 
Hausman test 669.7     
p-value 0     
Wooldridge test 0.603     
p-value 0.467     
Likelihood-ratio test 4011.6     
p-value 0     
Friedman's test 294.7     
p-value 0     
Hausman test   24.32   
p-value   0   
Sargan test   5.85   
p-value   0.05   
Endogenous test   50.94   
p-value   0   
* p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01 
T-statistic are in parenthesis 
AS=the size of property, FR=the floor level of property located, BR=number of bedroom, LR=number of living 
room, HPP=floor space under construction of Beijing land, HPI=house price index, MR=monthly mortgage 
payment rates, IC=Income, Orien=dummy for property orientation. 
𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝑏𝑖𝑡(𝐴𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝐹𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝐹𝑅𝑖𝑡
2 + 𝐿𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐻𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝐹𝑅𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐻𝑃𝑃 + 𝐹𝑅𝑖𝑡
2 ∗ 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐻𝑃𝑃 + 𝐻𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝑀𝑅𝑖𝑡
+ 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐼𝐶𝑖𝑡) + 𝑏𝑗𝑡(𝐵𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵𝑅𝐹𝑅𝑖𝑡) + 𝑑1𝑂𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛 + 𝑑2𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝑑3𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 
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Table 4.13 Regression Results Using IV-GMM (Panel) for House Price Using 
Bedroom_nums as Endogenous Variables 
 
 
 
  2SLS GMM 2SLS GMM 
Size 
0.195*** 0.195*** 0.176*** 0.176*** 
(4.23) (4.23) (5.14) (5.14) 
Floor_level 
16.96*** 16.96*** 14.19*** 14.19*** 
(4.23) (4.23) (3.34) (3.34) 
Floor_level^2 
-0.235*** -0.235*** -0.192** -0.192** 
(-3.30) (-3.30) (-2.57) (-2.57) 
Bedroom_nums 
-18.95*** -18.95*** -20.68*** -20.68*** 
(-2.75) (-2.75) (-3.36) (-3.36) 
Bedroom*Floor 
0.197 0.197 0.398** 0.398** 
(1.27) (1.27) (2.08) (2.08) 
Livingroom_nums 
4.864*** 4.864*** 4.048*** 4.048*** 
(3.27) (3.27) (3.69) (3.69) 
House_planning_permissions 
109.3*** 109.3*** 103.0*** 103.0*** 
(10.74) (10.74) (9.59) (9.59) 
Floor*House_permissions 
-4.418*** -4.418*** -3.895*** -3.895*** 
(-4.91) (-4.91) (-4.18) (-4.18) 
Floor^2*House_permissions 
0.0610*** 0.0610*** 0.0518*** 0.0518*** 
(3.56) (3.56) (2.91) (2.91) 
House_price_index 
0.197*** 0.197*** 0.199*** 0.199*** 
(9.07) (9.07) (9.17) (9.17) 
Mortgage_payment_rate 
-288.2*** -288.2*** -286.5*** -286.5*** 
(-9.27) (-9.27) (-9.24) (-9.24) 
Income 
76.85*** 76.85*** 76.92*** 76.92*** 
(31.72) (31.72) (32.77) (32.77) 
Time Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 
-839.6*** -839.6*** -839.6*** -839.6*** 
(-30.34) (-30.34) (-30.34) (-30.34) 
N 17143 17143 17143 17143 
Instrumented BR BRFR 
Instruments 
AS FR FR2 LR HPP FRHPP 
FR2HPP HPI MR IC SE NW 
FRSE FRNW 
AS FR FR2 LR HPP FRHPP 
FR2HPP HPI MR IC SW NW 
FRSW FRNW 
Hausman test 10.02   13.17   
p-value 0.01   0   
Sargan test 5.29   4.81   
p-value 0.07   0.09   
Endogenous test 53.94   77.92   
p-value 0   0   
* p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01 
T-statistic are in parenthesis 
AS=the size of property, FR=the floor level of property located, BR=number of bedroom, LR=number of living 
room, HPP=floor space under construction of Beijing land, HPI=house price index, MR=monthly mortgage 
payment rates, IC=Income, Orien=dummy for property orientation. 
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Table 4.14 Regression Results Using IV-GMM (OLS) for House Price Using 
Livingroom_nums as Endogenous Variables 
     
       
      
  OLS 2SLS GMM 
Size 
0.0551*** 0.0109 0.0141 
(14.23) (0.41) (0.73) 
Floor_level 
22.69*** 13.32** 13.95*** 
(8.88) (2.55) (3.01) 
Floor_level^2 
-0.331*** -0.211** -0.219*** 
(-5.89) (-2.50) (-2.73) 
Bedroom_nums 
-1.808*** -7.342** -6.976*** 
(-6.70) (-2.31) (-3.07) 
Livingroom_nums 
3.165*** 6.879 5.938*** 
(5.68) (1.05) (1.19) 
Livingroom_nums*Floor 
-0.146*** 0.634* 0.617** 
(-6.09) (1.80) (2.35) 
House_planning_permissions 
120.5*** 99.40*** 101.5*** 
(14.80) (7.32) (7.80) 
Floor*House_permissions 
-5.696*** -3.761*** -3.909*** 
(-9.08) (-3.27) (-3.69) 
Floor^2*House_permissions 
0.0853*** 0.0575*** 0.0594*** 
(6.17) (2.83) (3.04) 
House_price_index 
0.203*** 0.219*** 0.216*** 
(9.55) (8.42) (8.12) 
Mortgage_ payment_rate 
-295.7*** -290.6*** -291.7*** 
(-9.70) (-8.33) (-12.42) 
Income 
77.20*** 75.58*** 75.76*** 
(35.53) (28.73) (38.69) 
Time Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 
-822.7*** -715.1*** -724.1*** 
(-28.34) (-12.00) (-13.03) 
N 17143 17143 17143 
Instrumented   LR LRFR 
Instruments  
AS FR FR2 LR HPP FRHPP FR2HPP HPI MR 
IC W WE FRW FRWE 
Breusch-Pagan test 9.68     
p-value 0     
Breusch-Godfrey LM test 130.8     
p-value 0     
Hausman test   6.45 
p-value   0.04 
Sargan test   2.02 
p-value   0.36 
Endogenous test 
  LR 12.7 
  LRFR 8.08 
p-value   0 
* p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01 
T-statistic are in parenthesis 
AS=the size of property, FR=the floor level of property located, BR=number of bedroom, LR=number of living 
room, HPP=floor space under construction of Beijing land, HPI=house price index, MR=monthly mortgage 
payment rates, IC=Income, Orien=dummy for property orientation. 
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4.6 Conclusion 
This chapter investigates the empirical relationship between house price, economic 
fundamental effects and house characteristics effects via the panel model and IV-GMM. 
Specifically, the results indicate that the economic factors have influenced the house price 
based on the economic theories (Cheng et al., 2014; Galbraith, 1958; Irving, 1911; Maisel, 
1963; Naylor, 1967). The house characteristics have influenced the property price 
significantly, which indicates that consumer behaviour is an essential aspect of the housing 
market (Rosen, 1979). The results have rejected the hypotheses that economic fundamentals 
and house characteristics are exogenous variables on property price. Therefore, this study 
provides innovative evidence that the economic fundamentals and the house characteristics 
are essential factors in the Chinese housing market. This result is supported by a number of 
previous studies in western country (Jim and Chen, 2009; Larraz and Alfaro, 2008; Malpezzi, 
2002; Meen, 1996; Oikarinen, 2006; Rosen, 1974) and in China (Gan et al., 2012; Horioka 
and Wan, 2007; Hui and Gu, 2009; Li and Chand, 2013; Li et al., 2018; Shen and Liu, 2004; 
Taylor, 2000; Wong et al., 2005; Yu, 2010; Zhang and Yi, 2017). 
Regarding the house characteristics, house size is leading to an increase in house prices 
which is in line with Zhang and Yi (2017) who found there is a positive relationship between 
house price and size of living area in Beijing. This result is also similar to Fang et al. (2016) 
who provide that despite the critical financial burdens afforded by the households, the home 
size is spacious which is more than the standards of most metropolitan areas in the world. It 
implies that home size in Beijing influences the housing demand in terms of China’s 
characterised consumer behaviour of households who prefer to buy larger-size house. There 
is a significant positive relationship between house prices by floor level and negative 
relationship on property prices with FR2. This result is similar to a previous study by Wong et 
al. (2005). This means the floor level influences the house price positively from the lower 
floor level to the middle floor level in a tall building. However, from the middle floor level to 
the upper floor level, the floor level influences house prices negatively. It implies that the 
household in Beijing preferred to buy a similar condition house with the lower price. The 
number of bedrooms has a significant negative influence on property prices. This situation 
may be based on privacy. According to Fahey (2016), one-bedroom rents are more expensive 
than two-bedroom rents. In terms of the house orientation, the north and south factor is 
significant and positive, which means that houses facing north and south have an increased 
price of 2.48%. This result is found in the previous studies (Fang et al., 2016 and Zhang and 
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Yi, 2017). This is because houses facing north and south have better natural ventilation and 
more daylight, which improves the natural quality of a house and its energy efficiency. 
However, it is similar to Jim and Chen (2009) who suggested that daylight and views from 
houses are significant factors affecting house price.  
Regarding the economic fundamentals, the mortgage down payment has a significant 
negative influence on property prices. This result is in line with Fang et al. (2016), Yu (2010) 
and Li and Chand (2013), who provided the mortgage down payment influence China’s urban 
house prices negatively by data between 1998 and 2009. Thus, it is suggested that the high 
levels of down payments in China should be kept which can not only reduce the risk of 
household default for the bank but also decline the housing demand significantly. The 
average income of citizens influences house price significantly and positively. This result is 
in line with Hui and Gu (2009) and Shen and Liu (2004), who provide income significantly 
influence the house price in China. Housing assets have been a significant part of household 
wealth in China. The housing assets accounted for 66% of household wealth in China in 2016 
(Liu and Xiong, 2018). Therefore, it is recommended that the demand for purchasing power 
in the Chinese housing market is influenced by the household incomes. The demand quantity 
of properties (Floor*House_permissions) has an inverse U-shape relationship with house 
prices. This result is not similar to Li et al. (2018), who provide the ratios of residential floor 
space under construction to floor space increase house price each year after 2004. This is 
because the thesis improved the method of calculating house demand, which is more flexible 
with an inverse U-shape relationship to explore the house price and house demand. Although 
some studies were undertaken in different countries, all of the results corresponded with 
economic theory. Based on such findings, economic factors have a significant influence on 
property prices in Beijing. 
Baltagi (2001) provides that employing the values of the other variable regressors as 
instruments can increase consistency and efficiency of the model. The IV-GMM model 
employed the instrumental variables to improve the efficiency of the model. Meanwhile, the 
IV-GMM method restricted unobserved heterogeneity and limited the consistency of the 
dependent variable. To deal with this, the independent variables employed in this 
investigation refer to the IV-GMM method. The result provides that the central bank interest 
rates (IR) significantly influence the income (IC) positively and the inflation (CPI) influences 
the income (IC) negatively and significantly. This result confirms that of Horioka and Wan 
(2007), who found the real interest rate has a significant positive impact on the household 
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income in China between 1995 and 2004. It implies that the central bank interest rates and 
inflation influences the house price in Beijing indirectly which is in line with Koss and Shi 
(2018).  
Regarding the fiscal factors which are treated as the instruments to the variable of mortgage 
down payments, the results provide that the investment in fixed assets (IFA) affect the 
mortgage payment rates positively and significantly. If the local government general 
budgetary revenue (GR) increases, the mortgage payment rates will be increased significantly. 
The mortgage payment rates will be increased significantly when the local government 
general budgetary expenditure (GE) increases. Based on these results, IFA and GE influence 
mortgage payment rates positively, which is in line with the theory of ‘conventional wisdom’ 
(Galbraith, 1958). The results also are in line with Taylor (2000), who provide the 
instruments of fiscal policy change aggregate demand and influence the monetary policy 
indirectly in China. However, the result, which money supply (MS) and GR influence 
mortgage payment rates positively, is contrary to the ‘conventional wisdom’ (Galbraith, 1958) 
and the ‘quantity theory of money’ (Irving, 1911). The reason for that may be referred to the 
Budget Law. The local governments expend the fiscal capacity by non-budgetary funding 
sources such as land sales (Liu and Xiong, 2018). Therefore, the increasing government 
revenue cannot restrain the demand for investments in the housing market. Regarding 
China’s “Local Government Financing Platform” (LGFP), the increase of government 
revenue means upward pressure on mortgage payment rates. Though the money supply 
increases, the aggregate demand for GDP is increasing rapidly so that exceed the amount of 
money supply, caused the increase of interest rate. Therefore, when the central government 
tightens monetary policy to limit debt accumulation by local governments, LGFP has been 
regulated. Accordingly, the fiscal factors and interest rate influence the house prices in 
Beijing indirectly. 
Furthermore, the results provide the house orientation (Orien) influences the condition of the 
bedroom and the condition of living room positively and significantly. The orientation factors 
of SE NW WE and SW negatively influence the number of bedrooms respectively and 
significantly. The orientation factor of W negatively influences the number of the living 
rooms significantly. The orientation factor of WE affects the number of living rooms 
positively and significantly. The results of this study are in line with Jim and Chen (2009), 
who suggested that daylight and views from houses are significant factors affecting house 
prices. After adding the instrumental variables (orientation factors) in different models, the 
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investigation found that the coefficients of BR are decreased. The coefficient of LR is 
increased. These results are in line with Rosen (1974). However, when the investigation 
considers the factor of floor level with number of bedrooms, the factor of Bedroom*Floor 
influences house prices positively and significantly with instruments of SE SW and SW NW 
respectively. The coefficient of Living_room*Floor increases. This means the more 
bedrooms are facing southeast and southwest or facing southwest and northwest with higher 
floor level, the higher house price. The more living rooms are facing west or east with higher 
floor level, the higher house price. Generally, the house facing south and west have more 
extended daylight, which increases the temperature of the room, so that increase the electrical 
efficiency. However, the bedrooms facing southwest, southeast or northwest not only keeps 
daylight but also reduces west sunburn and improves natural ventilation to improve sleeping 
context. The living room improves west sunburn increasing the whole house temperature so 
that increase house efficiency. Moreover, the higher floor level of houses, the more efficient 
daylight and natural ventilation. Thus, this investigation found the more numbers of rooms 
with proper orientation, the better condition of the room is which has good daylight and better 
natural ventilation. This result provides the orientation of the property influence the property 
prices indirectly in Beijing. 
Regarding IV-GMM methods, the hypotheses are examined by the endogenous test. In the 
hypotheses, the coefficients of the independent variables are not significant and are 
individually equal to zero. If the null hypothesis is not rejected, the model is not efficient so 
that to modify the equation. With regards to the efficient model, the null hypothesis should be 
rejected so that the independent variables are significant in the general regression. 
Alternatively, the investigation could reduce the number of non-significant variables to 
estimate a confining hypothesis. Such estimations yield consistent estimations of the 
parameters. The coefficients of independent variables are respectable and refer to the 
restriction for the number of independent variables. According to the test of error terms 
unrelated to regressors, the hypothesis is rejected, which means that the regressors have 
endogeneity. With respect to linear instrumental variables regression, this investigation 
applies and tests the instrumental variables and endogeneity in order to establish IV-GMM 
models. As there is heteroscedasticity in the model, the GMM model is more efficient than 
the 2SLS model. This research employs mortgage payment rates, income, house planning 
permissions, number of bedrooms, number of living room as the endogenous variable 
respectively. The results of test reject the null hypothesis, indicating that IV-GMM is 
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efficient and appropriate to be employed in the investigation of house prices in Beijing in 
terms of the relevant factors influencing the house prices indirectly.  
In conclusion, this investigation complements the literature that studies the determinants of 
real estate markets and the economic area. This research is based on the panel model and IV-
GMM, which could monitor the process of influencing factors. Defining the endogenous 
variable through instrumental variables is more detailed in terms of analysing exogenous 
variables. This investigation factors in a new variable of the orientation of property. This 
variable has never been analysed in previous studies. Through the panel analysis and GMM 
model, the results found that the orientation of property has influences on property price 
directly and indirectly. In addition, this study examines an extended period (2002-2014), 
which provides a sample of 17,143 property transaction records containing detailed 
information to examine the whole of Beijing’s core real estate area. It encourages the 
developer of houses to have a rational house structure in order to have a maximum 
shareholder value. It also implicates that the regulators of banks and government should 
monitor the mortgage payment rate, interest rate, government revenue and expenditure in 
order to deter the irrational increasing house price. 
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Chapter 5 The Spatial Analysis and Spill-Over Effects of House Price in 
Beijing 
 
5.1 Introduction 
From one decade to 2013, China’s house prices increased at an annual nominal rate of 16.4% 
(Error! Reference source not found.). The increases in house price over time and across 
space has developed a price distribution in most area of China, especially in Beijing (Liu et 
al., 2016). China’s private housing market was developed by the reforms containing land 
system, property taxes, and access to credit (Chen et al., 2015). In terms of the reform process, 
economic prosperity and rapid urbanisation have stimulated the demand for housing. Based 
on Error! Reference source not found., per capita income has grown rapidly at a rate of 
31.1% per annum between 2003 and 2013. The rapid increasing per capita income within the 
boundary regions of urban, which also encourage the development of urbanisation (Li and 
Chand, 2013). During these ten years, nearly 260 million rural workers migrated to Tier 1 and 
Tier 2 cities. Therefore, increased demand for housing was accompanied by increased supply 
as prices and rents increased. There are many previous studies have provided one of driven 
for rapidly expanding house price is the population in China (Chow et al., 2016; Gong et al., 
2015; Li and Chand, 2013; Liu et al., 2016; Zhang et al., 2015; Zhang et al., 2018). The prior 
studies illustrated that economic fundamentals in China can drive the increase in the long run 
equilibrium price of house prices, such as building starts (Hanink et al., 2012; Zhang et al., 
2018), income (Hui and Gu, 2009; Shen and Liu; 2004), tax (Guo et al., 2012; Li and Chand, 
2013; Liu, 2013), unemployment rate (Harris et al., 2013) and central bank interest rate (Li 
and Chand, 2013; Yu, 2010). However, these studies did not address the spatial effects of the 
determinates of house prices. Therefore, this chapter investigates spatial analysis to examine 
house price and its determinates and spill-over effects in Beijng. 
The problems in cities are to some extent relaxed with the city planner by the different 
solutions through the alternative methods in various countries. Evans (1973) mentions that 
the free market operation causes the urban problems in the UK; however, the town planner 
could solve these urban problems by executing the allotment of land uses enforcedly. In the 
United States, predicting the future pattern of land use is the responsibility of city planner, 
who will decide the optimal distribution of fixed assets investments. Based on the real estate 
development of China, Beijing is the first city which attempted to implement the operation of 
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the free real estate market. It is valuable to analyse the effects of neighbouring regions on 
house price in Beijing in terms of predicting the future pattern of house prices in order to 
response the city planner.  
Referred to the previous studies (Giussani and Hadjimatheou, 1991; Meen, 1999), the 
increasing demand that occurs as a result of migration to regions where house prices are 
comparably low results in an increase in house prices. The house price difference is caused 
by information asymmetries suggested that new information referred to the housing market in 
one area is transported gradually to other submarkets. The spatial analyses of house price in 
China have been provided by the prior studies (Guo et al., 2012; Li and Chand, 2013; Harris 
et al., 2013; Liu et al., 2016; Chow et al., 2016; Gong et al., 2016; Shi and Lee, 2017; Zhang 
et al., 2017; Yang et al., 2018). While the Chinese housing market is significantly different 
from the other countries’ housing market in terms of the development levels. Thus, the spatial 
autoregressive and spatial error component are essential to be investigated in understanding 
the spatial spillovers of house prices in China. 
In this Chpater, the evidence is found for spatial dependence of house prices: house prices in 
one region are influenced by the house prices in neighbouring regions, positively and 
significantly in Beijing. The evidence is found for spatial heterogeneity of house prices across 
space: house price spill-over is greater in neighbouring regions when neighbouring house 
prices are increasing than when neighbouring house prices are declining. The evidence is 
found for spatial spill-over effects of explanatory factors: increases of the average wage, 
income, tax, urban population and house price of last year increase the house price positively 
in neighbouring regions; a decrease of unemployment drives down the house prices in 
neighbouring regions. These factors have spill-over effects across space. 
From the theoretical standpoint, these findings are likely to contribute to the theory of “the 
concentric zone’ Burgess (1925) that the information will expand radially from its central 
place or the city leading to information asymmetries in the surroundings. Consistent with this 
view, the findings reveal that the house prices in Beijing have a geographical variation and 
expand radially from CBD. This encourages the city planner of Beijing to simulate the 
regulation of the United States, which predicts the future pattern of land use in order to 
decide the optimal distribution of fixed assets investments. The rational distribution of fixed 
assets effectively averse the unstable house price variation referred to the information 
asymmetries.  
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5.1.1 Research Objectives 
This empirical chapter investigates the spatial statistics of house prices in Beijing between 
2003 and 2013. It examines whether house prices in one region are affected by house prices 
in neighbouring regions. This investigation also analyses how house prices in one region are 
affected by unknown characteristics of the neighbouring regions. Moreover, it explores 
whether the explanatory factors of house prices in one region are affected by explanatory 
factors of house prices in neighbouring regions. In addition, this chapter investigates the spill-
over effects of explanatory factors on house prices. This investigation also examines the 
partitioning of direct effect and indirect effect from the impacts of the neighbouring factors 
on house prices.  This research aims to overcome the shortcomings of the previous studies by 
extending the range of examining spatial models, providing reasonable spatial model 
selection procedures, and employing improved spatial weights to analyse spill-over effects of 
explanatory factors. 
 
5.1.2 Summary of Findings and Contribution 
This investigation finds that house prices in one district and the surrounding districts exists 
the significance of spatial autocorrelation. The results reveal strong house price spill-overs 
when the increase in house price, size of building started, average wage, income, tax, and a 
population of the neighbouring regions is taken into account. The evidence for the disposition 
effect of house prices in Beijing is based on the below results. 
The house price spill-overs in Beijing area exist when there is an increase in the population of 
the neighbouring regions, significant upper house price spill-overs are detected in terms of 
increasing house prices in the neighbouring regions. This result is similar to Zhang et al. 
(2015) and Chow et al. (2016), which means the urban population influence house prices 
positively and significantly in Beijing. This finding is in line with Alonso (1964), who 
provides the population is a significant factor in the economic analysis, because the 
population changes the demand for the number of houses. In the theory of ‘the concentric 
zone’ (Burgess, 1925), the development of ideal construction of the city expands from its 
CBD. The workers live near CBD aims to easy access to their work. Thus, the demand for 
house surrounding CBD is high, which causes the increase in house price. The findings of 
this analysis are also in line with Burgess’s theory (1925) that the distance from district to 
CBD influenced the house price significantly and negatively. This encourages the regulators 
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of Beijing housing market to establish the rational distribution of fixed assets effectively 
deter the unstable house price variation referred to the population changes. 
The differences in household income cause changes in residential location and house prices 
based on the ‘sector theory’ (Hoyt, 1939). This result is in line with Shen and Liu (2004). The 
income significantly influences the house price in Beijing and changes the distribution of 
house prices. This investigation provides a similar result to Hoyt’s theory (1939), which the 
average wage of employees in the real estate market leads to an increase in house price. This 
finding is also in line with the theory of ‘the concentric zone’ (Burgess, 1925), which 
presents the high-income group ‘who have escaped from the area of deterioration’ changes 
the demand of residential location. This encourages the regulators of Beijing housing market 
to establish the subsidiary CBD in Beijing in order to arrange rational distribution of fixed 
assets. 
Evans (1973) found that there is an equilibrium relationship between the density and revenue 
of houses in ‘the theory of the supply of space’. Thus, even though there is enough space for 
construction, the irrational density of buildings leads to lower revenues of the house. Size of 
building starts, which instead of the supply of houses, influences house prices positively. This 
result is in line with Hanink et al. (2012) and Zhang et al. (2018) who provide house starts is 
a potential determination of new construction rate which reflects the supply of housing 
market in Beijing. However, the result is not very significant. The result is similar to Evans 
(1973), who suggests a rational space and density of constructions are significant to 
households. Thus, it encourages the regulators of Beijing housing market to control the 
building permits and continue updating the policy of construction so that rationally monitor 
the supply of houses. 
The research found the taxes and other charges on principal business of enterprises for real 
estate development lead to an increase in house price significantly. This result is similar to 
the previous studies (Li and Chand, 2013; Liu, 2013), which means the taxes and other 
charges on principal business of enterprises for real estate development influence house 
prices negatively and significantly in Beijing. Based on the trade-off theory (Evans, 1973), 
the maximum utility of the household is the objective of the choice of location. The 
increasing tax added the costs of construction, and then the developers will increase the house 
selling price so that balance the costs. When the household considers the house price, they 
will change the location of living so that the patterns of residential location changes. Thus, it 
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encourages the regulators of Beijing housing market to control the tax rates, so that have a 
rational distribution of constructions. 
The results of partitioning analyses are appropriately explaining the effects of surroundings, 
which can approach the utilities. Because of loss aversion, homeowners who intend to sell 
their properties will not lower their asking price, even when they see house prices declining 
in neighbouring regions. Loss aversion reduces the number of transactions in the housing 
market and, reduces the amount of house price spill-over. Results of this study are similar to 
previous findings (Genesove and Mayer, 2001; Engelhardt, 2003; Anenberg, 2011) with 
regards to loss aversion in the housing market. This result is also in line with the previous 
studies (Yang, Noah, and Shoff, 2015), who show that the results of significant levels of the 
partitioned indirect effects in the second order are higher than those of the other order 
neighbours, which are referred to in the complicated estimation process in Spatial Durbin 
Model. Thus, it is suggested that the regulators of Beijing housing market should monitor the 
economic factors and population in the different order regions in order to adjust the house 
prices. 
From the theoretical standpoint, these findings are likely to contribute to the theory of “the 
concentric zone’ Burgess (1925) that the information will expand radially from its central 
place or the city leading to information asymmetries in the surroundings. Consistent with this 
view, the findings reveal that the house prices in Beijing have a geographical variation and 
expand radially from CBD. This encourages the city planner of Beijing to simulate the 
regulation of the United States, which predicts the future pattern of land use in order to 
decide the optimal distribution of fixed assets investments. The rational distribution of fixed 
assets effectively averse the unstable house price variation referred to the information 
asymmetries.  
This investigation is the first study to provide the partitioning spill-over effects on house 
prices based on the regional information asymmetries. In the findings, the significance of the 
partitioned spill-over effects on urban population and GDP are in the second-order 
surrounding regions. This result is consistent with and contributed to the ‘sector theory’ 
(Hoyt, 1939), which the differences in household income cause the changes of residential 
location and house prices. Thus, it is valuable information for the regulators of real estate 
market. Because the appropriate distribution of submarket of CBD reduces the degree of 
income differences, so that decreases the geographical house price variation. 
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This chapter extends previous research in terms of the data sample and independent variables 
used, and by combining methods used in economics and geography. In particular, this 
investigation examines 15 regions of Beijing over an extended period (2002-2014). It 
contains detailed information, building on and extending the work of Bhattacharjee et al. 
(2016), who analysed spatial heterogeneity and endogenous spatial dependence in Portugal. 
Regional house price records are linked with the coordinates of regions to track the spatial 
heterogeneity of house prices, and the region-related factors are employed in Beijing. Most of 
the previous empirical studies that combined geographic factors focused on the area of 
environment, health outcome, crimes and policy analyses (Hund et al., 2015; Neelon and 
Gelfand, 2014; Seliske et al., 2016; Terán-Hernández et al., 2016). These factors can be 
extended by our method with spatial partitioning, which can analyse the intensity of spill-
over effects of explanatory factors. 
 
5.1.3 Structure of This Chapter 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows: Section 5.2 denotes the theory 
framework; Section 5.3 formulates the hypotheses that are tested in this chapter; Section 5.4 
outlines the methodology and data; Section 5.5 analyses the empirical results; and Section 5.6 
presents the concluding remarks. 
 
5.2 Theoretical Framework 
5.2.1 Theory of Residential Location 
The residential location theory is emphasised as a field of economic study in terms of the 
growth of interest of economists (Evans, 1973). Prior to 1960s, the economic influences on 
residential location theory were rejected by socialists (Evans, 1973). It is unable to explain 
the investments in transportation to change the residential location in the field of sociology 
(Isard, 1956, p. 144). While Losch (1954) argues that the individual’s choice of residential 
location is based on the maximum utility which in turn is based on the wages and the costs of 
good. The equilibrium pattern of town is considered with the short life of building and house 
conditions relived to building costs (Turvey, 1957). The residential location theory falls into 
intense debates between the field of economics and that of sociology during the 1950s. 
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Alonso (1964) demonstrates that the household location should be taken into economic 
factors based on the ‘concentric zone theory’ (Burgess, 1925) and ‘sector theory’ (Hoyt, 
1939). Alonso (1964) argues that the increasing population and old residential property limits 
the implementation of ‘concentric zone theory’ in the real world referred to the ‘concentric 
zone theory’. The pattern of residential location is not completely explained by the filtering-
down process in the ‘sector theory’. The assumptions made by sociologists (Burgess, 1925 
and Hoyt, 1939), such as growing population, increasing stocks of the house, the relationship 
between house age and income of customers, are belonging to economic factors (Alonso, 
1964). Richardson (1971) developed a trade-off theory, which ‘assumes household find its 
optimal location relative to the centre of the city by trading off travel costs’. This theory 
denotes that regarding the distance increases from the city centre, the rent of houses or the 
house costs would be declined. The household through maximising the utility of house 
location balances the costs of the house and satisfies more space for living. Richardson (1971) 
has a similar result with Alonso (1964) which provides the household location should be 
taken into economic factors. After the 1970s, the location theory is brought to the field of 
economics from uncertainty to the certainty.  
Richardson (1971) describes a trade-off theory, which ‘assumes household find its optimal 
location relative to the centre of the city by trading off travel costs’.  This theory denotes that 
through increasing the distance from city centre, the rent of houses or the house costs would 
be declined. The household through maximising the utility of house location balances the 
costs of the house and satisfies more space for living (Richardson, 1971). 
Referred to the location analysis associating the components of spatial methods, a variety of 
investigations in housing development and housing investment could be entrenched. The 
housing developers, for example, design a prime case for the resource allocation approaches 
for housing location planning (Pace and Zhu, 2019). While several techniques in house 
location analysis are not based on resource allocation approaches but conceptual links 
between geography and valuation approaches. Related to the allocation of one or several 
facilities has valuable impacts on housing development or house price in space. For example, 
the analysis of delimitation of CBD is revealed referred to the representation of CBD is 
significant in urban development (Yu et al., 2015). The distance to CBD has impacts on 
house prices (Chen and Hao, 2008 and Huang et al., 2018). Fernandez et al., (2018) 
investigate open space value in an ideal setting for a natural experiment between Riverside 
County, with an open space conservation policy, and neighbouring San Bernardino County 
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without the policy. Accordingly, the regions with alternative facilities or conditions (e.g., 
policy, household income, disease rates), which have geographical features, are valuable to 
investigate with locational analysis and spatial methods (e.g., crime analysis). 
 
5.2.2 Concepts in Spatial Analysis 
The term ‘spatial effects’ provides spatial dependence (spatial autocorrelation) and spatial 
heterogeneity.  Spatial dependence describes the spatial relationship between variable values 
or locations. The spatial heterogeneity implicates that spatial distribution is instability or non-
stationarity. Regarding a regression model, the spatial heterogeneity implies the non-constant 
error variances (heteroscedasticity) or the variable regression coefficients (Baltagi, 2013, pp. 
319-320). When the model is specified inappropriately, the spatial heterogeneity will 
generate spatial autocorrelation in the residuals of the model (McMillan, 2003). As 
mentioned above, spatial dependence implies the scarcity of independence in terms of the 
observations of cross-sectional samples. For instance, house price’s spatial dependence 
illustrates that the house price is relative to that of in the neighbouring locations due to there 
are other explainable variables except that of included in a regression model. Accordingly, 
the spatial effects occur due to the scarcity of the combination between the spatial distribution 
of the entities and the spatial partition of entities. The spatial effects could be due to the 
spillover effects (e.g., the influences of house price on that of neighbours) spatially correlated 
variables which have errors in measurement or omitted unobserved quantities. Anselin et al. 
(2008) suggest that the inherent spatial arrangement and structure delineate complicated 
patterns of interactions and dependencies. Therefore, both the spatial dependence and spatial 
heterogeneity are suggested to be contained in an appropriate spatial analysis. 
Previous studies (Giussani and Hadjimatheou, 1991; Meen, 1999) explain that spatial 
dependence is the movement of house prices between one region and neighbouring regions. 
The increasing demand that occurs as a result of migration to regions where house prices are 
comparably low results in an increase in house prices. The spatial dependence is caused by 
information asymmetries suggested that new information referred to housing market in one 
area is transported gradually to other submarkets (Meen, 1999). Housing market provides 
attributes not only on spatial dependence but also on spatial heterogeneity. Wood (2003) 
provided that spatial heterogeneity is caused based on the speed of responses of national 
economic shocks in one region, where the housing market is more liquid and where new 
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information affects house prices more rapidly than in the neighbouring regions. Meen (1999) 
argues that heterogeneity arises because of variations in household behaviours and household 
compositions. Pijnenburg (2017) suggested that the “disposition effect” (Shefrin and Statman, 
1985) can explain the spatial heterogeneity. Disposition effect suggests that the sellers of 
delay selling their houses to avoid nominal losses. Thus, the speed of responses to national 
economic shocks is different in different regions across time so that there is spatial 
heterogeneity. In addition, the housing supply could be controlled by planning restrictions or 
by geographical features such as mountains or lakes. House prices, therefore, react differently 
to fluctuations in demand conditions if the supply cannot be adjusted. The present chapter, in 
contrast, does not rely on information about geographical constraints but instead applies some 
new projects and housing starts as the housing demand. The investigation also establishes 
models on the difference of house prices in the dynamics across space in order to analyse the 
spatial heterogeneity. 
 
5.3 Literature Review and Hypotheses 
A previous study (Kuethe and Pede, 2011) provided that the forecasts of house prices in the 
Western United States can be made more accurate by looking at house prices from 
neighbouring states. Meanwhile, they suggested that previous house prices can influence 
current house prices in the same space and time. Holly et al. (2011) also found that the 
dynamic spill-over affects house prices in the neighbouring areas. For China, Zhang et al. 
(2015) examine the house price spill-over effect with capital cities of Yangtze River Delta 
Economic Zone in China. Shanghai, Hangzhou, Nanjing, Hefei’s house prices index is tested 
over the period 2001-2014. They find the house price spill-overs in the Yangtze River Delta 
Economic Zone because of high market integration, but the direction and speed of spill-over 
are different.  Chow et al. (2016) investigate house price convergence in 34 Chinese cities. 
They apply convergence model with contemporaneous spatial dependence in house prices 
and find that price convergence and positive spatial spill-over are both present. The spill-over 
narrows the gaps between the growth paths of house prices in neighbouring cities. The 
increasing demand that occurs as a result of migration to regions where house prices are 
comparably low results in an increase in house prices. Meen (1999) also illustrates that 
spatial dependence is caused by information asymmetries suggested that new information 
referred to the housing market in one area is transported gradually to other submarkets. Based 
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on the ripple effect of spatial dependence on house prices and previous studies, this 
investigation has a hypothesis that: 
H1 The neighbouring regional house prices do not influence the local house prices. 
Empirical evidence suggests spatial heterogeneity, such as planning constraints and 
geographical constraints, is different in different regions. Van Dijk et al. (2011) examined 
two groups of regions in the Netherlands and found that house prices within the same group 
had the same dynamics across time, while the dynamics were different across different 
groups. The spatial heterogeneity which exists is based on the different demand and supply of 
house price across clusters (Dieleman et al., 2000). For China, Zhang et al. (2015) examine 
the house price spill-over effect and the dynamic linkages among municipalities and capital 
cities of Yangtze River Delta Economic Zone in China between 2001-2014. The results 
provide that the movement of the population of Yangtze River Delta impacts in Hefei house 
price negatively, which means the regional house price leads to movement of population and 
the spillover effect of the house price. Chow et al. (2016) investigate house price convergence 
in 34 Chinese cities. They denote that population growth is the most influential factors that 
propel house prices regardless of the city of shock origin. Thus, this investigation has a 
hypothesis that: 
H2 The urban population influence house prices negatively. 
The previous studies provide the determinates of house prices such as income (Liu and Xiong, 
2018), housing supply (Fang et al., 2016), interest rate (Koss and Shi, 2018), unemployment 
rate (Drachal, 2016), urbanisation (Garriga et al., 2017) and local government tax (Shi and 
Lee, 2017). However, these studies did not address the spatial effects of the determinates of 
house prices. The literature analysing the spatial heterogeneity of house prices in terms of 
unemployment rate provides that the municipal unemployment rates denote significant 
positive spatial autocorrelation (Kondo, 2015). The movement of the population leads to the 
spillover effect of the house price which causes the spatial heterogeneity of house prices 
(Zhang et al., 2015). It is mentioned that local government tax is a significant factor to the 
house price when considering the spatial analysis of house price in China (Liu, 2013). Yu 
(2010) applied panel data econometrics to achieve the conclusion that the interest rate has a 
negative effect on house prices. Abate (2017) indicated a rising spatial correlation in house 
prices and income. While these studies ignore the regional partitioning spatial effects of the 
determinates of house prices. The influences of direct effects and indirect effects by 
partitioning technique which provides a significant impact on spatial econometrics (LeSage 
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and Pace, 2010). It considers the influences of explanatory variables on different orders of 
neighbours. The partitioned direct effects clarify a picture of the spatial feedback effects 
(Elhorst, 2014). It is valuable to capture the determinates of house prices accounting for the 
measures within different geographical regions to the regulators of the housing market and 
city planners. Thus, this research regards the economic information as the driving force of 
house price spill-overs and has the following hypotheses: 
H3 Average wage of staff and workers of real estate do not have spill-over effects; 
H4 Income of residents does not have spill-over effects; 
H5 Taxes and other charges on principal business of enterprises for real estate development 
do not have spill-over effects; 
H6 Unemployment rate does not have spill-over effects; 
H7 Urban population does not have spill-over effects. 
 
5.4 Methodology and Data 
5.4.1 Spatial Matrix 
In order to observe the spatial variation of house prices, in which the house price is 
influenced by house prices in neighbour regions, the spatial lag of the dependent variable 
should be estimated.30  The spatial weight matrix depicts the relationship between an element 
and elements in surrounding regions. For instance, the spatial weight matrix, WN, is provided 
for the region and the neighbouring regions. N represents the number of regions. WN 
estimates an N×N matrix to determine the weight of neighbouring regions (Anselin et al., 
2008). For instance, Wij is an element in the weight matrix, WN. i and j represent two 
different regions. Therefore, Wij illustrates the number of neighbouring regions between the 
region i and region j. If there is a neighbouring region for the element Wij, the value of Wij is 
equal to 1. If there are no neighbouring regions between i and j, Wij is equal to zero. 
According to the convention, Wii, which is the diagonal element, is equal to zero. In this 
chapter, there are fifteen districts of Beijing. Thus, the investigation estimates a spatial weight 
matrix, W15. 
The calculation of weight element, Wij, belongs to the dimension of the weighted matrix. The 
relevant dimension of the weight matrix defines the number of neighbours that influence the 
                                                          
30 See Anselin, et al. (2008) for spatial variation in spatial panel econometrics, spatial variation interrupted that 
the house price in one region is influenced by neighbouring region house prices. 
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element in this weight matrix. Several methods can define the dimension of the weight matrix, 
such as inverse distance, fixed distance, K nearest neighbours and contiguity to set for 
neighbourhood effects. In a distance-based weight matrix, a threshold distance is specified 
such that all locations within the given distance are considered to be “neighbours”. 
Alternatively, the k-nearest neighbour weight matrix is also based on distance, which is 
computed as the distance between a point and the number (k) of nearest neighbour points. 
Contrarily, the dimension of the weight matrix can be referred to tests. Global Moran’s I test 
is an appropriate method for spatial correlation. If p-value of Global Moran’s I is significant, 
there is a spatial lag or a spatial error in the model. Nevertheless, the dimension of the weight 
matrix should be defined first before Global Moran’s I test. For instance, the previous study 
(Hoshino and Kuriyama, 2010) estimated the relative distance that regarded as a standard of 
the weight matrix in spatial error model (SEM). This investigation estimates a spatial weight 
matrix based on boundaries. There are two kinds of methods that select the appropriate 
spatial weights, namely rook contiguity and queen contiguity. 
Figure 5.1 Rook Contiguity and Queen Contiguity 
                               Rook Contiguity                                  Queen Contiguity 
                                   
The differences between rook contiguity and queen contiguity illustrates whether the spatial 
element shares a boundary or not. Rook contiguity takes only four neighbours into account 
with common boundaries. Queen contiguity takes into account all eight surrounding cells, 
including common boundaries and common corners. For instance, if the element, Wij, is 
denoted by shared boundary then it is called queen contiguity weights; otherwise, it is called 
rook contiguity weights (Figure 5.1). This chapter employs queen contiguity spatial weight 
for the model. Table 5.1 provides the spatial weight matrix for this investigation. 
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Table 5.1 Spatial Weight Matrix W15 
Region 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 
3 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
4 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
6 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
7 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
8 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
9 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 
10 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 
11 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 
14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 
15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 
 
Additionally, the elements in the weight matrix are row standardised. After row standardised, 
the sum value of elements for each row is equal to one. The objective of row standardisation 
is to establish the proportional weights so that there are unequal numbers of neighbours. For 
instance, Table 5.2 provides the spatial weight matrix after row standardisation. 
Table 5.2 Row Standardised Spatial Weight Matrix W15 
Region 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1 0 1/3 1/3 0 1/3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2 1/7 0 1/7 0 1/7 0 0 1/7 1/7 1/7 1/7 0 0 0 0 
3 1/7 1/7 0 1/7 1/7 1/7 1/7 0 0 0 1/7 0 0 0 0 
4 0 0 1/3 0 1/3 1/3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6 0 1/6 0 0 0 1/6 0 0 0 0 0 
6 0 0 1/5 1/5 1/5 0 1/5 0 0 1/5 0 0 0 0 0 
7 0 0 1/3 0 0 1/3 0 0 0 0 1/3 0 0 0 0 
8 0 1/3 0 0 0 0 0 0 1/3 0 1/3 0 0 0 0 
9 0 1/6 0 0 0 0 0 1/6 0 1/6 0 1/6 1/6 1/6 0 
10 0 1/6 0 0 1/6 1/6 0 0 1/6 0 0 0 1/6 0 1/6 
11 0 1/4 1/4 0 0 0 1/4 1/4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1/2 0 0 0 0 1/2 0 
13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1/4 1/4 0 0 0 1/4 1/4 
14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1/3 0 0 1/3 1/3 0 0 
15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1/2 0 0 1/2 0 0 
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In this investigation, panel data are employed. Thus, the model assumes that the spatial 
weight matrix does not change across time. The cross-sectional weight matrix, WN, is stacked 
by T times. The equation is provided below: 
                                                              𝑊𝑁𝑡 = 𝐼𝑇 ⊗ 𝑊𝑁                                                       (5.1) 
Thus, the spatial lagged dependent variable is represented as: 
                                                       𝑊𝑦 = 𝑊𝑁𝑇𝑦 = (𝐼𝑇 ⊗ 𝑊𝑁)𝑦                                        (5.1.1) 
And the spatial lagged independent variables are represented as: 
                                                       𝑊𝑥 = 𝑊𝑁𝑇𝑥 = (𝐼𝑇 ⊗ 𝑊𝑁)𝑥                                        (5.1.2) 
5.4.2 Spatial Autocorrelation Tests 
Spatial autocorrelation tests assess the variable correlation which is relative to this variable’s 
spatial location. This test approaches the variable features and the spatial attributes for the 
locations. Global Moran’s I is one of the spatial autocorrelation tests. Global Moran’s I tests 
the existence of the spatial autocorrelation for the model residuals. The value of Global 
Moran’s I could be different between 1 and -1. If the value of Global Moran’s I tends to 1, 
which is positively higher, the values in surrounding regions tend to be clustered. On the 
other hand, if the the value of Global Moran’s I tends towards lower and negative, the values 
in surrounding regions tend to be interspersed. If the value of Global Moran’s I is zero, the 
spatial autocorrelation does not exist in the model. This means that the samples are randomly 
distributed. In the sample, variable x has n observations at locations of i and j, the value of 
Global Moran’s I equation is written as: 
                                                      𝐼 =
𝑛 ∑ ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑗(𝑥𝑖−?̅?)(𝑥𝑗−?̅?)
𝑛
𝑗=1
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝑊 ∑ (𝑥𝑖−?̅?)
2𝑛
𝑖=1
                                             (5.2) 
𝑥𝑖 = attribute value in area i; 
n = number of areas. 
                                                            𝑊 = ∑ ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1
𝑛
𝑖=1                                                  (5.2.1) 
                                                                ?̅? =
1
𝑛
∑ 𝑥𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1                                                        (5.2.2) 
where xi represents the attribute value in region i. n provides the number of observations for 
the whole regions. i and j represent the region i and region j. ?̅? is the mean value of variable x. 
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Wij is an element in the spatial weight matrix, representing the spatial weight between region 
i and region j. 
The Moran’s I plot is a method to observe the distribution in Global Moran’s I tests, which 
selects randomisation for more than 999 permutations. The Moran’s I plot computes the 
distribution of Moran’s I statistics under the null hypothesis by randomly re-allocating the 
observed values to the map. It repeats this process 999 times to yield the empirical histogram 
plot for the Moran’s I statistics. The chart compares the reference distribution under the null 
hypothesis with the computed statistics and also indicates the values of the computed 
statistics, including the Moran’s I value with its p-value based on the 999 permutations. The 
p-value would be the probability of obtaining the observed value of the Moran statistic, or 
one more extreme if the null hypothesis were accepted. 
If the p-value of Global Moran’s I is below 5%, and the coefficient of Global Moran’s I is not 
zero, there is a spatial dependence in the model. In order to determine the type of spatial 
dependence, this investigation applies Lagrange Multiplier diagnostics (LM tests). 
Figure 5.2 Process of Spatial Econometrics 
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The spatial dependence is divided into two types, which are spatial error and spatial lag. The 
spatial error indicates that the error terms of the model are correlated across different spatial 
elements. Spatial lag illustrates the dependent variable y in region i, and is influenced by the 
independent variable in both region i and region j. For instance, if the p-value of the LM-lag 
test is below 5%, the spatial lag model exists; if the p-value of the LM-error test is below 5%, 
the spatial error model exists. Thus, when there is a spatial error, and there is no spatial lag in 
the model, the investigation will apply spatial error model (SEM). When there is spatial lag 
and there is no spatial error, the investigation will employ spatial autoregressive model (SAR). 
When both LM-error and LM-lag are significant, the robust tests are employed to find a 
proper alternative. If the robust spatial error test and robust spatial lag test are both significant, 
the model will estimate a spatial autoregressive model with autoregressive disturbances 
(SAC). 
 
5.4.3 Parametric Spatial Econometrics 
In the spatial econometrics, the relevant variables are modelled with spatial weight matrix. In 
this approach, the surrounding region observations could be identified. There are several 
alternative models that could achieve the appropriate approach for the investigation. The 
spatial approaches include the spatial lag model (SAR), the spatial error model (SEM), and 
the joined approach accommodating of both spatial lag and spatial lag operations (SAC). 
These spatial econometric models establish assumptions for the formation spatial correlation 
in the sample. The general spatial autoregressive model with spatial autoregressive errors is 
given by: 
                                𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜏𝑃𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜌 ∑ 𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑃𝑖𝑡
𝑁
𝑗=1 + 𝛽𝑘 ∑ 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝑘
𝑘
𝑘=1 + 𝜈𝑖𝑡                       (5.3) 
                                                     𝜈𝑖𝑡 = 𝜆 ∑ 𝑊𝑖𝑗𝜈𝑖𝑡
𝑁
𝑗=1 + 𝑖𝑡                                               (5.3.1) 
where Pit is a N×1 vector containing one observation of the dependent variable for each 
spatial element (i=1,…, N). N is the number of regions. t represents the observation at time t. 
Pit-1 is the value of dependent variable for last year. ρ provides the parameters of spatial lag. λ 
illustrates the parameters of spatial error. Xit represents the vector of independent variables, 
which are explanatory variables as well. The vector Xit consists of a N×K matrix. K is the 
number of explanatory variables. β provides the coefficient of K explanatory variable. The 
parameters λ and ρ are with respect to the spatial autocorrelation coefficients. In most cases 
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of house prices analyses, the spatial autocorrelation coefficients are positive so that cluster the 
value of residential  house prices.31 In the spatial error model (SEM), ρ is equal to zero and λ 
is unequal to zero. The error terms, υit, are independent and identically distributed. In the 
spatial autoregressive model (SAR), λ is equal to zero and ρ is unequal to zero. Spatial lag 
term is endogenous and refers to the result of the two-directionality of neighbouring relations 
in space. Thus, the appropriate method is to employ maximum likelihood estimator or GMM 
estimator in SAR. Nevertheless, in the spatial autoregressive model with autoregressive 
disturbances (SAC), λ and ρ are both unequal to zero. Spatial Durbin model (SDM) is a 
generalisation of the SAR model which also includes spatially weighted independent 
variables as explanatory variables, and is written as: 
         𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜏𝑃𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜌 ∑ 𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑃𝑖𝑡
𝑁
𝑗=1 + 𝛽𝑘 ∑ 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝑘
𝑘
𝑘=1 + 𝜃𝑘 ∑ ∑ 𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑋𝑖𝑡𝑘
𝑁
𝑗=1
𝑘
𝑘=1 + 𝑖𝑡       (5.4) 
Table 5.3 Summary of Spatial Model Assumptions 
Assumptions 
Neighbouring 
Regions Effects  
Unspecified 
Characteristics Effects 
of Neighbouring 
Regions 
Explanatory 
Effects from 
Neighbouring 
Regions 
(ρ≠0) (λ≠0) (θ≠0) 
Spatial Autoregressive Model (SAR) √     
Spatial Error Model (SEM)   √   
Spatial Autoregressive Model with 
Autoregressive Disturbances (SAC) 
√ √   
Spatial Durbin Model (SDM) √   √ 
 
Table 5.3 illustrates the summary of spatial models and the assumptions of neighbouring 
regions for the different models. In the investigation, if the autocorrelation in the error term is 
inconsiderate, the incorrect standard errors will affect the efficiency of the model. Veie and 
Panduro (2015) provided that the disregard of positive correlation in the error terms results in 
overestimating significance levels. For instance, the value of parameters for spatial lagged 
terms, such as ρ and λ, will be increased when the spatial correlation originates from the 
spatial error terms correlated with the independent variables. In terms of the correlation of 
spatial errors, the spatial model contributes the unknown spatial characteristics. Accordingly, 
spatial error model (SEM) is an appropriate approach for the real estate market analyses 
(Veie and Panduro, 2015). McMillen (2012) illustrated that the method of the spatial error 
model (SEM) is similar to random effects in panel data estimation or feasible generalised 
                                                          
31 See Veie & Panduro (2015) for an alternative to the standard spatial econometric approaches in hedonic house 
price models. 
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least squares (FGLS). McMillen (2012) also emphasises that the spatial error model 
structures a spatial parameter (λ) that could be influenced by the dimension of spatial weight 
matrix. 
The spatial lag model (SAR) illustrates the direct spill-over effects, showing that one factor in 
its location is affected by the surrounding regions factor. In the housing market, the spatial 
lag model assumes that house prices are influenced by those of neighbouring regions. Le-
Sage and Pace (2009) state that spill-overs effects depict how house prices in less expensive 
regions are increased by higher prices in neighbouring regions. The wealthier households 
move in the regions, and consequently adjust the distribution of neighbourhood, increasing 
house price. Alternatively, the spill-over effects are derived from information asymmetries.32 
Meen (1999) described that house sellers and buyers prefer to set an appropriate house price 
obtaining the prices of houses with similar characteristics in neighbouring location. 
Information about previous transactions will likewise inform assumptions about the future 
house prices in this region. Pijnenburg (2017) indicates that the increasing demand for house 
in one region when prices in a neighbouring region are comparably lower will cause spill-
over effects. In most applications of the spatial lag model, that distinction is not made. As a 
thought experiment, consider the expansion of the central business district (CBD) area. An 
increase in access to the CBD will raise the price of not just one home but also the 
neighbouring properties. The prices of surrounding properties are themselves outcome 
variables and as such are affected by changes in the attractiveness of the location. 
Gibbons and Overman (2012) emphasises that it is also essential to consider the theoretical 
background to establish a model referred to statistical tests. Spatial regression models explore 
the complicated spatial dependence structure in the spatial elements. In the spatial structure, 
the explanatory factors influence the dependent variable in its location is direct spill-overs 
effects. The explanatory factors likewise affect the surrounding regions value indirectly 
(indirect spill-overs effects).33 According to the spatial models, the spatial lag model (SAR) 
provides the presence of direct effects, indirect effects and total marginal effects. LeSage and 
Pace (2009) provide that the distinctions between these effects rely on the degree of influence 
from one region and the degree of influence from the neighbouring regions. For instance, the 
direct effect illustrates that the explanatory variable in region i influences the dependent 
variable in region i at the same time. The indirect effect explores how the effect on the 
                                                          
32 See Meen (1999) for spatial aggregation, spatial dependence and predictability in the UK house market. 
33 See Le-Sage & Pace (2009) for introduction to spatial econometrics. 
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dependent variable in region i is associated with a change in an explanatory variable in other 
regions. A similar interpretation is given by Won, Phipps and Anselin et al. (2003). The 
equation of marginal prices for a house (total effects) is written as: 
               (𝐼 − 𝜌𝑊)𝑃𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜏𝑃𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝑘 ∑ 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝑘
𝑘
𝑘=1 + 𝜃𝑘 ∑ ∑ 𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑋𝑖𝑡𝑘
𝑁
𝑗=1
𝑘
𝑘=1 + 𝑖𝑡             (3.5) 
where 𝐼 and (𝐼 − 𝜌𝑊) are matrices. The change of P as regards X (i.e. 𝜕P/𝜕X) results in 
spatial direct effects and indirect (spill-over) effects (Autant-Bernard and LeSage, 2011). 
Elhorst (2014) summarises the parameters of direct effect and indirect effect in the alternative 
spatial models: 
Table 5.4 The Parameters of Direct Effects and Indirect Effects in Spatial Models 
  Direct Effect Indirect Effect (spill-overs effects) 
OLS/SEM βk 0 
SAR/SAC Diagonal entries of Off-diagonal entries of 
SDM Diagonal entries of Off-diagonal entries of 
 
The direct effects and indirect effects provide the influences of a factor from one region and 
the first order region (Figure 5.3). Figure 5.3 provides the order of neighbouring regions. First 
order neighbours are those which lie immediately next to the regions being observed. 
However, the direct effects and indirect effects do not illustrate the influences of more distant 
neighbours, such as third order neighbouring regions. According to Jensen and Lacombe 
(2012), the degrees of influence of an explanatory variable on a dependent variable differ 
widely, depending on location. To deal with this, LeSage and Pace (2010) segmented the 
influences of direct effects and indirect effects to explore the influences of neighbours from 
different areas. Jensen and Lacombe (2012) developed this partitioning equation in terms of 
the spatial model, which is written as: 
                                               
𝜕𝑌𝑖𝑡
𝜕𝑋𝑘𝑡
= (𝐼 − 𝜌𝑊𝑌𝑖𝑡)
−1
(𝛽𝑘 + 𝑊𝜃𝑘)                                         (3.6) 
where 
                               (𝐼 − 𝜌𝑊𝑌𝑖𝑡)
−1
= 𝐼 + 𝜌𝑊 + 𝜌2𝑊2 + 𝜌3𝑊3 + ⋯ + 𝜌𝑁𝑊𝑁               (3.6.1) 
The impacts are relative to each order neighbourhood can be illustrated as: 
(𝐼 − 𝜌𝑊𝑌𝑖𝑡)
−1
(𝛽𝑘 + 𝑊𝜃𝑘)
= (𝐼𝛽𝑘 + 𝑊𝜃𝑘) + (𝜌𝑊𝛽𝑘 + 𝜌𝑊
2𝜃𝑘) + (𝜌
2𝑊2𝛽𝑘 + 𝜌
2𝑊3𝜃𝑘) + ⋯ 
                               W(1)                                       W(2)                                               W(3)                               (3.6.2) 
(𝐼 − 𝜌𝑊)−1𝛽𝑘 
(𝐼 − 𝜌𝑊)−1(𝛽𝑘 + 𝑊𝜃𝑘) 
(𝐼 − 𝜌𝑊)−1𝛽𝑘 
(𝐼 − 𝜌𝑊)−1(𝛽𝑘 + 𝑊𝜃𝑘) 
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Figure 5.3 Order of Neighbourhood 
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  Second order neighbours (Rook) 
  Third order neighbours (Rook) 
 
W(i) represents the spatial weight matrix of ith order neighbours. Regarding to the order of 
neighbourhood, the lower order W(i) illustrates the closed neighbours, such as first-order 
neighbours W(1) (Figure 5.3). The higher order W(i) indicates the distant neighbours, such as 
first-order neighbours W(3). The partitioning technique provides a significant implication for 
spatial econometrics. It considers the influences of explanatory variables on different orders 
of neighbours. In this chapter, the partitioning technique is employed to analyse the 
influences of economic fundamentals on house prices. In contrast, previous studies apply this 
method to explore the influences of geographic features on property prices.34 
 
5.4.4 Study Area and Data 
This research addresses the area of Beijing that lies within the real estate development in 
Beijing. The government demarcates the core area of Beijing by Dongcheng district, Xicheng 
district, Xuanwu district, Chongwen district, Haidian district, Chaoyang district and Fengtai 
district. The surrounding districts of Beijing are Shijingshan, Changping, Tongzhou, Daxing, 
Shunyi, Huairou, Fangshan, Mentougou, Pinggu, Miyun and Yanqing. In total, there are 18 
districts in Beijing. Due to the limited data, this investigation combines the districts of 
Dongcheng, Xicheng, Xuanwu and Chongwen into one region, which is called “Chengnei”, 
for analysis. Figure 5.4 provides the map of fifteen districts in Beijing. 
                                                          
34 See Hui & Liang (2016) for spatial spill-over effect of urban landscape views on property price. 
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Figure 5.4 Map of Fifteen Districts in Beijing 
 
In the empirical analysis, this chapter employs samples of regional house price records 
containing a total of 675 observations. The sample period spans 2003 – 2013 annually. The 
data are retrieved from the official website of the National Bureau of Statistics of China and 
the World Bank database. The research investigates the determinants of house prices in 
fifteen districts of Beijing. The regional house price records include the longitude and latitude 
of the centre of regions respectively in order to calculate the distance between region and 
airport and the distance between region and CBD. 
Table 5.5 Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Log House Price 165 3.95 0.38 3.04 4.78 
Log Number of New Projects 165 3.07 0.21 2.77 3.56 
Log Size of Building Started 165 3.28 0.08 3.14 3.41 
Log Average Wage 165 4.71 0.18 4.40 4.97 
Log Income 165 4.02 0.19 3.70 4.30 
Log Tax 165 2.23 0.28 1.72 2.60 
Log Urban Population 165 1.67 0.04 1.60 1.73 
Unemployment Rate 165 0.042 0.001 0.04 0.043 
Central Bank Interest Rate 165 0.064 0.005 0.058 0.073 
Distance to Beijing Capital 
Airport (km) 
165 35,759 15,025 6,912 67,652 
Distance to CBD (km) 165 33,303 19,788 6,303 74,130 
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In order to provide an overview of the sample, Table 5.5 summarises the number of 
observations for each variable. Mean of the sample, standard deviation of the sample, 
minimum of the sample and maximum of the sample are provided to estimate this descriptive 
statistic. House Price is the dependent variable and the other variables are independent 
variables. All of the variables are the average value for each district in Beijing. 
 
5.5 Empirical Findings 
5.5.1 Spatial Dependence and Spatial Heterogeneity 
The results of the examination of the determinants in the property sector are presented in the 
panel data regression models and are analysed using different estimators tested. In both the 
non-spatial regression and spatial econometrics regression, the investigation contains the 
house price of the previous year, which is the lag (1) house price, in terms of the dynamic 
estimation. 
Table 5.6 and Table 5.7 test the influences of the number of new projects, size of building 
starts and the average wage of staff and workers in the real estate market on house prices with 
static models and dynamic models, respectively (Model 1). The investigation tests each 
estimator with OLS, fixed effects and random effects for the house prices in the combined 15 
regions. It is found that the p-value of the Hausman Test can accept the null hypothesis and 
that random effect is appropriate for Model 1. Based on the result of SAC (Table 5.6), the 
average wage of employees in the real estate market leads to an increase in house price by 
1.367% significantly. This finding is in line with ‘the sector theory’ (Hoyt, 1939), because the 
differences in household income cause the changes of residential location and house prices. 
Thus, this result support Hui and Gu (2009) who conclude that income is a significant factor 
affecting house price levels in Beijing Area. The number of new projects influence the house 
price positively but not significantly. This result is not in line with Zhang et al. (2015). The 
results also found that the distance from district to CBD influenced the house price 
significantly and negatively; which means the closer the house location is to CBD, the higher 
the price of a house will be. This finding is in line with the theory of ‘the concentric zone’ 
(Burgess, 1925), which explains that the development of ideal construction of the city 
expands from its CBD. The workers live near CBD aims to easy access to their work. Thus, 
the demand for house surrounding CBD is high, which causes the increase in house price. 
The distance from district to CBD influenced the house price significantly and negatively. 
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Moreover, the investigation found size of building starts, which instead of the supply of 
houses, influences house prices positively by 0.336%, but not significantly in SAC model. 
This result is in line with Hanink et al. (2012) and Zhang et al. (2018) who provide house 
starts is a potential determination of new construction rate which reflects the supply of 
housing market in Beijing. This finding is similar to the theory of ‘the supply of space’ 
(Evans, 1973), which provides that there is an equilibrium relationship between the density 
and revenue of houses in the theory of the supply of space. Even though there is enough 
space for construction, the irrational density of buildings leads to lower revenues of the house. 
Thus, the uncertainties of the model are more appropriate to explain the results in SEM model, 
which presents size of building starts, which instead of the supply of houses, influences house 
prices positively by 0.388%. However, the result is not very significant. Thus, the result is 
similar to Evans (1973), who suggests a rational space and density of constructions are 
significant to households. Across the data over the time, these results are similar to the 
previous study (Pijnenburg, 2017). Though the previous studies analysed data from different 
countries, the results correspond to economic theory.  
For the test of heteroskedasticity in the OLS, fixed effects and random effects, Breusch-
Pagan test is applied. The results show the p-value below 0.05, which strongly rejects the null 
hypothesis. This means there is heteroskedasticity in the random estimator and that random 
estimator is inefficient. The Breusch-Godfrey LM test provides there is serial autocorrelation 
in the panel model, in which the p-value is 0 and that random estimator is inefficient. 
Through the Global Moran’s I test, the LM-error test and the LM-lag test, the results provide 
that there is spatial autocorrelation on both spatial error and spatial lag. In terms of Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC), it is sufficient evidence for the efficient model when AIC is 
smaller. The spatial error model (SEM) is a compatible model in the spatial analysis. In the 
SEM model (Table 5.6), the results provide that the coefficient of the average wage increases 
to 1.66% and the coefficient of the average wage increases to 0.39%. Spatial error model 
(SEM) focuses on the influences of neighbouring unobserved characteristics on house prices. 
According to the null hypothesis of SEM, ρ equals to zero so that the neighbouring house 
prices of the previous year are removed. The SEM model estimates the parameters λ, which 
are the autocorrelation coefficients of neighbouring unobserved characteristics on the house 
prices of the previous year. The result provides that the spatial autocorrelation coefficient of λ 
is 0.0074. This means the house prices are influenced by the neighbouring unobserved 
characteristics significantly and positively. 
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When adding the lag (1) house prices variable, this investigation establishes dynamic models 
for testing the spatial heterogeneity for Model 1 (Table 5.7). Through the Global Moran’s I 
test, the LM-error test and the LM-lag test, the results provide that there is spatial 
autocorrelation on spatial error. In terms of AIC, SEM is an efficient model. It is found that 
the house prices of the previous year influenced the house price by 0.887% positively and 
significantly. This means house prices in neighbouring regions spill-over more in times of 
increasing neighbouring house prices. Thus, the hypothesis H1 is rejected. This finding is in 
line with an earlier study (Pijnenburg, 2017). This result is also similar to Zhang et al. (2015) 
and Chow et al. (2016), who find that the house price is influenced by that of neighbouring 
regions. Thus, this study confirms house price is influenced by that of neighbouring regions 
in Beijing area, which means Beijing house price has a spatial dependence. The Wooldridge 
LM Test suggests there is no more spatial autocorrelation in the data, according to the p-value 
of 0.37 which is above 0.05. The Breusch-Pagan Test indicates remaining heteroskedasticity 
in the residuals. In conclusion, the unobserved characteristics of the neighbouring regions 
influence house price significantly in the long term and short term, which is a dynamic 
analysis. The short-term effects of unobserved characteristics in the neighbouring regions are 
more than long-term unobserved characteristics in the neighbouring regions.  
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Table 5.6 Test Results for Panel Model and Spatial Models 
            
        
        
      
        
        
        
  Random SAC SAR SEM SDM 
Num of New Projects 
0.0105 0.0127 0.0102 0.0145 0.0270 
(0.18) (0.14) (0.13) (0.18) (0.13) 
Size of Building Started 
0.353** 0.313 0.336 0.388* 0.248 
(2.34) (1.40) (1.62) (1.95) (0.79) 
Average Wage 
1.649*** 1.367*** 1.565*** 1.663*** 1.309*** 
(23.51) (11.85) (15.94) (17.82) (6.42) 
Distance to Beijing Capital 
Airport (km) 
2.38E-07 1.22E-07 1.64E-07 1.57E-07 1.28E-07 
(0.05) (0.88) (1.22) (1.15) (-0.35) 
Distance to CBD (km) 
-6.79E-06** -5.30E-06*** -5.31E-06*** -5.81E-06*** -2.64E-06 
(-2.05) (-4.79) (-5.06) (-5.64) (-0.83) 
Rho(ρ) - 
0.039*** 0.012*** 
- 
0.0784*** 
(3.82) (4.18) (3.54) 
Lambda(λ) - 
0.0284** 
- 
0.00742*** 
- 
(2.44) (-2.96) 
Sigma(σ) - 
0.194*** 0.200*** 0.203*** 0.191*** 
(18.14) (18.17) (18.17) (17.91) 
Constants 
-4.788*** -3.689*** -4.633*** -5.186*** -3.143*** 
(-6.70) (-3.66) (-4.81) (-5.62) (-3.03) 
Adjusted r2 0.654 0.183 0.338 0.531 0.047 
VIF 1.35 - - - - 
Hausman 0.21 
- - - - 
p-value 1 
Breusch-Godfrey LM 83.02 
- - - - 
p-value 0 
Breusch-Pagan 104.5 
- - - - 
p-value 0 
Global Moran's I 0.173 
- - - - 
p-value 0 
LM-Error Test 10.6 
- - - - 
p-value 0 
Robust LM-Error Test 8.06 
- - - - 
p-value 0.01 
LM-Lag Test 15.9 
- - - - 
p-value 0 
Robust LM-Lag Test 13.3 
- - - - 
p-value 0 
AIC - 0.127 0.091 0.064 2.425 
Wooldridge LM 
- 
0.587 0.587 0.587 0.773 
p-value 0.443 0.443 0.443 0.379 
Breusch-Pagan 
- 
92 81.02 70.11 152.3 
p-value 0 0 0 0 
* p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01 
T-statistic are in parenthesis 
Breusch–Pagan test is used to test for heteroskedasticity in the model; 
Breusch-Godfrey LM test is used to test for serial correlation; 
Moran’s I tests for the presence of spatial autocorrelation of residuals, the value is between 1 and −1; positive Moran’s I 
means values in neighbouring positions tend to cluster; negative Moran’s I means values are interspersed; zero of Moran’s I, 
there is no spatial autocorrelation, means the data are randomly distributed. 
Spatial error: the error terms across different spatial units are correlated. 
Spatial lag:  the dependent variable y in place i is affected by the independent variables in both place i and j. 
Lagrange Multiplier Diagnostics (LM): LM-Error Test and LM-Lag Test determines the type of spatial dependence - spatial 
error or spatial lag (Robust tests used to find a proper alternative, only use robust forms when BOTH LMerror and LMlag 
are significant). If p-value of LM less than 0.05 indicates there are spatial autocorrelation on error or lag. 
Panel: 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝑎1𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑁𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐵𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎3𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐴𝑊𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎4𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑟 + +𝑎5𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝐶𝐵𝐷 + 𝑑1𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝑑2𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 
Spatial: 
          𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜌 ∑ 𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑖𝑡
𝑁
𝑗=1 + 𝑎1𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑁𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐵𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎3𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐴𝑊𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎4𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑟 + +𝑎5𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝐶𝐵𝐷 + 𝑖𝑡  
                𝑖𝑡 = 𝜆 ∑ 𝑊𝑖𝑗 𝑖𝑡
𝑁
𝑗=1 + 𝜈𝑖𝑡  
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Table 5.7 Test Results for Dynamic Panel Model and Dynamic Spatial Models 
      
      
    
    
    
      
        
  Random SEM SDM 
Lag(1) House Price 
0.897*** 0.887*** 0.88*** 
(21.84) (23.86) (23.37) 
Num of New Projects 
0.0882** 0.0897** 0.168* 
(2.02) (2.05) (1.70) 
Size of Building Started 
0.234** 0.268*** 0.121 
(-2.05) (-4.94) (-0.66) 
Average Wage 
0.0685 0.07 0.003 
(0.77) (1.07) (0.02) 
Distance to Beijing Capital Airport (km) 
1.07E-07 5.52E-07 1.48E-07 
(0.15) (0.77) (-0.09) 
Distance to CBD (km) 
-1.46E-06** -1.16E-06** -9.20E-07 
(-2.50) (-1.99) (-0.61) 
Rho(ρ) - - 
0.112*** 
(6.86) 
Lambda(λ) - 
0.0154** 
- 
(2.44) 
Sigma(σ) - 
0.103*** 0.091*** 
(18.16) (17.76) 
Constants 
0.703 0.77 0.44 
(1.23) (0.75) (0.64) 
Adjusted r2 0.914 0.899 0.731 
VIF 2.18 - - 
Hausman 4.73 
- - 
p-value 0.32 
Breusch-Godfrey LM 10.9 
- - 
p-value 0 
Breusch-Pagan 22.7 
- - 
p-value 0 
Global Moran's I 2.35 
- - 
p-value 0.02 
LM-Error Test 48.9 
- - 
p-value 0 
LM-Lag Test 1.07 
- - 
p-value 0.3 
AIC - 0.014 4.96 
Wooldridge LM 
- 
9.05 5.98 
p-value 0.37 0.14 
Breusch-Pagan 
- 
16.7 159.4 
p-value 0 0 
* p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01 
T-statistic are in parenthesis 
Breusch–Pagan test is used to test for heteroskedasticity in the model; 
Breusch-Godfrey LM test is used to test for serial correlation; 
Moran’s I tests for the presence of spatial autocorrelation of residuals, the value is between 1 and −1; positive Moran’s I 
means values in neighbouring positions tend to cluster; negative Moran’s I means values are interspersed; zero of Moran’s I, 
there is no spatial autocorrelation, means the data are randomly distributed. 
Spatial error: the error terms across different spatial units are correlated. 
Spatial lag:  the dependent variable y in place i is affected by the independent variables in both place i and j. 
Lagrange Multiplier Diagnostics (LM): LM-Error Test and LM-Lag Test determines the type of spatial dependence - spatial 
error or spatial lag (Robust tests used to find a proper alternative, only use robust forms when BOTH LMerror and LMlag 
are significant). If p-value of LM less than 0.05 indicates there are spatial autocorrelation on error or lag. 
  
Panel: 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝜏𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑎1𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑁𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐵𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎3𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐴𝑊𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎4𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑟 + +𝑎5𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝐶𝐵𝐷 + 𝑑1𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝑑2𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 
Spatial: 
  𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜏𝑃𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜌 ∑ 𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑖𝑡
𝑁
𝑗=1 + 𝑎1𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑁𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐵𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎3𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐴𝑊𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎4𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑟 + +𝑎5𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝐶𝐵𝐷 + 𝑖𝑡  
        𝑖𝑡 = 𝜆 ∑ 𝑊𝑖𝑗 𝑖𝑡
𝑁
𝑗=1 + 𝜈𝑖𝑡  
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Table 5.8 and Table 5.9 test the influences of income, unemployment rates and central bank 
interest rates on house prices (Model 2). From the Hausman Test, the results show that 
random effect is appropriate for this model based on p-value is 1. The Breusch-Pagan Test 
shows the p-value is below 0.05, which means there is heteroskedasticity in the random 
estimator and that the random estimator is inefficient. The Breusch-Godfrey LM test provides 
that there is serial autocorrelation in the panel model, where the p-value is 0 and the random 
estimator is inefficient. 
Through the Global Moran’s I test, the LM-error test and the LM-lag test, it is found there is 
spatial autocorrelation on spatial lag. The spatial lag model (SAR) is a compatible model in 
the spatial analysis. In the SAR model (Table 5.8), the results provide that income leads to 
the increase in house price by 1.59% significantly. This result is also line with Shen and Liu 
(2004). The income significantly influences the house price in Beijing. This finding is in in 
line with the theory of ‘the concentric zone’ (Burgess, 1925), which presents the high-income 
group ‘who have escaped from the area of deterioration’ changes the demand of residential 
location. Thus, house price would increase. This is similar the empirical results of this 
investigation that income leads to the increase in house price. The unemployment rate 
influences the house price negatively but not significantly. This result is not in line with 
Harris et al. (2013). This means the unemployment rate does not influence the house price in 
Beijing. Central bank interest rates influence house prices negatively and significantly by 
12%. This result is similar to the prior study (Li and Chand, 2013). This means the interest 
rate influence urban house prices negatively in Beijing area. The investigation also found that 
the distance from district to CBD influenced the house price significantly and negatively; 
which means the closer the house location is to CBD, the higher the price of a house will be. 
This finding is also in line with ‘the concentric zone’ (Burgess, 1925). Spatial autoregressive 
model (SAR) is focused on the influences of neighbouring dependent variable. According to 
the null hypothesis of SAR, λ equals to zero so that the neighbouring unobserved 
characteristics of the dependent variables are removed. The SAR model provides estimates of 
the parameters ρ, which is the spatial autocorrelation coefficient of neighbouring dependent 
variable. In Table 5.8, the result provides the spatial autocorrelation coefficients of ρ is 0.01 
in SAR. These means the house price is influenced by the neighbouring house price by 0.1%  
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Table 5.8 Test Results for Panel Model and Spatial Models 
      
      
      
    
      
      
        
  Random SAR SDM 
GDP 
1.672*** 1.59*** 1.386*** 
(25.08) (16.26) (6.09) 
Unemployment Rate 
-0.051 -0.047 0.058 
(-0.30) (-0.19) (0.20) 
Central Bank Interest Rate 
-12.64*** -12.02*** -11.38 
(-3.97) (-2.63) (-1.16) 
Distance to Beijing Capital Airport (km) 
2.38E-07 1.59E-06 1.08E-06 
(0.05) (1.23) (-0.30) 
Distance to CBD (km) 
-6.79E-06** -5.36E-06*** -2.79E-06 
(-2.05) (-5.28) (-0.89) 
Rho(ρ) - 
0.0111*** 0.0588** 
(4.18) (2.24) 
Sigma(σ) - 
0.193*** 0.188*** 
(18.17) (17.99) 
Constants 
-1.539 -1.551 -1.169 
(-1.62) (-1.15) (-0.88) 
Adjusted r2 0.715 0.705 0.923 
VIF 1.79 - - 
Hausman 0.2 
- - 
p-value 1 
Breusch-Godfrey LM 112.8 
- - 
p-value 0 
Breusch-Pagan 90.6 
- - 
p-value 0 
Global Moran's I 0.112 
- - 
p-value 0.02 
LM-Error Test 4.42 
- - 
p-value 0.04 
Robust LM-Error Test 2.86 
- - 
p-value 0.09 
LM-Lag Test 15.9 
- - 
p-value 0 
Robust LM-Lag Test 14.3 
- - 
p-value 0 
AIC - 0.085 1.38 
Wooldridge LM 
- 
3.02 6.08 
p-value 0.08 0.01 
Breusch-Pagan 
- 
92.14 149.2 
p-value 0 0 
* p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01 
T-statistic are in parenthesis 
Breusch–Pagan test is used to test for heteroskedasticity in the model; 
Breusch-Godfrey LM test is used to test for serial correlation; 
Moran’s I tests for the presence of spatial autocorrelation of residuals, the value is between 1 and −1; positive Moran’s I 
means values in neighbouring positions tend to cluster; negative Moran’s I means values are interspersed; zero of Moran’s I, 
there is no spatial autocorrelation, means the data are randomly distributed. 
Spatial error: the error terms across different spatial units are correlated. 
Spatial lag:  the dependent variable y in place i is affected by the independent variables in both place i and j. 
Lagrange Multiplier Diagnostics (LM): LM-Error Test and LM-Lag Test determines the type of spatial dependence - spatial 
error or spatial lag (Robust tests used to find a proper alternative, only use robust forms when BOTH LMerror and LMlag 
are significant). If p-value of LM less than 0.05 indicates there are spatial autocorrelation on error or lag. 
  
Panel: 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝑎1𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎2𝑈𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎3𝐼𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎4𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑟 + +𝑎5𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝐶𝐵𝐷 + 𝑑1𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝑑2𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 
Spatial: 
              𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜌 ∑ 𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑖𝑡
𝑁
𝑗=1 + 𝑎1𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎2𝑈𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎3𝐼𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎4𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑟 + +𝑎5𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝐶𝐵𝐷 + 𝑖𝑡  
                     𝑖𝑡 = 𝜆 ∑ 𝑊𝑖𝑗 𝑖𝑡
𝑁
𝑗=1 + 𝜈𝑖𝑡  
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Table 5.9 Test Results for Dynamic Panel Model and Dynamic Spatial Models 
      
      
 
 
 
   
    
        
  Fixed SEM SDM 
Lag(1) House Price 
0.844*** 0.864*** 0.865*** 
(21.36) (23.06) (22.98) 
GDP 
0.331*** 0.243*** 0.189 
(4.06) (2.71) (1.53) 
Unemployment Rate 
-0.155 -0.0194 -0.186 
(1.17) (0.37) (1.34) 
Central Bank Interest Rate 
-5.423** -6.902** -4.596 
(-2.16) (-2.31) (-0.96) 
Distance to Beijing Capital Airport (km) 
1.14E-07 1.94E-07 1.75E-07 
(0.17) (0.25) (0.10) 
Distance to CBD (km) 
-1.78E-06*** -1.42E-06** -1.23E-06 
(-3.11) (-2.09) (-0.81) 
Rho(ρ) - - 
0.0979*** 
(5.28) 
Lambda(λ) - 
0.108*** 
- 
(6.48) 
Sigma(σ) - 
0.091*** 0.091*** 
(17.78) (17.83) 
Constants 
-0.885 0.0198 -0.618 
(-1.20) (0.66) (-0.95) 
Adjusted r2 0.917 0.913 0.793 
VIF 2.46 - - 
Hausman 16.14 
- - 
p-value 0 
Breusch-Godfrey LM 7.7 
- - 
p-value 0.01 
Breusch-Pagan 27.4 
- - 
p-value 0 
Global Moran's I 2.23 
- - 
p-value 0.03 
LM-Error Test 41.75 
- - 
p-value 0 
LM-Lag Test 1.59 
- - 
p-value 0.207 
AIC - 0.012 3.81 
Wooldridge LM 
- 
13.2 8.16 
p-value 0 0 
Breusch-Pagan 
- 
27 159 
p-value 0 0 
* p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01 
T-statistic are in parenthesis 
Breusch–Pagan test is used to test for heteroskedasticity in the model; 
Breusch-Godfrey LM test is used to test for serial correlation; 
Moran’s I tests for the presence of spatial autocorrelation of residuals, the value is between 1 and −1; positive Moran’s I 
means values in neighbouring positions tend to cluster; negative Moran’s I means values are interspersed; zero of Moran’s I, 
there is no spatial autocorrelation, means the data are randomly distributed. 
Spatial error: the error terms across different spatial units are correlated. 
Spatial lag:  the dependent variable y in place i is affected by the independent variables in both place i and j. 
Lagrange Multiplier Diagnostics (LM): LM-Error Test and LM-Lag Test determines the type of spatial dependence - spatial 
error or spatial lag (Robust tests used to find a proper alternative, only use robust forms when BOTH LMerror and LMlag 
are significant). If p-value of LM less than 0.05 indicates there are spatial autocorrelation on error or lag. 
  
Panel: 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝜏𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑎1𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎2𝑈𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎3𝐼𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎4𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑟 + +𝑎5𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝐶𝐵𝐷 + 𝑑1𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝑑2𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 
Spatial: 
      𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜏𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜌 ∑ 𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑖𝑡
𝑁
𝑗=1 + 𝑎1𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎2𝑈𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎3𝐼𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎4𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑟 + +𝑎5𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝐶𝐵𝐷 + 𝑖𝑡  
            𝑖𝑡 = 𝜆 ∑ 𝑊𝑖𝑗 𝑖𝑡
𝑁
𝑗=1 + 𝜈𝑖𝑡  
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significantly and positively. Thus, the hypothesis H1 is rejected. This result is similar to 
Zhang et al. (2015) and Chow et al. (2016), which means Beijing house price has a spatial 
heterogeneity. In respect to adding the lag (1) house prices variable, it is found that spatial 
autocorrelation of spatial lag house prices is not significant. 
However, the house prices of the previous year influence the house price by 0.86% positively 
and significantly. This means house prices in neighbouring regions spill-over more in times 
of increasing neighbouring house prices. The Breusch-Pagan Test indicates remaining 
heteroskedasticity in the residuals. 
Table 5.10 and Table 5.11 test the influences of ‘taxes and other charges on principal 
business of enterprises for real estate development’ (Tax) on the house prices (Model 3). The 
Hausman Test accepts the null hypothesis that random effect is appropriate for this model. 
Based on the result of SAR model (Table 5.10), taxes and other charges on principal business 
of enterprises for real estate development lead to the increase in house price by 1.07% 
significantly. This result is similar to the previous studies (Li and Chand, 2013; Liu, 2013; 
Shi and Lee, 2017), which means the taxes and other charges on principal business of 
enterprises for real estate development influence house prices negatively and significantly in 
Beijing. This finding is in line with ‘trade-off theory of residential location’ (Evans, 1973), 
which provides the maximum utility of household is the objective of the choice of location. 
The increasing tax added the costs of construction, and then the developers will increase the 
house selling price so that balance the costs. When the household considers the house price, 
they will change the location of living so that the patterns of residential location changes. 
Thus, the tax could influence the house price, which is appropriate for trade-off theory. The 
distance from district to CBD influences house prices significantly and negatively; which 
means the closer the house location is to CBD, the higher the price of a house will be. This 
finding is similar with ‘the concentric zone’ (Burgess, 1925). Across the data over the time, 
these results are similar to the previous study (Pijnenburg, 2017). Though the previous 
studies analysed the different countries, the results correspond to economic theory. For the 
test of heteroskedasticity in random effects, the Breusch-Pagan test shows the p-value below 
0.05, which strongly rejects the null hypothesis. This means there is heteroskedasticity in the 
random estimator and that the random estimator is inefficient. The Breusch-Godfrey LM test 
provides that there is serial autocorrelation in the panel model, in which the p-value is 0 that 
the random estimator is inefficient. Through the Global Moran’s I test, LM-error test and 
LM-lag test, it is found that there is spatial autocorrelation on both spatial error and spatial   
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Table 5.10 Test Results for Panel Model and Spatial Models 
        
        
        
        
      
        
            
  Random SAC SAR SEM SDM 
Tax 
1.121*** 1.082 1.066*** 1.116*** 0.941*** 
(25.31) (16.58) (16.78) (16.48) (5.68) 
Central Bank Interest Rate 
-11.19*** -10.75*** -10.65*** -10.7*** -1.49 
(-4.31) (-2.79) (-2.93) (-2.67) (-0.21) 
Distance to Beijing Capital 
Airport (km) 
2.38E-07 1.66E-06 1.61E-06 1.75E-06 3.48E-07 
(0.06) (1.21) (1.22) (1.28) (-0.10) 
Distance to CBD (km) 
-6.79E-06** -5.4E-06*** -5.34E-06*** -5.43E-06*** -3.08E-06 
(-2.35) (-5.14) (-5.19) (-5.04) (-0.97) 
Rho(ρ) - 
0.00775 0.0112*** 
- 
0.0522** 
(0.46) (4.17) (2.18) 
Lambda(λ) - 
0.00624 
- 
0.0198*** 
- 
(0.20) (3.71) 
Sigma(σ) - 
0.196*** 0.196*** 0.195*** 0.192*** 
(18.16) (18.17) (18.17) (18.06) 
Constants 
2.383*** 2.168*** 2.183*** 2.113*** 1.879*** 
(12.57) (9.22) (10.10) (8.78) (5.79) 
Adjusted r2 0.707 0.697 0.697 0.695 0.939 
VIF 1.44 - - - - 
Hausman 0.02 
- - - - 
p-value 1 
Breusch-Godfrey LM 105.4 
- - - - 
p-value 0 
Breusch-Pagan 94.9 
- - - - 
p-value 0 
Global Moran's I 0.134 
- - - - 
p-value 0.01 
LM-Error Test 6.28 
- - - - 
p-value 0.01 
Robust LM-Error Test 4.38 
- - - - 
p-value 0.04 
LM-Lag Test 15.85 
- - - - 
p-value 0 
Robust LM-Lag Test 13.95 
- - - - 
p-value 0 
AIC - 0.081 0.086 0.072 1.07 
Wooldridge LM 
- 
4.32 4.32 4.32 5.36 
p-value 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.02 
Breusch-Pagan 
- 
95.5 97.34 91.58 147.1 
p-value 0 0 0 0 
* p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01 
T-statistic are in parenthesis 
Breusch–Pagan test is used to test for heteroskedasticity in the model; 
Breusch-Godfrey LM test is used to test for serial correlation; 
Moran’s I tests for the presence of spatial autocorrelation of residuals, the value is between 1 and −1; positive Moran’s I 
means values in neighbouring positions tend to cluster; negative Moran’s I means values are interspersed; zero of Moran’s I, 
there is no spatial autocorrelation, means the data are randomly distributed. 
Spatial error: the error terms across different spatial units are correlated. 
Spatial lag:  the dependent variable y in place i is affected by the independent variables in both place i and j. 
Lagrange Multiplier Diagnostics (LM): LM-Error Test and LM-Lag Test determines the type of spatial dependence - spatial 
error or spatial lag (Robust tests used to find a proper alternative, only use robust forms when BOTH LMerror and LMlag 
are significant). If p-value of LM less than 0.05 indicates there are spatial autocorrelation on error or lag. 
  
Panel: 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝑎1𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎2𝐼𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎3𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑟 + +𝑎4𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝐶𝐵𝐷 + 𝑑1𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝑑2𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 
Spatial: 
                       𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜌 ∑ 𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑖𝑡
𝑁
𝑗=1 + 𝑎1𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎2𝐼𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎3𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑟 + +𝑎4𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝐶𝐵𝐷 + 𝑖𝑡  
                             𝑖𝑡 = 𝜆 ∑ 𝑊𝑖𝑗 𝑖𝑡
𝑁
𝑗=1 + 𝜈𝑖𝑡  
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Table 5.11 Test Results for Dynamic Panel Model and Dynamic Spatial Models 
      
      
      
      
    
    
        
  Fixed SEM SDM 
Lag(1) House Price 
0.825*** 0.823*** 0.866*** 
(22.36) (20.64) (23.59) 
Tax 
0.248*** 0.249*** 0.116 
(4.88) (4.63) (1.33) 
Central Bank Interest Rate 
-7.686*** -6.587*** -5.789 
(-4.00) (-2.76) (-1.62) 
Distance to Beijing Capital Airport (km) 
1.17E-07 6.66E-07 2.91E-07 
(0.17) (0.94) (0.17) 
Distance to CBD (km) 
-1.89E-06*** -1.47E-06** -1.29E-06 
(-3.41) (-2.45) (-0.85) 
Rho(ρ) - - 
0.084*** 
(4.36) 
Lambda(λ) - 
0.0218* 
- 
(1.91) 
Sigma(σ) - 
0.099*** 0.091*** 
(18.16) (17.93) 
Constants 
0.762*** 0.61*** 0.727*** 
(5.75) (3.26) (4.06) 
Adjusted r2 0.92 0.899 0.848 
VIF 2.18 - - 
Hausman 20.89 
- - 
p-value 0 
Breusch-Godfrey LM 4.92 
- - 
p-value 0.03 
Breusch-Pagan 26.18 
- - 
p-value 0 
Global Moran's I 0.297 
- - 
p-value 0 
LM-Error Test 30.9 
- - 
p-value 0 
LM-Lag Test 1.76 
- - 
p-value 0.18 
AIC - 0.014 2.74 
Wooldridge LM 
- 
24.82 23.18 
p-value 0 0 
Breusch-Pagan 
- 
19.62 158.3 
p-value 0 0 
* p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01 
T-statistic are in parenthesis 
Breusch–Pagan test is used to test for heteroskedasticity in the model; 
Breusch-Godfrey LM test is used to test for serial correlation; 
Moran’s I tests for the presence of spatial autocorrelation of residuals, the value is between 1 and −1; positive Moran’s I 
means values in neighbouring positions tend to cluster; negative Moran’s I means values are interspersed; zero of Moran’s I, 
there is no spatial autocorrelation, means the data are randomly distributed. 
Spatial error: the error terms across different spatial units are correlated. 
Spatial lag:  the dependent variable y in place i is affected by the independent variables in both place i and j. 
Lagrange Multiplier Diagnostics (LM): LM-Error Test and LM-Lag Test determines the type of spatial dependence - spatial 
error or spatial lag (Robust tests used to find a proper alternative, only use robust forms when BOTH LMerror and LMlag 
are significant). If p-value of LM less than 0.05 indicates there are spatial autocorrelation on error or lag. 
  
Panel: 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝜏𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑎1𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎2𝐼𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎3𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑟 + +𝑎4𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝐶𝐵𝐷 + 𝑑1𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝑑2𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 
Spatial: 
             𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜏𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜌 ∑ 𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑖𝑡
𝑁
𝑗=1 + 𝑎1𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎2𝐼𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎3𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑟 + +𝑎4𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝐶𝐵𝐷 + 𝑖𝑡  
                   𝑖𝑡 = 𝜆 ∑ 𝑊𝑖𝑗 𝑖𝑡
𝑁
𝑗=1 + 𝜈𝑖𝑡  
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lag. According to the AIC result, the spatial error model (SEM) is a compatible model in the 
dynamic spatial analysis. In the SEM model, the result provides that the spatial 
autocorrelation coefficient of λ is 0.02. This means house prices are influenced by the 
neighbouring unobserved characteristics significantly and positively. 
When adding the lag (1) house prices variable, the investigation establishes dynamic models 
to test the spatial heterogeneity for Model 3 (Table 5.11). Through the Global Moran’s I test, 
the LM-error test and the LM-lag test, it is found there is spatial autocorrelation on spatial 
error. In terms of AIC, SEM is an efficient model. The results illustrate that the house prices 
of the previous year influence the house price by 0.82% positively and significantly. This 
means house prices in neighbouring regions spill-over more in times of increasing 
neighbouring house prices. This finding is in line with a previous study (Pijnenburg, 2017). 
Breusch-Pagan Test indicates remaining heteroskedasticity in the residuals. 
Table 5.12 and Table 5.13 test the influences of the unbanning population on the house prices 
(Model 4). Results of the Hausman Test illustrate that random effect is appropriate for this 
model based on p-value is 1. The Breusch-Pagan Test shows the p-value is below 0.05, which 
means there is heteroskedasticity in the random estimator and that the random estimator is 
inefficient. The Breusch-Godfrey LM test provides there is serial autocorrelation in the panel 
model, which p-value is 0 that random estimator is inefficient. 
Through the Global Moran’s I test, the LM-error test and the LM-lag test, the investigation 
found there is spatial autocorrelation on spatial lag. The spatial lag model (SAR) is a 
compatible model in the spatial analysis. In SAR model, the urban population leads to the 
increase in house price by 7.36% significantly. The hypothesis H2 is rejected. This result is 
similar to Zhang et al. (2015) and Chow et al. (2016), which means the urban population 
influence house prices positively and significantly in Beijing. This finding is in line with 
Alonso (1964), who provides population is a significant factor in the economic analysis, 
because the population changes the demand for the number of houses. The investigation 
result demonstrated the increasing demand that occurs as a result of migration to regions 
where house prices are comparably low results in an increase in house prices. The results 
provided that the distance from district to CBD influenced the house price significantly and 
negatively; which means the closer the house location is to CBD, the higher the price of a 
house will be. This finding is in line with ‘the concentric zone’ (Burgess, 1925). The central 
bank interest rate influence house price significantly and negatively by -9.12%. This in line 
with Li and Chand (2013), which means the central bank interest rates influence house prices   
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Table 5.12 Test Results for Panel Model and Spatial Models 
      
      
    
   
      
    
        
  Random SAR SDM 
Urban Population 
7.742*** 7.362*** 6.272*** 
(24.76) (16.15) (6.65) 
Unemployment Rate 
-0.0521 -0.0482 -0.0163 
(-0.30) (-0.20) (-0.04) 
Central Bank Interest Rate 
-9.596*** -9.125** -9.429 
(-3.00) (-2.00) (-0.89) 
Distance to Beijing Capital Airport (km) 
2.38E-07 1.60E-06 1.10E-06 
(0.05) (1.22) (-0.30) 
Distance to CBD (km) 
-6.79E-06** -5.35E-06*** -2.78E-06 
(-2.05) (-5.25) (-0.88) 
Rho(ρ) - 
0.0112*** 0.0595** 
(4.17) (2.39) 
Sigma(σ) - 
0.194*** 0.189*** 
(18.17) (18.00) 
Constants 
-7.899*** -7.599*** -5.859*** 
(-7.15) (-4.85) (-3.34) 
Adjusted r2 0.675 0.376 0.921 
VIF 1.77 - - 
Hausman 0.021 
- - 
p-value 1 
Breusch-Godfrey LM 111.1 
- - 
p-value 0 
Breusch-Pagan 90.1 
- - 
p-value 0 
Global Moran's I 0.119 
- - 
p-value 0.02 
LM-Error Test 4.96 
- - 
p-value 0.03 
Robust LM-Error Test 3.3 
- - 
p-value 0.07 
LM-Lag Test 15.9 
- - 
p-value 0 
Robust LM-Lag Test 14.2 
- - 
p-value 0 
AIC - 0.086 1.41 
Wooldridge LM 
- 
2.85 4.86 
p-value 0.09 0.03 
Breusch-Pagan 
- 
92.1 149.1 
p-value 0 0 
* p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01 
T-statistic are in parenthesis 
Breusch–Pagan test is used to test for heteroskedasticity in the model; 
Breusch-Godfrey LM test is used to test for serial correlation; 
Moran’s I tests for the presence of spatial autocorrelation of residuals, the value is between 1 and −1; positive Moran’s I 
means values in neighbouring positions tend to cluster; negative Moran’s I means values are interspersed; zero of Moran’s I, 
there is no spatial autocorrelation, means the data are randomly distributed. 
Spatial error: the error terms across different spatial units are correlated. 
Spatial lag:  the dependent variable y in place i is affected by the independent variables in both place i and j. 
Lagrange Multiplier Diagnostics (LM): LM-Error Test and LM-Lag Test determines the type of spatial dependence - spatial 
error or spatial lag (Robust tests used to find a proper alternative, only use robust forms when BOTH LMerror and LMlag 
are significant). If p-value of LM less than 0.05 indicates there are spatial autocorrelation on error or lag. 
  
Panel: 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝑎1𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑈𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎2𝑈𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎3𝐼𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎4𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑟 + +𝑎5𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝐶𝐵𝐷 + 𝑑1𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝑑2𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 
Spatial: 
                  𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜌 ∑ 𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑖𝑡
𝑁
𝑗=1 + 𝑎1𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑈𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎2𝑈𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎3𝐼𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎4𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑟 + +𝑎5𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝐶𝐵𝐷 + 𝑖𝑡  
                         𝑖𝑡 = 𝜆 ∑ 𝑊𝑖𝑗 𝑖𝑡
𝑁
𝑗=1 + 𝜈𝑖𝑡  
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Table 5.13 Test Results for Dynamic Panel Model and Dynamic Spatial Models 
      
      
      
      
      
        
 
  Fixed SEM SDM 
Lag(1) House Price 
0.847*** 0.842*** 0.867*** 
(21.42) (20.13) (23.10) 
Urban Population 
1.502*** 1.546*** 0.918* 
(3.96) (3.87) (1.81) 
Unemployment Rate 
0.154 0.161 0.282 
(1.16) (1.24) (1.41) 
Central Bank Interest Rate 
-4.789* -4.724* -2.880 
(-1.92) (-1.95) (-0.55) 
Distance to Beijing Capital Airport (km) 
1.14E-07 1.74E-07 1.75E-07 
(0.17) (0.25) (0.10) 
Distance to CBD (km) 
-1.76E-06*** -1.74E-06*** -1.21E-06 
(-3.07) (-3.08) (-0.80) 
Rho(ρ) - - 
0.0995*** 
(5.58) 
Lambda(λ) - 
0.000768 
- 
(-0.27) 
Sigma(σ) - 
0.103*** 0.0909*** 
(18.17) (17.83) 
Constants 
-2.103** -2.201** -1.898** 
(-2.35) (-2.40) (-1.96) 
Adjusted r2 0.916 0.916 0.745 
VIF 2.42 - - 
Hausman 15.1 
- - 
p-value 0 
Breusch-Godfrey LM 13.8 
- - 
p-value 0 
Breusch-Pagan 27.03 
- - 
p-value 0 
Global Moran's I 0.35 
- - 
p-value 0 
LM-Error Test 42.7 
- - 
p-value 0 
LM-Lag Test 1.56 
- - 
p-value 0.21 
AIC - 0.012 3.94 
Wooldridge LM 
- 
13.8 9.37 
p-value 0 0 
Breusch-Pagan 
- 
25.8 158.9 
p-value 0 0 
* p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01 
T-statistic are in parenthesis 
Breusch–Pagan test is used to test for heteroskedasticity in the model; 
Breusch-Godfrey LM test is used to test for serial correlation; 
Moran’s I tests for the presence of spatial autocorrelation of residuals, the value is between 1 and −1; positive Moran’s I 
means values in neighbouring positions tend to cluster; negative Moran’s I means values are interspersed; zero of Moran’s I, 
there is no spatial autocorrelation, means the data are randomly distributed. 
Spatial error: the error terms across different spatial units are correlated. 
Spatial lag:  the dependent variable y in place i is affected by the independent variables in both place i and j. 
Lagrange Multiplier Diagnostics (LM): LM-Error Test and LM-Lag Test determines the type of spatial dependence - spatial 
error or spatial lag (Robust tests used to find a proper alternative, only use robust forms when BOTH LMerror and LMlag 
are significant). If p-value of LM less than 0.05 indicates there are spatial autocorrelation on error or lag. 
  
Panel: 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝜏𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑎1𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑈𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎2𝑈𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎3𝐼𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎4𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑟 + +𝑎5𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝐶𝐵𝐷 + 𝑑1𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝑑2𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 
Spatial: 
       𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜏𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜌 ∑ 𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑖𝑡
𝑁
𝑗=1 + 𝑎1𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑈𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎2𝑈𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎3𝐼𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎4𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑟 + +𝑎5𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝐶𝐵𝐷 + 𝑖𝑡  
              𝑖𝑡 = 𝜆 ∑ 𝑊𝑖𝑗 𝑖𝑡
𝑁
𝑗=1 + 𝜈𝑖𝑡  
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negatively in Beijing. The SAR model provides estimates of the parameters ρ, which is the 
spatial autocorrelation coefficient of neighbouring dependent variable. In Table 5.12, the 
spatial autocorrelation coefficient of ρ is 0.011 in SAR. These means the house price is 
influenced by the neighbouring house price by 0.011% significantly and positively. Thus, H1 
is rejected. 
In respect to adding the lag (1) house prices variable, it is found that spatial autocorrelation of 
spatial lag house prices is not significant. However, the house prices of the previous year 
influence the house price by 0.84% positively and significantly. This means house prices in 
neighbouring regions spill-over more in times of increasing neighbouring house prices. The 
Breusch-Pagan Test indicates remaining heteroskedasticity in the residuals. 
 
5.5.2 Marginal Effects and Partitioning Spill-Over Effects 
LeSage and Pace (2010) provide that the empirical results of spatial models are analysed by 
direct effects, indirect (spill-over) effects and total effects in the further research. The reason 
is due to “the change in a single observation (region) associated with any given explanatory 
variable will affect the region itself (a direct impact) and potentially affect all other regions 
indirectly”. Accordingly, Table 5.14 and Table 5.15 provide the results of partitioning spill-
overs effects in the empirical analysis. 
The partitioning methodology, which is introduced by LeSage and Pace (2010), illustrates 
how to analyse the effects of characteristics of low order and high order neighbouring region 
(Figure 5.3) on the region being observed. In this investigation, the coefficients of direct and 
indirect effects for neighbourhood orders are divided into five segments, which are W(0), W(1), 
W(2), W(3), W(4). The estimated coefficients of indirect effects for W(0), are zero. Because the 
zero-order neighbourhood means there is no neighbourhood for this factor. The other orders 
of neighbourhood indirect effects are not zero. Similar explanations of this condition are 
referred in the previous studies (Autant-Bernard and LeSage, 2011; LeSage and Pace, 2010). 
Elhorst (2014) illustrated that the direct effects from partitioning depict a process of spatial 
feedback effects. The direct effects and indirect effects of partitioning provide the influences 
of factors from immediate neighbours to the subordinate neighbours (e.g. from W(1) to W(5)).  
Klugman, Panjer, and Willmot (2012) suggest that the statistic of the likelihood ratio test is 
an appropriate method to choose the best fit models for testing spill-over effects. In this 
chapter, the likelihood ratio test of SDM model is 36.712, which indicates that the best fit 
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spill-over model is SDM. The Spatial Durbin model (SDM) focuses on the influences of 
neighbouring explanatory variables of the previous year on the house price. According to the 
null hypothesis of SDM, λ equals to zero so that the neighbouring unobserved characteristics 
of the previous year are removed. The SDM model estimates the parameters ρ, which is the 
autocorrelation coefficients of neighbouring house price of the previous year. 
The results show that the major influences of the factors are from direct effects. This means 
the influences of the factor derive from its own location significantly. For instance, in Table 
5.15, 75.6% of direct effects for GDP influence house prices in first-order neighbouring 
regions. The calculation of direct effects is 1 – 0.338/1.386 = 75.6%; 0.338 refers to indirect 
effects and 1.386 refers to total effects. Otherwise, the indirect effects of GDP on house 
prices in first-order neighbouring regions is 24.4%. This means the influences of GDP on 
house prices originating from the other order neighbouring regions is 24.4%. However, in 
Table 5.15, the direct effects of GDP is 24% in the second-order neighbours, W(2). This 
condition provides that the house prices achieve more feedback effects from the other 
neighbours. There is an interpretation that the second order neighbours are the most 
influenced by the GDP factor; when compared to the rest of the other order neighbours. 
Based on the results, this study rejects the hypothesis H3, H4, H5, H6 and H7, which denotes 
the average wage of staff and workers of real estate have spill-over effects in Beijing; the 
income of residents have spill-over effects in Beijing; the taxes and other charges on principal 
business of enterprises for real estate development have spill-over effects in Beijing; the 
unemployment rate have spill-over effects in Beijing and the urban population have spill-over 
effects in Beijing. These results are in line with the previous studies (Ge and Wu, 2017; Shen 
and Liu, 2004; Gan et al., 2012; Harris et al., 2013; Garriga et al., 2017), which suggest that 
the facotrs of average wage, income, tax, unemployment rate and population influence house 
prices in China. However, these studies have not contained the spill-over effects of these 
factors on house price. The results implicated average wage, income, tax, unemployment rate 
and population changed the spatial pattern of Beijing house price, so that directly and 
indirectly affect the house price in different areas of Beijing. Overall, the direct effects derive 
from alternative order neighbours, which indicates house prices are affected form the 
neighbouring regions significantly. Meanwhile, house prices are affected by the other 
neighbouring factors significantly as well. The variables of the unemployment rate and 
central bank interest rate are not detected to be significant. The variable of building starts is 
significant in the second order. The other variables are significant across all orders. Previous  
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Table 5.14 Test Results for Summary of Indirect (spill-overs) Effects in SAR Model 
  Total         Indirect       
  W(1) W(2) W(3) W(4)  W(1) W(2) W(3) W(4) 
Average Wage 1.565*** 1.649*** 1.635*** 1.642***  0.0764 0.0713 0.0142 0.0065 
GDP 1.590*** 1.681*** 1.659*** 1.666***  0.0751 0.092 0.0135 0.0059 
Tax 1.066*** 1.125*** 1.113*** 1.117***  0.0509 0.0362 0.0092 0.0038 
Urban Population 7.362*** 7.781*** 7.683*** 7.713***  0.349 0.382 0.0631 0.0278 
Unemployment Rate -0.0482 -0.0524 -0.0513 -0.0516  -0.0023 -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0002 
Central Bank Interest Rate -12.02*** -12.71*** -12.55*** -12.61***   -0.568 -0.695 -0.102 -0.044 
 
 
 
Table 5.15 Test Results for Summary of Indirect (spill-overs) Effects in SDM Model 
  Total         Indirect       
  W(1) W(2) W(3) W(4)  W(1) W(2) W(3) W(4) 
Size of Building Started 0.248 0.905* 0.372 0.538**  0.0796 0.316 0.128 0.071 
Average Wage 1.309*** 1.369*** 1.448*** 1.345***  0.420** 0.478 0.497*** 0.176 
GDP 1.386*** 1.460*** 1.463*** 1.351***  0.338 1.108*** 0.355** 0.066 
Tax 0.941*** 0.902*** 0.960*** 0.884***  0.205 0.425 0.447 0.075 
Urban Population 6.272*** 7.703*** 6.686*** 6.419***  1.548 5.231*** 1.730** 0.086 
Unemployment Rate -0.016 -0.093* -0.02 -0.03  -0.004 -0.006 -0.005 -0.004 
Central Bank Interest Rate -11.38 -16.43 -8.768 -6.524   -2.776 -1.247 -2.128 -0.32 
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studies (Yang, Noah, and Shoff, 2015) show that the results of significant levels of the 
partitioned indirect effects in the second order are higher than those of the other order 
neighbours, which are referred to in the complicated estimation process in Spatial Durbin 
Model. The results denote that the significance of the partitioned spill-over effects on urban 
population and GDP; encourages the house price to increase by 68% and 76% respectively. 
These factors are the most prominent partitioned spill-over effects in the attributes of the 
house prices. According to Evans (1973), the trade-off theory provides the residential 
location choices are depending on the minimise cost and maximise utility. The results of 
partitioning analyses are appropriately explaining the effects of surroundings, which can 
approach the utilities. 
 
5.6 Conclusion 
This chapter analyses the spatial statistics of house prices in Beijing with the spatial 
autoregressive model (SAR), spatial Durbin model (SDM), a spatial autoregressive model 
with autoregressive disturbances (SAC) and spatial error model (SEM). The analyses of 
spatial characteristics in house price dynamics with spatial dependence, spatial heterogeneity 
and spill-over effects of explanatory are estimated. While it is well-known that spatial 
dependence and spatial heterogeneity are important aspects of house price developments, the 
concept of spatial partitioning has not yet received wide-spread attention. This study confirms 
that the disposition effect could explain the effects of house price spill-overs across space. 
The investigation supports the previous spatial studies in China (Chow et al., 2016; Hanink et 
al., 2012; Harris et al., 2013; Hui and Gu, 2009; Li and Chand, 2013; Liu, 2013; Shi and Lee, 
2017; Zhang et al., 2015; Zhang et al., 2018). Spatial and non-spatial panel regressions are 
both estimated to determine whether overall spatial dependence in house price developments 
is present. The alternative types of spatial models are applied to estimate the most appropriate 
model for the analyses. On the aspect of analysing direct and indirect (spill-over) effects, this 
research examines the influence of direct and indirect partitioning and establishes the effects 
on property prices of neighbouring characteristics, from immediate neighbours to those 
further. 
The results reveal strong house price spill-overs when the increase in house price, size of 
building started, average wage, income, tax, and a population of the neighbouring regions is 
taken into account. The house price spill-overs in Beijing area exist when there is an increase 
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in the population of the neighbouring regions, significant upper house price spill-overs are 
detected in terms of increasing house prices in the neighbouring regions. This result is similar 
to Zhang et al. (2015) and Chow et al. (2016), which means the urban population influence 
house prices positively and significantly in Beijing. This finding is in line with Alonso (1964), 
who provides the population is a significant factor in the economic analysis, because the 
population changes the demand for the number of houses. Regarding the theory of ‘the 
concentric zone’ (Burgess, 1925), the development of ideal construction of the city expands 
from its CBD. The workers live near CBD aims to easy access to their work. Thus, the 
demand for house surrounding CBD is high, which causes the increase in house price. The 
findings of this analysis are also in line with Burgess’s theory (1925) that the distance from 
district to CBD influenced the house price significantly and negatively. This encourages the 
regulators of Beijing housing market to establish the rational distribution of fixed assets 
effectively deter the unstable house price variation referred to the population changes. 
The differences in household income cause changes in residential location and house prices 
based on the ‘sector theory’ (Hoyt, 1939). This result is in line with Shen and Liu (2004). The 
income significantly influences the house price in Beijing and changes the distribution of 
house prices. This investigation provides a similar result to Hoyt’s theory (1939), which the 
average wage of employees in the real estate market leads to an increase in house price. This 
finding is also in line with the theory of ‘the concentric zone’ (Burgess, 1925), which 
presents the high-income group ‘who have escaped from the area of deterioration’ changes 
the demand of residential location. This encourages the regulators of Beijing housing market 
to establish the subsidiary CBD in Beijing in order to arrange rational distribution of fixed 
assets. 
Evans (1973) found that there is an equilibrium relationship between the density and revenue 
of houses in ‘the theory of the supply of space’. Thus, even though there is enough space for 
construction, the irrational density of buildings leads to lower revenues of the house. Size of 
building starts, which instead of the supply of houses, influences house prices positively. This 
result is in line with Hanink et al. (2012) and Zhang et al. (2018) who provide house starts is 
a potential determination of new construction rate which reflects the supply of housing 
market in Beijing. However, the result is not very significant. The result is similar to Evans 
(1973), who suggests a rational space and density of constructions are significant to 
households. Thus, it encourages the regulators of Beijing housing market to control the 
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building permits and continue updating the policy of construction so that rationally monitor 
the supply of houses. 
The research found the taxes and other charges on principal business of enterprises for real 
estate development lead to an increase in house price significantly. This result is similar to 
the previous studies (Li and Chand, 2013; Liu, 2013), which means the taxes and other 
charges on principal business of enterprises for real estate development influence house 
prices negatively and significantly in Beijing. Based on the trade-off theory (Evans, 1973), 
the maximum utility of the household is the objective of the choice of location. The 
increasing tax added the costs of construction, and then the developers will increase the house 
selling price so that balance the costs. When the household considers the house price, they 
will change the location of living so that the patterns of residential location changes. Thus, it 
encourages the regulators of Beijing housing market to control the tax rates, so that have a 
rational distribution of constructions. 
The results of partitioning analyses are appropriately explaining the effects of surroundings, 
which can approach the utilities. Because of loss aversion, homeowners who intend to sell 
their properties will not lower their asking price, even when they see house prices declining 
in neighbouring regions. Loss aversion reduces the number of transactions in the housing 
market and, reduces the amount of house price spill-over. Results of this study are similar to 
previous findings (Anenberg, 2011; Engelhardt, 2003; Genesove and Mayer, 2001) with 
regards to loss aversion in the housing market. This result is also in line with the previous 
studies (Yang, Noah, and Shoff, 2015), who show that the results of significant levels of the 
partitioned indirect effects in the second order are higher than those of the other order 
neighbours, which are referred to in the complicated estimation process in Spatial Durbin 
Model. Thus, it is suggested that the regulators of Beijing housing market should monitor the 
economic factors and population in the different order regions in order to adjust the house 
prices. 
The evidence is found for spatial dependence of house prices: house prices in one region are 
influenced by the house prices in neighbouring regions, positively and significantly in Beijing. 
The evidence is found for spatial heterogeneity of house prices across space: house price 
spill-over is greater in neighbouring regions when neighbouring house prices are increasing 
than when neighbouring house prices are declining. The evidence is found for spatial spill-
over effects of explanatory factors: increases of the average wage, income, tax, urban 
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population and house price of last year increase the house price positively in neighbouring 
regions; a decrease of unemployment drives down the house prices in neighbouring regions. 
These factors have spill-over effects across space. 
From the theoretical standpoint, these findings are likely to contribute to the theory of “the 
concentric zone’ Burgess (1925) that the information will expand radially from its central 
place or the city leading to information asymmetries in the surroundings. Consistent with this 
view, the findings reveal that the house prices in Beijing have a geographical variation and 
expand radially from CBD. This encourages the city planner of Beijing to simulate the 
regulation of the United States, which predicts the future pattern of land use in order to 
decide the optimal distribution of fixed assets investments. The rational distribution of fixed 
assets effectively averse the unstable house price variation referred to the information 
asymmetries.  
This investigation is the first study to provide the partitioning spill-over effects on house 
prices based on the regional information asymmetries. In the findings, the significance of the 
partitioned spill-over effects on urban population and GDP are in the second-order 
surrounding regions. This result is consistent with and contributed to the ‘sector theory’ 
(Hoyt, 1939), which the differences in household income cause the changes of residential 
location and house prices. Thus, it is valuable information for the regulators of real estate 
market. Because the appropriate distribution of submarket of CBD reduces the degree of 
income differences, so that decreases the geographical house price variation. 
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Chapter 6 The Uncertainty of House Prices and Real Options in China 
 
6.1 Introduction 
Over the last decades, there is a significant boom in China’s real estate market with rapid 
urbanisation and economic prosperity. While how to purchase valuable land vacant and 
maximise the shareholder value is a serious problem for the investors. Developing land is 
analogical to exercise a financial option (Tsekrekos and Kanoutos, 2013 and Razak et al., 
2018). However, it is illustrated that the landowners are unable to determine the timing of 
land development and the uncertainty about the underlying house price on the vacant land in 
the financial markets (Chiang et al., 2006 and Barbopoulos et al., 2019). The previous studies 
suggest that the real options theory on land development has denoted several advantages in 
the real estate market (Capozza and Sick 1991; Cunningham, 2006; Myers, 1977; 
Oppenheimer, 2002; Quigg, 1993; Shilling et al., 1985; Titman, 1985; Zeng and Zhang, 
2011). The value of management or land flexibility determines the value of real options under 
uncertainty.  
There are limited literatures applied real options in emerging market, such as China’s real 
estate market (Huang and Rong, 2017; Hui and Fung, 2009; Li et al., 2014; Shi et al., 2015; 
Tang and Wang, 2017; Wang et al., 2016; Zeng and Zhang, 2011). The real options theory 
application in China’s real estate market is valuable to explore. Because the added 
complication is that various control policies, most of which are administrative and quite 
volatile, are always affecting China’s real estate market (Wang et al., 2016). The Chinese real 
estate market is characteristised by the incomplete information which influences the land 
development of land in the urban city (Tang and Wang, 2017). The factors influencing the 
public rental housing fraud are analysed in the real estate market in China (Zeng et al., 2017). 
The uncertainty of apartments’ physical attributes, firms’ financial position and other 
economic conditions influencing apartment price is analysed by Shi et al. (2015). The 
uncertainty of the real estate market in China should be explained in an appropriate method 
based on China’s real estate market characteristics. 
It is recommended to estimate the application of real options in the real estate market in 
China. The land is valued as an option, for which the underlying asset is the construction that 
could potentially be built on that site. There is considerable evidence, as well as 
developments in modified models, to support the application of real options in evaluating real 
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estate markets (Hui and Fung, 2009; Quigg, 1993; Schwartz and Trigeorgis, 2004; Titman, 
1985; Yamaguchi et al., 2001). This chapter considers this underlying asset of land as 
neighbouring house prices, neighbouring unobserved characteristics and economic conditions. 
We evaluate this by real options in a spatial manner, which improves the accuracy of 
predicting the value of house prices and considers the neighbouring regional house prices. 
Previous studies on real options of real estate market focused on the uncertainty of house 
prices are applied by OLS estimator, which is in the absence of considering the effects of 
neighbouring regional influences (Cunningham, 2006; Quigg, 1993; Titman, 1985). In this 
chapter, the effects of price uncertainty on neighbouring regions are considered by the spatial 
model. The method we employ to accomplish this is the Spatial Durbin Model (SDM), 
making this the first time that real option predictions have been tested in a spatial manner. 
Spatial analysis improves the accuracy of predicting the value of house prices and considers 
the surrounding regions’ house prices and their effects on the house prices of a particular 
region (Muss et al., 2017). The SDM model includes spatial fixed measures, time fixed 
measures, and spatial and time fixed measures of expected future prices and price uncertainty. 
To test for the presence of real options in asset prices, the vacant land sales price is regressed 
on similar measures of future house price uncertainty. 
 
6.1.1 Research Objectives 
This chapter investigates real options with the spatial analysis in China’s real estate markets. 
This investigation extends the real options method with the spatial Durbin model (SDM), 
making this the first study in which real option forecast have been assessed in a spatial case. 
It measures the degree of price uncertainty by a generalised autoregressive conditional 
heteroskedasticity (GARCH) model. The Black-Scholes’ (1973) pricing model is employed 
to explore the option premium of land value. This chapter investigates whether the 
uncertainty about future house prices in neighbouring regions influence investment activity in 
the current period. It also examines whether the uncertainty about future house prices in 
neighbouring regions influence land prices. This research explores whether the market house 
prices in neighbouring regions reflect a premium for optimal development in terms of the 
likelihood of developing the land. 
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6.1.2 Summary of Findings and Contribution 
The findings suggest that it is more appropriate to employ a spatial model rather than a non-
spatial model in the present investigation based on the Lagrange Multiplier (LM) tests. The 
spatial method improves the accuracy of predicting house prices by considering neighbouring 
house prices. The results illustrate that neighbouring house prices affected house prices in this 
region, supporting the idea that house price has a ripple effect (Pijnenburg, 2017). In the 
Spatial Durbin Model (SDM) analysis of underlying house price, an increase in income 
equivalent of 1% is associated with a 41.2% rise in house prices. This result is in line with 
Tang and Wang (2017), who suggest income increases the house price in China. The 
unemployment rate and CPI is negatively correlated with house prices. Similar empirical 
results were obtained by Harris et al. (2013) and Farlow (2004), who provides that house 
prices were higher in cities with increased income and lower CPI and unemployment rates in 
China. The spatial fixed model is the first time applied in the real options analysis.  
The results of implied volatility analysis provide that house price in China has ARCH effects. 
This result is in line with Wang et al. (2016), who found ARCH effects for house prices in 
Hangzhou housing market, China. It is also similar to the study of Cunningham (2006), who 
found ARCH effects for house prices in Seattle. Based on the results, the standard deviation 
of residential housing market in China ranges from 2.14% to 23.49%, depending on the time 
series of house prices. This result is in line with Wang et al. (2016), who provide a one-
standard-deviation residential housing market in Hangzhou ranges from 13.39 % and 16.51 %. 
Regarding the results of uncertainty and timing of land development, the uncertainty delayed 
land development, as the coefficient of uncertainty was negative (-1.101). This result is in 
line with Tang and Wang (2017), who suggest the rising housing demand is accompanied by 
developers' strategic delay of land development in China. It implies that the uncertainty of 
future information delays the land development in China based on land flexibility. The results 
also provide the similar results to Wang et al. (2016), who found the uncertainty delay the 
land development by 42% in Hangzhou, China. Based on the analyses, the results provide 
that the uncertainty affected land value by 1.82% significantly and positively. The 
unemployment rate influences the land value by 40.2%, significantly and negatively. These 
results are in line with Tang and Wang (2017) and Shi et al. (2015), who suggest the 
uncertainty increases the land value. 
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Market prices indicate a premium for optimal development of land, which according to our 
estimates has a mean of 16.28% of the land value. A one-standard-deviation increase in 
uncertainty reduces the likelihood of development by 1.101%. These results differ from those 
of previous studies. Wang et al. (2016) found the real-option premium 9.76% in housing 
market in Hangzhou, China. Yao and Pretorius (2004) found the real-option premium 11.75% 
in housing market in Hongkong, China. Quigg (1993) found a real-option premium of 6% on 
undeveloped land that is relative to the deterministic price. Cunningham (2006) posited a 
one-standard-deviation increase in the vacant land price of 1.6% in Seattle. This research also 
estimates that standard deviation of real estate asset values in China ranges from 2.14% to 
23.49%, which relies on the time series of property prices. Wang et al. (2016) provide a one-
standard-deviation residential housing market ranges from 13.39 % and 16.51 % in Hangzhou, 
China. 
This context appropriately solves the agency problem based on investment timing (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976). When the shareholder and agents capture the information of 
surroundings at the same time and plan the investment of options, the information 
asymmetric and timing of investment are solved in order to establish an optimal capital 
structure and maximise the shareholder’s value. Regarding the evaluation of land price, the 
increasing one-standard-deviation in price uncertainty raises the land price. If there is a 
greater level of price uncertainty according to the economic information, then the vacant land 
will be traded at a premium above discounted future rents in current low capital use. 
The results of this study suggest that investors in China’s real estate do take note of real 
options, even in sectors such as new home construction that is highly competitive and 
economically important. That real options are present in land markets is further evidence for 
the need to include real options in capital investment models. Real options have wider 
implications concerning the importance of price stability and the need for consistent 
government policy to stimulate fixed investment. 
Most research in this area has focused on the house price uncertainty in a panel dataset. This 
approach provides a basis for testing the main expectations of real options with regard to land 
development: namely, that neighbouring house price uncertainty should delay building 
activities and increase the value of vacant land. This investigation extends the real options 
method with the spatial Durbin model (SDM), making this the first study in which real option 
forecast have been assessed in a spatial case. The evidence of this research links spatial 
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analysis and GARCH analysis, which adds to the overall understanding of house price 
uncertainty. 
This investigation overcomes the prior studies by extended sample with three datasets have 
been assembled for this investigation: house price files, land price files and GIS files for each 
location. When they are combined, these records produce a data set of 496 average house 
prices and average land prices in 31 provinces of China, for the period 2000 to 2015. 
Rather than extracting expectations from subsequently reported advantages, this investigation 
uses the Black-Scholes’ (1973) pricing model to explore the option premium of land value, 
which concerns current stock price, time until option exercise, option striking price, risk-free 
interest rates and standard deviation. For the conception of real options, the analyses 
considered market land value as current stock price, future house price as option striking 
price, and house price volatility as standard deviation in order to determine the land option 
premium. 
 
6.1.3 Structure of This Chapter 
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows: Section 6.2 formulates the theoretical 
framework and hypotheses that are tested in this research; Section 6.3 reviews the previous 
studies in real options; Section 6.4 outlines the methodology and data; Section 6.5 analyses 
the estimation results; and Section 6.6 presents the concluding remarks. 
 
6.2 Theoretical Framework 
6.2.1 Real Options for Land Development 
In the real estate markets, the applications of real option theories are divided into two general 
areas of prediction. Firstly, uncertainty about future house prices decrease investment activity 
in the current period, i.e. the current building activity. This prediction stems from Jensen’s 
Inequality and the convexity of the profit function in connection with house prices (Titman, 
1985). According to Titman (1985), the “profit fiction” for house prices is convex because 
developers can exchange land capital by accommodating construction structure when house 
prices increase. The less confident developers become about property prices in the future, the 
greater the gap will be between future profits derived from building at the actual price and 
those derived from building at the expected price. Delaying construction may reveal 
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information which will affect future prices and reduce foregone profits due to construction 
height or more densely at an inappropriate time. In the Titman (1985) framework, uncertainty 
reduces the building activity of the current period; in the Capozza and Helsley (1990) model, 
uncertainty reduces the activity of converting agricultural land to housing in the current 
period. In either case, the more considerable the uncertainty about future house prices, the 
lower the desire to invest in the current period. In this chapter, the investigation focused on 
information about future house prices in neighbouring regions to test whether neighbouring 
price uncertainty affected building activities or not. This research also examined the effect of 
uncertainty on land development to determine the presence of real options and timing of land 
development. 
The second prediction is that uncertainty about future house prices increases land prices. The 
land is at a premium; this is similar to a financial option, as this option allows the owner to 
acquire security at a predetermined price. Thus, landowners retain a call option that affords a 
right to purchase an optimal building, based on neighbouring house price information in the 
future, at an exercise price which is equal to the construction costs. In Titman’s model (1985), 
this refers to the right to own a building of optimal height, dependent on house price 
fluctuations. The Capozza and Helsley (1990) model, in comparison, refers to the right to 
convert the land from agricultural usage to housing when house prices increase in the future. 
In both cases, price uncertainty increases land value. Likewise, future house price uncertainty 
increases the real option of converting land to high-intensity use at a future time. In this 
chapter, the investigation was concerned with the issue of the landowner having a right to 
convert the land to housing, depending on increases in neighbouring house prices. 
Real options emphasise the uncertainty about future house prices rather than the volatility of 
house prices in the current period. If there is a chance that future house prices will increase, 
the value of vacant land would also increase, accommodating the structure of buildings in the 
future. This chapter examines whether, on balance, developers consider these factors when 
making decisions about development and the purchase price of land. 
 
6.2.2 Agency Theory 
Without the real options approach, the agency problem may be generated by the timing to 
invest. The agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) provided that the concerted contract, 
designated by ‘a principal entity and an agent where the latter has legal authority to act for 
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the first’, caused conflicts. The agency problem crucially denoted that the agent, which also 
be a manager, may be accounted for moral hazard, conflict of interests and not acting aligned 
with the principal’s interests. In the case of real estate sector, the principal is represented by 
the developer of vacant land and the agent is represented by the sales agent. Without the 
assumption of real options approach, when the developer has made the investment decision 
first, the objective of developer is to maximise the investment expected net present value 
(NPV) in terms of achieving the fixed portion of the investment’s (NPV). The profits of the 
agent with sharing rule are settled before bargaining. However, if the developer is encouraged 
to delay the timing of construction based on the existence of options, the objective of 
developer is changed to maximize the expected NPV of the claim on the future investment 
after bargaining. After bargaining, the option to invest still exists. In another word, the timing 
of construction causes the agency problem (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). For instance, the 
developer bought vacant land in 2015 and encouraged to finish the building in 2017. In 2016, 
this developer entrusted a sales agency to sell the units of building with 2% profits of 
revenues. The expected revenue of constrictions is one million. However, after this 
bargaining, the developer found that there will be 1.5 million revenues of the building if the 
construction will be sold in 2018. The developer decided to delay the construction time, so 
that achieve the higher profits. Whereas, the agent still gets 2% of revenues which does not 
maximise the shareholders’ value. Real options are the right to buy or sell a physical asset 
after the company has made an investment decision to purchase that asset (Myers, 1977). In 
cases of Titman (1985) framework and Capozza and Helsley (1990) model, the more 
considerable the uncertainty about future house prices, the lower the desire to invest in the 
current period. Thus, real options approach is appropriate to reduce the agency problem based 
on the timing of investment. 
Banerjee et al. (2014) argued that the agency conflicts occur in terms of the influences of 
incomplete and asymmetric information on the shareholder maximizing operation of the 
agent. In the assumption of real options, the investment opportunity is directly managed by 
the principal, who also be the owner (McDonald and Siegel, 1986). Meanwhile, the agents 
are perfectly aligned with them (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). Regarding the previous studies of 
agency conflicts with real options in the recent, Nishihara and Shibata (2008) extends the 
model involves the relationship between an audit mechanism and managers’ behaviours with 
bonus-incentives. Shibata and Nishihara (2010) contributed the agency conflicts and real 
options based on debt financing on investment expenditure. Hori and Osano (2010) provided 
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a model consider the managerial compensation that endogenously illustrated a contingent 
claim on firms’ cash-flows using stock options. However, this investigation established a 
spatial method, which considered the effects of surrounding house prices and surrounding 
economic factors, has improved the accuracy of house price uncertainty estimation, in terms 
of reducing the agent problems of incomplete and asymmetric information. Thus, the optimal 
contract scheme could be proposed by real options approach with spatial analysis. In this 
context, this investigation avoids inadequate information from the agent in order to encourage 
the shareholders to follow the future evolution of investment value so that to achieve the 
optimal profits. 
 
6.2.3 Predicting House Prices  
Pijnenburg (2017) provided that the spatial dependence in house prices is represented as a 
ripple effect, and that spatial dependence is the movement of house prices between one 
region and the neighbouring regions. Meen (1999) contended that migration, equity transfer 
and information asymmetries are the fundamental economic variables affecting house prices 
and cause the spatial spill-overs of house prices. Information asymmetries may suggest that 
any new information that is available about the housing market is not communicated 
immediately to other submarkets, but instead over a period; thus, a ripple effect might appear 
if the variables that explain house prices themselves show a spatial pattern. Kuethe and Pede 
(2011) argued that, in the Western USA, the forecasting of one state’s house prices could be 
improved by considering house prices from neighbouring states, further suggesting that prior 
house prices can influence current house prices in space and time. Holly et al. (2011) also 
found a dynamic spill-over effect of house prices from neighbouring regions. According to 
Kohn and Bryant (2010), excessive demand for housing caused house price volatility in the 
US economy. Therefore, this chapter empoy SDM approach to forecaste the underlying house 
prices which provides a basis for testing the main expectations of real options with regard to 
land development. This investigation extends the real options method with the spatial Durbin 
model (SDM), making this the first study in which real option forecast have been assessed in 
a spatial case. 
From the house price spatial model, the price of housing depends on income, CPI, 
unemployment rate, population density and the culture of the region. Farlow (2004) 
suggested that real incomes and interest rates are the essential factors that act as determinants 
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of real house prices. Zhang et al. (2016) found that the income is relative to house prices 
significantly and positively in China. According to Giussani and Hadjimatheou (1991), there 
is a positive correlation between income and house prices. Chang et al. (2008) analysed 
Taipei’s housing real estate market through the house price-income and house price-rent 
state-space model and found a significant relationship between income and house price. Riley 
et al. (2015) opined that the falling house prices are associated with the increasing 
unemployment. Geoffrey (2017) examined the way school quality and uncertainty about 
quality affects house prices. The author concluded that higher school quality raises the value 
of houses within the catchment area and steepens the gradient, while uncertainty about 
quality lowers house prices and flattens the gradient. Thus, this investigation added the 
observable measures of hospitals, museums and libraries to our tests of house prices, which 
are new independent variables for evaluating house price. 
 
6.3 Literature Review 
6.3.1 Real Options Development 
Myers (1977) first proposes the ‘real options’ concept and suggests similarities between the 
financial options and real options. According to Myers (1977), ‘real options’ are the right to 
buy or sell a physical asset after the company has made an investment decision to purchase 
that asset. An analysis of risk projects was made by Ross (1978) who provides inherent 
potential investment opportunities so that the theory of real options valuation could be 
discussed. Trigeorgis (1993) illustrates the seven categories of real options through the proper 
evaluation of investment alternatives under conditions of uncertainty and differences in 
flexibility. Meanwhile, Gibson (2001) shows the importance of flexibility for corporate real 
estate portfolios, in contrast with Trigeorgis (1993). Amran and Kulatilaka (1999) apply 
option pricing theory and financial market rules to the evaluation of non-trading assets, 
helping managers make use of their option rights to make management decisions in option 
areas. There are sixteen aspects of real options applications which contain real estate, 
summarised by Lander and Pinches (1998). Parthasarathy and Madhumathi (2010) value the 
project as a perpetual American call option and computed the premium value of the 
commercial project and found there is a strategic return of 85% to the developers. Regarding 
the above studies, the real options theory is to associate monetary value referred to the 
flexibility (Čirjevskis and Tatevosjans, 2015). Dixit and Pindyck (1994) and Trigeorgis (1999) 
178 
 
provide that alternative methodologies to better evaluate investment projects in the presence 
of these managerial flexibilities within the real options theory. Schwartz and Trigeorgis (2004) 
include classical readings where real options have been applied to several investment projects 
to account for the value of flexibility where the traditional net present value (NPV) is unable 
to do so. Trigeorgis (1993) shows alternative roles among several real options embedded in a 
single project, including the non-additivity principle of their individual values. Lander and 
Pinches (1998) identify that the lack of mathematical skills, restrictive modelling assumptions, 
and increasing complexity are the main obstacles to the practical implementation of the real 
options approach. Hui and Fung (2009) discuss some of the implications of the Williams and 
Quigg valuation framework in real options as real estate development. Real options have 
been applied to investment projects to account for the value of flexibility where the 
traditional DCF is unable to do so (Tsekrekos and Kanoutos, 2013). Once the future 
information is received and the uncertainties identified, the optimal decision can be made by 
investment (Fan et al., 2018). 
 
6.3.2 Employment of Real Options in Real Estate Market 
Real options analysis has varied applications in real estate markets. Winfree et al. (2002) find 
that land which is not developed has a significantly higher price through real options analysis. 
Capozza and Sick (1989) find that options could be used to convert agricultural land into 
urban land. Subsequently, Capozza and Schwann (1990) apply options to convert land for 
urban usage. Williams (1991) illustrates the optimal timing for land development and 
abandonment of the property as well as the optimal density in terms of the presence of 
uncertainties about price/m² and cost/m². Quigg (1993) analyses Seattle’s real estate 
transaction data between 1976 and 1979 and found that holding undeveloped land was the 
equivalent of holding an American-style call option; meanwhile, a land evaluation model 
with options was also suggested. Capozza and Sick (1994) present the case that agricultural 
landowners have the option to convert their property into urban land suitable for real estate 
developments. Their results showed a positive correlation between the land price waiting for 
conversion and the land rent price. When rental urban land prices become more volatile, the 
option for agricultural land development became more valuable. Grenadier (1995) shows that 
the difference between the dynamic and static strategies was the value added by the options 
embedded. A year later, Grenadier (1996) suggest that the behaviour of real estate markets 
with option game concepts linked the investment timing in strategic equilibrium to increases 
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or reductions in development activity. Quigg (1995) finds that perpetual American options 
exceed the value of rent expected for a building at the decision date, with a method of valuing 
the option to wait before developing the land. Patel et al. (2001) and Yamazaki (2001) 
analyse land prices by using the empirical testing of premium option in real estate, favouring 
the application of real options theory. In 2002, Oppenheimer (2002) proposes real options 
models in real estate evaluations with a review of conditions and methods. Subsequently, 
there is a case study of a house investment in Rio de Janerio which shows the proposed 
values of managerial flexibilities and improved risk management by identifying the optimal 
strategy and timing for construction phases, in order to examine the application of real 
options analysis (Rocha et al., 2007). Karami and Farsani (2011) illustrate that the real 
options method shows lower EC for a failed project than those who merely use the net 
present value method. Zeng and Zhang (2011) provide a literature review of real options 
covering 30 years of research. It is suggested that the discounted cash flow method is 
essential to value the real options of real estate (Makhudu, 2011). 
For China, Wang et al. (2016) consider the existence of policy intervention of land in China 
and introduce policy uncertainty into a real options framework. The authors examine the 
determinants of timing of land development empirically, using a sample of 783 residential 
projects in Hangzhou, China from 2005 to 2011 and provide a theoretical explanation for the 
land development decision. The monetary policy indices are regarded as a measurement of 
policy environment, and results provide when the expected policy is positive, a one-standard-
deviation increase in the volatility of M2 change rate and interest rate lowers the likelihood of 
development by 13.39 % and 16.51 %. However, market uncertainty fails to meet the 
prediction of real options, which indicates that developers in China focus more on policy 
uncertainty rather than market uncertainty in exercising their real options. They further find 
that in the face of declining demand, price volatility significantly accelerates land 
development. Tang and Wang (2017) suggest the rising housing demand is accompanied by 
developers' strategic delay of land development in China. This paper uses a dataset of 
residential projects from the City of Hangzhou, China, and finds incomplete information 
undermines the acceleration effect of competition on development timing. This delay effect 
disappears when the project is developed in multi-phases. Shi et al. (2015) investigate real 
estate development firms' pricing behaviours in Beijing, China during the period 2006–2008. 
They find that real estate development firms apply real options theory for new apartment 
price setting at the presale stage, having regard also to apartments’ physical attributes, firms’ 
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financial position and other economic conditions. Zeng et al. (2017) consider the public rental 
housing fraud is an essential problem since the central government decided on the large-scale 
construction of affordable housing in 2010. They provide marital status, education, 
occupation, family size and household per capita disposable income, current situation 
cognition, audit difficulty cognition, and punishment cognition will increase or decrease the 
probability of fraud. It seems like there is no relationship between house price and the 
probability of fraud. However, the authors applied real options to analyse the information of 
the real estate market in China. Li et al. (2014) analyse the private sector’s provision of 
public rental housing (PRH) in China. This paper fills the gap between a privately-owned 
PRH provision mode and a real option-based valuation model. The authors find the 
increasing the average rent of PRH buildings is found to be the most effective measure to 
enhance the ENPV indicator. This prior enrich the application of real options in the real estate 
market in China. Therefore, the uncertainty of the real estate market in China should be 
explained in an appropriate method based on China’s real estate market characteristics. 
Real options encourage investors to pay attention to strategical consideration in the real estate 
market. Real options require the landowner to identify the options depending on the decisions 
and to determine under which conditions the option will be exercised. It leads to a flexible 
investment style in which investors occur optimally as economic uncertainty unfolds. 
 
6.4 Methodology 
6.4.1 Model of Land Development 
This investigation calculates the option premium of land using the Black-Scholes pricing 
formula for call options, based on the work of Titman (1985) and Quigg (1993), who 
suggested that vacant land can be treated as a call option. The Black-Scholes pricing formula 
considers the ensuing variables: current underlying price, options strike price, time until 
expiration, implied volatility and risk-free interest rates. The specifications for the Black-
Scholes pricing formula are as follows: 
                                                     𝐶 = 𝑆𝑁(𝑑1) − 𝑁(𝑑2)𝐾𝑒
−𝑟𝑡                                           (6.1) 
                                                             𝑑1 =
ln(
𝑆
𝐾
)+(𝑟+
𝑆2
2
)𝑡
𝑠∗√𝑡
                                                 (6.1.1) 
                                                             𝑑2 = 𝑑1 − 𝑠 ∗ √𝑡                                                  (6.1.2) 
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Where: 
C = call premium 
S = current stock price 
t = time until option exercise 
K = option striking price 
r = risk-free interest rate 
N = cumulative standard normal distribution 
e = exponential term 
s= standard deviation 
ln = natural log 
 
Cunningham (2006) provides a framework to explain the decision on land development in 
terms of the future use of land. The profit of new land development is specified as: 
                                                               𝜋 = 𝑃𝑖 − 𝐶𝑖 − 𝑅                                                    (6.2) 
where, 𝜋 is the profit of a new development of land. 𝑃𝑖 is the house price at location i. 𝐶𝑖 is 
cost of house location i. 𝑅 is the land rent. In order to deal with the optimum amount of 
capital at location i, the investigation estimates the equilibrium land rent, which is 𝑅𝑖. When 
the profit is equal to zero, the modified formula of land rent is written as: 
                                                                  𝑅𝑖 = 𝑃𝑖 − 𝐶𝑖                                                    (6.2.1) 
When the land value at location i, which has newly established houses, is more than the value 
of land as it is currently used, the land will be developed for housing construction. The 
landowner makes a decision as below: 
                                                    if  𝑅𝑖 ≥ 𝑅𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡,             build 
                                                    if  𝑅𝑖 < 𝑅𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡,             do not build 
Regarding the purpose of this model, 𝑅𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 is concerned as the discounted future rent of 
land. However, if the future house price at location 𝑖 is uncertain, the optimal land capital, 𝑚, 
will be referred to today’s price information. The current house prices in the neighbouring 
regions have an ability to inform the level of investment in the future. When the market 
values this information, there should remain a real-option premium, 𝐶  (Equation 6.1), on 
undeveloped land. These option premiums may delay the building activity. Accordingly, the 
modified decision with option premium by landowner is written as: 
                                                     if  𝑅𝑚 ≥ 𝑅𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 + 𝐶,           build 
                                                     if  𝑅𝑚 < 𝑅𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 + 𝐶,           do not build 
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where 𝑅𝑚 represents the land rent at the optimal land capital. Thus, the increase of option 
premium delays the building activity, while the decrease of option premiums encourages the 
land development. However, to successfully determine the presence of real options premium 
requires predictions of underlying house prices and examinations of uncertainty about 
underlying house prices.  
 
6.4.2 Forecasted House Prices 
The land is appraised to decide whether to develop into a building or to keep in its current 
usage. If the landowner decides to develop the land into construction, the future building is 
underlying to the land value. As stated above, the price of the future building is not 
observable and needs to be estimated. This investigation employs spatial Durbin model 
(SDM) for this purpose. SDM focuses on the effects of the independent variables in itself 
location and the surrounding regions. This chapter separates the sample by year (2000-2015) 
and into the 31 provinces of China (i.e. 16 years × 31 provinces) to improve the predictive 
power of the coefficients. For the sample, the model regresses the log function of house 
prices on its influencing factors, as follows: 
            𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜏𝑃𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜌 ∑ 𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑃𝑖𝑡
𝑁
𝑗=1 + 𝛽𝑘 ∑ 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝑘
𝑘
𝑘=1 + 𝜃𝑘 ∑ ∑ 𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑋𝑖𝑡𝑘
𝑁
𝑗=1
𝑘
𝑘=1 + 𝜐𝑖𝑡  (6.3) 
                                                      𝜈𝑖𝑡 = 𝜆 ∑ 𝑊𝑖𝑗𝜈𝑖𝑡
𝑁
𝑗=1 + 𝑖𝑡                                             (6.3.1) 
Here, the vector of independent variables (X) contains gross regional product (GDP), 
consumer price index (CPI), population density (pop_den), unemployment rate (une_r), 
number of regular institutions of higher education (num_edu), number of public libraries 
(num_lib), number of museums (num_muse) and number of healthcare institutions 
(num_heal). The dependent variable is an N×1 vector incorporating each dependent variable 
for every spatial element (i=1,…, N) at time t. 𝜌 is the spatial dependence parameter, m the 
specific region, jt the time-period-specific effects, iN is an N×1 vector of ones, and Xt is an 
N×K matrix of K explanatory variables. In the spatial model, the intercept α, the 
contributions of neighbouring houses (ρ) and neighbouring factor characteristics (θK) are 
allowed to vary by regions across time. 
The resulting parameter estimates, which vary by time and district, are used to predict the 
value of a house in a particular time and province. The specifications for the adjusted house 
price series are as follows: 
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             𝑃′𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜏𝑃′𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜌 ∑ 𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑃′𝑖𝑡
𝑁
𝑗=1 + 𝛽𝐾 ∑ 𝑋′𝑖𝑡𝑘
𝐾
𝐾=1 + 𝜃𝐾 ∑ ∑ 𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑋′𝑖𝑡𝑘
𝑁
𝑗=1
𝐾
𝐾=1     (6.4) 
Previous studies, such as Titaman (1985), Quigg (1993) and Cunningham (2006), applied OLS 
specifications to examining the house price uncertainty. However, this investigation established a 
spatial method which considers the surrounding house price effects and surrounding economic factor 
effects in order to improve the accuracy of the resulting house price uncertainty. Therefore, this 
investigation extends this model by incorporating the spatial Durbin model. 
 
6.4.3 Measuring House Prices Uncertainty 
This investigation measures the degree of house price uncertainty employing generalised 
autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (GARCH) model. The house price of one year 
ahead, 𝑃𝑖𝑡−1
′ , is estimated by incorporating with the current house price, 𝑃𝑖𝑡
′ , to establish the 
mean equation of GARCH, which is written as: 
                                                       𝑃𝑖𝑡
′ = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛼1𝑖𝑃𝑖𝑡−1
′ + 𝑖𝑡                                              (6.5) 
In the formula 4.5, t is the year the house was sold, and i denotes the province. The estimate 
of price uncertainty is calculated as the one-year moving variance of residuals, which is the 
variance equation of GARCH, and can be written as: 
𝜎𝑖𝑡
2 = 𝑎 + 𝛾 𝑖𝑡−1
2 + 𝜃𝜎𝑖𝑡−1
2                                           (6.5.1) 
The investors’ confidence in the one-year-ahead price forecast is stipulated on the accuracy 
of price forecasts in the recent past. The estimation of the variance of residuals suggests the 
developers have additional information that is influencing the price. On the other hand, the 
factor, which is leading market price, might be recognised more by developers through 𝜎𝑖𝑡
2 . 
Thus, the measure, 𝜎𝑖𝑡
2 , involves the assumption that developers know 𝜎𝑖𝑡
2  for the next year. 
This method declines the error term. Meanwhile, GARCH estimation provides that the price 
uncertainty, which is 𝜎𝑖𝑡
2 , rises when the analysis includes the one-year-ahead house price. 
The variation in uncertainty is reasonable over time and across districts. 
The method employed to measure house price uncertainty accords with previous studies 
(Cunningham, 2006; Schwartz, 2013; Byun and Min, 2013). The future price uncertainty, 𝜎𝑖𝑡
2 , 
suggests that developers’ confidence in their predicted price forecast depends on the 
availability of forecast prices in the recent past (Cunningham, 2006). Combining the GARCH 
model and real options approaches, the investigation employs 𝜎𝑖𝑡
2  of GARCH model as house 
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price volatility in the real options approaches. When there are real options, the forecasting 
model is appropriate to house price analysis. The increase of house price volatility, 𝜎𝑖𝑡
2 , delays 
the building activity. Moreover, the house price volatility increases vacant land prices by the 
future house price. 
 
6.4.4 Other Explanatory Variables 
In order to explore the influences of price uncertainty on the development timing, the 
duration of time (in years) is set at a maximum of two based on regulations governing land 
development in China. The investigation employs two-years-time as the ‘time until option 
exercise’ (t in formula 6.1) in the real options approach. Based on the China land policy, after 
buying the land, the land must be utilised for building or agriculture land. Thus, in reference 
to the land parcels, the investigation assumes that the timing of land development is 
explained by the point when undeveloped land ends when the construction of a building 
begins. 
In the real options model, the investigation involves a ten-year Chinese government bond 
interest rate, rt (r in formula 6.1), which is regarded as a risk-free rate in real options model. 
This ten-year Chinese government bond interest rate measures the cost of capital applied to 
build houses. According to Cunningham (2006), interest rate could be regarded as a 
determinant of house demand when referring to private mortgage conditions. Moreover, the 
author also emphasised that increasing interest rates decrease the discounted present value of 
future returns. Thus, higher-interest rates produce more profits over short terms than the rents 
from the future constructed building. The influence of high interest rates on the development 
timing maintains an empirical question for further research. 
In order to explore the real option premium, the investigation involves a factor of future 
house price uncertainty, 𝑖𝑡
2 , in the model of land development timing and the model of the 
undeveloped land price. 
 
6.4.5 Uncertainty and Timing of Land Development 
The previous studies suggest that the proportional hazard model is appropriately employed to 
examine the effects of house price uncertainty on the timing of land development (Bulan et 
al., 2009; Cunningham, 2006; Shi et al., 2015). The proportional hazard model examines the 
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function of timing of land development ℎ(𝑡). In other words, the land will ‘dies’ when a 
building is constructed on it. The length of time, which is from presale permit to developers 
to put the houses on the market for sale, depends on the baseline hazard model assumption, 
ℎ0(𝑡), and a vector of covariates, 𝑍. Regarding the spatial lags of land prices and explanatory 
variables, this thesis incorporates the spatial Durbin model into the proportional hazard model, 
which is specified as: 
ℎ(𝑡) = ℎ0(𝑡)exp (𝛿𝑍)                                              (6.6) 
where the baseline hazard, ℎ0(𝑡), is shifted by a vector of covariates, 𝑍. The covariates are 
specified as: 
𝛿𝑍 = 𝛾𝐸[𝑌𝑖𝑡
′ ] + 𝜑𝜎𝜀
2 + 𝜌 ∑ 𝑊𝑖𝑗𝐿𝑖𝑡
𝑁
𝑗=1 + ∑ 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝑘𝛽𝐾
𝐾
𝐾=1 + ∑ ∑ 𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑋𝑗𝑡𝑘𝜃𝐾
𝑁
𝑗=1
𝐾
𝐾=1     (6.6.1) 
The expected house prices, 𝐸[𝑌𝑗𝑡
′ ], and price uncertainty, 𝜎𝜀
2, vary by year t and by province j. 
The vector of independent variables (X) contains: gross regional product (GDP), consumer 
price index (CPI), population density (pop_den), unemployment rate (une_r), number of 
regular institutions of higher education (num_edu), number of public libraries (num_lib), 
number of museums (num_muse) and number of health care institutions (num_heal). The 
effect of price uncertainty on the timing of development is estimated by cross-sectional 
variation. 
When real options exist, an increase in house price uncertainty will delay the timing of 
building activity. The investigation assumes that house price uncertainty does not affect the 
timing of land development. Thus, the coefficient of 𝜑 (in formula 6.6.1) is equal to zero in 
the null hypothesis. While the price uncertainty delays the timing of land development in the 
alternative hypothesis, which means 𝜑 is less than zero. 
 
6.4.6 Uncertainty and Land Prices 
Concerning the test for the existence of real options in land markets, this investigation 
examines the price uncertainty on transacted land prices. Price uncertainty increases the 
option premium on land and causes the land to be more valuable with alternative uses than it 
does for immediate development. To test the presence of price uncertainty, this investigation 
employs house price uncertainty factor on land values. The model specifies a regression 
model of vacant land prices. If there is a greater level of price uncertainty according to the 
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economic information, then the vacant land will be traded at a premium above discounted 
future rents in current low capital use, 𝑅𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡. The equation of price uncertainty and land 
prices can be written as: 
                      𝐿𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛼1 𝑖𝑡
2 + 𝛼2𝑓𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒ℎ + 𝛼3𝐺𝐷𝑃 + 𝛼4𝐶𝑃𝐼 + 𝛼5𝑢𝑛𝑒_𝑟 +               (6.7) 
Here, L is vacant land price, 𝑖𝑡
2  is the uncertainty of house price, fpriceh is predicted future 
house price, GDP is an index of gross domestic product, CPI is consumer price index and 
une_r is unemployment rate. When there are real options, the price uncertainty should 
increase the option premium, C (in formula 6.1). If the parameter estimate of price 
uncertainty is significantly above t zero, this investigation could reject the null hypothesis 
that price uncertainty does not affect land values. 
 
6.5 Robustness of Findings 
In this sector, the investigation illustrates the results of the estimation and specification tests. 
Black-Scholes pricing formula considered the variables, including current underlying house 
price, options strike price of land, time until expiration, implied volatility and risk-free 
interest rates. These factors will be analysed in the following sections. The summary statistics 
for variables are provided in Table 6.1. 
Table 6.1 Summary Statistics for Variables 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Price 496 3,722.77 3,029.72 854 22300 
GDP 496 11,336.02 12,327.25 117.8 72812.55 
CPI 496 102.34 2.13 96.7 110.1 
Une_r 496 3.60 0.71 0.8 6.5 
Pop_den 496 2,275.10 1,411.93 171 6307 
Num_edu 496 64.25 36.08 3 162 
Num_heal 496 19,014.57 18,239.52 1237 81403 
Num_lib 496 92.28 43.92 1 203 
Num_muse 496 71.67 56.00 1 312 
Size_building 496 5,041.41 3,784.01 33.4 20477.12 
VIF 4.38         
Price=house average price (yuan), GDP=gross regional product (100 million yuan), CPI=consumer 
price index (preceding year=100), une_r=unemployment rate in urban area (%), pop_den=population 
density of urban area (person/sq.km), num_edu=number of regular institutions of higher education 
(unit), num_heal=number of health care institutions (unit), num_lib=number of institutions in public 
libraries(unit), num_muse=number of museums (unit), size_building=floor space of residential 
buildings completed (10000 sq.m). 
187 
 
6.5.1 Underlying House Prices 
The investigation notes that while a variety of spatial models exist (e.g. SEM, SAR), the 
incorporation of both into a single model (e.g. SDM) has not been previously employed to 
capture spatial dependence in housing studies. Elhorst (2010) provides guidelines for 
determining the appropriate model specification, which is followed in the present study. To 
decide whether panel analysis or spatial panel analysis should be employed, the Lagrange 
Multiplier (LM) test is employed to determine the appropriate model including non-spatial 
model (OLS), spatial lag model and spatial error model (see Table 6.2). The LM test is based 
on the residuals of the OLS model. If the LM tests results provide the rejection of non-spatial 
model, then the spatial model is the appropriate method to be employed. In the spatial models, 
if the LM spatial lag test is significant (p-value is less than 0.05), the spatial lag model (SAR) 
is appropriate to employ. Alternatively, if the LM spatial error test is significant (p-value is 
less than 0.05), the spatial error model (SEM) is appropriate to employ. When both the LM 
spatial lag test and the LM spatial error test are significant, the spatial autoregressive model 
with the autoregressive disturbances model (SAC) is appropriate to employ. Table 6.2 
presents the test results (LM classic and robust tests) for the different panel model 
specifications. Using the classic and robust LM tests, the hypothesis of the non-spatially 
autocorrelated error term and the hypothesis of no spatially lagged dependent variable were 
both rejected at the 1% significance level. Overall, these results suggest that it is more 
appropriate to employ a spatial model rather than a non-spatial model in the present 
investigation. 
This investigation also tests whether the unobserved heterogeneities (spatial and time period 
fixed effects) are jointly significant by performing likelihood ratio (LR) tests. The hypothesis 
that the spatial fixed effects are not jointly significant can be rejected for house price (70.1, p > 
0.01) estimations. Similarly, results showed that the hypothesis that time-period fixed effects 
are not jointly significant could also be rejected for house price (664.64, p < 0.01) estimations. 
These test results justify the extension of the spatial model with spatial fixed effects and time 
period fixed effects and are similar to those of the previous study (Mussa et al., 2017), which 
tested the immigration effects on house prices in the USA. Accompanied by the prior studies 
of the Chinese housing market, these results are also in line with Zhang et al. (2015) and 
Chow et al. (2016), which means Beijing house price has a spatial heterogeneity. It implicates 
the house price in China has spatial dependence and spatial heterogenous. Thus, the results 
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illustrate that neighbouring house prices affected house prices in this region, supporting the 
idea that house price has a ripple effect (Pijnenburg, 2017). 
Since the OLS specification is rejected in favour of spatial models, the investigation proceeds 
by estimating the SDM model. This research determines whether or not the SDM can be 
simplified to one or the other (spatial lag or spatial error model) using a Wald test (Elhorst, 
2010). Regarding the Wald test and the LR test, results shown in the bottom column of Table 
6.3 and Table 6.4, indicate that both the spatial lag and the spatial error tests were rejected in 
favour of the SDM. It implies that the spatial dependence of house prices is exist. The present 
investigation will, therefore, employ the SDM model to describe house prices and predict 
future house prices. 
The novelty of the SDM method lies in its ability to disaggregate the marginal (total) effects 
into direct and indirect effects, as displayed in Table 6.3 and Table 6.4. The first column of 
each specification records the direct effect which is the impact of changes in determinants on 
house prices in a particular province. The indirect or spill-over effect, displayed in the second 
column of each specification, measures the impact of price determinants in a particular 
province on house prices in surrounding provinces. The total effect is the sum of both direct 
and indirect effects. It implies the house prices in China has spill-over effects which is in line 
with Chow et al. (2016), Zhang et al. (2015) and Zhang et al. (2017). 
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Table 6.2 Test Results for Choosing Between Spatial and Non-Spatial Models 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  log house price 
  Spatial fixed effect Time-period fixed effect Spatial and time-period fixed effect 
LM spatial lag (classic) 
46.93 22.93 34.8 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
LM spatial error (classic) 
70.82 16.69 23.96 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Robust LM spatial lag 
0.1171 7.012 33.02 
[0.732] [0.008] [0.000] 
Robust LM spatial error 
24 0.7752 22.18 
[0.000] [0.379] [0.000] 
Robust LM SAR 
21.4 9.84 24.88 
[0.011] [0.363] [0.003] 
Robust LM SEM 
27.53 18.28 27.29 
[0.001] [0.032] [0.001] 
LR tests for the joint   70.1 
Significance of spatial fixed effects [0.000] 
LR tests for the joint  664.64 
Significance of time-period fixed effects [0.000] 
P values are in square brackets. 
P=house average price (yuan), GDP=gross regional product (100 million yuan), CPI=consumer price index (preceding year=100), une_r=unemployment rate in urban area 
(%), pop_den=population density of urban area (person/sq.km), num_edu=number of regular institutions of higher education (unit), num_heal=number of health care 
institutions (unit), num_lib=number of institutions in public libraries(unit), num_muse=number of museums (unit), size_building=floor space of residential buildings 
completed (10000 sq.m), i and j=the location of house, t=time. 
 
  
OLS: 
𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜏𝑃𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑎1𝐺𝑃𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎2𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎3𝑢𝑛𝑒_𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎4𝑝𝑜𝑝_𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎5𝑛𝑢𝑚_𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎6𝑛𝑢𝑚_ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎7𝑛𝑢𝑚_𝑙𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎8𝑛𝑢𝑚_𝑚𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎9𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒_𝑏𝑢𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡 
 
Spatial: 
      𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜏𝑃𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜌 ∑ 𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑃𝑖𝑡−1
𝑁
𝑗=1 + 𝑎1𝐺𝑃𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎2𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎3𝑢𝑛𝑒_𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎4𝑝𝑜𝑝_𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎5𝑛𝑢𝑚_𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎6𝑛𝑢𝑚_ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎7𝑛𝑢𝑚_𝑙𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎8𝑛𝑢𝑚_𝑚𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑖𝑡 +
𝑎9𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒_𝑏𝑢𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡  
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Table 6.3 presents the results of the house price equation with specifications displaying the 
SDM results prior to and after controlling for unobserved fixed heterogeneities. The effect of 
the spatial coefficient, ρ (W∗house price), displayed in the first row of Table 6.3, is highly 
significant in both specifications, suggesting that this estimation strategy is appropriate. 
When rents in one region rise (or fall), the house prices in surrounding regions tend to rise (or 
fall) as well. The methodology splits the “total effect” of the explanatory variables into two 
parts: the “direct effect” and “indirect effect”. Considering first the direct effect in the Spatial 
Durbin Model, the results suggest that income is positively associated with house price and 
that unemployment rate is negatively associated with house price. More specifically, the 
coefficient of income is interpreted as the percentage change in house price, equal to 28.4%. 
A similar result holds after the research controls for time period fixed effects. An increase in 
income equivalent of 1% is associated with a 41.2% rise in house prices. This result is in line 
with Tang and Wang (2017), who suggest income increases the house price in China. 
Moreover, the unemployment rate and CPI is negatively correlated with house prices. Similar 
empirical results were obtained by Harris et al. (2013) and Farlow (2004), who found that 
house prices were higher in cities with increased income and lower CPI and unemployment 
rates in China.  
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Table 6.3 House Prices Estimation 
 
 
 
  
 Spatial Durbin model  Spatial Durbin fixed effects model 
  Direct effect Indirect effect Total effect   Direct effect Indirect effect Total effect 
Rho(ρ) 0.462***    0.232**   
 (6.92)    (2.22)   
GDP 0.284*** 0.461*** 0.745***  0.466*** 0.365** 0.831*** 
 (4.18) (3.73) (5.25)  (5.24) (2.49) (4.93) 
CPI -1.045 0.865 -0.179  -2.470*** -0.713 -3.182 
 (-1.40) (0.76) (-0.25)  (-2.65) (-0.38) (-1.55) 
une_r -0.209** -0.486 -0.694**  -0.499*** -0.565* -1.064*** 
 (-2.17) (-1.53) (-2.04)  (-4.06) (-1.96) (-3.06) 
pop_den -0.0181 0.0116 -0.00648  -0.0498 -0.0854 -0.135 
 (-0.63) (0.16) (-0.08)  (-1.50) (-0.90) (-1.29) 
num_edu -0.0292 0.308 0.279  0.0608 -0.665** -0.604** 
 (-0.38) (1.52) (1.13)  (0.55) (-2.30) (-2.32) 
num_heal -0.00783 0.109*** 0.101**  -0.174*** -0.0465 -0.221 
 (-0.35) (3.06) (2.52)  (-4.15) (-0.25) (-1.12) 
num_lib -0.0700*** -0.170* -0.240**  -0.226*** -0.0668 -0.293** 
 (-3.15) (-1.80) (-2.16)  (-3.52) (-0.52) (-1.99) 
num_muse -0.0145 -0.230 -0.245  -0.0312 0.0472 0.0161 
 (-0.50) (-1.36) (-1.36)  (-0.80) (0.32) (0.10) 
size_building -0.0388 -0.252* -0.291*  -0.125** 0.0839 -0.0412 
 (-1.01) (-1.87) (-1.84)  (-2.04) (0.49) (-0.22) 
Observation 496  496 
Log-likelihood 740.16  533.82 
Time fixed effect No  Yes 
Wald test, spatial lag     24.88[0.003] 
Wald test, spatial     27.29[0.001] 
LR test, spatial lag     64.25[0.000] 
LR test, spatial         70.28[0.000] 
*p<0.10 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01 
P=house average price (yuan), GDP=gross regional product (100 million yuan), CPI=consumer price index (preceding year=100), une_r=unemployment rate in urban area (%), 
pop_den=population density of urban area (person/sq.km), num_edu=number of regular institutions of higher education (unit), num_heal=number of health care institutions (unit), 
num_lib=number of institutions in public libraries(unit), num_muse=number of museums (unit), size_building=floor space of residential buildings completed (10000 sq.m), i and j=the location 
of house, t=time.  
𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜏𝑃𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜌 ∑ 𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑃𝑖𝑡−1
𝑁
𝑗=1 + 𝑎1𝐺𝑃𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎2𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎3𝑢𝑛𝑒_𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎4𝑝𝑜𝑝_𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎5𝑛𝑢𝑚_𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎6𝑛𝑢𝑚_ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎7𝑛𝑢𝑚_𝑙𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎8𝑛𝑢𝑚_𝑚𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎9𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒_𝑏𝑢𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡 +
𝜃1 ∑ 𝑊𝑖𝑗𝐺𝑃𝐷𝑗𝑡
𝑁
𝑗=1 + 𝜃2 ∑ 𝑊𝑖𝑗𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑗𝑡
𝑁
𝑗=1 + 𝜃3 ∑ 𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑢𝑛𝑒_𝑟𝑗𝑡
𝑁
𝑗=1 + 𝜃4 ∑ 𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑝𝑜𝑝_𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑗𝑡
𝑁
𝑗=1 + 𝜃5 ∑ 𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑛𝑢𝑚_𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑗𝑡
𝑁
𝑗=1 + 𝜃6 ∑ 𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑛𝑢𝑚_ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑗𝑡
𝑁
𝑗=1 + 𝜃7 ∑ 𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑛𝑢𝑚_𝑙𝑖𝑏𝑗𝑡
𝑁
𝑗=1 +
𝜃8 ∑ 𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑛𝑢𝑚_𝑚𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑗𝑡
𝑁
𝑗=1 + 𝜃9 ∑ 𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒_𝑏𝑢𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑗𝑡
𝑁
𝑗=1 + 𝜈𝑖𝑡  
192 
 
The indirect effect results across the different model specifications indicate that income 
flowing into a region is associated with a positive spill-over (indirect) effect on surrounding 
regions and that the effect appears to be larger relative to the direct effect. Prior to controlling 
for unobserved heterogeneities, house prices are found to increase by 46.1% with 1% 
increase in income in the surrounding regions. However, a 36.5% change in house prices 
based on a 1% change in income is observed when the investigation controls for time period 
fixed effects, as the investigation does in the spatial fixed model. In Table 6.4, the 
investigation applied the predicted house price in order to estimate the spatial model. 
Examining the spatial and time-period fixed effect results, the results provide that house 
prices are affected by variables of interest and surrounding factors significantly. The spatial 
fixed model is the first time applied and should capture the source of the parameter 
heterogeneity in the real options analysis. Regarding Van Dijk et al. (2011), neighbouring 
house prices should be a good approximation of the average house price development in the 
larger geographical region.  
Overall, the results provide that house prices in a particular region are not only associated 
with factors in that region but also factors in surrounding regions. It implies that the indirect 
effects from surrounding regions are significant as well, specifically that larger indirect 
effects than direct effects are observed. These are interesting patterns that require further 
explanation. This result is similar to Mussa et al. (2017), who suggested that the indirect 
effects of variables in neighbouring regions have a greater explanatory weight than those in 
the target region. Thus, when the investigation considers house price uncertainty, it is 
suggested that surrounding effects of factors are also significant in China. 
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Table 6.4 Predict House Prices Estimation 
 
 
 
 
  
 Spatial fixed effect  Time-period fixed effect  Spatial and time-period fixed effect 
  Direct effect Indirect effect Total effect   Direct effect Indirect effect Total effect   Direct effect Indirect effect Total effect 
Rho(ρ) 0.606***    0.232    0.389***   
 (10.56)    (1.74)    (4.34)   
GDP 0.325*** 0.408*** 0.734***  0.480*** 0.435*** 0.916***  0.303*** 0.222*** 0.525*** 
 (12.86) (11.08) (16.58)  (5.65) (2.66) (4.93)  (10.96) (2.81) (5.81) 
CPI -1.043*** 0.989*** -0.0538  -2.497*** -0.422 -2.919  -1.008*** 0.950*** -0.0583 
 (-8.07) (4.68) (-0.32)  (-2.93) (-0.24) (-1.59)  (-6.57) (2.78) (-0.15) 
une_r -0.135*** -0.561*** -0.696***  -0.494*** -0.536* -1.030***  -0.137*** -0.457*** -0.595*** 
 (-4.57) (-5.91) (-5.88)  (-4.61) (-1.84) (-2.98)  (-5.74) (-4.94) (-5.32) 
pop_den -0.0171*** -0.00512 -0.0222  -0.0462* -0.0423 -0.0885  -0.0238*** -0.0411** -0.065*** 
 (-4.65) (-0.32) (-1.37)  (-1.70) (-0.57) (-1.16)  (-7.00) (-2.50) (-3.80) 
num_edu 0.00906 0.297*** 0.306***  0.0500 -0.788*** -0.738***  0.0270 0.311*** 0.338*** 
 (0.53) (3.98) (3.93)  (0.45) (-2.65) (-2.72)  (1.30) (4.74) (4.32) 
num_heal -0.0112*** 0.123*** 0.112***  -0.162*** 0.0693 -0.0927  -0.0140*** 0.0720*** 0.058*** 
 (-3.09) (7.77) (7.08)  (-3.82) (0.42) (-0.53)  (-4.05) (5.81) (4.71) 
num_lib -0.0458*** -0.110*** -0.155***  -0.237*** -0.120 -0.357**  -0.0408*** -0.0583** -0.099*** 
 (-9.35) (-3.40) (-4.34)  (-3.56) (-0.97) (-2.33)  (-7.70) (-2.06) (-3.03) 
num_muse 0.0149* -0.249*** -0.234***  -0.0360 0.0270 -0.00901  0.0250*** -0.157*** -0.132*** 
 (1.88) (-4.10) (-3.61)  (-1.00) (0.25) (-0.07)  (3.55) (-3.69) (-2.86) 
size_building -0.0401*** -0.267*** -0.307***  -0.124** 0.0747 -0.0497  -0.0411*** -0.219*** -0.260*** 
 (-3.73) (-5.43) (-6.00)  (-2.52) (0.50) (-0.30)  (-4.17) (-7.93) (-9.55) 
Observation 496  496  496 
Log-likelihood 1622.95  615.46  1666.34 
Time fixed effect No  Yes  Yes 
Wald test, spatial lag 24.88[0.003]  43.55[0.056]  27.63[0.011] 
Wald test, spatial error 27.29[0.001]  69.87[0.065]  39.17[0.013] 
LR test, spatial lag 64.25[0.000]  52.19[0.071]  78.71[0.000] 
LR test, spatial error 70.28[0.000]   31.52[0.083]   55.32[0.000] 
*p<0.10 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01 
P'=predict house average price (yuan), GDP=gross regional product (100 million yuan), CPI=consumer price index (preceding year=100), une_r=unemployment rate in urban area (%), 
pop_den=population density of urban area (person/sq.km), num_edu=number of regular institutions of higher education (unit), num_heal=number of health care institutions (unit), 
num_lib=number of institutions in public libraries(unit), num_muse=number of museums (unit), size_building=floor space of residential buildings completed (10000 sq.m), i and j=the location 
of house, t=time.  
𝑃𝑖𝑡
′ = 𝛼 + 𝜏𝑃𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜌 ∑ 𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑃𝑖𝑡−1
𝑁
𝑗=1 + 𝑎1𝐺𝑃𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎2𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎3𝑢𝑛𝑒_𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎4𝑝𝑜𝑝_𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎5𝑛𝑢𝑚_𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎6𝑛𝑢𝑚_ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎7𝑛𝑢𝑚_𝑙𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎8𝑛𝑢𝑚_𝑚𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎9𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒_𝑏𝑢𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡 +
𝜃1 ∑ 𝑊𝑖𝑗𝐺𝑃𝐷𝑗𝑡
𝑁
𝑗=1 + 𝜃2 ∑ 𝑊𝑖𝑗𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑗𝑡
𝑁
𝑗=1 + 𝜃3 ∑ 𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑢𝑛𝑒_𝑟𝑗𝑡
𝑁
𝑗=1 + 𝜃4 ∑ 𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑝𝑜𝑝_𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑗𝑡
𝑁
𝑗=1 + 𝜃5 ∑ 𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑛𝑢𝑚_𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑗𝑡
𝑁
𝑗=1 + 𝜃6 ∑ 𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑛𝑢𝑚_ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑗𝑡
𝑁
𝑗=1 + 𝜃7 ∑ 𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑛𝑢𝑚_𝑙𝑖𝑏𝑗𝑡
𝑁
𝑗=1 +
𝜃8 ∑ 𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑛𝑢𝑚_𝑚𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑗𝑡
𝑁
𝑗=1 + 𝜃9 ∑ 𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒_𝑏𝑢𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑗𝑡
𝑁
𝑗=1 + 𝜈𝑖𝑡  
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6.5.2 Implied Volatility 
The future price uncertainty, 𝜎𝑖𝑡
2 , speculates that developers’ confidence in their predicted 
price forecast depends on the availability of forecast prices in the recent past (Cunningham, 
2006). The estimation of the variance of residuals suggests that the developers have 
additional information that influences the price. Thus, this investigation employs generalised 
autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (GARCH) to test future house price uncertainty, 
in which residuals from a forecasting equation (formula 6.5) are employed to measure 
volatility. 
Table 6.5 House Prices Forecasting Parameter Estimates by Year 
      
      
      
      
      
Year Intercept   Lagged 1-year price     
  
Parameter 
estimate 
Standard 
errors 
Parameter 
estimate 
Standard 
errors 
LM-test p-value 
2000 3.464 (0.021) -0.0002 (0.0001) 0.770 0.00 
2001 3.458 (0.021) 0.0001 (0.0012) 0.657 0.01 
2002 3.463 (0.018) 0.0007 (0.0007) 0.718 0.00 
2003 3.481 (0.021) 0.0393 (0.0047) 0.774 0.00 
2004 3.461 (0.020) -0.0004 (0.0015) 0.637 0.00 
2005 3.464 (0.018) 0.0002 (0.0001) 0.758 0.02 
2006 3.424 (0.049) 0.0260 (0.0071) 0.888 0.00 
2007 3.409 (0.015) 0.0190 (0.0204) 0.832 0.00 
2008 3.417 (0.040) 0.0273 (0.0412) 0.991 0.00 
2009 3.394 (0.014) 0.0488 (0.0206) 1.088 0.00 
2010 3.365 (0.017) 0.0408 (0.0654) 1.033 0.00 
2011 3.352 (0.025) 0.0279 (0.0301) 1.170 0.00 
2012 3.368 (0.052) 0.0282 (0.0352) 1.212 0.00 
2013 3.364 (0.023) 0.0237 (0.0021) 1.222 0.01 
2014 3.388 (0.029) 0.0479 (0.0038) 1.110 0.00 
2015 3.371 (0.062) 0.0321 (0.0497) 1.148 0.00 
 
In Table 6.5, the investigation formally tests for autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity 
(ARCH) effects employing a Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test and find evidence of ARMA 
effects. The investigation estimates the ARMA specification of (1) and collects the residuals. 
Subsequently, the model regresses the squared residuals on their own lags. If n×R2 from this 
regression exceeds a critical value, the null hypothesis of no ARCH effects can be rejected. 
Thus, the series can be seen to exhibit volatility clustering. Here, the results reject that the 
variance is constant. This result is in line with Wang et al. (2016), who found ARCH effects 
for house prices in Hangzhou housing market, China. It is also similar to the study of 
Cunningham (2006), who found ARCH effects for house prices in Seattle. It implices that the 
Mean equation: 
𝑃𝑖𝑡
′ = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛼1𝑖𝑃𝑖𝑡−1
′ + 𝑖𝑡 
Variance equation: 
𝜎𝑖𝑡
2 = 𝑎 + 𝛾 𝑖𝑡−1
2 + 𝜃𝜎𝑖𝑡−1
2  
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house price is influenced by not only fundamentals but also uncertainties. The GARCH 
method, which decreases the error term, provides that the price uncertainty, which is 𝜎𝑖𝑡
2 , rises 
when the analysis includes one-year-ahead house prices. This investigation calculates the 
option premium using the Black-Scholes model, in which the standard deviation of the 
stock’s returns is required. The historical house price fluctuation has a predictable orientation 
to the future house price (Cunningham, 2006). Cunningham (2006) also suggested that “the 
current observed volatility of prices may be the best measure of future price uncertainty”. 
Related to the studies of real options in China, Wang et al. (2016), Tang and Wang (2017) 
and Shi et al. (2015) are in line with the view of Cunningham (2006). Therefore, this 
investigation suggests applying the unconditional standard error of alternative regions in 
different years of China to represent the standard deviation of the stock’s returns in the 
Black-Scholes model. The results of the unconditional standard error are displayed in Table 
6.6. 
Based on the above results, the investigation presents the standard error of house price in 
Table 6.6. The results found that the standard deviation of residential housing market in 
China ranges from 2.14% to 23.49%, depending on the time series of house prices. This 
result is in line with Wang et al. (2016), who provide a one-standard-deviation residential 
housing market in Hangzhou ranges from 13.39 % and 16.51 %. Case and Shiller (1989) 
provides an average of 15% standard deviation in individual house prices in alternative cities, 
such as Atlanta, Chicago, Dallas, and San Francisco-Oakland, from 1970 to 1986. Titman and 
Torous (1989) illustrate that there was a 15.5% standard deviation in property value 
employed by the model of commercial mortgage-pricing. However, Sheik and Vora (1990) 
argue that the different fundamentals could be altered by assuming constant variance to 
estimate implied variances. It implies that the volatility of underlying profits can be explored 
by implied volatilities reasonably, referred to as change variance.  
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Table 6.6 The Volatility of House Price 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
Region 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Anhui 18.38% 18.85% 19.32% 13.75% 19.02% 19.16% 17.35% 18.04% 18.37% 13.77% 19.79% 20.07% 19.91% 18.77% 9.77% 18.12% 
Beijing 22.12% 22.45% 23.49% 19.36% 22.83% 23.38% 18.04% 18.52% 19.29% 22.08% 20.96% 21.25% 21.35% 19.56% 21.86% 19.09% 
Chongqing 8.01% 8.80% 7.49% 11.69% 9.13% 9.30% 5.03% 9.00% 4.97% 12.76% 4.75% 9.39% 17.30% 15.21% 12.37% 14.46% 
Fujian 9.60% 10.50% 9.42% 13.88% 10.88% 11.46% 16.12% 13.77% 16.53% 16.80% 20.19% 16.71% 16.80% 15.38% 15.95% 17.93% 
Gansu 9.92% 10.59% 9.56% 11.48% 10.71% 11.05% 16.68% 15.33% 17.25% 13.36% 19.10% 17.48% 17.70% 16.19% 12.76% 17.32% 
Guangdong 11.54% 12.17% 11.43% 14.48% 12.51% 13.03% 17.77% 17.21% 18.73% 16.56% 20.68% 20.05% 20.21% 18.37% 15.91% 18.76% 
Guangxi 7.78% 7.85% 6.00% 12.52% 7.32% 6.98% 15.06% 14.76% 15.96% 15.27% 17.28% 16.93% 17.45% 15.77% 14.50% 16.20% 
Guizhou 9.32% 9.45% 7.72% 12.77% 8.63% 8.65% 17.59% 17.11% 18.66% 13.91% 20.79% 20.06% 20.39% 18.43% 13.06% 18.86% 
Hainan 8.68% 9.58% 7.69% 13.02% 8.56% 8.97% 17.78% 17.80% 19.02% 15.89% 20.79% 20.95% 21.27% 19.17% 15.68% 18.91% 
Hebei 5.69% 4.60% 3.01% 12.93% 5.63% 3.98% 16.77% 16.90% 17.97% 14.67% 19.10% 18.72% 19.04% 16.94% 14.08% 16.54% 
Heilongjiang 6.76% 5.61% 4.48% 12.22% 6.25% 4.76% 17.93% 18.02% 19.18% 14.70% 20.92% 20.74% 20.99% 18.85% 13.74% 18.90% 
Henan 7.56% 6.58% 5.82% 13.18% 7.04% 5.79% 18.17% 18.53% 19.52% 14.72% 21.03% 21.54% 21.74% 19.54% 14.28% 19.17% 
Hubei 7.67% 6.74% 6.21% 12.23% 6.84% 5.93% 18.13% 18.64% 19.49% 14.77% 20.95% 21.73% 21.91% 19.70% 13.78% 19.09% 
Hunan 9.19% 8.12% 7.97% 13.17% 8.06% 7.39% 18.19% 18.79% 19.60% 14.59% 21.03% 21.94% 22.16% 19.91% 14.12% 19.18% 
Inner Mongolia 8.81% 8.28% 8.06% 12.46% 8.04% 7.62% 18.05% 18.69% 19.44% 15.01% 20.90% 21.85% 22.09% 19.77% 14.22% 18.97% 
Jiangsu 9.60% 8.98% 8.14% 13.31% 8.14% 7.09% 17.60% 18.09% 18.64% 15.30% 19.75% 20.59% 21.18% 18.93% 14.48% 18.34% 
Jiangxi 7.69% 7.59% 6.45% 12.54% 7.50% 6.80% 17.88% 18.40% 19.20% 14.00% 20.87% 21.40% 21.71% 19.48% 13.51% 18.95% 
Jilin 9.24% 9.15% 8.20% 12.79% 8.76% 8.34% 18.14% 18.68% 19.51% 15.51% 21.06% 21.82% 22.09% 19.82% 14.55% 19.20% 
Liaoning 9.65% 9.32% 9.13% 12.54% 9.62% 9.33% 17.93% 18.59% 19.28% 13.81% 20.73% 21.63% 21.98% 19.71% 13.30% 18.84% 
Ningxia 9.18% 9.53% 9.27% 13.73% 10.15% 9.99% 17.92% 18.58% 19.24% 15.96% 20.88% 21.71% 21.88% 19.64% 15.29% 19.00% 
Qinghai 10.59% 11.22% 11.35% 11.06% 11.96% 12.08% 18.09% 18.73% 19.30% 13.07% 20.99% 21.88% 22.10% 19.83% 11.88% 19.15% 
Shaanxi 12.51% 13.15% 13.60% 14.84% 14.21% 14.42% 18.06% 18.73% 19.29% 16.88% 20.88% 21.86% 22.06% 19.84% 16.80% 19.09% 
Shandong 15.10% 15.77% 16.67% 8.34% 17.07% 17.66% 18.19% 18.84% 19.56% 11.30% 21.05% 22.02% 22.26% 19.99% 17.98% 19.21% 
Shanghai 18.34% 18.89% 20.34% 17.06% 20.54% 21.62% 18.16% 18.83% 19.59% 18.10% 21.02% 22.05% 22.31% 20.01% 19.64% 19.17% 
Shanxi 8.87% 8.67% 7.51% 14.22% 8.42% 8.05% 7.79% 8.33% 8.09% 18.02% 7.26% 6.26% 4.82% 5.19% 16.04% 6.86% 
Sichuan 10.10% 9.92% 9.07% 10.13% 9.61% 9.43% 16.47% 14.81% 16.97% 9.07% 20.18% 17.07% 16.98% 15.61% 10.42% 18.00% 
Tianjin 12.20% 11.87% 11.21% 15.57% 11.46% 11.61% 17.87% 17.13% 18.91% 19.64% 21.00% 20.10% 20.20% 18.35% 17.93% 19.07% 
Tibet 7.61% 8.53% 7.53% 9.35% 8.86% 8.64% 16.01% 15.79% 16.72% 8.92% 17.79% 17.62% 17.52% 15.79% 10.93% 15.59% 
Xinjiang 9.13% 10.19% 9.46% 16.27% 10.55% 10.59% 17.77% 17.53% 18.65% 19.80% 20.79% 20.22% 19.99% 18.16% 17.68% 18.77% 
Yunnan 10.88% 12.02% 11.62% 2.60% 12.56% 12.81% 17.97% 18.13% 19.21% 2.14% 20.81% 21.10% 21.06% 19.08% 5.74% 18.99% 
Zhejiang 12.97% 14.22% 14.20% 19.59% 15.05% 15.71% 18.18% 18.57% 19.53% 21.96% 21.06% 21.70% 21.81% 19.65% 20.86% 19.17% 
 
Mean equation: 
𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛼1𝑖𝑃𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑖𝑡 
Variance equation: 
𝜎𝑖𝑡
2 = 𝑎 + 𝛾 𝑖𝑡−1
2 + 𝜃𝜎𝑖𝑡−1
2  
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6.5.3 Uncertainty and Timing of Land Development 
In Table 6.7, the investigation examines the effect of uncertainty on land development as a 
test for the presence of real options in land markets. To test the prediction, this research 
estimates the effect of house price uncertainty and future house prices on land value. The 
investigation specifies an proportional hazard model incorporating SDM model, using a data 
set where vacant land price is a transacted price. Based on the results, it is found that 
uncertainty delayed land development, as the coefficient of uncertainty was negative (-1.101). 
This result is similar to Cunningham (2006), who also suggested that uncertainty of house 
prices delays land development. The coefficient estimate for the price uncertainty term is 
both negative and significant, suggesting the presence of a real option premium. This result is 
in line with Tang and Wang (2017), who suggest the rising housing demand is accompanied 
by developers’ strategic delay of land development in China. It provides the uncertainty of 
future information delay the land development in China based on land flexibility. These 
results support the theory, advanced by Titman (1985), that uncertainty about future house 
prices can decrease investment activity in the current period. Meanwhile, this context 
appropriately solves the agency problem based on investment timing (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). When the shareholder and agents capture the information of surroundings at the same 
time and plan the investment of options, the information asymmetric and timing of 
investment are solved in order to establish an optimal capital structure and maximise the 
shareholder’s value. The results also provide the similar results to Wang et al. (2016), who 
found the uncertainty delay the land development by 42% in Hangzhou, China. In China, the 
central government policies, such as “freeze” in transactions, the purchase restrictions and 
increased land supplies, cannot be regarded as these measures have changed the fundamentals 
of the residential housing market, particularly with regards to damping the speculative 
fervour. This is because these policies curbed the house prices in short-term but did not 
correct the fundamental mismatch in the market between supply and demand or cool the 
enthusiasm of property speculators in the over-heated cities (Koss and Shi, 2018). 
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Table 6.7 The Effect of House Prices Uncertainty in Neighbouring Regions on Timing of Development and Land Prices 
   
   
   
   
 
   
   
   
Explanatory variables 
Timing of development Land Prices 
Spatial OLS 
land price Wx land price 
fpriceh 2.984 1.428 0.576*** 
 (1.34) (1.20) (6.44) 
uncer -1.101*** 0.176 1.829*** 
 (-3.78) (0.27) (5.21) 
GDP 0.409 0.855 0.496*** 
 (-0.80) (-0.90) (16.10) 
CPI 1.875 5.029* 1.601 
 (-0.51) (1.69) (0.92) 
une_r -0.539** -1.423** -0.402*** 
 (2.06) (1.98) (-2.61) 
pop_den 0.101 0.298 0.219*** 
 (1.44) (1.40) (4.48) 
num_edu -0.465 -1.574** - 
 (-1.42) (-2.08) 
 
num_heal -0.00546 0.360** - 
 (-0.09) (2.00) 
 
num_lib 0.0264 -0.214 - 
 (0.36) (-0.63) 
 
num_muse -0.264* 0.174 - 
 (-1.87) (0.51) 
 
size_building 0.0335 0.495 - 
 (0.32) (1.14) 
 
Observation 496 496 
Log-likelihood 722.95  
Time fixed effect  Yes Yes 
Wald test, spatial lag 26.16[0.021]  
Wald test, spatial 29.82[0.016]  
LR test, spatial lag 58.37[0.000]  
LR test, spatial 64.58[0.000]   
*p<0.10 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01 
Landprice=average land price (yuan), fpriceh=predict house average price (yuan), uncer=standard error of house price, GDP=gross regional product (100 million yuan), CPI=consumer price index (preceding 
year=100), une_r=unemployment rate in urban area (%), pop_den=population density of urban area (person/sq.km), num_edu=number of regular institutions of higher education (unit), num_heal=number of health care 
institutions (unit), num_lib=number of institutions in public libraries(unit), num_muse=number of museums (unit), size_building=floor space of residential buildings completed (10000 sq.m), i and j=the location of 
house, t=time. 
Timing of land development: 
                            𝛿𝑍 = 𝜏𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜌 ∑ 𝑊𝑖𝑗𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡−1
𝑁
𝑗=1 + 𝑎1𝑓𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎2𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎3𝐺𝑃𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎4𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎5𝑢𝑛𝑒_𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎6𝑝𝑜𝑝_𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎7𝑛𝑢𝑚_𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎8𝑛𝑢𝑚_ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎9𝑛𝑢𝑚_𝑙𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑡 +
𝑎10𝑛𝑢𝑚_𝑚𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎11𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒_𝑏𝑢𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃1 ∑ 𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑓𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒ℎ𝑗𝑡
𝑁
𝑗=1 + 𝜃2 ∑ 𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑗𝑡
𝑁
𝑗=1 + 𝜃3 ∑ 𝑊𝑖𝑗𝐺𝑃𝐷𝑗𝑡
𝑁
𝑗=1 + 𝜃4 ∑ 𝑊𝑖𝑗𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑗𝑡
𝑁
𝑗=1 + 𝜃5 ∑ 𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑢𝑛𝑒_𝑟𝑗𝑡
𝑁
𝑗=1 + 𝜃6 ∑ 𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑝𝑜𝑝_𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑗𝑡
𝑁
𝑗=1 + 𝜃7 ∑ 𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑛𝑢𝑚_𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑗𝑡
𝑁
𝑗=1 +
𝜃8 ∑ 𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑛𝑢𝑚_ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑗𝑡
𝑁
𝑗=1 + 𝜃9 ∑ 𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑛𝑢𝑚_𝑙𝑖𝑏𝑗𝑡
𝑁
𝑗=1 + 𝜃10 ∑ 𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑛𝑢𝑚_𝑚𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑗𝑡
𝑁
𝑗=1 + 𝜃11 ∑ 𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒_𝑏𝑢𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑗𝑡
𝑁
𝑗=1 + 𝜈𝑖𝑡  
Land prices: 
                            𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝑎1𝑓𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎2𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎3𝐺𝑃𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎4𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎5𝑢𝑛𝑒_𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎6𝑝𝑜𝑝_𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑡 
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6.5.4 Uncertainty and Land Prices 
In the right-hand column of Table 6.7, the investigation regresses the price uncertainty on 
land prices to test the existence of real options in land markets. Price uncertainty increases the 
option premium on land so that the land becomes more valuable with uses other than urgent 
development. This investigation specifies an OLS model of vacant land prices, using a data 
set where vacant land prices are transacted prices. Based on the analyses, the results provide 
that the uncertainty affected land value by 1.82% significantly and positively. These results 
are in line with Tang and Wang (2017) and Shi et al. (2015), who suggest the uncertainty 
increases the land value. This result is also similar to Cunningham (2006), who suggested that 
uncertainty of house prices increases both land value and the real option premium. Through 
the results of ‘Land Prices model’, this research rejects the null hypothesis in favour of the 
presence of a real option premium, referred to as the coefficient estimate for the price 
uncertainty term is 1.82% above zero. Regarding the evaluation of land price, the increasing 
one-standard-deviation in price uncertainty raises the land price. If there is a greater level of 
price uncertainty according to the economic information, then the vacant land will be traded 
at a premium above discounted future rents in current low capital use, 𝑅𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡.  
 
6.5.5 Real Options Premium 
Regarding Table 6.7, the increasing price uncertainty in the future raises the option premium. 
The result for the parameter estimates of price uncertainty is significantly above zero. This 
investigation could reject the null hypothesis that price uncertainty does not affect land values. 
According to the analysis of the impact of price uncertainty on the timing of land 
development and land value (Table 6.7), neighbouring house price uncertainty delays 
building activity and increases the land value. Thus, a real option exists in the land markets of 
China. 
In Table 6.8, the investigation presents real option premium in all of the provinces of China. 
According to the method, this research provides the option premium, which is the difference 
between the option model price and the intrinsic value. The range of these option premiums is 
between 11.16% and 21.97%. The mean value of these option premiums is 16.28%. The 
results recognise that these option premiums are provided by a high bound for  
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Table 6.8 Summary Statistics of Option Premium 
 
 
 
 
Region 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Anhui 16.23% 18.10% 17.67% 18.73% 18.13% 17.73% 18.34% 15.00% 17.92% 17.18% 16.45% 16.69% 21.00% 12.71% 12.62% 13.85% 
Beijing 16.89% 11.85% 17.58% 17.66% 18.76% 17.50% 19.03% 18.34% 15.32% 18.32% 17.13% 16.52% 19.78% 17.28% 12.42% 13.97% 
Chongqing 17.34% 12.66% 12.51% 17.95% 16.57% 18.13% 18.77% 19.22% 17.74% 15.41% 18.19% 17.20% 16.56% 14.99% 17.14% 11.16% 
Fujian 14.20% 12.61% 13.29% 11.77% 17.99% 16.94% 19.24% 18.96% 18.59% 18.36% 15.61% 18.22% 17.25% 15.78% 14.79% 18.04% 
Gansu 20.37% 13.32% 13.22% 12.38% 12.06% 16.97% 17.02% 19.40% 18.50% 19.16% 18.27% 16.04% 18.35% 15.44% 15.57% 16.08% 
Guangdong 18.67% 17.19% 13.24% 12.29% 12.93% 11.49% 18.13% 16.96% 18.97% 18.93% 19.11% 18.28% 16.60% 17.18% 15.87% 16.47% 
Guangxi 16.19% 14.96% 17.53% 13.67% 12.66% 11.88% 11.74% 18.14% 17.10% 19.36% 18.83% 19.18% 18.34% 12.83% 17.08% 16.93% 
Guizhou 16.88% 11.80% 15.48% 16.92% 13.88% 12.11% 12.09% 12.11% 17.76% 17.12% 19.28% 18.92% 19.27% 17.94% 12.78% 18.18% 
Hainan 17.80% 13.21% 15.88% 14.47% 17.09% 13.54% 12.33% 12.50% 11.75% 18.15% 17.41% 19.37% 19.04% 17.00% 16.84% 11.79% 
Hebei 14.65% 13.49% 15.67% 15.15% 14.87% 16.83% 13.55% 12.76% 12.31% 12.41% 18.05% 18.02% 19.44% 16.56% 17.24% 18.24% 
Heilongjiang 17.76% 14.22% 17.31% 15.42% 16.39% 14.25% 16.88% 13.64% 12.37% 12.84% 12.77% 18.10% 19.23% 17.59% 16.80% 18.82% 
Henan 18.35% 12.43% 14.48% 16.75% 16.78% 16.45% 14.33% 17.01% 13.68% 13.08% 13.53% 14.70% 18.13% 15.71% 17.66% 18.44% 
Hubei 17.91% 14.02% 17.44% 15.30% 18.09% 16.88% 16.55% 14.58% 16.94% 13.68% 13.87% 15.46% 12.13% 17.61% 15.86% 19.04% 
Hunan 18.91% 16.70% 17.17% 16.60% 15.58% 18.16% 17.16% 16.51% 14.44% 17.28% 13.07% 16.12% 12.62% 13.42% 16.56% 14.82% 
Inner Mongolia 19.29% 17.43% 16.88% 16.93% 18.23% 15.05% 18.30% 17.18% 16.43% 14.97% 17.86% 12.08% 12.61% 13.79% 12.22% 18.05% 
Jiangsu 17.66% 16.33% 17.82% 16.77% 18.75% 18.29% 15.08% 18.28% 17.05% 16.46% 15.82% 19.60% 14.41% 13.82% 13.14% 13.75% 
Jiangxi 18.05% 16.10% 16.47% 17.66% 18.54% 18.66% 18.30% 15.19% 18.17% 17.14% 16.53% 18.03% 17.07% 15.02% 13.19% 14.78% 
Jilin 18.61% 12.39% 17.31% 17.10% 19.08% 18.41% 19.12% 18.28% 14.75% 18.21% 17.21% 16.58% 14.66% 17.73% 15.34% 15.03% 
Liaoning 19.34% 13.26% 13.15% 16.82% 17.57% 18.94% 18.85% 19.18% 18.27% 14.67% 18.22% 17.26% 12.36% 15.66% 17.49% 16.91% 
Ningxia 16.80% 13.17% 13.91% 12.29% 18.02% 16.82% 19.31% 18.93% 18.97% 18.20% 14.35% 18.34% 13.01% 16.43% 15.33% 18.86% 
Qinghai 21.97% 14.26% 13.90% 12.88% 11.26% 18.01% 16.83% 19.34% 18.75% 19.07% 18.33% 13.64% 13.97% 16.47% 16.38% 17.20% 
Shaanxi 20.59% 17.57% 14.52% 12.67% 11.76% 11.71% 18.10% 17.00% 19.21% 18.88% 19.19% 18.35% 16.56% 18.04% 16.65% 16.57% 
Shandong 16.51% 15.61% 18.02% 13.78% 12.07% 12.06% 12.24% 18.04% 16.73% 19.31% 18.94% 19.26% 12.83% 17.32% 17.93% 17.13% 
Shanghai 17.11% 15.62% 16.16% 17.10% 13.85% 12.26% 12.45% 12.39% 18.03% 16.66% 19.36% 19.01% 13.29% 18.33% 17.40% 18.32% 
Shanxi 18.21% 15.00% 16.38% 14.80% 16.80% 13.95% 12.73% 12.72% 12.26% 17.98% 16.16% 19.44% 12.57% 18.36% 18.23% 18.43% 
Sichuan 18.49% 16.99% 16.50% 16.30% 14.23% 16.89% 13.95% 12.78% 12.78% 12.24% 18.13% 18.51% 14.85% 18.04% 18.42% 18.36% 
Tianjin 18.31% 16.00% 17.96% 16.46% 15.92% 14.32% 17.01% 14.01% 12.80% 12.91% 13.56% 18.15% 17.71% 18.73% 17.94% 19.10% 
Tibet 18.90% 17.95% 15.89% 17.93% 16.37% 16.57% 14.53% 17.03% 13.78% 13.13% 14.32% 16.22% 13.67% 18.50% 18.64% 18.80% 
Xinjiang 18.58% 16.84% 18.18% 14.71% 17.62% 17.11% 16.58% 14.48% 17.12% 14.19% 14.77% 16.91% 12.58% 18.09% 18.39% 19.29% 
Yunnan 19.25% 16.48% 18.34% 18.23% 15.04% 18.32% 17.23% 16.30% 14.72% 17.40% 14.69% 17.83% 13.05% 11.72% 17.95% 19.77% 
Zhejiang 20.22% 17.50% 18.04% 18.35% 17.44% 15.06% 18.35% 16.91% 16.55% 15.15% 18.57% 15.71% 13.06% 12.58% 12.88% 18.13% 
C=call premium, S=land value (sq.m), t=time until option exercise (2 years), K=predict house price (sq.m), r=risk-free interest rate (China 10 years bond yield), N=cumulative standard normal 
distribution, e=exponential term, s=standard deviation (house price volatility), ln=natural log.  
𝐶 = 𝑆𝑁(𝑑1) − 𝑁(𝑑2)𝐾𝑒
−𝑟𝑡                      𝑑1 =
ln(
𝑆
𝐾
)+(𝑟+
𝑆2
2
)𝑡
𝑠∗√𝑡
                                𝑑2 = 𝑑1 − 𝑠 ∗ √𝑡 
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land because the sample contains average land prices for all industries. Otherwise, there may 
be large standard errors although the variance estimates present the limited confidence 
intervals. These results are different from those of previous studies. Wang et al. (2016) found 
the real-option premium 9.76% in housing market in Hangzhou, China. Yao and Pretorius 
(2004) found the real-option premium 11.75% in housing market in Hongkong, China. Quigg 
(1993) found a real-option premium of 6% on undeveloped land that is relative to the 
deterministic price. Bulan et al. (2009) determined that a one-standard-deviation increase in 
conditional price volatility cause the prospect of development to be reduced by 13%. In this 
investigation, the results provided that the mean of land option premium is 16.28% in the 
average China’s land market. There are some reasons for the high option premium in the 
Chinese land market. The real estate market in China is characterised as poorly liquid and 
decentralised (Tang and Wang, 2017). According to Shiller (1998), “illiquid (real asset) 
markets tend to be markets where the individual assets are idiosyncratic, having quality 
characteristics that are unique to each asset sold, assets that are difficult to describe or 
measure”. The assessment of asset price could be a misunderstanding based on the inefficient 
financial market liquidity. Childs et al. (2001) point out that the decentralised trading is a 
feature of the real estate market. Continuous trading facilitates arbitrage by well-informed 
agents, bringing the prices of financial products to their fundamental prices. By contrast, 
decentralised trading in real estate markets inhibits arbitrage, generating difficulty in price 
discovery. Thus, the valuation of real estate typically contains plenty of information noises, 
especially in emerging markets like China (Hui et al., 2013). Childs et al. (2002) note that the 
phenomenon of phasing development observed in urban fringe or blighted urban land is an 
illustration of internalising the potential benefits of information spill-over arising from 
advanced investment. As the Chinese housing market has become overheated since the year 
2003, the central government’s control policies have become more and more intensive. 
Different from market-oriented policies in the developed economies, the Chinese government 
relies on the command-and-control approach, such as a limit on home-purchase and loan, 
censorship of real estate projects and so on. Those policies are notoriously inconsistent and 
short-run. Moreover, due to different objectives, sometimes the stance of the central 
government is quite different from that of the local government, which brings in more 
uncertainty to policies. Consequently, policy uncertainty in a transition economy like China 
could be very high. 
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Table 6.9 Regressions of Market Prices on Model Prices 
The models are well specified if the coefficients are not significantly different from zero, and the 
constants are not significantly different from one. Option model: 
 Constant Std. Coeff. Std. 
R-square  a Error b Error 
2000 1.0577 0.0484 0.3901 0.0130 0.9679 
2001 1.0457 0.0514 0.3888 0.0135 0.9653 
2002 1.0827 0.0520 0.3784 0.0135 0.9634 
2003 1.0074 0.0406 0.3970 0.0099 0.9816 
2004 0.8819 0.0306 0.4045 0.0069 0.9914 
2005 0.9938 0.0368 0.3927 0.0081 0.9873 
2006 0.7548 0.0533 0.4431 0.0111 0.9814 
2007 0.8016 0.0368 0.4308 0.0072 0.9917 
2008 0.7537 0.0393 0.4343 0.0074 0.9915 
2009 0.9648 0.0454 0.4071 0.0083 0.9876 
2010 0.7696 0.0508 0.4315 0.0088 0.9876 
2011 0.7623 0.0496 0.4307 0.0084 0.9886 
2012 0.7718 0.0458 0.4300 0.0074 0.9912 
2013 0.4302 0.0057 0.7546 0.0359 0.9948 
2014 0.8770 0.0311 0.4166 0.0047 0.9962 
2015 0.7893 0.0325 0.4291 0.0047 0.9964 
 
The investigation establishes that several regressions in terms of the model are comparatively 
fitted. In Table 6.9, the research regresses the option value of land and market value of land. 
R-square suggests that the model processes reasonably. The investigation rejects the 
hypothesis that the coefficient (b) is one and the constant (a) is zero. This result is similar to 
Quigg (1993) who found that real options exist in the land market of the USA. According to 
Quigg (1993), when the constant is zero and the other coefficients are one, the option 
valuation model will be an appropriate depiction of land values. In this research, not only is 
the constant unequal to zero but also the option premium coefficients are positive and 
significant. Thus, the investigation has an approval that “option valuation model has some 
explanatory power for prices over and above the intrinsic value” (Quigg, 1993). 
 
6.6 Conclusion 
The weight of the evidence presented in this chapter suggests there are real options in China’s 
real estate markets. Future price uncertainty drives up land prices in China. This finding is 
robust to a number of different parameterisations and a well-specified spatial regression on 
𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 = 𝑎 + 𝑏 ∗ 𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 +  
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house price and vacant land. In the analysis of underlying house price, the test results justify 
the extension of the spatial model with spatial fixed effects and time period fixed effects and 
are similar to those of the previous study (Mussa et al., 2017), which tested the immigration 
effects on house prices in the USA. Thus, the results illustrate that neighbouring house prices 
affected house prices in this region, supporting the idea that house price has a ripple effect 
(Pijnenburg, 2017). In the Spatial Durbin Model (SDM) analysis of underlying house price, 
this study found an increase in income equivalent of 1% is associated with a 41.2% rise in 
house prices. This result is in line with Tang and Wang (2017), who suggest income increases 
the house price in China. The unemployment rate and CPI is negatively correlated with house 
prices. Similar empirical results were obtained by Harris et al. (2013) and Farlow (2004), 
who found that house prices were higher in cities with increased income and lower CPI and 
unemployment rates in China. The spatial fixed model is the first time applied and should 
capture the source of the parameter heterogeneity in the real options analysis. Regarding Van 
Dijk et al. (2011), neighbouring house prices should be a good approximation of the average 
house price development in the larger geographical region. The results of implied volatility 
analysis provide that house price in China has ARCH effects. This result is in line with Wang 
et al. (2016), who found ARCH effects for house prices in Hangzhou housing market, China. 
It is also similar to the study of Cunningham (2006), who found ARCH effects for house 
prices in Seattle. The standard deviation of residential housing market in China ranges from 
2.14% to 23.49%, depending on the time series of house prices. This result is in line with 
Wang et al. (2016), who provide a one-standard-deviation residential housing market in 
Hangzhou ranges from 13.39 % and 16.51 %. Referred to the results of uncertainty and 
timing of land development, it is found that uncertainty delayed land development, as the 
coefficient of uncertainty was negative (-1.101). This result is in line with Tang and Wang 
(2017), who suggest the rising housing demand is accompanied by developers' strategic delay 
of land development in China. It provides the uncertainty of future information delay the land 
development in China based on land flexibility. The results also provide the similar results to 
Wang et al. (2016), who found the uncertainty delay the land development by 42% in 
Hangzhou, China. Based on the analyses, the results provide that the uncertainty affected land 
value by 1.82% significantly and positively. The unemployment rate influences the land 
value by 40.2%, significantly and negatively. These results are in line with Tang and Wang 
(2017) and Shi et al. (2015), who suggest the uncertainty increases the land value. 
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Market prices indicate a premium for optimal development of land, which according to our 
estimates has a mean of 16.28% of the land value. A one-standard-deviation increase in 
uncertainty reduces the likelihood of development by 1.101%. These results differ from those 
of previous studies. Wang et al. (2016) found the real-option premium 9.76% in housing 
market in Hangzhou, China. Yao and Pretorius (2004) found the real-option premium 11.75% 
in housing market in Hongkong, China. Quigg (1993) found a real-option premium of 6% on 
undeveloped land that is relative to the deterministic price. There are some reasons for the 
high option premium in the Chinese land market. The real estate market in China is 
characterised as poorly liquid and decentralised (Tang and Wang, 2017). According to Shiller 
(1998), “illiquid (real asset) markets tend to be markets where the individual assets are 
idiosyncratic, having quality characteristics that are unique to each asset sold, assets that are 
difficult to describe or measure”. The assessment of asset price could be a misunderstanding 
based on the inefficient financial market liquidity. Childs et al. (2001) point out that the 
decentralised trading is a feature of the real estate market. Continuous trading facilitates 
arbitrage by well-informed agents, bringing the prices of financial products to their 
fundamental prices. By contrast, decentralised trading in real estate markets inhibits arbitrage, 
generating difficulty in price discovery. Thus, the valuation of real estate typically contains 
plenty of information noises, especially in emerging markets like China (Hui et al., 2013). 
Childs et al. (2002) note that the phenomenon of phasing development observed in urban 
fringe or blighted urban land is an illustration of internalising the potential benefits of 
information spill-over arising from advanced investment. As the Chinese housing market has 
become overheated since the year 2003, the central government’s control policies have 
become more and more intensive. Different from market-oriented policies in the developed 
economies, the Chinese government relies on the command-and-control approach, such as a 
limit on home-purchase and loan, censorship of real estate projects and so on. Those policies 
are notoriously inconsistent and short-run. Moreover, due to different objectives, sometimes 
the stance of the central government is quite different from that of the local government, 
which brings in more uncertainty to policies. Consequently, policy uncertainty in a transition 
economy like China could be very high. 
It is suggested that real options valuation has been undertaken to develop and improve the 
real assets investment valuation with investment flexibility, variability and irreversibility. 
Employing methods to account for uncertainty can increase the ability of decision making. 
Real options state the flexibility in decision making. Moreover, real options implement the 
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flexibility to be inherently facilitated in irreversible investments. Whilst real options 
valuation has been applied to investment projects to account for the value of flexibility 
referred to the uncertainties where the traditional DCF is unable to do so. 
It is recommended that the real option valuation is senior for real estate investment facing 
uncertain market which desires flexible and adaptive approaches. It is suggested that real 
options identify the uncertainties in real estate development, which is evident by development 
cost, the timing of building activity and incomplete information. While real options valuation 
is suggested to apply in the real estate market, the limitation and methodological guidance 
cannot be neglected. In this thesis, real options valuation is employed in the context of real 
estate investment to value the flexible options. The objective of this thesis is to extend a 
methodology with identified uncertainties for the application of real option in the Chinses 
housing market. 
This context appropriately solves the agency problem based on investment timing (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976). When the shareholder and agents capture the information of 
surroundings at the same time and plan the investment of options, the information 
asymmetric and timing of investment are solved in order to establish an optimal capital 
structure and maximise the shareholder’s value. Regarding the evaluation of land price, the 
increasing one-standard-deviation in price uncertainty raises the land price. If there is a 
greater level of price uncertainty according to the economic information, then the vacant land 
will be traded at a premium above discounted future rents in current low capital use. 
In the assumption of real options, the investment opportunity is directly managed by the 
principal, who also be the owner (McDonald and Siegel, 1986). Meanwhile, the agents are 
perfectly aligned with them (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). Regarding the previous studies of 
agency conflicts with real options in the recent, Nishihara and Shibata (2008) extends the 
model involves the relationship between an audit mechanism and managers’ behaviours with 
bonus-incentives. Shibata and Nishihara (2010) contributed the agency conflicts and real 
options based on debt financing on investment expenditure. Hori and Osano (2010) provided 
a model consider the managerial compensation that endogenously illustrated a contingent 
claim on firm’s cash-flows using stock options. However, this investigation established a 
spatial method, which considered the effects of surrounding house prices and surrounding 
economic factors, has improved the accuracy of house price uncertainty estimation, in terms 
of reducing the agent problems of incomplete and asymmetric information. Thus, the optimal 
206 
 
contract scheme could be proposed by real options approach with spatial analysis. In this 
context, this investigation avoids inadequate information from the agent in order to encourage 
the shareholders to follow the future evolution of investment value so that to achieve the 
optimal profits. 
Although previous studies, such as Titaman (1985), Quigg (1993), Cunningham (2006), 
applied the OLS specification to examine house price uncertainty, the investigation 
established a spatial method which also considered the effects of surrounding house prices 
and surrounding economic factors in order to improve the accuracy of house price uncertainty 
estimation. Accordingly, this research extended this model by incorporating a spatial Durbin 
model. Our evidence links spatial analysis and GARCH analysis, which adds to our overall 
understanding of house price uncertainty.  
The results of this study suggest that investors in China’s real estate do take note of real 
options, even in sectors such as new home construction that is highly competitive and 
economically important. That real options are present in land markets is further evidence for 
the need to include real options in capital investment models. Real options have wider 
implications concerning the importance of price stability and the need for consistent 
government policy to stimulate fixed investment.  
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Chapter 7 Conclusion  
 
7.1 Overview 
This thesis has investigated several important issues relating to real estate markets in China. 
Chapter 4 investigated the influences of house characteristic and economic fundamentals on 
house prices of Beijing and introduced new flat-related factors that influencing house price. 
Moreover, this investigation employed IV-GMM method to explore the endogeneity of the 
variables with instrumental variables. Chapter 5 investigated the spatial statistics of house 
prices in Beijing and examined whether the house prices in one region are affected by the 
house prices in neighbouring regions. This investigation also analysed how the house prices 
in one region are affected by unknown characteristics of the neighbouring regions. Moreover, 
it explored whether the explanatory factors of house prices in one region are affected by 
explanatory factors of house prices in neighbouring regions. Subsequently, the objective was 
to investigate the spatial spill-over effects of explanatory factors. Chapter 6 investigated the 
real options for the spatial analysis in China’s real estate markets and extended the real 
options method with spatial Durbin model (SDM), making this the first time that real option 
predictions have been tested in a spatial manner. Chapter 6 also measured the degree of price 
uncertainty by a generalised autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (GARCH) model. 
The weight of the evidence suggested there are real options in China’s real estate markets. 
Uncertainty about future house prices of neighbouring regions drives up land prices in China. 
The objective of this thesis has been to extend the existing literature and provide potential 
explanations for the contradictory results reported in the existing literature, thus contributing 
to the empirical foundations in the real estate area. 
 
7.2 Summary of Key Findings and Implications 
Chapter 4 explored the empirical relationship among property prices, economic fundamental 
effects and property characteristics effects via the panel model and IV-GMM estimation. This 
chapter overcomes the omitted variables of house characteristics, leading to biased estimates 
of the implicit house price, compared with the previous studies (Rosen, 1974; Bajari et al., 
2010). The house characteristics have influenced the property price significantly, which 
indicates that consumer behaviour is an essential aspect of the housing market (Rosen, 1979). 
The results have rejected the hypotheses that economic fundamentals and house 
208 
 
characteristics are exogenous variables on property price. Therefore, this study provides 
innovative evidence that the economic fundamentals and the house characteristics are 
essential factors in the Chinese housing market. This result is supported by a number of 
previous studies in western country (Jim and Chen, 2009; Larraz and Alfaro, 2008; Malpezzi, 
2002; Meen, 1996; Oikarinen, 2006; Rosen, 1974) and in China (Gan et al., 2012; Horioka 
and Wan, 2007; Hui and Gu, 2009; Li and Chand, 2013; Li et al., 2018; Shen and Liu, 2004; 
Taylor, 2000; Wong et al., 2005; Yu, 2010; Zhang and Yi, 2017). 
Regarding the house characteristics, house size is leading to an increase in house prices 
which is in line with Zhang and Yi (2017) who found there is a positive relationship between 
house price and size of living area in Beijing. This result is also similar to Fang et al. (2016) 
who provide that despite the critical financial burdens afforded by the households, the home 
size is spacious which is more than the standards of most metropolitan areas in the world. It 
implies that home size in Beijing influences the housing demand in terms of China’s 
characterised consumer behaviour of households who prefer to buy larger-size house. There 
is a significant positive relationship between house prices by floor level and negative 
relationship on property prices with FR2. This result is similar to a previous study by Wong et 
al. (2005). This means the floor level influences the house price positively from the lower 
floor level to the middle floor level in a tall building. However, from the middle floor level to 
the upper floor level, the floor level influences house prices negatively. It implies that the 
household in Beijing preferred to buy a similar condition house with the lower price. The 
number of bedrooms has a significant negative influence on property prices. This situation 
may be based on privacy. According to Fahey (2016), one-bedroom rents are more expensive 
than two-bedroom rents. In terms of the house orientation, the north and south factor is 
significant and positive, which means that houses facing north and south have an increased 
price of 2.48%. This result is found in the previous studies (Fang et al., 2016 and Zhang and 
Yi, 2017). This is because houses facing north and south have better natural ventilation and 
more daylight, which improves the natural quality of a house and its energy efficiency. 
However, it is similar to Jim and Chen (2009) who suggested that daylight and views from 
houses are significant factors affecting house price.  
Regarding the economic fundamentals, the mortgage down payment has a significant 
negative influence on property prices. This result is in line with Fang et al. (2016), Yu (2010) 
and Li and Chand (2013), who provided the mortgage down payment influence China’s urban 
house prices negatively by data between 1998 and 2009. Thus, it is suggested that the high 
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levels of down payments in China should be kept which can not only reduce the risk of 
household default for the bank but also decline the housing demand significantly. The 
average income of citizens influences house price significantly and positively. This result is 
in line with Hui and Gu (2009) and Shen and Liu (2004), who provide income significantly 
influence the house price in China. Housing assets have been a significant part of household 
wealth in China. The housing assets accounted for 66% of household wealth in China in 2016 
(Liu and Xiong, 2018). Therefore, it is recommended that the demand for purchasing power 
in the Chinese housing market is influenced by the household incomes. The demand quantity 
of properties (Floor*House_permissions) has an inverse U-shape relationship with house 
prices. This result is not similar to Li et al. (2018), who provide the ratios of residential floor 
space under construction to floor space increase house price each year after 2004. This is 
because the thesis improved the method of calculating house demand, which is more flexible 
with an inverse U-shape relationship to explore the house price and house demand. Although 
some studies were undertaken in different countries, all of the results corresponded with 
economic theory. Based on such findings, economic factors have a significant influence on 
property prices in Beijing. 
Baltagi (2001) provides that employing the values of the other variable regressors as 
instruments can increase consistency and efficiency of the model. The IV-GMM model 
employed the instrumental variables to improve the efficiency of the model. Meanwhile, the 
IV-GMM method restricted unobserved heterogeneity and limited the consistency of the 
dependent variable. To deal with this, the independent variables employed in this 
investigation refer to the IV-GMM method. The result provides that the central bank interest 
rates (IR) significantly influence the income (IC) positively and the inflation (CPI) influences 
the income (IC) negatively and significantly. This result confirms that of Horioka and Wan 
(2007), who found the real interest rate has a significant positive impact on the household 
income in China between 1995 and 2004. It implies that the central bank interest rates and 
inflation influences the house price in Beijing indirectly which is in line with Koss and Shi 
(2018).  
Regarding the fiscal factors which are treated as the instruments to the variable of mortgage 
down payments, the results provide that the investment in fixed assets (IFA) affect the 
mortgage payment rates positively and significantly. If the local government general 
budgetary revenue (GR) increases, the mortgage payment rates will be increased significantly. 
The mortgage payment rates will be increased significantly when the local government 
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general budgetary expenditure (GE) increases. Based on these results, IFA and GE influence 
mortgage payment rates positively, which is in line with the theory of ‘conventional wisdom’ 
(Galbraith, 1958). The results also are in line with Taylor (2000), who provide the 
instruments of fiscal policy change aggregate demand and influence the monetary policy 
indirectly in China. However, the result, which money supply (MS) and GR influence 
mortgage payment rates positively, is contrary to the ‘conventional wisdom’ (Galbraith, 1958) 
and the ‘quantity theory of money’ (Irving, 1911). The reason for that may be referred to the 
Budget Law. The local governments expend the fiscal capacity by non-budgetary funding 
sources such as land sales (Liu and Xiong, 2018). Therefore, the increasing government 
revenue cannot restrain the demand for investments in the housing market. Regarding 
China’s “Local Government Financing Platform” (LGFP), the increase of government 
revenue means upward pressure on mortgage payment rates. Though the money supply 
increases, the aggregate demand for GDP is increasing rapidly so that exceed the amount of 
money supply, caused the increase of interest rate. Therefore, when the central government 
tightens monetary policy to limit debt accumulation by local governments, LGFP has been 
regulated. Accordingly, the fiscal factors and interest rate influence the house prices in 
Beijing indirectly. 
Furthermore, the results provide the house orientation (Orien) influences the condition of the 
bedroom and the condition of living room positively and significantly. The orientation factors 
of SE NW WE and SW negatively influence the number of bedrooms respectively and 
significantly. The orientation factor of W negatively influences the number of the living 
rooms significantly. The orientation factor of WE affects the number of living rooms 
positively and significantly. The results of this study are in line with Jim and Chen (2009), 
who suggested that daylight and views from houses are significant factors affecting house 
prices. After adding the instrumental variables (orientation factors) in different models, the 
investigation found that the coefficients of BR are decreased. The coefficient of LR is 
increased. These results are in line with Rosen (1974). However, when the investigation 
considers the factor of floor level with number of bedrooms, the factor of Bedroom*Floor 
influences house prices positively and significantly with instruments of SE SW and SW NW 
respectively. The coefficient of Living_room*Floor increases. This means the more 
bedrooms are facing southeast and southwest or facing southwest and northwest with higher 
floor level, the higher house price. The more living rooms are facing west or east with higher 
floor level, the higher house price. Generally, the house facing south and west have more 
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extended daylight, which increases the temperature of the room, so that increase the electrical 
efficiency. However, the bedrooms facing southwest, southeast or northwest not only keeps 
daylight but also reduces west sunburn and improves natural ventilation to improve sleeping 
context. The living room improves west sunburn increasing the whole house temperature so 
that increase house efficiency. Moreover, the higher floor level of houses, the more efficient 
daylight and natural ventilation. Thus, this investigation found the more numbers of rooms 
with proper orientation, the better condition of the room is which has good daylight and better 
natural ventilation. This result provides the orientation of the property influence the property 
prices indirectly in Beijing. 
Regarding IV-GMM methods, the hypotheses are examined by the endogenous test. In the 
hypotheses, the coefficients of the independent variables are not significant and are 
individually equal to zero. If the null hypothesis is not rejected, the model is not efficient so 
that to modify the equation. With regards to the efficient model, the null hypothesis should be 
rejected so that the independent variables are significant in the general regression. 
Alternatively, the investigation could reduce the number of non-significant variables to 
estimate a confining hypothesis. Such estimations yield consistent estimations of the 
parameters. The coefficients of independent variables are respectable and refer to the 
restriction for the number of independent variables. According to the test of error terms 
unrelated to regressors, the hypothesis is rejected, which means that the regressors have 
endogeneity. With respect to linear instrumental variables regression, this investigation 
applies and tests the instrumental variables and endogeneity in order to establish IV-GMM 
models. As there is heteroscedasticity in the model, the GMM model is more efficient than 
the 2SLS model. This research employs mortgage payment rates, income, house planning 
permissions, number of bedrooms, number of living room as the endogenous variable 
respectively. The results of test reject the null hypothesis, indicating that IV-GMM is 
efficient and appropriate to be employed in the investigation of house prices in Beijing in 
terms of the relevant factors influencing the house prices indirectly.  
In conclusion, this investigation complements the literature that studies the determinants of 
real estate markets and the economic area. This research is based on the panel model and IV-
GMM, which could monitor the process of influencing factors. Defining the endogenous 
variable through instrumental variables is more detailed in terms of analysing exogenous 
variables. This investigation factors in a new variable of the orientation of property. This 
variable has never been analysed in previous studies. Through the panel analysis and GMM 
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model, the results found that the orientation of property has influences on property price 
directly and indirectly. In addition, this study examines an extended period (2002-2014), 
which provides a sample of 17,143 property transaction records containing detailed 
information to examine the whole of Beijing’s core real estate area. It encourages the 
developer of houses to have a rational house structure in order to have a maximum 
shareholder value. It also implicates that the regulators of banks and government should 
monitor the mortgage payment rate, interest rate, government revenue and expenditure in 
order to deter the irrational increasing house price. 
Chapter 5 analyses the spatial statistics of house prices in Beijing, China with the spatial 
autoregressive model (SAR), spatial Durbin model (SDM), a spatial autoregressive model 
with autoregressive disturbances (SAC) and spatial error model (SEM). The analyses of 
spatial characteristics in house price dynamics with spatial dependence, spatial heterogeneity 
and spill-over effects of explanatory are estimated. While spatial dependence and spatial 
heterogeneity are well-established aspects of house price developments, spatial partitioning 
has not gained much attention yet. The investigation confirms that the disposition effect 
might explain different house price spill-overs across space. On the aspect of analysing direct 
and indirect (spill-over) effects, Chapter 5 examines the partitioning of direct and indirect 
effects and finds out the impacts of the neighbouring characteristics from a close distance 
(immediate neighbours) to the faraway distance on property prices.  
The results of Chapter 5 reveal strong house price spill-overs when the increase in house 
price, size of building started, average wage, income, tax, and a population of the 
neighbouring regions is taken into account. The evidence for the disposition effect is based 
on the below results. The house price spill-overs in Beijing area exist when there is an 
increase in the population of the neighbouring regions, significant upper house price spill-
overs are detected in terms of increasing house prices in the neighbouring regions. This result 
is similar to Zhang et al. (2015) and Chow et al. (2016), which means the urban population 
influence house prices positively and significantly in Beijing. This finding is in line with 
Alonso (1964), who provides the population is a significant factor in the economic analysis, 
because the population changes the demand for the number of houses. In the theory of ‘the 
concentric zone’ (Burgess, 1925), the development of ideal construction of the city expands 
from its CBD. The workers live near CBD aims to easy access to their work. Thus, the 
demand for house surrounding CBD is high, which causes the increase in house price. The 
findings of this analysis are also in line with Burgess’s theory (1925) that the distance from 
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district to CBD influenced the house price significantly and negatively. This encourages the 
regulators of Beijing housing market to establish the rational distribution of fixed assets 
effectively deter the unstable house price variation referred to the population changes. The 
differences in household income cause changes in residential location and house prices based 
on the ‘sector theory’ (Hoyt, 1939). This result is in line with Shen and Liu (2004). The 
income significantly influences the house price in Beijing and changes the distribution of 
house prices. This investigation provides a similar result to Hoyt’s theory (1939), which the 
average wage of employees in the real estate market leads to an increase in house price. This 
finding is also in line with the theory of ‘the concentric zone’ (Burgess, 1925), which 
presents the high-income group ‘who have escaped from the area of deterioration’ changes 
the demand of residential location. This encourages the regulators of Beijing housing market 
to establish the subsidiary CBD in Beijing in order to arrange rational distribution of fixed 
assets. Evans (1973) found that there is an equilibrium relationship between the density and 
revenue of houses in ‘the theory of the supply of space’. Thus, even though there is enough 
space for construction, the irrational density of buildings leads to lower revenues of the house. 
Size of building starts, which instead of the supply of houses, influences house prices 
positively. This result is in line with Hanink et al. (2012) and Zhang et al. (2018) who provide 
house starts is a potential determination of new construction rate which reflects the supply of 
housing market in Beijing. However, the result is not very significant. The result is similar to 
Evans (1973), who suggests a rational space and density of constructions are significant to 
households. Thus, it encourages the regulators of Beijing housing market to control the 
building permits and continue updating the policy of construction so that rationally monitor 
the supply of houses. The research found the taxes and other charges on principal business of 
enterprises for real estate development lead to an increase in house price significantly. This 
result is similar to the previous studies (Li and Chand, 2013; Liu, 2013), which means the 
taxes and other charges on principal business of enterprises for real estate development 
influence house prices negatively and significantly in Beijing. Based on the trade-off theory 
(Evans, 1973), the maximum utility of the household is the objective of the choice of location. 
The increasing tax added the costs of construction, and then the developers will increase the 
house selling price so that balance the costs. When the household considers the house price, 
they will change the location of living so that the patterns of residential location changes. 
Thus, it encourages the regulators of Beijing housing market to control the tax rates, so that 
have a rational distribution of constructions.The results of partitioning analyses are 
appropriately explaining the effects of surroundings, which can approach the utilities. 
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Because of loss aversion, homeowners who intend to sell their properties will not lower their 
asking price, even when they see house prices declining in neighbouring regions. Loss 
aversion reduces the number of transactions in the housing market and, reduces the amount of 
house price spill-over. Results of this study are similar to previous findings (Genesove and 
Mayer, 2001; Engelhardt, 2003; Anenberg, 2011) with regards to loss aversion in the housing 
market. This result is also in line with the previous studies (Yang, Noah, and Shoff, 2015), 
who show that the results of significant levels of the partitioned indirect effects in the second 
order are higher than those of the other order neighbours, which are referred to in the 
complicated estimation process in Spatial Durbin Model. Thus, it is suggested that the 
regulators of Beijing housing market should monitor the economic factors and population in 
the different order regions in order to adjust the house prices. 
Chapter 5 extends previous research in terms of the data sample and independent variables 
used, and by combining methods used in economics and geography. In particular, this 
investigation examines 15 regions of Beijing over an extended period (2002-2014). It 
contains detailed information, building on and extending the work of Bhattacharjee et al. 
(2016), who analysed spatial heterogeneity and endogenous spatial dependence in Portugal. 
Regional house price records are linked with the coordinates of regions to track the spatial 
heterogeneity of house prices, and the region-related factors are employed in Beijing. Most of 
the previous empirical studies that combined geographic factors focused on the area of 
environment, health outcome, crimes and policy analyses (Hund et al., 2015; Neelon and 
Gelfand, 2014; Seliske et al., 2016; Terán-Hernández et al., 2016). These factors can be 
extended by our method with spatial partitioning, which can analyse the intensity of spill-
over effects of explanatory factors. Chapter 5 presents the evidence for the spatial 
dependence of house prices: house prices in one region are influenced by the house prices in 
neighbouring regions positively and significantly. The evidence is found for spatial 
heterogeneity of house prices across space: house prices in neighbouring regions spill-over 
more in times of increasing neighbouring house prices than when neighbouring house prices 
are declining. The evidence is found for spatial spill-over effects of explanatory factors: 
increases of the average wage, income, tax, urban population and house price of the previous 
year increase the house price positively in neighbouring regions; a decrease of unemployment 
drives down the house prices in neighbouring regions. These factors have spill-over effects 
across space. 
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Chapter 6 provides the evidence that there are real options in China’s real estate markets. 
Uncertainty about future prices drives up land prices in China. This finding is robust to 
various parameterisations and a well-specified spatial regression on house price and vacant 
land. In the analysis of underlying house price, the test results justify the extension of the 
spatial model with spatial fixed effects and time period fixed effects and are similar to those 
of the previous study (Mussa et al., 2017), which tested the immigration effects on house 
prices in the USA. Thus, the results illustrate that neighbouring house prices affected house 
prices in this region, supporting the idea that house price has a ripple effect (Pijnenburg, 
2017). In the Spatial Durbin Model (SDM) analysis of underlying house price, this study 
found an increase in income equivalent of 1% is associated with a 41.2% rise in house prices. 
This result is in line with Tang and Wang (2017), who suggest income increases the house 
price in China. The unemployment rate and CPI is negatively correlated with house prices. 
Similar empirical results were obtained by Harris et al. (2013) and Farlow (2004), who found 
that house prices were higher in cities with increased income and lower CPI and 
unemployment rates in China. The spatial fixed model is the first time applied and should 
capture the source of the parameter heterogeneity in the real options analysis. Regarding van 
Dijk et al. (2011), neighbouring house prices should be a good approximation of the average 
house price development in the larger geographical region. The results of implied volatility 
analysis provide that house price in China has ARCH effects. This result is in line with Wang 
et al. (2016), who found ARCH effects for house prices in Hangzhou housing market, China. 
It is also similar to the study of Cunningham (2006), who found ARCH effects for house 
prices in Seattle. The standard deviation of residential housing market in China ranges from 
2.14% to 23.49%, depending on the time series of house prices. This result is in line with 
Wang et al. (2016), who provide a one-standard-deviation residential housing market in 
Hangzhou ranges from 13.39 % and 16.51 %. Referred to the results of uncertainty and 
timing of land development, it is found that uncertainty delayed land development, as the 
coefficient of uncertainty was negative (-1.101). This result is in line with Tang and Wang 
(2017), who suggest the rising housing demand is accompanied by developers' strategic delay 
of land development in China. It provides the uncertainty of future information delay the land 
development in China based on land flexibility. The results also provide the similar results to 
Wang et al. (2016), who found the uncertainty delay the land development by 42% in 
Hangzhou, China. Based on the analyses, the results provide that the uncertainty affected land 
value by 1.82% significantly and positively. The unemployment rate influences the land 
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value by 40.2%, significantly and negatively. These results are in line with Tang and Wang 
(2017) and Shi et al. (2015), who suggest the uncertainty increases the land value. 
Chapter 6 denotes that the market prices indicate a premium for optimal development of land, 
which according to our estimates has a mean of 16.28% of the land value. A one-standard-
deviation increase in uncertainty reduces the likelihood of development by 1.101%. These 
results differ from those of previous studies. Wang et al. (2016) found the real-option 
premium 9.76% in housing market in Hangzhou, China. Yao and Pretorius (2004) found the 
real-option premium 11.75% in housing market in Hongkong, China. Quigg (1993) found a 
real-option premium of 6% on undeveloped land that is relative to the deterministic price. 
There are some reasons for the high option premium in the Chinese land market. The real 
estate market in China is characterised as poorly liquid and decentralised (Tang and Wang, 
2017). According to Shiller (1998), “illiquid (real asset) markets tend to be markets where the 
individual assets are idiosyncratic, having quality characteristics that are unique to each asset 
sold, assets that are difficult to describe or measure”. The assessment of asset price could be a 
misunderstanding based on the inefficient financial market liquidity. Childs et al. (2001) 
point out that the decentralised trading is a feature of the real estate market. Continuous 
trading facilitates arbitrage by well-informed agents, bringing the prices of financial products 
to their fundamental prices. By contrast, decentralised trading in real estate markets inhibits 
arbitrage, generating difficulty in price discovery. Thus, the valuation of real estate typically 
contains plenty of information noises, especially in emerging markets like China (Hui et al., 
2013). Childs et al. (2002) note that the phenomenon of phasing development observed in 
urban fringe or blighted urban land is an illustration of internalising the potential benefits of 
information spill-over arising from advanced investment. As the Chinese housing market has 
become overheated since the year 2003, the central government’s control policies have 
become more and more intensive. Different from market-oriented policies in the developed 
economies, the Chinese government relies on the command-and-control approach, such as a 
limit on home-purchase and loan, censorship of real estate projects and so on. Those policies 
are notoriously inconsistent and short-run. Moreover, due to different objectives, sometimes 
the stance of the central government is quite different from that of the local government, 
which brings in more uncertainty to policies. Consequently, policy uncertainty in a transition 
economy like China could be very high. 
In Chapter 6, most research in this area has focused on the house price uncertainty in a panel 
dataset. This approach provides a basis for testing the main expectations of real options with 
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regard to land development: namely, that neighbouring house price uncertainty should delay 
building activities and increase the value of vacant land. Although previous studies, such as 
Titaman (1985), Quigg (1993), Cunningham (2006), applied the OLS specification to 
examine house price uncertainty. This investigation extends the real options method with the 
spatial Durbin model (SDM), making this the first study in which real option forecast have 
been assessed in a spatial case. The evidence of this research links spatial analysis and 
GARCH analysis, which adds to the overall understanding of house price uncertainty. This 
investigation overcomes the prior studies by extended sample with three datasets have been 
assembled for this investigation: house price files, land price files and GIS files for each 
location. When they are combined, these records produce a data set of 496 average house 
prices and average land prices in 31 provinces of China, for the period 2000 to 2015. 
It is suggested that real options valuation has been undertaken to develop and improve the 
real assets investment valuation with investment flexibility, variability and irreversibility. 
Employing methods to account for uncertainty can increase the ability of decision making. 
Real options state the flexibility in decision making. Moreover, real options implement the 
flexibility to be inherently facilitated in irreversible investments. Whilst real options 
valuation has been applied to investment projects to account for the value of flexibility 
referred to the uncertainties where the traditional DCF is unable to do so. 
Rather than extracting expectations from subsequently reported advantages, Chapter 6 uses 
the Black-Scholes’ (1973) pricing model to explore the option premium of land value, which 
concerns current stock price, time until option exercise, option striking price, risk-free 
interest rates and standard deviation. For the conception of real options, the analyses 
considered market land value as current stock price, future house price as option striking 
price, and house price volatility as standard deviation (Quigg, 1993) in order to determine the 
land option premium. 
It is recommended that the real option valuation is senior for real estate investment facing 
uncertain market which desires flexible and adaptive approaches. It is suggested that real 
options identify the uncertainties in real estate development, which is evident by development 
cost, the timing of building activity and incomplete information. While real options valuation 
is suggested to apply in the real estate market, the limitation and methodological guidance 
cannot be neglected. In this thesis, real options valuation is employed in the context of real 
estate investment to value the flexible options. The objective of this thesis is to extend a 
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methodology with identified uncertainties for the application of real option in the Chinses 
housing market. 
This context appropriately solves the agency problem based on investment timing (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976). When the shareholder and agents capture the information of 
surroundings at the same time and plan the investment of options, the information 
asymmetric and timing of investment are solved in order to establish an optimal capital 
structure and maximise the shareholder’s value. Regarding the evaluation of land price, the 
increasing one-standard-deviation in price uncertainty raises the land price. If there is a 
greater level of price uncertainty according to the economic information, then the vacant land 
will be traded at a premium above discounted future rents in current low capital use. 
In the assumption of real options, the investment opportunity is directly managed by the 
principal, who also be the owner (McDonald and Siegel, 1986). Meanwhile, the agents are 
perfectly aligned with them (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). Regarding the previous studies of 
agency conflicts with real options in the recent, Nishihara and Shibata (2008) extends the 
model involves the relationship between an audit mechanism and managers’ behaviours with 
bonus-incentives. Shibata and Nishihara (2010) contributed the agency conflicts and real 
options based on debt financing on investment expenditure. Hori and Osano (2010) provided 
a model consider the managerial compensation that endogenously illustrated a contingent 
claim on firm’s cash-flows using stock options. However, this investigation established a 
spatial method, which considered the effects of surrounding house prices and surrounding 
economic factors, has improved the accuracy of house price uncertainty estimation, in terms 
of reducing the agent problems of incomplete and asymmetric information. Thus, the optimal 
contract scheme could be proposed by real options approach with spatial analysis. In this 
context, this investigation avoids inadequate information from the agent in order to encourage 
the shareholders to follow the future evolution of investment value so that to achieve the 
optimal profits. 
Although previous studies, such as Titaman (1985), Quigg (1993), Cunningham (2006), 
applied the OLS specification to examine house price uncertainty, the investigation 
established a spatial method which also considered the effects of surrounding house prices 
and surrounding economic factors in order to improve the accuracy of house price uncertainty 
estimation. Accordingly, this research extended this model by incorporating a spatial Durbin 
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model. Our evidence links spatial analysis and GARCH analysis, which adds to our overall 
understanding of house price uncertainty.  
The results of this study suggest that investors in China’s real estate do take note of real 
options, even in sectors such as new home construction that is highly competitive and 
economically important. That real options are present in land markets is further evidence for 
the need to include real options in capital investment models. Real options have wider 
implications concerning the importance of price stability and the need for consistent 
government policy to stimulate fixed investment. 
 
7.3 Future Research 
This PhD thesis set out to construct an appropriate composite model and real estate market 
condition for the unique characteristics of valid evidence and trust modelling, based on the 
data employed. Such research is, to the best of my knowledge, original and sufficient at PhD 
level with various potentially significant contributions to both academic and practical 
applications. The composite measure of real estate, if successfully designed and proven to be 
reliable, will attract great attention from practitioners. Moreover, the fundamental analysis 
models developed for land and house prices will also be of significant interest to practitioners 
since they can enhance their operational methods. All of the topics addressed in this PhD 
thesis are relevant to current discussions taking place in academic literature, making the new 
knowledge presented here an important contribution to the growing body of literature on 
economic research and real estate valuation in China. For investors, this research could guide 
future real estate investment. However, there are limitations, which suggest avenues for 
future research. 
In the investigation of determinants of house prices in seven districts of Beijing (Chapter 4), 
the results of the dominance of the panel models were obtained for only a selection of cities 
in the north of China. Further research is suggested to determine whether our results are 
specific to the particular dataset or the specification of the IV-GMM model. For instance, this 
investigation provides that floor level influences house prices positively, from the lower floor 
level to the middle floor level in a tall building; however, above the middle floor level, floor 
level influences house prices negatively. Meanwhile, when the research controls the floor 
level, the results provide that bedrooms facing southwest and southeast increase house prices 
significantly. Nonetheless, whether the same situation occurs in southern China is worth 
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consideration. In the south of China, weather and geographical conditions are different from 
those in the north. Thus, the natural ventilation and the amount of daylight a house receives 
are also different. For future research, it would be worth investigating whether the house 
characteristics examined in this study also influence house prices in the south of China. 
Regarding the development of the real estate market in China, the government’s “217th 
policy”, introduced in 2001, made changes to the various structures of the housing market 
from land supply, house construction, and market consolidation and regulations. The market 
response to this policy was to slow the rate at which house prices increased. However, 
Beijing house prices continued to rise. While this study investigates the influence of house 
characteristics on house prices, further research could analyse the degree to which prices have 
been affected by house construction regulations. Moreover, whether or not this policy 
affected particular regions, such as Beijing, it is worth further analysis in future studies. For 
instance, in the history of China’s housing market, the Capital Planning and Construction 
Commission Office of Beijing enacted “Beijing Regulatory Detailed Planning (BRDP)”. 
BRDP drew from the experience of American “zoning laws” to regulate details about 
construction projects and the city’s overall planning. Table 7.1 provides the details of 
classification of residential building height. Whether these policies influence house prices are 
not yet known. Further work along these lines is called for, to check the other instrumental 
variables of house characteristics in the particular period.   
Table 7.7.1 Classification of Residential Building Height 
  Requirement Range of Building Height 
I Building height is smaller than 18m <18m 
II Building with 9 floor levels or below 9 floor levels ≥ 18m and <30m 
III Building with floor level between 10 and 18 ≥ 30m and <60m 
IV Building with floor level above 18 floor levels ≥ 60m and <100m 
V Super high floor level building ≥ 100m and ≤250m 
m is meter 
 
In Chapter 4, the results provide that the number of bedrooms has a significant negative 
influence on the property prices. This situation may be based on privacy. According to Fahey 
(2016), the cost of renting a one-bedroom house is more than for a two-bedroom house. 
However, there is no marginal house size to measure the influences of the number of 
bedrooms. Investigating whether a 100-square-meter one-bedroom house is more expensive 
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than an 80-square-meter two-bedroom house, for instance, would be an interesting subject for 
future research. 
In Chapter 4, mortgage payment rates were shown to have a significant negative influence on 
property prices. The House Price Index (HPI), on the other hand, has a positive influence on 
property prices. It was also found that the average income of citizens influences property 
prices significantly and positively. These factors are related to economic performance in 
terms of property price and are statistically significant, as well as consistent with previous 
studies (Antolin and Bover, 1997; Lee, 1997; Chen and Patel, 1998; Shiller, 2007; Mints, 
2007; Miles, 2008). Combining the developments in real estate in China, the Chinese 
government issued the “Notice on Strengthening Commercial Real Estate Credit 
Management”, which had a significant effect on curbing high house prices. Further research 
could analyse the degree to which this policy affected prices. Whether the endogenous 
variables of economic fundamentals in this particular time have different levels of influence 
on house prices would be a significant question for future research. Moreover, the time taken 
for the real estate market to respond to policies is worthy of analysis.  
Chapter 5 analyses the spatial statistics of house prices in Beijing, with the spatial 
autoregressive model (SAR), spatial Durbin model (SDM), a spatial autoregressive model 
with autoregressive disturbances (SAC) and spatial error model (SEM). The first significant 
step of the spatial analysis is to establish the spatial matrix in order to observe the spatial 
variation of house prices. The spatial weight matrix depicts the relationship between an 
element and elements in surrounding regions. The relevant dimension of the weight matrix 
defines the number of neighbours that influence the element in this weight matrix. Several 
methods can define the dimension of the weight matrix, such as inverse distance, fixed 
distance, K nearest neighbours, and contiguity to set for neighbourhood effects. This chapter 
employs queen contiguity spatial weight for the model based on the data characteristics, 
which are the polygons data of districts in Beijing, such as the average income of Chaoyang 
district. However, a previous study (Hoshino and Kuriyama, 2010) estimated the relative 
distance that was regarded as a standard of the weight matrix in spatial error model (SEM). 
For further research, it is suggested to employ different spatial weight matrices to check the 
influence of variables on the house prices. It is possible that the alternative weight matrix is 
the determinant of different spatial models, in reference to the tests of spatial dependence. 
222 
 
For future research, the selection of independent variables which was examined in Chapter 5 
could be extended. This investigation employs GDP, unemployment rate, central bank 
interest rate, number of new projects, size of building started, average wage, distance to 
Beijing Capital Airport (km), distance to CBD (km), tax and urban population as the 
independent variables. Based on the data characteristics and data limitation, the calculation of 
distance has an error. For instance, this investigation regards polygons data, which are the 
average value of variables in each district, as the objective. The central location of each 
district is defined as the coordinate of the district. Thus, the distance to CBD is the distance 
between the centre of the district and the centre of CBD. In further research, the type of data 
can be diversified so to extend the independent variables. The other kinds of spatial data are 
points, lines and pixels. With reference to the development of the real estate market in China, 
data is limited. If this investigation were to use point’s data for a longer period, the analysis 
would be more accurate and more interesting. The point data, which can be regarded as the 
house location, enhance the surrounding characteristics, such as the distance from the house 
to schools, the distance to shopping centres, the green ratio of the house, and the number of 
parking spaces allocated to the house. The more details specified about the house, the more 
accurate the measure of variation of house prices will be. 
Future research could extend the work presented in Chapter 5 by exploring the spatial 
analysis of house prices combined with events consideration. For instance, in this 
investigation, the evidence is found for spatial dependence of house prices: house prices in 
one region are influenced by the house prices in neighbouring regions positively and 
significantly. The evidence is found for spatial heterogeneity of house prices across space: 
house prices spill-over to a greater extent when neighbouring house prices are increasing than 
when neighbouring house prices are declining. The evidence is found for spatial spill-over 
effects of explanatory factors: increases of the average wage, income, tax, urban population 
and house price of last year increase the house price positively in neighbouring regions; a 
decrease of unemployment drives down the house prices in neighbouring regions. These 
factors have spill-over effects across space. This investigation does not include event 
influences on house prices. In 2007, Shenzhen Bay Bridge, which connects Shenzhen and the 
west of Hong Kong, was established. After 2007, house prices of Shenzhen increased rapidly. 
The reason for that increase was the demand for Shenzhen houses by Hong Kong citizens. 
The construction of Shenzhen Bay Bridge enabled traffic to pass much more conveniently 
between Shenzhen and Hong Kong. Subsequently, increasing numbers of Hong Kong 
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citizens bought houses in Shenzhen to avoid the high Hong Kong house prices. Thus, it is 
suggested that the influences of events on house prices are a further topic for research. This 
investigation examined the partitioning of direct and indirect effects to determine the impact 
on property prices of characteristics from nearby neighbours, to those which are more distant. 
Future research could also employ this method to test the range of event influences on house 
prices.  
Chapter 6 of this investigation provides evidence that there are real options in China’s real 
estate markets. Uncertainty about future prices drives up land prices in China. The 
investigation establishes a spatial method which also considered the effects of surrounding 
house prices and surrounding economic factors in order to improve the accuracy of house 
price uncertainty estimation. For further research, it is suggested to include surrounding 
environmental effects on house prices such as ratio of crime, ratio of causes of disease, and 
both CO2 and air pollution indices. These determinants also improve the uncertainties which 
influence house price. On the other hand, the uncertainties can be obtained by alternative 
methods such as spatial autoregressive model (SAR), spatial autoregressive with 
autoregressive disturbances model (SAC) and spatial error model (SEM). This investigation 
suggests that real estate investors do account for real options, even in competitive and 
economically important sectors such as new home construction. The presence of real options 
in land markets is further evidence for the necessary inclusion of real options in models of 
capital investment and has broader implications for the importance of price stability and 
consistent government policy in stimulating fixed investment. 
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Appendix 
This Appendix contains two sections, which are Appendix A and Appendix B. Appendix A 
provides the relative tables of the empirical chapters (Chapter 4, Chapter 5 and Chapter 6). 
And, Appendix B provides the relative figures of the empirical chapters (Chapter 4, Chapter 5 
and Chapter 6). 
 
Appendix A 
Table A.1 – Table A.87 are belonging to Chapter 4 An Empirical Analysis of the Effect of 
Housing Characteristics on Property Price in Beijing 
Table A.1: Variable List 
Name Variables 
P House price times 
AS House size 
FR Floor level of house 
BR Number of bedrooms 
LR Number of living rooms 
HPP House planning permissions 
HCP House completed permissions 
HPI House price index 
MR Mortgage payment rates 
UR Unemployment rates 
IC Income 
IR Central bank interest rate 
CPI Consumer price index 
GRP Gross regional product 
IFA Total investment in fixed assets 
GR Local governments general budgetary revenue 
GE Local governments general budgetary expenditure 
VC Gross output value of construction 
MS Money supply 
S South 
N North 
E East 
W West 
SE Southeast 
SW Southwest 
NE Northeast 
NW Northwest 
NS North and south 
WE West and east 
Region_ID 1 Dongcheng district 
Region_ID 2 Xicheng district 
Region_ID 3 Chongwen district 
Region_ID 4 Xuanwu district 
Region_ID 5 Chaoyang district 
Region_ID 6 Fengtai district 
Region_ID 7 Haidian district 
Notes: All variables were downloaded from the Soufang DataStream and the Beijing municipal commission on 
house and urban-rural development website. Data is from 2/1/2002 to 11/18/2014. 
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Table A.2: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
House Price 17,143 36.87 24.74 0.27 937.5 
Size 17,143 122.9 64.13 16.36 656 
Floor_level 17,143 19.51 9.24 1 66 
Bedroom_nums 17,143 2.22 0.96 1 8 
Livingroom_nums 17,143 1.47 0.64 0 4 
House_planning_permissions 17,143 4.07 0.07 3.88 4.14 
House_completed_permissions 17,143 3.44 0.05 3.35 3.58 
House_price_index 17,143 109.8 7.08 97.4 122 
Mortgage_ payment_rate 17,143 0.07 0.00 0.058 0.078 
Unemployment_rate 17,143 0.01 0.00 0.012 0.021 
Income 17,143 4.73 0.16 4.32 4.89 
Central_bank_interest_rate 17,143 0.06 0.005 0.053 0.075 
Consumer Price Index 17,143 102.2 1.76 98.2 105.6 
Gross Regional Product 17,143 4.14 0.21 3.63 4.33 
Total Investment in Fixed Assets in the Whole Country 17,143 3.70 0.17 3.25 3.84 
Local Governments General Budgetary Revenue 17,143 3.37 0.27 2.73 3.60 
Local Governments General Budgetary Expenditure 17,143 3.42 0.26 2.80 3.66 
Gross Output Value of Construction 17,143 3.67 0.27 3.02 3.91 
Money Supply 17,143 5.82 0.26 5.20 6.08 
South 17,143 0.14 0.35 0 1 
North 17,143 0.07 0.26 0 1 
East 17,143 0.10 0.29 0 1 
West 17,143 0.07 0.26 0 1 
Southeast 17,143 0.11 0.31 0 1 
Southwest 17,143 0.08 0.27 0 1 
Northeast 17,143 0.05 0.21 0 1 
North & South 17,143 0.32 0.47 0 1 
West & East 17,143 0.03 0.17 0 1 
Region_ID 17,143 4.78 1.40 1 7 
Year 17,143 2010 3.7 2002 2014 
Notes: This table summarises descriptive statistics (number of observations, sample mean, standard deviation, 
minimum and maximum) of the full sample of variables. 
 
Table A.3: Results of Breusch-Pagan Test for Heteroskedasticity in OLS Estimator 
  Coef. Std. Err. t P-value [95% Conf. Interval] 
AS 0.05 0.00 13.9 0 0.0463 0.0615 
FR 22.94 2.55 8.99 0 17.9348 27.9402 
FR2 -0.33 0.06 -5.94 0 -0.4440 -0.2237 
BR -2.09 0.27 -7.65 0 -2.6276 -1.5556 
LRFR -0.14 0.02 -5.81 0 -0.1861 -0.0923 
LR 2.92 0.56 5.22 0 1.8220 4.0112 
HPP 120.81 8.14 14.85 0 104.8616 136.7536 
FRHPP -5.74 0.63 -9.16 0 -6.9686 -4.5114 
FR2HPP 0.09 0.01 6.2 0 0.0586 0.1127 
HPI 0.20 0.02 9.48 0 0.1598 0.2431 
MR -292.38 30.45 -9.6 0 -352.0614 -232.6909 
IC 77.15 2.17 35.54 0 72.8923 81.4022 
NS 2.22 0.37 5.99 0 1.4931 2.9464 
_cons -824.27 29.00 -28.42 0 -881.1117 -767.4218 
Breusch-Pagan test 
chi2(1) = 9.68 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0019 
Notes: This table provides results of the Breusch-Pagan test. The null hypothesis of Breusch-Pagan test is that 
there is a constant variance in the model. 
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Table A.4: Results of Breusch-Godfrey LM Test for Autocorrelation in OLS Estimator 
  Coef. Std. Err. t P-value [95% Conf. Interval] 
AS 0.05 0.00 13.9 0 0.0463 0.0615 
FR 22.94 2.55 8.99 0 17.9348 27.9402 
FR2 -0.33 0.06 -5.94 0 -0.4440 -0.2237 
BR -2.09 0.27 -7.65 0 -2.6276 -1.5556 
LRFR -0.14 0.02 -5.81 0 -0.1861 -0.0923 
LR 2.92 0.56 5.22 0 1.8220 4.0112 
HPP 120.81 8.14 14.85 0 104.8616 136.7536 
FRHPP -5.74 0.63 -9.16 0 -6.9686 -4.5114 
FR2HPP 0.09 0.01 6.2 0 0.0586 0.1127 
HPI 0.20 0.02 9.48 0 0.1598 0.2431 
MR -292.38 30.45 -9.6 0 -352.0614 -232.6909 
IC 77.15 2.17 35.54 0 72.8923 81.4022 
NS 2.22 0.37 5.99 0 1.4931 2.9464 
_cons -824.27 29.00 -28.42 0 -881.1117 -767.4218 
Breusch-Godfrey LM test 
lags(p) = 1 
chi2 = 130.612 
df = 1 
Prob > chi2 = 0 
Notes: This table provides results of the Breusch-Godfrey LM test. The null hypothesis of Breusch-Godfrey LM 
is that there is no serial correlation in the model. 
 
Table A.5: Results of Hausman Test in Panel Model 
  (b) (B) (b-B) 
  Fixed Random Difference 
AS 0.0617 0.0548 0.0069 
FR 22.4138 21.6995 0.7142 
FR2 -0.3036 -0.3161 0.0125 
BR -2.6302 -2.1006 -0.5296 
LR 0.4467 0.1644 0.2823 
HPP 118.0117 118.2172 -0.2055 
FRHPP -5.5937 -5.4947 -0.0990 
FR2HPP 0.0777 0.0815 -0.0038 
HPI 0.1931 0.2012 -0.0081 
MR -278.7437 -292.0275 13.2839 
IC 79.3844 77.0973 2.2870 
NS 2.4784 2.3182 0.1603 
Hausman Test 
chi2(10) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
                = 679.9 
Prob>chi2 = 0.00 
Notes: This table provides results of the Hausman test. b=consistent under null hypothesis and alternative 
hypothesis. B=inconsistent under alternative hypothesis, efficient under null hypothesis. The null hypothesis is 
that difference in coefficients not systematic, which means random effect is appropriate. 
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Table A.6: Results of Wooldridge Test for Autocorrelation in Panel Model 
  
Coef. 
Robust Std. 
Err. 
t P-value [95% Conf. Interval] 
AS 
0.0658 0.0151 4.36 0.005 0.0289 0.1028 
D1. 
FR 
25.3360 12.5309 2.02 0.09 -5.3260 55.9980 
D1. 
FR2 
-0.3630 0.1691 -2.15 0.075 -0.7768 0.0508 
D1. 
BR 
-2.9990 0.2742 -10.94 0 -3.6699 -2.3280 
D1. 
LR 
0.6317 0.4799 1.32 0.236 -0.5427 1.8061 
D1. 
HPP 
122.5829 38.3787 3.19 0.019 28.6735 216.4923 
D1. 
FRHPP 
-6.3228 3.1289 -2.02 0.09 -13.9789 1.3333 
D1. 
FR2HPP 
0.0924 0.0422 2.19 0.071 -0.0109 0.1956 
D1. 
HPI 
0.1710 0.0166 10.31 0 0.1304 0.2116 
D1. 
MR 
-281.1627 89.2891 -3.15 0.02 -499.6452 -62.6802 
D1. 
IC 
79.3620 7.8734 10.08 0 60.0965 98.6276 
D1. 
NS 
2.6498 1.4966 1.77 0.127 -1.0123 6.3119 
D1. 
Wooldridge Test 
F(1,6) = 0.669 
Prob > F = 0.4447 
Notes: This table provides results of the Wooldridge test. The null hypothesis is that there is no first-order 
autocorrelation in the model. 
 
 
Table A.7: Results of Likelihood-ratio Test for Groupwise Heteroskedasticity in Panel Model 
Cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression 
Coefficients:  generalized least squares 
Panels: heteroskedastic 
 Coef. Std. Err. z P-value [95% Conf. Interval] 
AS 0.0621 0.0030 20.48 0 0.0561 0.0680 
FR 6.3742 2.1133 3.02 0.003 2.2322 10.5162 
FR2 -0.1084 0.0430 -2.52 0.012 -0.1926 -0.0242 
BR -2.5888 0.2228 -11.62 0 -3.0255 -2.1520 
LR -0.0055 0.2376 -0.02 0.982 -0.4711 0.4601 
HPP 60.2255 7.2381 8.32 0 46.0390 74.4120 
FRHPP -1.6553 0.5192 -3.19 0.001 -2.6728 -0.6378 
FR2HPP 0.0296 0.0106 2.8 0.005 0.0089 0.0503 
HPI 0.2046 0.0172 11.89 0 0.1709 0.2383 
MR -232.0307 25.1767 -9.22 0 -281.3761 -182.6854 
IC 72.8319 1.7863 40.77 0 69.3308 76.3329 
NS 1.8089 0.3025 5.98 0 1.2159 2.4018 
_cons -562.6226 26.5223 -21.21 0 -614.6055 -510.6398 
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Panels: homoskedastic 
 Coef. Std. Err. z P-value [95% Conf. Interval] 
AS 0.0548 0.0039 14.14 0 0.0472 0.0624 
FR 21.6995 2.5448 8.53 0 16.7118 26.6873 
FR2 -0.3161 0.0561 -5.63 0 -0.4261 -0.2060 
BR -2.1006 0.2736 -7.68 0 -2.6369 -1.5643 
LR 0.1644 0.2966 0.55 0.579 -0.4169 0.7456 
HPP 118.2172 8.1278 14.54 0 102.2871 134.1473 
FRHPP -5.4947 0.6257 -8.78 0 -6.7212 -4.2683 
FR2HPP 0.0815 0.0138 5.9 0 0.0544 0.1085 
HPI 0.2012 0.0213 9.46 0 0.1596 0.2429 
MR -292.0275 30.4676 -9.58 0 -351.7430 -232.3121 
IC 77.0973 2.1720 35.5 0 72.8402 81.3544 
NS 2.3182 0.3705 6.26 0 1.5919 3.0444 
_cons -809.2254 28.9021 -28 0 -865.8725 -752.5782 
Likelihood-ratio 
Test 
LR chi2(6) = 3999.35 
Prob > chi2 = 0.00 
Notes: This table provides results of the Likelihood-ratio test. The null hypothesis is that homoscedastic is 
nested in heteroskedastic. 
 
Table A.8: Results of Friedman's Test for Cross-sectional Correlation in Panel Model 
  Coef. Std. Err. t P-value [95% Conf. Interval] 
AS 0.0617 0.0037 16.58 0 0.0544 0.0690 
FR 22.4138 2.4133 9.29 0 17.6834 27.1441 
FR2 -0.3036 0.0531 -5.72 0 -0.4076 -0.1996 
BR -2.6302 0.2611 -10.08 0 -3.1419 -2.1185 
LR 0.4467 0.2800 1.6 0.111 -0.1021 0.9955 
HPP 118.0117 7.7089 15.31 0 102.9014 133.1220 
FRHPP -5.5937 0.5931 -9.43 0 -6.7562 -4.4312 
FR2HPP 0.0777 0.0130 5.95 0 0.0521 0.1032 
HPI 0.1931 0.0201 9.62 0 0.1538 0.2325 
MR -278.7437 28.7429 -9.7 0 -335.0826 -222.4047 
IC 79.3844 2.0515 38.7 0 75.3633 83.4054 
NS 2.4784 0.3538 7.01 0 1.7850 3.1719 
_cons -823.9214 27.4906 -29.97 0 -877.8057 -770.0370 
Friedman's Test 
Cross sectional independence = 264.505 
Pr = 0.00 
Notes: This table provides results of the Friedman's test. The null hypothesis is there is no cross-sectional 
correlation in the model. 
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Table A.9: Results of First Stage Regression for GMM (MR as endogenous variables, IR and 
CPI as instruments) 
MR Coef. Robust Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf.Interval] 
AS 3.36E-07 1.29E-07 2.6 0.009 8.31E-08 5.89E-07 
FR 8.62E-05 8.25E-05 1.04 0.296 -7.55E-05 2.48E-04 
FR2 -1.09E-06 1.74E-06 -0.62 0.533 -4.51E-06 2.33E-06 
BR -1.67E-05 9.23E-06 -1.81 0.071 -3.48E-05 1.41E-06 
LR -1.32E-06 9.30E-06 -0.14 0.887 -1.95E-05 1.69E-05 
HPP -3.62E-03 2.79E-04 -12.97 0 -4.17E-03 -3.08E-03 
FRHPP -2.21E-05 2.00E-05 -1.1 0.27 -6.13E-05 1.72E-05 
FR2HPP 2.80E-07 4.23E-07 0.66 0.508 -5.49E-07 1.11E-06 
HPI 6.61E-06 4.42E-07 14.96 0 5.75E-06 7.48E-06 
IC 3.08E-03 7.41E-05 41.6 0 2.94E-03 3.23E-03 
NS -2.40E-05 1.16E-05 -2.06 0.039 -4.68E-05 -1.17E-06 
IR 0.9521 0.0019003 501.06 0 9.48E-01 9.56E-01 
CPI -3.99E-05 5.23E-06 -7.63 0 -5.02E-05 -2.96E-05 
_cons 1.19E-02 9.60E-04 12.38 0 1.00E-02 1.38E-02 
Notes: This table provides results of the first stage regression of IV-GMM. The null hypothesis is that 
instrumental variables have not relationship to the endogenous variable (instrumental variables are exogenous). 
 
Table A.10: Results of Hausman Test for GMM (MR as endogenous variable, IR and CPI as 
instruments) 
  (b) (B) (b-B) 
  iv ols Difference 
MR -254.4061 -292.0275 37.6214 
AS 0.0548 0.0548 -0.0001 
FR 21.6922 21.6995 -0.0073 
FR2 -0.3164 -0.3161 -0.0003 
BR -2.1011 -2.1006 -0.0005 
LR 0.1647 0.1644 0.0003 
HPP 118.2787 118.2172 0.0615 
FRHPP -5.4926 -5.4947 0.0021 
FR2HPP 0.0816 0.0815 0.0001 
HPI 0.1996 0.2012 -0.0016 
IC 76.7025 77.0973 -0.3948 
NS 2.3266 2.3182 0.0084 
_cons -809.8862 -809.2254 -0.6608 
Hausman Test 
chi2(2) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
             = 91.26 
Prob>chi2 = 0.00 
Notes: This table provides results of the Hausman test. b=consistent under null hypothesis and alternative 
hypothesis. B=inconsistent under alternative hypothesis, efficient under null hypothesis. The null hypothesis is 
that difference in coefficients not systematic, which means ols estimator is appropriate. 
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Table A.11: Results of Sargan Test for GMM (MR as endogenous variable, IR and CPI as 
instruments) 
  Coef. Std. Err. t P-value [95% Conf. Interval] 
MR -254.4061 30.7223 -8.28 0 -314.6206 -194.1916 
AS 0.0548 0.0039 14.12 0 0.0472 0.0624 
FR 21.6922 2.5449 8.52 0 16.7042 26.6802 
FR2 -0.3164 0.0561 -5.63 0 -0.4264 -0.2063 
BR -2.1011 0.2736 -7.68 0 -2.6374 -1.5648 
LR 0.1647 0.2966 0.56 0.579 -0.4166 0.7459 
HPP 118.2787 8.1281 14.55 0 102.3478 134.2095 
FRHPP -5.4926 0.6258 -8.78 0 -6.7191 -4.2661 
FR2HPP 0.0816 0.0138 5.91 0 0.0545 0.1086 
HPI 0.1996 0.0213 9.39 0 0.1579 0.2413 
IC 76.7025 2.1725 35.31 0 72.4444 80.9605 
NS 2.3266 0.3706 6.28 0 1.6003 3.0529 
_cons -809.8862 28.9035 -28.02 0 -866.5360 -753.2364 
Sargan Test 
chi2(1) =  0.237623 
  p = 0.6259 
Notes: This table provides results of the Sargan test. The null hypothesis is that instrumental variables have not 
relationship to the error (instrumental variables are exogenous). 
 
Table A.12: Results of Endogenous Test for GMM (MR as endogenous variable, IR and CPI 
as instruments) 
First-stage regression summary statistics 
Variable R-sq. Adjusted R-sq. Partial R-sq. F(2,17129) Prob > F 
MR 0.9853 0.9853 0.9836 513003 0 
Shea's partial R-squared 
Variable Shea's Partial R-sq. Shea's Adj. Partial R-sq. 
MR 0.9836 0.9836 
Wald test for weak instruments (Critical Values)  
  10% 15% 20% 25% 
Maximal IV Size 19.93 11.59 8.75 7.25 
Notes: This table provides results of the endogenous test. The null hypothesis is that instrumental variables are 
not relative to endogenous variables. For Wald test, the null hypothesis is that the instruments are weak. 
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Table A.13: Results of Hausman Test for GMM in Panel Model (MR as endogenous variable, 
IR and CPI as instruments) 
  (b) (B) (b-B) 
  iv fe Difference 
MR -244.3859 -278.7437 34.3578 
AS 0.0617 0.0617 -0.0001 
FR 22.3992 22.4138 -0.0145 
FR2 -0.3038 -0.3036 -0.0002 
BR -2.6301 -2.6302 0.0000 
LR 0.4473 0.4467 0.0006 
HPP 118.0459 118.0117 0.0341 
FRHPP -5.5899 -5.5937 0.0037 
FR2HPP 0.0777 0.0777 0.0000 
HPI 0.1917 0.1931 -0.0015 
IC 79.0219 79.3844 -0.3625 
NS 2.4878 2.4784 0.0094 
Hausman Test 
chi2(2) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
              = 85.66 
Prob>chi2 = 0.00 
Notes: This table provides results of the Hausman test. b=consistent under null hypothesis and alternative 
hypothesis. B=inconsistent under alternative hypothesis, efficient under null hypothesis. The null hypothesis is 
that difference in coefficients not systematic, which means fixed effect is appropriate. 
 
Table A.14: Results of Sargan Test for GMM in Panel Model (MR as endogenous variable, 
IR and CPI as instruments) 
  Coef. Std. Err. t P-value [95% Conf. Interval] 
MR -244.3859 28.9727 -8.44 0 -301.1713 -187.6005 
AS 0.0617 0.0037 16.57 0 0.0544 0.0689 
FR 22.3992 2.4126 9.28 0 17.6707 27.1278 
FR2 -0.3038 0.0530 -5.73 0 -0.4077 -0.1998 
BR -2.6301 0.2610 -10.08 0 -3.1417 -2.1186 
LR 0.4473 0.2799 1.6 0.11 -0.1013 0.9959 
HPP 118.0459 7.7066 15.32 0 102.9413 133.1505 
FRHPP -5.5899 0.5929 -9.43 0 -6.7520 -4.4279 
FR2HPP 0.0777 0.0130 5.96 0 0.0521 0.1032 
HPI 0.1917 0.0201 9.55 0 0.1523 0.2310 
IC 79.0219 2.0512 38.52 0 75.0016 83.0421 
NS 2.4878 0.3537 7.03 0 1.7946 3.1810 
Sargan Test 
chi2(1) =  0.026 
  p = 0.8708 
Notes: This table provides results of the Sargan test. The null hypothesis is that instrumental variables have not 
relationship to the error (instrumental variables are exogenous). 
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Table A.15: Results of Endogenous Test for GMM in Panel Model (MR as endogenous 
variable, IR and CPI as instruments) 
Underidentification test (Anderson canon. corr. LM statistic) 
Variable Chi-sq(2) Prob > F 
MR 17000 0 
Wald test for weak instruments (Critical Values)  
  10% 15% 20% 25% 
Maximal IV Size 19.93 11.59 8.75 7.25 
Notes: This table provides results of the endogenous test. The null hypothesis is that instrumental variables are 
not relative to endogenous variables. For Wald test, the null hypothesis is that the instruments are weak. 
 
Table A.16: Results of First Stage Regression for GMM (MR and IC as endogenous variables, 
IR, CPI and GRP as instruments) 
MR Coef. Robust Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf.Interval] 
AS 3.20E-07 1.28E-07 2.5 0.013 6.88E-08 5.72E-07 
FR 7.75E-05 8.31E-05 0.93 0.351 -8.54E-05 2.40E-04 
FR2 -8.82E-07 1.74E-06 -0.51 0.612 -4.29E-06 2.53E-06 
BR -1.61E-05 9.18E-06 -1.75 0.08 -3.41E-05 1.93E-06 
LR -7.94E-07 9.24E-06 -0.09 0.932 -1.89E-05 1.73E-05 
HPP -3.12E-03 2.64E-04 -11.78 0 -3.63E-03 -2.60E-03 
FRHPP -1.99E-05 2.02E-05 -0.99 0.325 -5.94E-05 1.97E-05 
FR2HPP 2.28E-07 4.22E-07 0.54 0.588 -5.98E-07 1.05E-06 
HPI 6.44E-06 4.34E-07 14.83 0 5.59E-06 7.29E-06 
NS -2.30E-05 1.16E-05 -1.99 0.047 -4.58E-05 -3.36E-07 
IR 9.56E-01 1.82E-03 525.55 0 9.52E-01 9.59E-01 
CPI -6.54E-05 4.84E-06 -13.5 0 -7.49E-05 -5.59E-05 
GRP 2.33E-03 4.88E-05 47.86 0 2.24E-03 2.43E-03 
_cons 1.71E-02 9.85E-04 17.37 0 1.52E-02 1.90E-02 
Notes: This table provides results of the first stage regression of IV-GMM. The null hypothesis is that 
instrumental variables have not relationship to the endogenous variable (instrumental variables are exogenous). 
 
IC Coef. Robust Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf.Interval] 
AS -3.37E-06 2.07E-06 -1.62 0.104 -7.44E-06 6.98E-07 
FR -3.50E-03 1.43E-03 -2.45 0.014 -6.29E-03 -7.01E-04 
FR2 8.55E-05 2.96E-05 2.89 0.004 2.75E-05 1.44E-04 
BR -3.71E-05 1.46E-04 -0.25 0.8 -3.24E-04 2.50E-04 
LR 2.40E-04 1.54E-04 1.56 0.119 -6.20E-05 5.43E-04 
HPP 2.65E-01 4.80E-03 55.19 0 2.56E-01 2.75E-01 
FRHPP 8.79E-04 3.48E-04 2.52 0.012 1.96E-04 1.56E-03 
FR2HPP -2.14E-05 7.22E-06 -2.96 0.003 -3.55E-05 -7.20E-06 
HPI -6.59E-06 1.32E-05 -0.5 0.616 -3.24E-05 1.92E-05 
NS 3.00E-04 1.92E-04 1.57 0.117 -7.54E-05 6.76E-04 
IR 1.32E+00 3.36E-02 39.2 0 1.25E+00 1.38E+00 
CPI -8.39E-03 9.86E-05 -85.1 0 -8.59E-03 -8.20E-03 
GRP 7.17E-01 7.69E-04 933.32 0 7.16E-01 7.19E-01 
_cons 1.45E+00 1.74E-02 83.78 0 1.42E+00 1.49E+00 
Notes: This table provides results of the first stage regression of IV-GMM. The null hypothesis is that 
instrumental variables have not relationship to the endogenous variable (instrumental variables are exogenous). 
 
254 
 
Table A.17: Results of Hausman Test for GMM (MR and IC as endogenous variables, IR, 
CPI and GRP as instruments) 
  (b) (B) (b-B) 
  iv ols Difference 
MR -260.3290 -292.0275 31.6985 
IC 80.6708 77.0973 3.5735 
AS 0.0547 0.0548 -0.0002 
FR 21.7845 21.6995 0.0850 
FR2 -0.3186 -0.3161 -0.0026 
BR -2.0856 -2.1006 0.0150 
LR 0.1596 0.1644 -0.0048 
HPP 110.4212 118.2172 -7.7960 
FRHPP -5.5156 -5.4947 -0.0209 
FR2HPP 0.0821 0.0815 0.0006 
HPI 0.1979 0.2012 -0.0033 
NS 2.3244 2.3182 0.0062 
_cons -796.0722 -809.2254 13.1532 
Hausman Test 
chi2(2) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
              = 274 
Prob>chi2 = 0.00 
Notes: This table provides results of the Hausman test. b=consistent under null hypothesis and alternative 
hypothesis. B=inconsistent under alternative hypothesis, efficient under null hypothesis. The null hypothesis is 
that difference in coefficients not systematic, which means ols estimator is appropriate. 
 
Table A.18: Results of Sargan Test for GMM (MR and IC as endogenous variables, IR, CPI 
and GRP as instruments) 
  Coef. Std. Err. t P-value [95% Conf. Interval] 
MR -260.3290 30.7363 -8.47 0 -320.5709 -200.0871 
IC 80.6708 2.1975 36.71 0 76.3638 84.9777 
AS 0.0547 0.0039 14.1 0 0.0471 0.0623 
FR 21.7845 2.5452 8.56 0 16.7961 26.7729 
FR2 -0.3186 0.0562 -5.67 0 -0.4287 -0.2086 
BR -2.0856 0.2737 -7.62 0 -2.6219 -1.5492 
LR 0.1596 0.2966 0.54 0.591 -0.4217 0.7409 
HPP 110.4212 8.1542 13.54 0 94.4393 126.4030 
FRHPP -5.5156 0.6258 -8.81 0 -6.7422 -4.2890 
FR2HPP 0.0821 0.0138 5.95 0 0.0551 0.1092 
HPI 0.1979 0.0213 9.31 0 0.1562 0.2396 
NS 2.3244 0.3706 6.27 0 1.5980 3.0507 
_cons -796.0722 28.9283 -27.52 0 -852.7705 -739.3739 
Sargan Test 
chi2(1) =  0.016395 
  p = 0.8981 
Notes: This table provides results of the Sargan test. The null hypothesis is that instrumental variables have not 
relationship to the error (instrumental variables are exogenous) 
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Table A.19: Results of Endogenous Test for GMM (MR and IC as endogenous variables, IR, 
CPI and GRP as instruments) 
First-stage regression summary statistics 
Variable R-sq. Adjusted R-sq. Partial R-sq. F(3,17129) Prob > F 
MR 0.9854 0.9854 0.9841 353266 0 
IC 0.9964 0.9964 0.9784 259215 0 
Shea's partial R-squared 
Variable Shea's Partial R-sq. Shea's Adj. Partial R-sq. 
MR 0.9828 0.9828 
IC 0.9772 0.9772 
Wald test for weak instruments (Critical Values)  
  10% 15% 20% 25% 
Maximal IV Size 13.43 8.18 6.4 5.45 
Notes: This table provides results of the endogenous test. The null hypothesis is that instrumental variables are 
not relative to endogenous variables. For Wald test, the null hypothesis is that the instruments are weak. 
 
Table A.20: Results of Hausman Test for GMM in Panel Model (MR and IC as endogenous 
variables, IR, CPI and GRP as instruments) 
  (b) (B) (b-B) 
  iv fe Difference 
MR -250.3979 -278.7437 28.3457 
IC 83.0350 79.3844 3.6506 
AS 0.0616 0.0617 -0.0001 
FR 22.5012 22.4138 0.0874 
FR2 -0.3062 -0.3036 -0.0026 
BR -2.6185 -2.6302 0.0117 
LR 0.4422 0.4467 -0.0045 
HPP 110.1347 118.0117 -7.8770 
FRHPP -5.6150 -5.5937 -0.0213 
FR2HPP 0.0783 0.0777 0.0006 
HPI 0.1899 0.1931 -0.0032 
NS 2.4856 2.4784 0.0072 
Hausman Test 
chi2(2) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
              = 291.5 
Prob>chi2 = 0.00 
Notes: This table provides results of the Hausman test. b=consistent under null hypothesis and alternative 
hypothesis. B=inconsistent under alternative hypothesis, efficient under null hypothesis. The null hypothesis is 
that difference in coefficients not systematic, which means fixed effect is appropriate. 
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Table A.21: Results of Sargan Test for GMM in Panel Model (MR and IC as endogenous 
variables, IR, CPI and GRP as instruments) 
  
Coef. Std. Err. t P-value [95% Conf. Interval] 
MR -250.3979 28.9864 -8.64 0 -307.2102 -193.5856 
IC 83.0350 2.0749 40.02 0 78.9683 87.1016 
AS 0.0616 0.0037 16.56 0 0.0543 0.0689 
FR 22.5012 2.4128 9.33 0 17.7722 27.2303 
FR2 -0.3062 0.0531 -5.77 0 -0.4102 -0.2022 
BR -2.6185 0.2610 -10.03 0 -3.1301 -2.1070 
LR 0.4422 0.2799 1.58 0.114 -0.1064 0.9909 
HPP 110.1347 7.7310 14.25 0 94.9823 125.2872 
FRHPP -5.6150 0.5930 -9.47 0 -6.7772 -4.4529 
FR2HPP 0.0783 0.0130 6 0 0.0527 0.1038 
HPI 0.1899 0.0201 9.46 0 0.1506 0.2292 
NS 2.4856 0.3537 7.03 0 1.7923 3.1789 
Sargan Test 
chi2(1) =  0.298 
  p = 0.5851 
Notes: This table provides results of the Sargan test. The null hypothesis is that instrumental variables have not 
relationship to the error (instrumental variables are exogenous). 
 
Table A.22: Results of Endogenous Test for GMM in Panel Model (MR and IC as 
endogenous variables, IR, CPI and GRP as instruments) 
Underidentification test (Anderson canon. corr. LM statistic) 
Variable Chi-sq(2) Prob > F 
MR IC 17000 0 
Wald test for weak instruments (Critical Values)  
  10% 15% 20% 25% 
Maximal IV Size 13.43 8.18 6.4 5.45 
Notes: This table provides results of the endogenous test. The null hypothesis is that instrumental variables are 
not relative to endogenous variables. For Wald test, the null hypothesis is that the instruments are weak. 
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Table A.23: Results of First Stage Regression for GMM (MR and IC as endogenous variables, 
IR, CPI and IFA as instruments) 
MR Coef. Robust Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf.Interval] 
AS 2.59E-07 1.23E-07 2.1 0.036 1.72E-08 5.01E-07 
FR 7.25E-05 7.76E-05 0.93 0.35 -7.96E-05 2.25E-04 
FR2 -9.23E-07 1.64E-06 -0.56 0.574 -4.14E-06 2.29E-06 
BR -1.14E-05 8.85E-06 -1.29 0.196 -2.88E-05 5.91E-06 
LR -1.35E-06 8.87E-06 -0.15 0.879 -1.87E-05 1.60E-05 
HPP -4.53E-03 2.36E-04 -19.16 0 -4.99E-03 -4.06E-03 
FRHPP -1.85E-05 1.88E-05 -0.98 0.325 -5.54E-05 1.84E-05 
FR2HPP 2.37E-07 3.98E-07 0.6 0.552 -5.43E-07 1.02E-06 
HPI 3.30E-06 4.25E-07 7.77 0 2.47E-06 4.13E-06 
NS -2.06E-05 1.11E-05 -1.85 0.064 -4.24E-05 1.22E-06 
IR 9.59E-01 1.72E-03 558.66 0 9.56E-01 9.63E-01 
CPI -6.54E-05 4.76E-06 -13.75 0 -7.47E-05 -5.61E-05 
IFA 3.50E-03 4.83E-05 72.58 0 3.41E-03 3.60E-03 
_cons 1.97E-02 9.11E-04 21.62 0 1.79E-02 2.15E-02 
Notes: This table provides results of the first stage regression of IV-GMM. The null hypothesis is that 
instrumental variables have not relationship to the endogenous variable (instrumental variables are exogenous). 
 
IC Coef. Robust Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf.Interval] 
AS -1.07E-05 3.90E-06 -2.74 0.006 -1.83E-05 -3.03E-06 
FR -7.44E-03 2.28E-03 -3.26 0.001 -1.19E-02 -2.97E-03 
FR2 1.53E-04 5.25E-05 2.91 0.004 4.96E-05 2.56E-04 
BR 8.76E-05 2.77E-04 0.32 0.752 -4.55E-04 6.30E-04 
LR 3.92E-04 2.91E-04 1.35 0.178 -1.78E-04 9.62E-04 
HPP 3.42E-01 7.00E-03 48.93 0 3.29E-01 3.56E-01 
FRHPP 1.88E-03 5.56E-04 3.38 0.001 7.89E-04 2.97E-03 
FR2HPP -3.83E-05 1.28E-05 -3 0.003 -6.34E-05 -1.32E-05 
HPI -5.48E-04 2.34E-05 -23.38 0 -5.94E-04 -5.02E-04 
NS 8.40E-04 3.57E-04 2.35 0.019 1.40E-04 1.54E-03 
IR 2.65E+00 7.20E-02 36.84 0 2.51E+00 2.79E+00 
CPI -8.92E-03 1.88E-04 -47.48 0 -9.29E-03 -8.55E-03 
IFA 8.31E-01 1.03E-03 803.92 0 8.29E-01 8.33E-01 
_cons 1.07E+00 2.51E-02 42.65 0 1.02E+00 1.12E+00 
Notes: This table provides results of the first stage regression of IV-GMM. The null hypothesis is that 
instrumental variables have not relationship to the endogenous variable (instrumental variables are exogenous). 
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Table A.24: Results of Hausman Test for GMM (MR and IC as endogenous variables, IR, 
CPI and IFA as instruments) 
  (b) (B) (b-B) 
  iv ols Difference 
MR -256.8723 -292.0275 35.1552 
IC 78.3343 77.0973 1.2370 
AS 0.0547 0.0548 -0.0001 
FR 21.7301 21.6995 0.0306 
FR2 -0.3173 -0.3161 -0.0012 
BR -2.0947 -2.1006 0.0059 
LR 0.1626 0.1644 -0.0018 
HPP 115.0482 118.2172 -3.1690 
FRHPP -5.5021 -5.4947 -0.0074 
FR2HPP 0.0818 0.0815 0.0003 
HPI 0.1989 0.2012 -0.0023 
NS 2.3257 2.3182 0.0075 
_cons -804.2063 -809.2254 5.0190 
Hausman Test 
chi2(2) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
              = 143.78 
Prob>chi2 = 0.00 
Notes: This table provides results of the Hausman test. b=consistent under null hypothesis and alternative 
hypothesis. B=inconsistent under alternative hypothesis, efficient under null hypothesis. The null hypothesis is 
that difference in coefficients not systematic, which means ols estimator is appropriate. 
 
Table A.25: Results of Sargan Test for GMM (MR and IC as endogenous variables, IR, CPI 
and IFA as instruments) 
  Coef. Std. Err. t P-value [95% Conf. Interval] 
MR -255.9604 18.0773 -14.16 0 -291.3913 -220.5295 
IC 78.2351 1.3671 57.23 0 75.5557 80.9145 
AS 0.0549 0.0042 13.05 0 0.0467 0.0632 
FR 21.6540 2.6395 8.2 0 16.4807 26.8274 
FR2 -0.3162 0.0472 -6.7 0 -0.4087 -0.2236 
BR -2.0944 0.2539 -8.25 0 -2.5921 -1.5967 
LR 0.1481 0.3023 0.49 0.624 -0.4445 0.7407 
HPP 114.7670 9.3310 12.3 0 96.4786 133.0554 
FRHPP -5.4827 0.6584 -8.33 0 -6.7731 -4.1923 
FR2HPP 0.0815 0.0117 6.94 0 0.0585 0.1045 
HPI 0.2009 0.0229 8.77 0 0.1560 0.2458 
NS 2.3300 0.4918 4.74 0 1.3661 3.2939 
_cons -802.9208 36.0580 -22.27 0 -873.5932 -732.2484 
Sargan Test 
chi2(1) =  0.115754 
  p = 0.7337 
Notes: This table provides results of the Sargan test. The null hypothesis is that instrumental variables have not 
relationship to the error (instrumental variables are exogenous). 
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Table A.26: Results of Endogenous Test for GMM (MR and IC as endogenous variables, IR, 
CPI and IFA as instruments) 
First-stage regression summary statistics 
Variable R-sq. Adjusted R-sq. Partial R-sq. F(2,17129) Prob > F 
MR 0.9864 0.9864 0.9852 380600 0 
IC 0.9873 0.9873 0.924 69457.6 0 
Shea's partial R-squared 
Variable Shea's Partial R-sq. Shea's Adj. Partial R-sq. 
MR 0.9795 0.9795 
IC 0.9187 0.9187 
Wald test for weak instruments (Critical Values)  
  10% 15% 20% 25% 
Maximal IV Size 13.43 8.18 6.4 5.45 
Notes: This table provides results of the endogenous test. The null hypothesis is that instrumental variables are 
not relative to endogenous variables. For Wald test, the null hypothesis is that the instruments are weak. 
 
Table A.27: Results of Hausman Test for GMM in Panel Model (MR and IC as endogenous 
variables, IR, CPI and IFA as instruments) 
  (b) (B) (b-B) 
  iv fe Difference 
MR -247.4559 -278.7437 31.2878 
IC 81.0895 79.3844 1.7052 
AS 0.0616 0.0617 -0.0001 
FR 22.4518 22.4138 0.0380 
FR2 -0.3050 -0.3036 -0.0014 
BR -2.6242 -2.6302 0.0060 
LR 0.4447 0.4467 -0.0020 
HPP 113.9693 118.0117 -4.0424 
FRHPP -5.6029 -5.5937 -0.0092 
FR2HPP 0.0780 0.0777 0.0003 
HPI 0.1908 0.1931 -0.0024 
NS 2.4867 2.4784 0.0082 
Hausman Test 
chi2(2) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
              = 151.4 
Prob>chi2 = 0.00 
Notes: This table provides results of the Hausman test. b=consistent under null hypothesis and alternative 
hypothesis. B=inconsistent under alternative hypothesis, efficient under null hypothesis. The null hypothesis is 
that difference in coefficients not systematic, which means fixed effect is appropriate. 
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Table A.28: Results of Sargan Test for GMM in Panel Model (MR and IC as endogenous 
variables, IR, CPI and IFA as instruments) 
  
Coef. Std. Err. t P-value [95% Conf. Interval] 
MR -247.4559 29.0344 -8.52 0 -304.3623 -190.5495 
IC 81.0895 2.1399 37.89 0 76.8954 85.2836 
AS 0.0616 0.0037 16.56 0 0.0544 0.0689 
FR 22.4518 2.4127 9.31 0 17.7230 27.1805 
FR2 -0.3050 0.0531 -5.75 0 -0.4090 -0.2010 
BR -2.6242 0.2610 -10.05 0 -3.1357 -2.1126 
LR 0.4447 0.2799 1.59 0.112 -0.1039 0.9933 
HPP 113.9693 7.7952 14.62 0 98.6909 129.2477 
FRHPP -5.6029 0.5929 -9.45 0 -6.7650 -4.4408 
FR2HPP 0.0780 0.0130 5.98 0 0.0524 0.1036 
HPI 0.1908 0.0201 9.51 0 0.1514 0.2301 
NS 2.4867 0.3537 7.03 0 1.7934 3.1799 
Sargan Test 
chi2(1) =  0.13 
  p = 0.7184 
Notes: This table provides results of the Sargan test. The null hypothesis is that instrumental variables have not 
relationship to the error (instrumental variables are exogenous). 
 
Table A.29: Results of Endogenous Test for GMM in Panel Model (MR and IC as 
endogenous variables, IR, CPI and IFA as instruments) 
Underidentification test (Anderson canon. corr. LM statistic) 
Variable Chi-sq(2) Prob > F 
MR IC 16000 0 
Wald test for weak instruments (Critical Values)  
  10% 15% 20% 25% 
Maximal IV Size 13.43 8.18 6.4 5.45 
Notes: This table provides results of the endogenous test. The null hypothesis is that instrumental variables are 
not relative to endogenous variables. For Wald test, the null hypothesis is that the instruments are weak. 
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Table A.30: Results of First Stage Regression for GMM (MR and IC as endogenous variables, 
IR, CPI and MS as instruments) 
MR Coef. Robust Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf.Interval] 
AS 3.63E-07 1.32E-07 2.75 0.006 1.04E-07 6.22E-07 
FR 7.15E-05 8.69E-05 0.82 0.411 -9.88E-05 2.42E-04 
FR2 -5.72E-07 1.79E-06 -0.32 0.749 -4.09E-06 2.94E-06 
BR -2.04E-05 9.42E-06 -2.17 0.03 -3.89E-05 -1.94E-06 
LR -3.07E-08 9.52E-06 0 0.997 -1.87E-05 1.86E-05 
HPP -1.79E-03 2.83E-04 -6.33 0 -2.35E-03 -1.24E-03 
FRHPP -1.84E-05 2.11E-05 -0.87 0.383 -5.97E-05 2.30E-05 
FR2HPP 1.52E-07 4.35E-07 0.35 0.728 -7.01E-07 1.00E-06 
HPI 7.45E-06 4.47E-07 16.68 0 6.58E-06 8.33E-06 
NS -2.44E-05 1.19E-05 -2.04 0.041 -4.78E-05 -1.00E-06 
IR 9.61E-01 1.80E-03 533.73 0 9.58E-01 9.65E-01 
CPI -6.20E-05 5.02E-06 -12.34 0 -7.18E-05 -5.21E-05 
MS 1.38E-03 4.26E-05 32.28 0 1.29E-03 1.46E-03 
_cons 1.26E-02 1.06E-03 11.95 0 1.05E-02 1.47E-02 
Notes: This table provides results of the first stage regression of IV-GMM. The null hypothesis is that 
instrumental variables have not relationship to the endogenous variable (instrumental variables are exogenous). 
 
IC Coef. Robust Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf.Interval] 
AS 3.53E-06 3.78E-06 0.93 0.351 -3.88E-06 1.09E-05 
FR -1.99E-03 3.04E-03 -0.65 0.514 -7.96E-03 3.98E-03 
FR2 1.03E-04 5.90E-05 1.74 0.082 -1.30E-05 2.18E-04 
BR -4.21E-04 2.68E-04 -1.57 0.116 -9.46E-04 1.05E-04 
LR 1.49E-04 2.85E-04 0.52 0.602 -4.10E-04 7.07E-04 
HPP 2.19E-01 1.01E-02 21.58 0 1.99E-01 2.39E-01 
FRHPP 5.05E-04 7.43E-04 0.68 0.497 -9.52E-04 1.96E-03 
FR2HPP -2.55E-05 1.44E-05 -1.77 0.076 -5.38E-05 2.69E-06 
HPI 1.16E-04 1.98E-05 5.86 0 7.72E-05 1.55E-04 
NS -2.02E-04 3.57E-04 -0.57 0.572 -9.00E-04 4.97E-04 
IR 2.76E+00 4.43E-02 62.39 0 2.68E+00 2.85E+00 
CPI -6.27E-03 1.52E-04 -41.28 0 -6.57E-03 -5.97E-03 
MS 5.60E-01 1.33E-03 421.05 0 5.57E-01 5.63E-01 
_cons 1.04E+00 3.94E-02 26.34 0 9.60E-01 1.11E+00 
Notes: This table provides results of the first stage regression of IV-GMM. The null hypothesis is that 
instrumental variables have not relationship to the endogenous variable (instrumental variables are exogenous). 
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Table A.31: Results of Hausman Test for GMM (MR and IC as endogenous variables, IR, 
CPI and MS as instruments) 
  (b) (B) (b-B) 
  iv ols Difference 
MR -272.0238 -292.0275 20.0037 
IC 88.4901 77.0973 11.3928 
AS 0.0545 0.0548 -0.0003 
FR 21.9665 21.6995 0.2669 
FR2 -0.3231 -0.3161 -0.0070 
BR -2.0550 -2.1006 0.0456 
LR 0.1496 0.1644 -0.0148 
HPP 94.9388 118.2172 -23.2784 
FRHPP -5.5609 -5.4947 -0.0662 
FR2HPP 0.0832 0.0815 0.0017 
HPI 0.1946 0.2012 -0.0067 
NS 2.3200 2.3182 0.0019 
_cons -768.8527 -809.2254 40.3726 
Hausman Test 
chi2(2) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
              = 398.58 
Prob>chi2 = 0.00 
Notes: This table provides results of the Hausman test. b=consistent under null hypothesis and alternative 
hypothesis. B=inconsistent under alternative hypothesis, efficient under null hypothesis. The null hypothesis is 
that difference in coefficients not systematic, which means ols estimator is appropriate. 
 
Table A.32: Results of Sargan Test for GMM (MR and IC as endogenous variables, IR, CPI 
and MS as instruments) 
  Coef. Std. Err. t P-value [95% Conf. Interval] 
MR -273.6937 18.1744 -15.06 0 -309.3148 -238.0726 
IC 88.7529 1.4257 62.25 0 85.9586 91.5473 
AS 0.0541 0.0042 12.84 0 0.0459 0.0624 
FR 22.1046 2.6364 8.38 0 16.9374 27.2718 
FR2 -0.3252 0.0469 -6.93 0 -0.4172 -0.2332 
BR -2.0560 0.2543 -8.09 0 -2.5544 -1.5576 
LR 0.1738 0.3027 0.57 0.566 -0.4195 0.7671 
HPP 95.2434 9.3612 10.17 0 76.8958 113.5909 
FRHPP -5.5960 0.6577 -8.51 0 -6.8850 -4.3070 
FR2HPP 0.0838 0.0117 7.17 0 0.0609 0.1066 
HPI 0.1912 0.0230 8.31 0 0.1461 0.2363 
NS 2.3115 0.4919 4.7 0 1.3474 3.2757 
_cons -770.7655 36.1099 -21.35 0 -841.5395 -699.9915 
Sargan Test 
chi2(1) =  0.337216 
  p = 0.5614 
Notes: This table provides results of the Sargan test. The null hypothesis is that instrumental variables have not 
relationship to the error (instrumental variables are exogenous). 
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Table A.33: Results of Endogenous Test for GMM (MR and IC as endogenous variables, IR, 
CPI and MS as instruments) 
First-stage regression summary statistics 
Variable R-sq. Adjusted R-sq. Partial R-sq. F(2,17129) Prob > F 
MR 0.9846 0.9846 0.9832 334158 0 
IC 0.9879 0.9879 0.9274 72923.6 0 
Shea's partial R-squared 
Variable Shea's Partial R-sq. Shea's Adj. Partial R-sq. 
MR 0.9845 0.9845 
IC 0.9286 0.9286 
Wald test for weak instruments (Critical Values)  
  10% 15% 20% 25% 
Maximal IV Size 13.43 8.18 6.4 5.45 
Notes: This table provides results of the endogenous test. The null hypothesis is that instrumental variables are 
not relative to endogenous variables. For Wald test, the null hypothesis is that the instruments are weak. 
 
Table A.34: Results of Hausman Test for GMM in Panel Model (MR and IC as endogenous 
variables, IR, CPI and MS as instruments) 
  (b) (B) (b-B) 
  iv fe Difference 
MR -261.8301 -278.7437 16.9135 
IC 90.6120 79.3844 11.2276 
AS 0.0616 0.0617 -0.0001 
FR 22.6937 22.4138 0.2800 
FR2 -0.3107 -0.3036 -0.0071 
BR -2.5966 -2.6302 0.0336 
LR 0.4327 0.4467 -0.0140 
HPP 95.1995 118.0117 -22.8122 
FRHPP -5.6624 -5.5937 -0.0687 
FR2HPP 0.0794 0.0777 0.0018 
HPI 0.1866 0.1931 -0.0065 
NS 2.4814 2.4784 0.0030 
Hausman Test 
chi2(2) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
              = 424.58 
Prob>chi2 = 0.00 
Notes: This table provides results of the Hausman test. b=consistent under null hypothesis and alternative 
hypothesis. B=inconsistent under alternative hypothesis, efficient under null hypothesis. The null hypothesis is 
that difference in coefficients not systematic, which means fixed effect is appropriate. 
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Table A.35: Results of Sargan Test for GMM in Panel Model (MR and IC as endogenous 
variables, IR, CPI and MS as instruments) 
  
Coef. Std. Err. t P-value [95% Conf. Interval] 
MR -261.8301 28.9853 -9.03 0 -318.6402 -205.0200 
IC 90.6120 2.1302 42.54 0 86.4368 94.7872 
AS 0.0616 0.0037 16.54 0 0.0543 0.0689 
FR 22.6937 2.4148 9.4 0 17.9609 27.4266 
FR2 -0.3107 0.0531 -5.85 0 -0.4148 -0.2067 
BR -2.5966 0.2612 -9.94 0 -3.1086 -2.0846 
LR 0.4327 0.2801 1.54 0.122 -0.1164 0.9818 
HPP 95.1995 7.7969 12.21 0 79.9179 110.4812 
FRHPP -5.6624 0.5934 -9.54 0 -6.8255 -4.4993 
FR2HPP 0.0794 0.0131 6.08 0 0.0538 0.1050 
HPI 0.1866 0.0201 9.29 0 0.1472 0.2260 
NS 2.4814 0.3540 7.01 0 1.7876 3.1753 
Sargan Test 
chi2(1) =  1.612 
  p = 0.2042 
Notes: This table provides results of the Sargan test. The null hypothesis is that instrumental variables have not 
relationship to the error (instrumental variables are exogenous). 
 
Table A.36: Results of Endogenous Test for GMM in Panel Model (MR and IC as 
endogenous variables, IR, CPI and MS as instruments) 
Underidentification test (Anderson canon. corr. LM statistic) 
Variable Chi-sq(2) Prob > F 
MR IC 16000 0 
Wald test for weak instruments (Critical Values)  
  10% 15% 20% 25% 
Maximal IV Size 13.43 8.18 6.4 5.45 
Notes: This table provides results of the endogenous test. The null hypothesis is that instrumental variables are 
not relative to endogenous variables. For Wald test, the null hypothesis is that the instruments are weak. 
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Table A.37: Results of First Stage Regression for GMM (MR and IC as endogenous variables, 
IR, CPI and GR as instruments) 
MR Coef. Robust Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf.Interval] 
AS 3.25E-07 1.29E-07 2.52 0.012 7.20E-08 5.77E-07 
FR 7.40E-05 8.42E-05 0.88 0.38 -9.12E-05 2.39E-04 
FR2 -7.87E-07 1.76E-06 -0.45 0.654 -4.23E-06 2.65E-06 
BR -1.66E-05 9.21E-06 -1.8 0.071 -3.47E-05 1.43E-06 
LR -4.42E-07 9.29E-06 -0.05 0.962 -1.86E-05 1.78E-05 
HPP -2.48E-03 2.66E-04 -9.33 0 -3.00E-03 -1.96E-03 
FRHPP -1.90E-05 2.04E-05 -0.93 0.353 -5.91E-05 2.11E-05 
FR2HPP 2.04E-07 4.26E-07 0.48 0.631 -6.30E-07 1.04E-06 
HPI 7.37E-06 4.33E-07 17.03 0 6.52E-06 8.22E-06 
NS -2.30E-05 1.16E-05 -1.98 0.048 -4.58E-05 -1.74E-07 
IR 9.55E-01 1.83E-03 520.63 0 9.52E-01 9.59E-01 
CPI -6.94E-05 4.82E-06 -14.4 0 -7.88E-05 -5.99E-05 
GR 1.63E-03 3.63E-05 44.75 0 1.55E-03 1.70E-03 
_cons 1.91E-02 1.01E-03 18.85 0 1.71E-02 2.11E-02 
Notes: This table provides results of the first stage regression of IV-GMM. The null hypothesis is that 
instrumental variables have not relationship to the endogenous variable (instrumental variables are exogenous). 
 
IC Coef. Robust Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf.Interval] 
AS -2.97E-06 2.33E-06 -1.27 0.203 -7.55E-06 1.60E-06 
FR -4.23E-03 1.87E-03 -2.27 0.023 -7.90E-03 -5.72E-04 
FR2 1.06E-04 3.61E-05 2.93 0.003 3.49E-05 1.77E-04 
BR -8.73E-05 1.65E-04 -0.53 0.596 -4.10E-04 2.35E-04 
LR 3.15E-04 1.76E-04 1.78 0.074 -3.11E-05 6.61E-04 
HPP 4.12E-01 6.11E-03 67.45 0 4.00E-01 4.24E-01 
FRHPP 1.06E-03 4.57E-04 2.33 0.02 1.67E-04 1.96E-03 
FR2HPP -2.64E-05 8.84E-06 -2.99 0.003 -4.37E-05 -9.08E-06 
HPI 2.61E-04 1.48E-05 17.68 0 2.32E-04 2.90E-04 
NS 3.28E-04 2.19E-04 1.5 0.134 -1.01E-04 7.57E-04 
IR 1.03E+00 3.22E-02 32.05 0 9.68E-01 1.09E+00 
CPI -9.60E-03 1.02E-04 -94.34 0 -9.79E-03 -9.40E-03 
GR 5.14E-01 5.43E-04 946.62 0 5.13E-01 5.15E-01 
_cons 2.21E+00 2.40E-02 92.07 0 2.16E+00 2.25E+00 
Notes: This table provides results of the first stage regression of IV-GMM. The null hypothesis is that 
instrumental variables have not relationship to the endogenous variable (instrumental variables are exogenous). 
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Table A.38: Results of Hausman Test for GMM (MR and IC as endogenous variables, IR, 
CPI and GR as instruments) 
  (b) (B) (b-B) 
  iv ols Difference 
MR -262.3725 -292.0275 29.6550 
IC 82.0415 77.0973 4.9442 
AS 0.0546 0.0548 -0.0002 
FR 21.8164 21.6995 0.1169 
FR2 -0.3194 -0.3161 -0.0033 
BR -2.0802 -2.1006 0.0204 
LR 0.1578 0.1644 -0.0065 
HPP 107.7069 118.2172 -10.5103 
FRHPP -5.5235 -5.4947 -0.0288 
FR2HPP 0.0823 0.0815 0.0008 
HPI 0.1973 0.2012 -0.0039 
NS 2.3236 2.3182 0.0054 
_cons -791.3003 -809.2254 17.9251 
Hausman Test 
chi2(2) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
              = 313.8 
Prob>chi2 = 0.00 
Notes: This table provides results of the Hausman test. b=consistent under null hypothesis and alternative 
hypothesis. B=inconsistent under alternative hypothesis, efficient under null hypothesis. The null hypothesis is 
that difference in coefficients not systematic, which means ols estimator is appropriate. 
 
Table A.39: Results of Sargan Test for GMM (MR and IC as endogenous variables, IR, CPI 
and GR as instruments) 
  Coef. Std. Err. t P-value [95% Conf. Interval] 
MR -262.3625 18.0687 -14.52 0 -297.7765 -226.9486 
IC 82.0400 1.3396 61.24 0 79.4144 84.6656 
AS 0.0546 0.0042 12.97 0 0.0464 0.0629 
FR 21.8165 2.6374 8.27 0 16.6473 26.9856 
FR2 -0.3194 0.0471 -6.78 0 -0.4117 -0.2271 
BR -2.0802 0.2540 -8.19 0 -2.5781 -1.5823 
LR 0.1577 0.3025 0.52 0.602 -0.4351 0.7505 
HPP 107.7077 9.3513 11.52 0 89.3794 126.0359 
FRHPP -5.5235 0.6579 -8.4 0 -6.8130 -4.2341 
FR2HPP 0.0823 0.0117 7.03 0 0.0593 0.1053 
HPI 0.1974 0.0229 8.61 0 0.1524 0.2423 
NS 2.3236 0.4918 4.72 0 1.3597 3.2876 
_cons -791.2996 36.1123 -21.91 0 -862.0784 -720.5208 
Sargan Test 
chi2(1) =  0.000015 
  p = 0.9969 
Notes: This table provides results of the Sargan test. The null hypothesis is that instrumental variables have not 
relationship to the error (instrumental variables are exogenous). 
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Table A.40: Results of Endogenous Test for GMM (MR and IC as endogenous variables, IR, 
CPI and GR as instruments) 
First-stage regression summary statistics 
Variable R-sq. Adjusted R-sq. Partial R-sq. F(2,17129) Prob > F 
MR 0.9853 0.9853 0.984 350513 0 
IC 0.9953 0.9953 0.9721 199022 0 
Shea's partial R-squared 
Variable Shea's Partial R-sq. Shea's Adj. Partial R-sq. 
MR 0.983 0.983 
IC 0.9712 0.9712 
Wald test for weak instruments (Critical Values)  
  10% 15% 20% 25% 
Maximal IV Size 13.43 8.18 6.4 5.45 
Notes: This table provides results of the endogenous test. The null hypothesis is that instrumental variables are 
not relative to endogenous variables. For Wald test, the null hypothesis is that the instruments are weak. 
 
Table A.41: Results of Hausman Test for GMM in Panel Model (MR and IC as endogenous 
variables, IR, CPI and GR as instruments) 
  (b) (B) (b-B) 
  iv fe Difference 
MR -252.3367 -278.7437 26.4070 
IC 84.3255 79.3844 4.9411 
AS 0.0616 0.0617 -0.0001 
FR 22.5340 22.4138 0.1202 
FR2 -0.3070 -0.3036 -0.0034 
BR -2.6148 -2.6302 0.0154 
LR 0.4406 0.4467 -0.0061 
HPP 107.5909 118.0117 -10.4209 
FRHPP -5.6231 -5.5937 -0.0294 
FR2HPP 0.0785 0.0777 0.0008 
HPI 0.1893 0.1931 -0.0038 
NS 2.4849 2.4784 0.0065 
Hausman Test 
chi2(2) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
              = 330.4 
Prob>chi2 = 0.00 
Notes: This table provides results of the Hausman test. b=consistent under null hypothesis and alternative 
hypothesis. B=inconsistent under alternative hypothesis, efficient under null hypothesis. The null hypothesis is 
that difference in coefficients not systematic, which means fixed effect is appropriate. 
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Table A.42: Results of Sargan Test for GMM in Panel Model (MR and IC as endogenous 
variables, IR, CPI and GR as instruments) 
  
Coef. Std. Err. t P-value [95% Conf. Interval] 
MR -252.3367 28.9858 -8.71 0 -309.1478 -195.5255 
IC 84.3255 2.0815 40.51 0 80.2459 88.4050 
AS 0.0616 0.0037 16.56 0 0.0543 0.0689 
FR 22.5340 2.4130 9.34 0 17.8046 27.2634 
FR2 -0.3070 0.0531 -5.79 0 -0.4109 -0.2030 
BR -2.6148 0.2610 -10.02 0 -3.1264 -2.1032 
LR 0.4406 0.2799 1.57 0.115 -0.1081 0.9893 
HPP 107.5909 7.7387 13.9 0 92.4233 122.7584 
FRHPP -5.6231 0.5930 -9.48 0 -6.7854 -4.4608 
FR2HPP 0.0785 0.0130 6.02 0 0.0529 0.1040 
HPI 0.1893 0.0201 9.43 0 0.1500 0.2287 
NS 2.4849 0.3537 7.02 0 1.7916 3.1782 
Sargan Test 
chi2(1) =  0.448 
  p = 0.5034 
Notes: This table provides results of the Sargan test. The null hypothesis is that instrumental variables have not 
relationship to the error (instrumental variables are exogenous). 
 
Table A.43: Results of Endogenous Test for GMM in Panel Model (MR and IC as 
endogenous variables, IR, CPI and GR as instruments) 
Underidentification test (Anderson canon. corr. LM statistic) 
Variable Chi-sq(2) Prob > F 
MR IC 19000 0 
Wald test for weak instruments (Critical Values)  
  10% 15% 20% 25% 
Maximal IV Size 13.43 8.18 6.4 5.45 
Notes: This table provides results of the endogenous test. The null hypothesis is that instrumental variables are 
not relative to endogenous variables. For Wald test, the null hypothesis is that the instruments are weak. 
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Table A.44: Results of First Stage Regression for GMM (MR and IC as endogenous variables, 
IR, CPI and GE as instruments) 
MR Coef. Robust Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf.Interval] 
AS 3.29E-07 1.30E-07 2.54 0.011 7.52E-08 5.83E-07 
FR 7.21E-05 8.45E-05 0.85 0.394 -9.36E-05 2.38E-04 
FR2 -7.16E-07 1.76E-06 -0.41 0.684 -4.16E-06 2.73E-06 
BR -1.72E-05 9.26E-06 -1.86 0.063 -3.54E-05 9.05E-07 
LR -2.38E-07 9.33E-06 -0.03 0.98 -1.85E-05 1.81E-05 
HPP -2.45E-03 2.68E-04 -9.17 0 -2.98E-03 -1.93E-03 
FRHPP -1.85E-05 2.05E-05 -0.9 0.367 -5.87E-05 2.17E-05 
FR2HPP 1.87E-07 4.27E-07 0.44 0.661 -6.50E-07 1.02E-06 
HPI 6.80E-06 4.38E-07 15.5 0 5.94E-06 7.65E-06 
NS -2.30E-05 1.17E-05 -1.97 0.049 -4.60E-05 -1.14E-07 
IR 9.58E-01 1.82E-03 526.5 0 9.54E-01 9.61E-01 
CPI -6.60E-05 4.88E-06 -13.51 0 -7.56E-05 -5.64E-05 
GE 1.63E-03 3.78E-05 43.14 0 1.56E-03 1.70E-03 
_cons 1.84E-02 1.02E-03 18.12 0 1.64E-02 2.04E-02 
Notes: This table provides results of the first stage regression of IV-GMM. The null hypothesis is that 
instrumental variables have not relationship to the endogenous variable (instrumental variables are exogenous). 
 
IC Coef. Robust Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf.Interval] 
AS -2.81E-06 2.58E-06 -1.09 0.276 -7.88E-06 2.25E-06 
FR -4.39E-03 1.90E-03 -2.31 0.021 -8.11E-03 -6.69E-04 
FR2 1.16E-04 3.71E-05 3.12 0.002 4.29E-05 1.88E-04 
BR -1.10E-04 1.82E-04 -0.61 0.544 -4.66E-04 2.46E-04 
LR 3.32E-04 1.93E-04 1.72 0.086 -4.68E-05 7.11E-04 
HPP 3.51E-01 6.31E-03 55.56 0 3.38E-01 3.63E-01 
FRHPP 1.10E-03 4.64E-04 2.37 0.018 1.92E-04 2.01E-03 
FR2HPP -2.88E-05 9.08E-06 -3.18 0.002 -4.66E-05 -1.10E-05 
HPI 4.52E-05 1.63E-05 2.78 0.005 1.33E-05 7.72E-05 
NS 3.15E-04 2.41E-04 1.31 0.19 -1.57E-04 7.86E-04 
IR 1.74E+00 3.58E-02 48.58 0 1.67E+00 1.81E+00 
CPI -8.43E-03 1.18E-04 -71.6 0 -8.66E-03 -8.20E-03 
GE 5.38E-01 7.25E-04 741.35 0 5.36E-01 5.39E-01 
_cons 2.21E+00 2.42E-02 91.46 0 2.16E+00 2.26E+00 
Notes: This table provides results of the first stage regression of IV-GMM. The null hypothesis is that 
instrumental variables have not relationship to the endogenous variable (instrumental variables are exogenous). 
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Table A.45: Results of Hausman Test for GMM (MR and IC as endogenous variables, IR, 
CPI and GE as instruments) 
  (b) (B) (b-B) 
  iv ols Difference 
MR -263.6990 -292.0275 28.3285 
IC 82.9304 77.0973 5.8331 
AS 0.0546 0.0548 -0.0002 
FR 21.8371 21.6995 0.1376 
FR2 -0.3199 -0.3161 -0.0039 
BR -2.0767 -2.1006 0.0239 
LR 0.1567 0.1644 -0.0077 
HPP 105.9469 118.2172 -12.2703 
FRHPP -5.5287 -5.4947 -0.0340 
FR2HPP 0.0824 0.0815 0.0010 
HPI 0.1970 0.2012 -0.0043 
NS 2.3231 2.3182 0.0050 
_cons -788.2061 -809.2254 21.0193 
Hausman Test 
chi2(2) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
              = 316.64 
Prob>chi2 = 0.00 
Notes: This table provides results of the Hausman test. b=consistent under null hypothesis and alternative 
hypothesis. B=inconsistent under alternative hypothesis, efficient under null hypothesis. The null hypothesis is 
that difference in coefficients not systematic, which means ols estimator is appropriate. 
 
Table A.46: Results of Sargan Test for GMM (MR and IC as endogenous variables, IR, CPI 
and GE as instruments) 
  Coef. Std. Err. t P-value [95% Conf. Interval] 
MR -263.9140 18.0790 -14.6 0 -299.3482 -228.4799 
IC 82.9595 1.3418 61.83 0 80.3297 85.5893 
AS 0.0546 0.0042 12.96 0 0.0463 0.0628 
FR 21.8549 2.6378 8.29 0 16.6849 27.0248 
FR2 -0.3202 0.0471 -6.8 0 -0.4125 -0.2279 
BR -2.0768 0.2540 -8.18 0 -2.5747 -1.5790 
LR 0.1599 0.3025 0.53 0.597 -0.4329 0.7528 
HPP 105.9985 9.3196 11.37 0 87.7324 124.2646 
FRHPP -5.5332 0.6580 -8.41 0 -6.8229 -4.2436 
FR2HPP 0.0825 0.0117 7.04 0 0.0595 0.1055 
HPI 0.1965 0.0229 8.57 0 0.1516 0.2415 
NS 2.3221 0.4918 4.72 0 1.3582 3.2861 
_cons -788.4786 36.0586 -21.87 0 -859.1522 -717.8050 
Sargan Test 
chi2(1) =  0.005887 
  p = 0.9388 
Notes: This table provides results of the Sargan test. The null hypothesis is that instrumental variables have not 
relationship to the error (instrumental variables are exogenous). 
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Table A.47: Results of Endogenous Test for GMM (MR and IC as endogenous variables, IR, 
CPI and GE as instruments) 
First-stage regression summary statistics 
Variable R-sq. Adjusted R-sq. Partial R-sq. F(2,17129) Prob > F 
MR 0.9852 0.9852 0.9838 347080 0 
IC 0.9944 0.9944 0.9664 163986 0 
Shea's partial R-squared 
Variable Shea's Partial R-sq. Shea's Adj. Partial R-sq. 
MR 0.9833 0.9833 
IC 0.9659 0.9659 
Wald test for weak instruments (Critical Values)  
  10% 15% 20% 25% 
Maximal IV Size 13.43 8.18 6.4 5.45 
Notes: This table provides results of the endogenous test. The null hypothesis is that instrumental variables are 
not relative to endogenous variables. For Wald test, the null hypothesis is that the instruments are weak. 
 
Table A.48: Results of Hausman Test for GMM in Panel Model (MR and IC as endogenous 
variables, IR, CPI and GE as instruments) 
  (b) (B) (b-B) 
  iv fe Difference 
MR -253.6978 -278.7437 25.0459 
IC 85.2283 79.3844 5.8440 
AS 0.0616 0.0617 -0.0001 
FR 22.5569 22.4138 0.1432 
FR2 -0.3075 -0.3036 -0.0039 
BR -2.6122 -2.6302 0.0180 
LR 0.4395 0.4467 -0.0072 
HPP 105.8112 118.0117 -12.2005 
FRHPP -5.6288 -5.5937 -0.0351 
FR2HPP 0.0786 0.0777 0.0010 
HPI 0.1890 0.1931 -0.0042 
NS 2.4844 2.4784 0.0060 
Hausman Test 
chi2(2) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
              = 337.6 
Prob>chi2 = 0.00 
Notes: This table provides results of the Hausman test. b=consistent under null hypothesis and alternative 
hypothesis. B=inconsistent under alternative hypothesis, efficient under null hypothesis. The null hypothesis is 
that difference in coefficients not systematic, which means fixed effect is appropriate. 
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Table A.49: Results of Sargan Test for GMM in Panel Model (MR and IC as endogenous 
variables, IR, CPI and GE as instruments) 
  
Coef. Std. Err. t P-value [95% Conf. Interval] 
MR -253.6978 28.9834 -8.75 0 -310.5042 -196.8914 
IC 85.2283 2.0873 40.83 0 81.1372 89.3194 
AS 0.0616 0.0037 16.56 0 0.0543 0.0689 
FR 22.5569 2.4132 9.35 0 17.8272 27.2867 
FR2 -0.3075 0.0531 -5.8 0 -0.4115 -0.2035 
BR -2.6122 0.2610 -10.01 0 -3.1238 -2.1006 
LR 0.4395 0.2800 1.57 0.116 -0.1092 0.9882 
HPP 105.8112 7.7457 13.66 0 90.6299 120.9926 
FRHPP -5.6288 0.5930 -9.49 0 -6.7911 -4.4664 
FR2HPP 0.0786 0.0130 6.03 0 0.0531 0.1042 
HPI 0.1890 0.0201 9.41 0 0.1496 0.2283 
NS 2.4844 0.3538 7.02 0 1.7910 3.1778 
Sargan Test 
chi2(1) =  0.571 
  p = 0.45 
Notes: This table provides results of the Sargan test. The null hypothesis is that instrumental variables have not 
relationship to the error (instrumental variables are exogenous). 
 
Table A.50: Results of Endogenous Test for GMM in Panel Model (MR and IC as 
endogenous variables, IR, CPI and GE as instruments) 
Underidentification test (Anderson canon. corr. LM statistic) 
Variable Chi-sq(2) Prob > F 
MR IC 16000 0 
Wald test for weak instruments (Critical Values)  
  10% 15% 20% 25% 
Maximal IV Size 13.43 8.18 6.4 5.45 
Notes: This table provides results of the endogenous test. The null hypothesis is that instrumental variables are 
not relative to endogenous variables. For Wald test, the null hypothesis is that the instruments are weak. 
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Table A.51: Results of First Stage Regression for GMM (HPP FRHPP and FR2HPP as 
endogenous variables, IFA GR IFAFR IFAFR2 GRFR and GRFR2 as instruments) 
HPP Coef. Robust Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf.Interval] 
AS -1.94E-05 5.46E-06 -3.56 0 -3.01E-05 -8.75E-06 
FR -8.34E-03 4.68E-03 -1.78 0.075 -1.75E-02 8.40E-04 
FR2 8.45E-05 9.99E-05 0.85 0.398 -1.11E-04 2.80E-04 
BR 9.41E-04 3.83E-04 2.46 0.014 1.91E-04 1.69E-03 
LR -3.41E-04 4.03E-04 -0.85 0.396 -1.13E-03 4.48E-04 
HPI -6.14E-05 3.43E-05 -1.79 0.073 -1.29E-04 5.79E-06 
MR 1.41E+00 5.03E-02 28.04 0 1.31E+00 1.51E+00 
IC 9.26E-01 1.09E-02 84.93 0 9.05E-01 9.48E-01 
NS 7.27E-04 5.07E-04 1.44 0.151 -2.66E-04 1.72E-03 
IFA 3.97E-01 3.35E-02 11.88 0 3.32E-01 4.63E-01 
GR -5.71E-01 2.12E-02 -26.89 0 -6.13E-01 -5.29E-01 
IFAFR 6.06E-03 2.92E-03 2.08 0.038 3.44E-04 1.18E-02 
IFAFR2 -7.78E-05 6.17E-05 -1.26 0.207 -1.99E-04 4.31E-05 
GRFR -4.18E-03 1.83E-03 -2.28 0.023 -7.77E-03 -5.86E-04 
GRFR2 6.07E-05 3.87E-05 1.57 0.117 -1.51E-05 1.37E-04 
_cons 6.11E-02 5.79E-02 1.05 0.292 -5.25E-02 1.75E-01 
Notes: This table provides results of the first stage regression of IV-GMM. The null hypothesis is that 
instrumental variables have not relationship to the endogenous variable (instrumental variables are exogenous). 
 
FRHPP Coef. Robust Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf.Interval] 
AS -4.60E-04 1.12E-04 -4.13 0 -6.79E-04 -2.42E-04 
FR 2.14E+00 2.10E-01 10.16 0 1.72E+00 2.55E+00 
FR2 4.88E-03 5.81E-03 0.84 0.401 -6.51E-03 1.63E-02 
BR 2.47E-02 7.78E-03 3.17 0.002 9.41E-03 3.99E-02 
LR -7.58E-03 9.05E-03 -0.84 0.402 -2.53E-02 1.02E-02 
HPI -1.03E-03 7.34E-04 -1.4 0.161 -2.47E-03 4.10E-04 
MR 2.64E+01 1.10E+00 24 0 2.43E+01 2.86E+01 
IC 1.77E+01 2.52E-01 70.21 0 1.72E+01 1.82E+01 
NS 1.75E-02 1.04E-02 1.68 0.094 -2.96E-03 3.79E-02 
IFA -3.45E+00 9.46E-01 -3.65 0 -5.30E+00 -1.60E+00 
GR -8.39E+00 6.06E-01 -13.84 0 -9.58E+00 -7.20E+00 
IFAFR 7.48E-01 1.28E-01 5.82 0 4.96E-01 9.99E-01 
IFAFR2 -3.77E-03 3.55E-03 -1.06 0.289 -1.07E-02 3.19E-03 
GRFR -2.45E-01 8.02E-02 -3.06 0.002 -4.03E-01 -8.83E-02 
GRFR2 2.68E-03 2.22E-03 1.21 0.226 -1.66E-03 7.02E-03 
_cons -4.42E+01 1.68E+00 -26.26 0 -4.75E+01 -4.09E+01 
Notes: This table provides results of the first stage regression of IV-GMM. The null hypothesis is that 
instrumental variables have not relationship to the endogenous variable (instrumental variables are exogenous). 
 
FR2HPP Coef. Robust Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf.Interval] 
AS -1.26E-02 3.38E-03 -3.73 0 -1.92E-02 -5.99E-03 
FR -1.39E+01 1.29E+01 -1.08 0.281 -3.92E+01 1.14E+01 
FR2 2.73E+00 3.67E-01 7.44 0 2.01E+00 3.45E+00 
BR 6.66E-01 2.12E-01 3.14 0.002 2.50E-01 1.08E+00 
LR -4.08E-02 2.91E-01 -0.14 0.889 -6.12E-01 5.30E-01 
HPI -2.03E-02 2.28E-02 -0.89 0.374 -6.49E-02 2.44E-02 
MR 6.17E+02 3.49E+01 17.67 0 5.48E+02 6.85E+02 
IC 4.16E+02 8.21E+00 50.69 0 4.00E+02 4.32E+02 
NS 5.64E-01 3.12E-01 1.81 0.07 -4.71E-02 1.18E+00 
IFA -1.10E+02 5.31E+01 -2.07 0.039 -2.14E+02 -5.62E+00 
GR -1.81E+02 3.20E+01 -5.66 0 -2.43E+02 -1.18E+02 
IFAFR 9.15E+00 7.85E+00 1.17 0.244 -6.24E+00 2.45E+01 
IFAFR2 3.34E-01 2.24E-01 1.49 0.136 -1.05E-01 7.73E-01 
GRFR -5.86E+00 4.90E+00 -1.2 0.232 -1.55E+01 3.75E+00 
GRFR2 2.97E-02 1.40E-01 0.21 0.832 -2.45E-01 3.04E-01 
_cons -9.92E+02 8.21E+01 -12.09 0 -1.15E+03 -8.31E+02 
Notes: This table provides results of the first stage regression of IV-GMM. The null hypothesis is that 
instrumental variables have not relationship to the endogenous variable (instrumental variables are exogenous). 
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Table A.52: Results of Hausman Test for GMM (HPP FRHPP and FR2HPP as endogenous 
variables, IFA GR IFAFR IFAFR2 GRFR and GRFR2 as instruments)  
  (b) (B) (b-B) 
  iv ols Difference 
HPP -0.4000 118.2172 -118.6172 
FRHPP -6.4463 -5.4947 -0.9516 
FR2HPP 0.1095 0.0815 0.0280 
AS 0.0514 0.0548 -0.0034 
FR 25.5781 21.6995 3.8785 
FR2 -0.4301 -0.3161 -0.1141 
BR -1.9362 -2.1006 0.1643 
LR 0.1135 0.1644 -0.0509 
HPI 0.2487 0.2012 0.0474 
MR -308.4581 -292.0275 -16.4306 
IC 126.4559 77.0973 49.3586 
NS 2.4522 2.3182 0.1340 
_cons -563.5997 -809.2254 245.6256 
Hausman Test 
chi2(2) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
              = 199.97 
Prob>chi2 = 0.00 
Notes: This table provides results of the Hausman test. b=consistent under null hypothesis and alternative 
hypothesis. B=inconsistent under alternative hypothesis, efficient under null hypothesis. The null hypothesis is 
that difference in coefficients not systematic, which means ols estimator is appropriate. 
 
Table A.53: Results of Sargan Test for GMM (HPP FRHPP and FR2HPP as endogenous 
variables, IFA GR IFAFR IFAFR2 GRFR and GRFR2 as instruments) 
  Coef. Std. Err. t P-value [95% Conf. Interval] 
HPP -4.9872 11.1831 -0.45 0.656 -26.9056 16.9311 
FRHPP -6.4909 0.6665 -9.74 0 -7.7972 -5.1846 
FR2HPP 0.1112 0.0122 9.09 0 0.0872 0.1351 
AS 0.0530 0.0042 12.54 0 0.0447 0.0613 
FR 25.7721 2.6679 9.66 0 20.5431 31.0012 
FR2 -0.4370 0.0491 -8.9 0 -0.5332 -0.3408 
BR -1.9445 0.2599 -7.48 0 -2.4539 -1.4352 
LR -0.0026 0.3053 -0.01 0.993 -0.6009 0.5958 
HPI 0.2609 0.0239 10.93 0 0.2141 0.3077 
MR -308.7417 19.7601 -15.62 0 -347.4708 -270.0126 
IC 127.8006 2.4629 51.89 0 122.9734 132.6277 
NS 2.6020 0.4831 5.39 0 1.6550 3.5489 
_cons -552.8503 38.5438 -14.34 0 -628.3947 -477.3059 
Sargan Test 
chi2(1) =  2.8907 
  p = 0.4088 
Notes: This table provides results of the Sargan test. The null hypothesis is that instrumental variables have not 
relationship to the error (instrumental variables are exogenous). 
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Table A.54: Results of Endogenous Test for GMM (HPP FRHPP and FR2HPP as 
endogenous variables, IFA GR IFAFR IFAFR2 GRFR and GRFR2 as instruments) 
First-stage regression summary statistics 
Variable R-sq. Adjusted R-sq. Partial R-sq. F(2,17129) Prob > F 
HPP 0.8719 0.8718 0.2292 848.621 0 
FRHPP 0.9998 0.9998 0.5635 3685.52 0 
FR2HPP 0.9999 0.9999 0.672 5847.16 0 
Shea's partial R-squared 
Variable Shea's Partial R-sq. Shea's Adj. Partial R-sq. 
HPP 0.4091 0.4086 
FRHPP 0.726 0.7258 
FR2HPP 0.6912 0.691 
Wald test for weak instruments (Critical Values)  
  5% 10% 20% 30% 
Maximal IV Size 12.2 7.77 5.35 4.4 
Notes: This table provides results of the endogenous test. The null hypothesis is that instrumental variables are 
not relative to endogenous variables. For Wald test, the null hypothesis is that the instruments are weak. 
 
Table A.55: Results of Hausman Test for GMM in Panel Model (HPP FRHPP and FR2HPP 
as endogenous variables, IFA GR IFAFR IFAFR2 GRFR and GRFR2 as instruments) 
  (b) (B) (b-B) 
  iv fe Difference 
HPP 3.9297 118.0117 -114.0820 
FRHPP -6.5570 -5.5937 -0.9633 
FR2HPP 0.1034 0.0777 0.0258 
AS 0.0587 0.0617 -0.0030 
FR 26.3427 22.4138 3.9290 
FR2 -0.4085 -0.3036 -0.1049 
BR -2.4893 -2.6302 0.1409 
LR 0.3990 0.4467 -0.0477 
HPI 0.2389 0.1931 0.0458 
MR -295.0656 -278.7437 -16.3219 
IC 127.4720 79.3844 48.0876 
NS 2.6293 2.4784 0.1508 
Hausman Test 
chi2(2) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
              = 212.21 
Prob>chi2 = 0.00 
Notes: This table provides results of the Hausman test. b=consistent under null hypothesis and alternative 
hypothesis. B=inconsistent under alternative hypothesis, efficient under null hypothesis. The null hypothesis is 
that difference in coefficients not systematic, which means fixed effect is appropriate. 
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Table A.56: Results of Sargan Test for GMM in Panel Model (HPP FRHPP and FR2HPP as 
endogenous variables, IFA GR IFAFR IFAFR2 GRFR and GRFR2 as instruments) 
  
Coef. Std. Err. t P-value [95% Conf. Interval] 
HPP 3.9297 12.2730 0.32 0.749 -20.1248 27.9843 
FRHPP -6.5570 0.7103 -9.23 0 -7.9491 -5.1649 
FR2HPP 0.1034 0.0160 6.46 0 0.0721 0.1348 
AS 0.0587 0.0038 15.45 0 0.0513 0.0662 
FR 26.3427 2.8899 9.12 0 20.6786 32.0069 
FR2 -0.4085 0.0651 -6.28 0 -0.5361 -0.2809 
BR -2.4893 0.2664 -9.35 0 -3.0114 -1.9672 
LR 0.3990 0.2855 1.4 0.162 -0.1606 0.9586 
HPI 0.2389 0.0207 11.53 0 0.1983 0.2795 
MR -295.0656 29.3304 -10.06 0 -352.5520 -237.5791 
IC 127.4720 4.0184 31.72 0 119.5961 135.3478 
NS 2.6293 0.3609 7.29 0 1.9220 3.3366 
Sargan Test 
chi2(1) =  0.63 
  p = 0.8895 
Notes: This table provides results of the Sargan test. The null hypothesis is that instrumental variables have not 
relationship to the error (instrumental variables are exogenous). 
 
Table A.57: Results of Endogenous Test for GMM in Panel Model (HPP FRHPP and 
FR2HPP as endogenous variables, IFA GR IFAFR IFAFR2 GRFR and GRFR2 as 
instruments) 
Underidentification test (Anderson canon. corr. LM statistic) 
Variable Chi-sq(2) Prob > F 
HPP FRHPP FR2HPP 396.742 0 
Wald test for weak instruments (Critical Values)  
  10% 15% 20% 25% 
Maximal IV Size 12.2 7.77 5.35 4.4 
Notes: This table provides results of the endogenous test. The null hypothesis is that instrumental variables are 
not relative to endogenous variables. For Wald test, the null hypothesis is that the instruments are weak. 
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Table A.58: Results of Breusch-Pagan Test for Heteroskedasticity in OLS Estimator (without 
orientation) 
  Coef. Std. Err. t P-value [95% Conf. Interval] 
AS 0.06 0.00 14.46 0 0.0484 0.0636 
FR 23.11 2.56 9.03 0 18.0918 28.1302 
FR2 -0.34 0.06 -6.01 0 -0.4488 -0.2280 
BR 0.06 0.40 0.15 0.878 -0.7303 0.8540 
BRFR -0.10 0.02 -6.2 0 -0.1355 -0.0704 
LR 0.36 0.30 1.22 0.221 -0.2178 0.9435 
HPP 121.60 8.15 14.91 0 105.6225 137.5870 
FRHPP -5.78 0.63 -9.2 0 -7.0122 -4.5488 
FR2HPP 0.09 0.01 6.26 0 0.0595 0.1137 
HPI 0.20 0.02 9.47 0 0.1598 0.2432 
MR -296.52 30.48 -9.73 0 -356.2499 -236.7813 
IC 77.37 2.17 35.6 0 73.1095 81.6287 
_cons -828.41 29.12 -28.45 0 -885.4830 -771.3293 
Breusch-Pagan test 
chi2(1) = 9.22 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0024 
Notes: This table provides results of the Breusch-Pagan test. The null hypothesis of Breusch-Pagan test is that 
there is a constant variance in the model. 
 
Table A.59: Results of Breusch-Godfrey LM Test for Autocorrelation in OLS Estimator 
(without orientation) 
  Coef. Std. Err. t P-value [95% Conf. Interval] 
AS 0.06 0.00 14.46 0 0.0484 0.0636 
FR 23.11 2.56 9.03 0 18.0918 28.1302 
FR2 -0.34 0.06 -6.01 0 -0.4488 -0.2280 
BR 0.06 0.40 0.15 0.878 -0.7303 0.8540 
BRFR -0.10 0.02 -6.2 0 -0.1355 -0.0704 
LR 0.36 0.30 1.22 0.221 -0.2178 0.9435 
HPP 121.60 8.15 14.91 0 105.6225 137.5870 
FRHPP -5.78 0.63 -9.2 0 -7.0122 -4.5488 
FR2HPP 0.09 0.01 6.26 0 0.0595 0.1137 
HPI 0.20 0.02 9.47 0 0.1598 0.2432 
MR -296.52 30.48 -9.73 0 -356.2499 -236.7813 
IC 77.37 2.17 35.6 0 73.1095 81.6287 
_cons -828.41 29.12 -28.45 0 -885.4830 -771.3293 
Breusch-Godfrey LM test 
lags(p) = 1 
chi2 = 130.612 
df = 1 
Prob > chi2 = 0 
Notes: This table provides results of the Breusch-Godfrey LM test. The null hypothesis of Breusch-Godfrey LM 
is that there is no serial correlation in the model. 
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Table A.60: Results of Hausman Test in Panel Model (without orientation) 
  (b) (B) (b-B) 
  Fixed Random Difference 
AS 0.0628 0.0560 0.0068 
FR 23.5122 23.1110 0.4012 
FR2 -0.3212 -0.3384 0.0171 
BR -0.8894 0.0619 -0.9512 
BRFR -0.0778 -0.1030 0.0251 
LR 0.6281 0.3629 0.2653 
HPP 120.9582 121.6047 -0.6466 
FRHPP -5.8230 -5.7805 -0.0425 
FR2HPP 0.0818 0.0866 -0.0048 
HPI 0.1940 0.2015 -0.0074 
MR -283.5479 -296.5156 12.9677 
IC 79.5524 77.3691 2.1833 
Hausman Test 
chi2(2) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
              = 669.69 
Prob>chi2 = 0.00 
Notes: This table provides results of the Hausman test. b=consistent under null hypothesis and alternative 
hypothesis. B=inconsistent under alternative hypothesis, efficient under null hypothesis. The null hypothesis is 
that difference in coefficients not systematic, which means random effect is appropriate. 
 
Table A.61: Results of Wooldridge Test for Autocorrelation in Panel Model (without orientation) 
  
Coef. 
Robust Std. 
Err. 
t P-value [95% Conf. Interval] 
AS 
0.0667 0.0152 4.4 0.005 0.0296 0.1039 
D1. 
FR 
26.4089 12.5139 2.11 0.079 -4.2114 57.0293 
D1. 
FR2 
-0.3805 0.1697 -2.24 0.066 -0.7958 0.0349 
D1. 
BR 
-1.1686 0.4332 -2.7 0.036 -2.2286 -0.1085 
D1. 
BRFR 
-0.0814 0.0207 -3.93 0.008 -0.1322 -0.0307 
D1. 
LR 
0.8445 0.5548 1.52 0.179 -0.5131 2.2021 
D1. 
HPP 
125.4494 38.3080 3.27 0.017 31.7131 219.1858 
D1. 
FRHPP 
-6.5445 3.1272 -2.09 0.081 -14.1966 1.1075 
D1. 
FR2HPP 
0.0964 0.0424 2.27 0.063 -0.0074 0.2002 
D1. 
HPI 
0.1724 0.0163 10.58 0 0.1325 0.2123 
D1. 
MR 
-283.6573 87.8508 -3.23 0.018 -498.6204 -68.6943 
D1. 
IC 
79.5517 7.8000 10.2 0 60.4658 98.6376 
D1. 
Wooldridge Test 
F(1,6) = 0.793 
Prob > F = 0.4074 
Notes: This table provides results of the Wooldridge test. The null hypothesis is that there is no first-order 
autocorrelation in the model. 
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Table A.62: Results of Likelihood-ratio Test for Groupwise Heteroskedasticity in Panel 
Model (without orientation) 
Cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression 
Coefficients:  generalized least squares 
Panels: heteroskedastic 
  Coef. Std. Err. z P-value [95% Conf. Interval] 
AS 0.0635 0.0030 21.01 0 0.0576 0.0694 
FR 7.8226 2.1293 3.67 0 3.6493 11.9959 
FR2 -0.1298 0.0431 -3.01 0.003 -0.2144 -0.0453 
BR -0.3963 0.3598 -1.1 0.271 -1.1015 0.3089 
BRFR -0.0966 0.0140 -6.91 0 -0.1241 -0.0692 
LR 0.1362 0.2373 0.57 0.566 -0.3289 0.6012 
HPP 64.2774 7.2724 8.84 0 50.0238 78.5310 
FRHPP -1.9534 0.5219 -3.74 0 -2.9763 -0.9304 
FR2HPP 0.0345 0.0106 3.26 0.001 0.0138 0.0553 
HPI 0.2051 0.0172 11.93 0 0.1714 0.2388 
MR -237.5752 25.1700 -9.44 0 -286.9074 -188.2430 
IC 73.1115 1.7865 40.92 0 69.6099 76.6130 
_cons -584.7025 26.7845 -21.83 0 -637.1991 -532.2059 
Panels: homoskedastic 
P Coef. Std. Err. z P-value [95% Conf. Interval] 
AS 0.0560 0.0039 14.47 0 0.0484 0.0636 
FR 23.1110 2.5597 9.03 0 18.0941 28.1279 
FR2 -0.3384 0.0563 -6.01 0 -0.4487 -0.2280 
BR 0.0619 0.4040 0.15 0.878 -0.7299 0.8537 
BRFR -0.1030 0.0166 -6.2 0 -0.1355 -0.0704 
LR 0.3629 0.2961 1.23 0.22 -0.2176 0.9433 
HPP 121.6047 8.1507 14.92 0 105.6297 137.5798 
FRHPP -5.7805 0.6281 -9.2 0 -7.0117 -4.5494 
FR2HPP 0.0866 0.0138 6.26 0 0.0595 0.1137 
HPI 0.2015 0.0213 9.47 0 0.1598 0.2432 
MR -296.5156 30.4635 -9.73 0 -356.2230 -236.8082 
IC 77.3691 2.1723 35.62 0 73.1114 81.6268 
_cons -828.4061 29.1083 -28.46 0 -885.4573 -771.3549 
Likelihood-ratio 
Test 
LR chi2(6) = 4011.58 
Prob > chi2 = 0.00 
Notes: This table provides results of the Likelihood-ratio test. The null hypothesis is that homoscedastic is 
nested in heteroskedastic. 
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Table A.63: Results of Friedman's Test for Cross-sectional Correlation in Panel Model 
(without orientation) 
  Coef. Std. Err. t P-value [95% Conf. Interval] 
AS 0.0628 0.0037 16.89 0 0.0555 0.0701 
FR 23.5122 2.4274 9.69 0 18.7543 28.2701 
FR2 -0.3212 0.0532 -6.03 0 -0.4256 -0.2169 
BR -0.8894 0.3867 -2.3 0.021 -1.6474 -0.1313 
BRFR -0.0778 0.0158 -4.93 0 -0.1088 -0.0469 
LR 0.6281 0.2799 2.24 0.025 0.0795 1.1768 
HPP 120.9582 7.7325 15.64 0 105.8017 136.1146 
FRHPP -5.8230 0.5954 -9.78 0 -6.9901 -4.6559 
FR2HPP 0.0818 0.0131 6.25 0 0.0562 0.1074 
HPI 0.1940 0.0201 9.66 0 0.1547 0.2334 
MR -283.5479 28.7567 -9.86 0 -339.9139 -227.1819 
IC 79.5524 2.0530 38.75 0 75.5282 83.5766 
_cons -839.5595 27.6761 -30.34 0 -893.8075 -785.3115 
Friedman's Test 
Cross sectional independence = 266.36 
Pr = 0.00 
Notes: This table provides results of the Friedman's test. The null hypothesis is there is no cross-sectional 
correlation in the model. 
 
Table A.64: Results of Hausman Test for GMM (BR and BRFR as endogenous variables, SE 
NW FRSE and FRNW as instruments)  
  (b) (B) (b-B) 
  iv ols Difference 
BR -16.5471 0.0619 -16.6090 
BRFR 0.1703 -0.1030 0.2733 
AS 0.1710 0.0560 0.1150 
FR 15.6338 23.1110 -7.4771 
FR2 -0.2362 -0.3384 0.1022 
LR 4.2550 0.3629 3.8921 
HPP 107.9600 121.6047 -13.6448 
FRHPP -4.1710 -5.7805 1.6095 
FR2HPP 0.0623 0.0866 -0.0243 
HPI 0.2054 0.2015 0.0039 
MR -296.1182 -296.5156 0.3974 
IC 73.9063 77.3691 -3.4628 
_cons -734.9127 -828.4061 93.4934 
Hausman Test 
chi2(2) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
              = 6.89 
Prob>chi2 = 0.0319 
Notes: This table provides results of the Hausman test. b=consistent under null hypothesis and alternative 
hypothesis. B=inconsistent under alternative hypothesis, efficient under null hypothesis. The null hypothesis is 
that difference in coefficients not systematic, which means ols estimator is appropriate. 
 
 
281 
 
Table A.65: Results of First Stage Regression for GMM (BR and BRFR as endogenous 
variables, SE NW FRSE and FRNW as instruments) 
BR Coef. Robust Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf.Interval] 
AS 9.78E-03 1.20E-04 81.4 0 9.55E-03 1.00E-02 
FR -2.88E-01 6.90E-02 -4.18 0 -4.23E-01 -1.53E-01 
FR2 3.75E-03 1.34E-03 2.79 0.005 1.11E-03 6.38E-03 
LR 3.47E-01 9.36E-03 37.11 0 3.29E-01 3.66E-01 
HPP -4.13E-01 2.48E-01 -1.67 0.095 -8.99E-01 7.18E-02 
FRHPP 6.96E-02 1.69E-02 4.11 0 3.64E-02 1.03E-01 
FR2HPP -9.91E-04 3.31E-04 -3 0.003 -1.64E-03 -3.42E-04 
HPI 9.03E-05 5.95E-04 0.15 0.879 -1.08E-03 1.26E-03 
MR -2.22E-01 8.95E-01 -0.25 0.804 -1.98E+00 1.53E+00 
IC -2.38E-01 6.27E-02 -3.8 0 -3.61E-01 -1.15E-01 
SE -1.74E-01 5.25E-02 -3.31 0.001 -2.77E-01 -7.08E-02 
NW -2.52E-01 5.33E-02 -4.72 0 -3.56E-01 -1.47E-01 
FRSE 1.27E-02 2.19E-03 5.77 0 8.35E-03 1.70E-02 
FRNW 1.20E-02 2.30E-03 5.23 0 7.51E-03 1.65E-02 
_cons 3.53E+00 8.89E-01 3.97 0 1.79E+00 5.27E+00 
Notes: This table provides results of the first stage regression of IV-GMM. The null hypothesis is that 
instrumental variables have not relationship to the endogenous variable (instrumental variables are exogenous). 
 
BRFR Coef. Robust Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf.Interval] 
AS 1.75E-01 3.08E-03 56.81 0 1.69E-01 1.81E-01 
FR 1.06E+01 1.89E+00 5.6 0 6.88E+00 1.43E+01 
FR2 -1.60E-01 4.21E-02 -3.81 0 -2.43E-01 -7.80E-02 
LR 6.87E+00 2.11E-01 32.51 0 6.46E+00 7.29E+00 
HPP 2.69E+01 5.92E+00 4.55 0 1.53E+01 3.85E+01 
FRHPP -1.82E+00 4.65E-01 -3.93 0 -2.74E+00 -9.14E-01 
FR2HPP 3.20E-02 1.04E-02 3.09 0.002 1.17E-02 5.23E-02 
HPI -7.24E-03 1.45E-02 -0.5 0.617 -3.56E-02 2.11E-02 
MR -1.27E+01 2.11E+01 -0.6 0.549 -5.41E+01 2.87E+01 
IC -2.08E+00 1.49E+00 -1.4 0.162 -5.00E+00 8.35E-01 
SE -1.13E+01 1.13E+00 -10.06 0 -1.35E+01 -9.11E+00 
NW -7.64E-02 1.27E+00 -0.06 0.952 -2.57E+00 2.42E+00 
FRSE 6.97E-01 5.02E-02 13.89 0 5.99E-01 7.96E-01 
FRNW 1.09E-02 6.29E-02 0.17 0.862 -1.12E-01 1.34E-01 
_cons -1.36E+02 2.12E+01 -6.4 0 -1.78E+02 -9.42E+01 
Notes: This table provides results of the first stage regression of IV-GMM. The null hypothesis is that 
instrumental variables have not relationship to the endogenous variable (instrumental variables are exogenous). 
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Table A.66: Results of Sargan Test for GMM (BR and BRFR as endogenous variables, SE 
NW FRSE and FRNW as instruments) 
  Coef. Std. Err. t P-value [95% Conf. Interval] 
BR -21.1236 7.7885 -2.71 0.007 -36.3888 -5.8584 
BRFR 0.2425 0.1704 1.42 0.155 -0.0915 0.5765 
AS 0.2028 0.0485 4.18 0 0.1077 0.2978 
FR 13.4942 4.8409 2.79 0.005 4.0063 22.9821 
FR2 -0.2077 0.0748 -2.78 0.005 -0.3542 -0.0612 
LR 5.3707 1.6615 3.23 0.001 2.1143 8.6272 
HPP 102.8866 12.5345 8.21 0 78.3195 127.4537 
FRHPP -3.7043 1.0833 -3.42 0.001 -5.8275 -1.5811 
FR2HPP 0.0555 0.0179 3.1 0.002 0.0204 0.0907 
HPI 0.2015 0.0241 8.36 0 0.1543 0.2488 
MR -296.5277 22.0128 -13.47 0 -339.6719 -253.3834 
IC 73.3106 2.2039 33.26 0 68.9910 77.6302 
_cons -705.0948 61.8320 -11.4 0 -826.2832 -583.9063 
Sargan Test 
chi2(1) =  5.86167 
  p = 0.0534 
Notes: This table provides results of the Sargan test. The null hypothesis is that instrumental variables have not 
relationship to the error (instrumental variables are exogenous). 
 
Table A.67: Results of Endogenous Test for GMM (BR and BRFR as endogenous variables, 
SE NW FRSE and FRNW as instruments) 
First-stage regression summary statistics 
Variable R-sq. Adjusted R-sq. Partial R-sq. F(2,17129) Prob > F 
BR 0.6976 0.6974 0.0085 36.8455 0 
BRFR 0.7643 0.7641 0.0279 122.778 0 
Shea's partial R-squared 
Variable Shea's Partial R-sq. Shea's Adj. Partial R-sq. 
BR 0.0034 0.0027 
BRFR 0.0111 0.0104 
Wald test for weak instruments (Critical Values)  
  10% 15% 20% 25% 
Maximal IV Size 16.87 9.93 7.54 6.28 
Notes: This table provides results of the endogenous test. The null hypothesis is that instrumental variables are 
not relative to endogenous variables. For Wald test, the null hypothesis is that the instruments are weak. 
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Table A.68: Results of First Stage Regression for GMM (BR and BRFR as endogenous 
variables, NW WE FRNW and FRWE as instruments) 
BR Coef. Robust Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf.Interval] 
AS 9.82E-03 1.21E-04 81.19 0 9.58E-03 1.01E-02 
FR -2.56E-01 6.49E-02 -3.94 0 -3.83E-01 -1.29E-01 
FR2 3.07E-03 1.17E-03 2.63 0.009 7.82E-04 5.37E-03 
LR 3.50E-01 9.44E-03 37.12 0 3.32E-01 3.69E-01 
HPP -3.41E-01 2.45E-01 -1.39 0.163 -8.20E-01 1.38E-01 
FRHPP 6.18E-02 1.59E-02 3.88 0 3.06E-02 9.31E-02 
FR2HPP -8.22E-04 2.87E-04 -2.86 0.004 -1.39E-03 -2.58E-04 
HPI -2.23E-05 5.96E-04 -0.04 0.97 -1.19E-03 1.15E-03 
MR -2.03E-01 8.94E-01 -0.23 0.821 -1.96E+00 1.55E+00 
IC -2.43E-01 6.29E-02 -3.87 0 -3.67E-01 -1.20E-01 
NW -2.39E-01 5.34E-02 -4.49 0 -3.44E-01 -1.35E-01 
WE -1.55E-01 6.41E-02 -2.42 0.016 -2.81E-01 -2.92E-02 
FRNW 1.08E-02 2.30E-03 4.69 0 6.30E-03 1.53E-02 
FRWE 1.43E-02 3.56E-03 4.03 0 7.35E-03 2.13E-02 
_cons 3.26E+00 8.74E-01 3.72 0 1.54E+00 4.97E+00 
Notes: This table provides results of the first stage regression of IV-GMM. The null hypothesis is that 
instrumental variables have not relationship to the endogenous variable (instrumental variables are exogenous). 
 
BRFR Coef. Robust Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf.Interval] 
AS 1.76E-01 3.12E-03 56.55 0 1.70E-01 1.82E-01 
FR 1.23E+01 2.12E+00 5.83 0 8.18E+00 1.65E+01 
FR2 -1.96E-01 4.93E-02 -3.98 0 -2.93E-01 -9.97E-02 
LR 7.03E+00 2.17E-01 32.45 0 6.61E+00 7.46E+00 
HPP 3.10E+01 6.20E+00 5 0 1.88E+01 4.31E+01 
FRHPP -2.24E+00 5.20E-01 -4.31 0 -3.26E+00 -1.22E+00 
FR2HPP 4.10E-02 1.21E-02 3.38 0.001 1.72E-02 6.48E-02 
HPI -1.28E-02 1.46E-02 -0.88 0.381 -4.15E-02 1.59E-02 
MR -1.31E+01 2.13E+01 -0.62 0.537 -5.49E+01 2.86E+01 
IC -2.33E+00 1.51E+00 -1.54 0.122 -5.29E+00 6.27E-01 
NW 7.80E-01 1.29E+00 0.61 0.544 -1.74E+00 3.30E+00 
WE -1.30E+00 1.53E+00 -0.85 0.395 -4.29E+00 1.69E+00 
FRNW -5.61E-02 6.33E-02 -0.89 0.376 -1.80E-01 6.80E-02 
FRWE 2.78E-01 1.01E-01 2.77 0.006 8.11E-02 4.75E-01 
_cons -1.52E+02 2.24E+01 -6.77 0 -1.96E+02 -1.08E+02 
Notes: This table provides results of the first stage regression of IV-GMM. The null hypothesis is that 
instrumental variables have not relationship to the endogenous variable (instrumental variables are exogenous). 
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Table A.69: Results of Hausman Test for GMM (BR and BRFR as endogenous variables, 
NW WE FRNW and FRWE as instruments)  
  (b) (B) (b-B) 
  iv ols Difference 
BR -10.0193 0.0619 -10.0812 
BRFR 0.6722 -0.1030 0.7752 
AS 0.0184 0.0560 -0.0376 
FR 11.0233 23.1110 -12.0877 
FR2 -0.1562 -0.3384 0.1822 
LR -1.5827 0.3629 -1.9456 
HPP 94.2587 121.6047 -27.3460 
FRHPP -3.4283 -5.7805 2.3522 
FR2HPP 0.0468 0.0866 -0.0399 
HPI 0.2126 0.2015 0.0111 
MR -288.3613 -296.5156 8.1544 
IC 76.7135 77.3691 -0.6557 
_cons -678.6653 -828.4061 149.7408 
Hausman Test 
chi2(2) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
              = 7.29 
Prob>chi2 = 0.0261 
Notes: This table provides results of the Hausman test. b=consistent under null hypothesis and alternative 
hypothesis. B=inconsistent under alternative hypothesis, efficient under null hypothesis. The null hypothesis is 
that difference in coefficients not systematic, which means ols estimator is appropriate. 
 
Table A.70: Results of Sargan Test for GMM (BR and BRFR as endogenous variables, NW 
WE FRNW and FRWE as instruments) 
  Coef. Std. Err. t P-value [95% Conf. Interval] 
BR -8.3823 8.1794 -1.02 0.305 -24.4136 7.6491 
BRFR 0.6291 0.2804 2.24 0.025 0.0795 1.1786 
AS 0.0100 0.0527 0.19 0.85 -0.0934 0.1133 
FR 11.9300 5.9413 2.01 0.045 0.2853 23.5747 
FR2 -0.1680 0.0928 -1.81 0.07 -0.3499 0.0140 
LR -1.8528 1.8720 -0.99 0.322 -5.5218 1.8162 
HPP 96.4537 14.7960 6.52 0 67.4541 125.4534 
FRHPP -3.6153 1.2721 -2.84 0.004 -6.1085 -1.1221 
FR2HPP 0.0495 0.0216 2.29 0.022 0.0070 0.0919 
HPI 0.2126 0.0237 8.97 0 0.1662 0.2591 
MR -288.5728 20.9098 -13.8 0 -329.5552 -247.5904 
IC 76.9197 2.1110 36.44 0 72.7822 81.0571 
_cons -691.3921 75.0659 -9.21 0 -838.5186 -544.2657 
Sargan Test 
chi2(1) =  1.58489 
  p = 0.4527 
Notes: This table provides results of the Sargan test. The null hypothesis is that instrumental variables have not 
relationship to the error (instrumental variables are exogenous). 
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Table A.71: Results of Endogenous Test for GMM (BR and BRFR as endogenous variables, 
NW WE FRNW and FRWE as instruments) 
First-stage regression summary statistics 
Variable R-sq. Adjusted R-sq. Partial R-sq. F(2,17129) Prob > F 
BR 0.6958 0.6955 0.0025 10.7233 0 
BRFR 0.758 0.7578 0.0022 9.4635 0 
Shea's partial R-squared 
Variable Shea's Partial R-sq. Shea's Adj. Partial R-sq. 
BR 0.0038 0.003 
BRFR 0.0033 0.0026 
Wald test for weak instruments (Critical Values)  
  10% 15% 20% 25% 
Maximal IV Size 16.87 9.93 7.54 6.28 
Notes: This table provides results of the endogenous test. The null hypothesis is that instrumental variables are 
not relative to endogenous variables. For Wald test, the null hypothesis is that the instruments are weak. 
 
Table A.72: Results of Hausman Test for GMM in Panel Model (BR and BRFR as 
endogenous variables, SE SW FRSE and FRSW as instruments) 
  (b) (B) (b-B) 
  iv fe Difference 
BR -31.5447 -0.8894 -30.6553 
BRFR 0.5502 -0.0778 0.6281 
AS 0.2575 0.0628 0.1947 
FR 10.4078 23.5122 -13.1045 
FR2 -0.1422 -0.3212 0.1790 
LR 6.6865 0.6281 6.0583 
HPP 96.3404 120.9582 -24.6178 
FRHPP -3.0770 -5.8230 2.7461 
FR2HPP 0.0398 0.0818 -0.0420 
HPI 0.2013 0.1940 0.0073 
MR -289.4630 -283.5479 -5.9151 
IC 75.2699 79.5524 -4.2825 
Hausman Test 
chi2(2) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
              = 24.32 
Prob>chi2 = 0.00 
Notes: This table provides results of the Hausman test. b=consistent under null hypothesis and alternative 
hypothesis. B=inconsistent under alternative hypothesis, efficient under null hypothesis. The null hypothesis is 
that difference in coefficients not systematic, which means fixed effect is appropriate. 
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Table A.73: Results of First Stage Regression for GMM (BR and BRFR as endogenous 
variables, SE SW FRSE and FRSW as instruments) 
BR Coef. Robust Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf.Interval] 
AS 0.0099 0.0001 125.02 0 0.0098 0.0101 
FR -0.2285 0.0712 -3.21 0.001 -0.3680 -0.0890 
FR2 0.0030 0.0016 1.91 0.056 -0.0001 0.0061 
LR 0.3338 0.0078 42.61 0 0.3184 0.3491 
HPP -0.2676 0.2272 -1.18 0.239 -0.7129 0.1777 
FRHPP 0.0560 0.0175 3.2 0.001 0.0217 0.0903 
FR2HPP -0.0008 0.0004 -2.11 0.035 -0.0016 -0.0001 
HPI 0.0001 0.0006 0.23 0.822 -0.0010 0.0013 
MIR -0.6785 0.8466 -0.8 0.423 -2.3379 0.9808 
IC -0.1691 0.0604 -2.8 0.005 -0.2875 -0.0507 
SE -0.1459 0.0414 -3.53 0 -0.2271 -0.0648 
SW -0.0185 0.0547 -0.34 0.735 -0.1257 0.0887 
FRSE 0.0125 0.0017 7.31 0 0.0091 0.0158 
FRSW 0.0100 0.0023 4.39 0 0.0055 0.0145 
Notes: This table provides results of the first stage regression of IV-GMM. The null hypothesis is that 
instrumental variables have not relationship to the endogenous variable (instrumental variables are exogenous). 
 
BRFR Coef. Robust Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf.Interval] 
AS 0.1750 0.0019 91.76 0 0.1713 0.1787 
FR 9.6048 1.7124 5.61 0 6.2483 12.9614 
FR2 -0.1377 0.0377 -3.66 0 -0.2115 -0.0639 
LR 6.6365 0.1885 35.21 0 6.2670 7.0059 
HPP 25.0583 5.4670 4.58 0 14.3424 35.7741 
FRHPP -1.6032 0.4208 -3.81 0 -2.4280 -0.7783 
FR2HPP 0.0266 0.0093 2.88 0.004 0.0085 0.0448 
HPI -0.0047 0.0142 -0.33 0.742 -0.0326 0.0232 
MIR -16.6162 20.3714 -0.82 0.415 -56.5462 23.3139 
IC -1.5318 1.4534 -1.05 0.292 -4.3807 1.3170 
SE -11.5760 0.9961 -11.62 0 -13.5285 -9.6234 
SW -7.4813 1.3158 -5.69 0 -10.0604 -4.9022 
FRSE 0.7429 0.0411 18.06 0 0.6623 0.8235 
FRSW 0.6176 0.0548 11.27 0 0.5102 0.7250 
Notes: This table provides results of the first stage regression of IV-GMM. The null hypothesis is that 
instrumental variables have not relationship to the endogenous variable (instrumental variables are exogenous). 
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Table A.74: Results of Sargan Test for GMM in Panel Model (BR and BRFR as endogenous 
variables, SE SW FRSE and FRSW as instruments) 
  
Coef. Std. Err. t P-value [95% Conf. Interval] 
BR -31.5447 8.1585 -3.87 0 -47.5350 -15.5544 
BRFR 0.5502 0.1992 2.76 0.006 0.1597 0.9407 
AS 0.2575 0.0485 5.31 0 0.1624 0.3526 
FR 10.4078 4.8015 2.17 0.03 0.9970 19.8186 
FR2 -0.1422 0.0829 -1.72 0.086 -0.3047 0.0202 
LR 6.6865 1.5229 4.39 0 3.7016 9.6713 
HPP 96.3404 11.8343 8.14 0 73.1457 119.5351 
FRHPP -3.0770 1.0631 -2.89 0.004 -5.1605 -0.9934 
FR2HPP 0.0398 0.0199 2 0.045 0.0009 0.0788 
HPI 0.2013 0.0240 8.39 0 0.1543 0.2484 
MR -289.4630 34.2446 -8.45 0 -356.5811 -222.3448 
IC 75.2699 2.6780 28.11 0 70.0212 80.5186 
Sargan Test 
chi2(1) =  5.848 
  p = 0.0537 
Notes: This table provides results of the Sargan test. The null hypothesis is that instrumental variables have not 
relationship to the error (instrumental variables are exogenous). 
 
Table A.75: Results of Endogenous Test for GMM in Panel Model (BR and BRFR as 
endogenous variables, SE SW FRSE and FRSW as instruments) 
Underidentification test (Anderson canon. corr. LM statistic) 
Variable Chi-sq(2) Prob > F 
BR BRFR 50.939 0 
Wald test for weak instruments (Critical Values)  
  10% 15% 20% 25% 
Maximal IV Size 16.87 9.93 7.54 6.28 
Notes: This table provides results of the endogenous test. The null hypothesis is that instrumental variables are 
not relative to endogenous variables. For Wald test, the null hypothesis is that the instruments are weak. 
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Table A. 76: Results of First Stage Regression for GMM (BR and BRFR as endogenous 
variables, SE NW FRSE and FRNW as instruments) 
BR Coef. Robust Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf.Interval] 
AS 0.0100 0.0001 125.21 0 0.0098 0.0101 
FR -0.2153 0.0715 -3.01 0.003 -0.3555 -0.0751 
FR2 0.0025 0.0016 1.61 0.107 -0.0005 0.0056 
LR 0.3383 0.0079 42.99 0 0.3229 0.3538 
HPP -0.2878 0.2284 -1.26 0.208 -0.7355 0.1599 
FRHPP 0.0532 0.0176 3.03 0.002 0.0188 0.0877 
FR2HPP -0.0007 0.0004 -1.83 0.068 -0.0015 0.0001 
HPI 0.0001 0.0006 0.23 0.822 -0.0010 0.0013 
MIR -0.4939 0.8508 -0.58 0.562 -2.1617 1.1738 
IC -0.1691 0.0607 -2.78 0.005 -0.2881 -0.0501 
SE -0.1565 0.0416 -3.76 0 -0.2380 -0.0750 
NW -0.2807 0.0579 -4.85 0 -0.3941 -0.1673 
FRSE 0.0118 0.0017 6.87 0 0.0084 0.0152 
FRNW 0.0123 0.0025 4.98 0 0.0074 0.0171 
Notes: This table provides results of the first stage regression of IV-GMM. The null hypothesis is that 
instrumental variables have not relationship to the endogenous variable (instrumental variables are exogenous). 
 
BRFR Coef. Robust Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf.Interval] 
AS 0.1770 0.0019 91.67 0 0.1732 0.1808 
FR 10.4939 1.7350 6.05 0 7.0932 13.8946 
FR2 -0.1630 0.0381 -4.27 0 -0.2378 -0.0882 
LR 6.8148 0.1909 35.7 0 6.4406 7.1889 
HPP 25.7510 5.5397 4.65 0 14.8926 36.6094 
FRHPP -1.7980 0.4264 -4.22 0 -2.6337 -0.9623 
FR2HPP 0.0326 0.0094 3.48 0.001 0.0142 0.0510 
HPI -0.0023 0.0144 -0.16 0.872 -0.0306 0.0259 
MIR -12.3950 20.6374 -0.6 0.548 -52.8464 28.0565 
IC -1.5913 1.4730 -1.08 0.28 -4.4784 1.2959 
SE -11.4207 1.0085 -11.32 0 -13.3974 -9.4440 
NW -0.7090 1.4035 -0.51 0.613 -3.4600 2.0420 
FRSE 0.6954 0.0416 16.71 0 0.6138 0.7769 
FRNW 0.0216 0.0597 0.36 0.717 -0.0954 0.1386 
Notes: This table provides results of the first stage regression of IV-GMM. The null hypothesis is that 
instrumental variables have not relationship to the endogenous variable (instrumental variables are exogenous). 
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Table A.77: Results of Hausman Test for GMM in Panel Model (BR and BRFR as 
endogenous variables, SE NW FRSE and FRNW as instruments) 
  (b) (B) (b-B) 
  iv fe Difference 
BR -18.9487 -0.8894 -18.0593 
BRFR 0.1969 -0.0778 0.2747 
AS 0.1946 0.0628 0.1317 
FR 16.9626 23.5122 -6.5497 
FR2 -0.2348 -0.3212 0.0864 
LR 4.8641 0.6281 4.2360 
HPP 109.3214 120.9582 -11.6368 
FRHPP -4.4175 -5.8230 1.4055 
FR2HPP 0.0610 0.0818 -0.0207 
HPI 0.1975 0.1940 0.0034 
MR -288.2494 -283.5479 -4.7015 
IC 76.8547 79.5524 -2.6977 
Hausman Test 
chi2(2) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
              = 10.02 
Prob>chi2 = 0.0067 
Notes: This table provides results of the Hausman test. b=consistent under null hypothesis and alternative 
hypothesis. B=inconsistent under alternative hypothesis, efficient under null hypothesis. The null hypothesis is 
that difference in coefficients not systematic, which means fixed effect is appropriate. 
 
Table A.78: Results of Sargan Test for GMM in Panel Model (BR and BRFR as endogenous 
variables, SE NW FRSE and FRNW as instruments) 
  Coef. Std. Err. t P-value [95% Conf. Interval] 
BR -18.9487 6.9021 -2.75 0.006 -32.4765 -5.4209 
BRFR 0.1969 0.1550 1.27 0.204 -0.1070 0.5007 
AS 0.1946 0.0460 4.23 0 0.1044 0.2847 
FR 16.9626 4.0057 4.23 0 9.1116 24.8135 
FR2 -0.2348 0.0712 -3.3 0.001 -0.3743 -0.0953 
LR 4.8641 1.4895 3.27 0.001 1.9447 7.7836 
HPP 109.3214 10.1793 10.74 0 89.3702 129.2725 
FRHPP -4.4175 0.9000 -4.91 0 -6.1814 -2.6537 
FR2HPP 0.0610 0.0172 3.56 0 0.0274 0.0947 
HPI 0.1975 0.0218 9.07 0 0.1548 0.2401 
MR -288.2494 31.1042 -9.27 0 -349.2124 -227.2863 
IC 76.8547 2.4226 31.72 0 72.1065 81.6029 
Sargan Test 
chi2(1) =  5.293 
  p = 0.0709 
Notes: This table provides results of the Sargan test. The null hypothesis is that instrumental variables have not 
relationship to the error (instrumental variables are exogenous). 
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Table A.79: Results of Endogenous Test for GMM in Panel Model (BR and BRFR as 
endogenous variables, SE NW FRSE and FRNW as instruments) 
Underidentification test (Anderson canon. corr. LM statistic) 
Variable Chi-sq(2) Prob > F 
BR BRFR 53.94 0 
Wald test for weak instruments (Critical Values)  
  10% 15% 20% 25% 
Maximal IV Size 16.87 9.93 7.54 6.28 
Notes: This table provides results of the endogenous test. The null hypothesis is that instrumental variables are 
not relative to endogenous variables. For Wald test, the null hypothesis is that the instruments are weak. 
 
 
Table A.80: Results of Hausman Test for GMM in Panel Model (BR and BRFR as 
endogenous variables, SW NW FRSW and FRNW as instruments) 
  (b) (B) (b-B) 
  iv fe Difference 
BR -20.6761 -0.8894 -19.7867 
BRFR 0.3976 -0.0778 0.4754 
AS 0.1760 0.0628 0.1132 
FR 14.1939 23.5122 -9.3183 
FR2 -0.1917 -0.3212 0.1295 
LR 4.0484 0.6281 3.4203 
HPP 102.9625 120.9582 -17.9956 
FRHPP -3.8946 -5.8230 1.9285 
FR2HPP 0.0518 0.0818 -0.0300 
HPI 0.1994 0.1940 0.0053 
MR -286.4716 -283.5479 -2.9237 
IC 76.9167 79.5524 -2.6357 
Hausman Test 
chi2(2) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
              = 13.17 
Prob>chi2 = 0.0014 
Notes: This table provides results of the Hausman test. b=consistent under null hypothesis and alternative 
hypothesis. B=inconsistent under alternative hypothesis, efficient under null hypothesis. The null hypothesis is 
that difference in coefficients not systematic, which means fixed effect is appropriate. 
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Table A.81: Results of First Stage Regression for GMM (BR and BRFR as endogenous 
variables, SW NW FRSW and FRNW as instruments) 
BR Coef. Robust Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf.Interval] 
AS 0.0100 0.0001 125.54 0 0.0098 0.0101 
FR -0.1954 0.0714 -2.74 0.006 -0.3353 -0.0556 
FR2 0.0023 0.0016 1.46 0.144 -0.0008 0.0054 
LR 0.3386 0.0079 43.09 0 0.3232 0.3540 
HPP -0.1962 0.2280 -0.86 0.39 -0.6431 0.2507 
FRHPP 0.0481 0.0175 2.74 0.006 0.0137 0.0825 
FR2HPP -0.0006 0.0004 -1.65 0.098 -0.0014 0.0001 
HPI -0.0001 0.0006 -0.12 0.903 -0.0012 0.0011 
MIR -0.6163 0.8498 -0.73 0.468 -2.2820 1.0494 
IC -0.1782 0.0606 -2.94 0.003 -0.2971 -0.0594 
SW -0.0097 0.0548 -0.18 0.859 -0.1172 0.0978 
NW -0.2745 0.0578 -4.75 0 -0.3877 -0.1612 
FRSW 0.0086 0.0023 3.77 0 0.0041 0.0131 
FRNW 0.0121 0.0025 4.91 0 0.0073 0.0169 
Notes: This table provides results of the first stage regression of IV-GMM. The null hypothesis is that 
instrumental variables have not relationship to the endogenous variable (instrumental variables are exogenous). 
 
BRFR Coef. Robust Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf.Interval] 
AS 0.1772 0.0019 91.5 0 0.1734 0.1810 
FR 11.6623 1.7409 6.7 0 8.2500 15.0747 
FR2 -0.1809 0.0383 -4.72 0 -0.2560 -0.1059 
LR 6.8703 0.1917 35.84 0 6.4946 7.2461 
HPP 29.7789 5.5617 5.35 0 18.8775 40.6804 
FRHPP -2.0932 0.4278 -4.89 0 -2.9318 -1.2547 
FR2HPP 0.0374 0.0094 3.97 0 0.0189 0.0558 
HPI -0.0119 0.0145 -0.82 0.412 -0.0402 0.0165 
MIR -15.8575 20.7297 -0.76 0.444 -56.4898 24.7747 
IC -1.8506 1.4791 -1.25 0.211 -4.7498 1.0485 
SW -6.3762 1.3377 -4.77 0 -8.9981 -3.7542 
NW -0.3513 1.4094 -0.25 0.803 -3.1139 2.4113 
FRSW 0.5242 0.0557 9.41 0 0.4150 0.6333 
FRNW 0.0009 0.0599 0.01 0.988 -0.1166 0.1184 
Notes: This table provides results of the first stage regression of IV-GMM. The null hypothesis is that 
instrumental variables have not relationship to the endogenous variable (instrumental variables are exogenous). 
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Table A.82: Results of Sargan Test for GMM in Panel Model (BR and BRFR as endogenous 
variables, SW NW FRSW and FRNW as instruments) 
  
Coef. Std. Err. t P-value [95% Conf. Interval] 
BR -20.6761 6.1457 -3.36 0.001 -32.7213 -8.6308 
BRFR 0.3976 0.1910 2.08 0.037 0.0233 0.7719 
AS 0.1760 0.0342 5.14 0 0.1089 0.2431 
FR 14.1939 4.2436 3.34 0.001 5.8765 22.5113 
FR2 -0.1917 0.0747 -2.57 0.01 -0.3381 -0.0453 
LR 4.0484 1.0985 3.69 0 1.8953 6.2015 
HPP 102.9625 10.7366 9.59 0 81.9193 124.0058 
FRHPP -3.8946 0.9326 -4.18 0 -5.7225 -2.0666 
FR2HPP 0.0518 0.0178 2.91 0.004 0.0169 0.0867 
HPI 0.1994 0.0217 9.17 0 0.1568 0.2420 
MR -286.4716 31.0043 -9.24 0 -347.2389 -225.7043 
IC 76.9167 2.3474 32.77 0 72.3158 81.5176 
Sargan Test 
chi2(1) =  4.81 
  p = 0.0903 
Notes: This table provides results of the Sargan test. The null hypothesis is that instrumental variables have not 
relationship to the error (instrumental variables are exogenous). 
 
Table A.83: Results of Endogenous Test for GMM in Panel Model (BR and BRFR as 
endogenous variables, SW NW FRSW and FRNW as instruments) 
Underidentification test (Anderson canon. corr. LM statistic) 
Variable Chi-sq(2) Prob > F 
BR BRFR 77.926 0 
Wald test for weak instruments (Critical Values)  
  10% 15% 20% 25% 
Maximal IV Size 16.87 9.93 7.54 6.28 
Notes: This table provides results of the endogenous test. The null hypothesis is that instrumental variables are 
not relative to endogenous variables. For Wald test, the null hypothesis is that the instruments are weak. 
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Table A.84: Results of First Stage Regression for GMM (LR and LRFR as endogenous 
variables, W WE FRW and FRWE as instruments) 
LR Coef. Robust Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf.Interval] 
AS 0.0026 0.0001 21.83 0 0.0024 0.0029 
FR 0.1476 0.0630 2.34 0.019 0.0242 0.2710 
FR2 -0.0017 0.0014 -1.25 0.212 -0.0044 0.0010 
BR 0.2885 0.0072 40 0 0.2744 0.3026 
HPP 0.3778 0.2069 1.83 0.068 -0.0278 0.7834 
FRHPP -0.0343 0.0155 -2.21 0.027 -0.0646 -0.0039 
FR2HPP 0.0004 0.0003 1.14 0.256 -0.0003 0.0010 
HPI -0.0010 0.0005 -1.75 0.079 -0.0020 0.0001 
MR -0.2177 0.7820 -0.28 0.781 -1.7504 1.3151 
IC 0.0772 0.0551 1.4 0.161 -0.0307 0.1851 
W -0.2247 0.0358 -6.28 0 -0.2948 -0.1545 
WE 0.0481 0.0552 0.87 0.384 -0.0602 0.1563 
FRW 0.0092 0.0014 6.66 0 0.0065 0.0119 
FRWE 0.0013 0.0031 0.42 0.674 -0.0047 0.0073 
_cons -1.3642 0.7351 -1.86 0.064 -2.8051 0.0768 
Notes: This table provides results of the first stage regression of IV-GMM. The null hypothesis is that 
instrumental variables have not relationship to the endogenous variable (instrumental variables are exogenous). 
 
LRFR Coef. Robust Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf.Interval] 
AS 0.0444 0.0025 17.66 0 0.0395 0.0493 
FR 11.0007 2.5672 4.29 0 5.9687 16.0326 
FR2 -0.1371 0.0691 -1.98 0.047 -0.2726 -0.0016 
BR 5.6959 0.1506 37.82 0 5.4007 5.9911 
HPP 24.8288 5.5792 4.45 0 13.8930 35.7646 
FRHPP -2.2459 0.6319 -3.55 0 -3.4845 -1.0074 
FR2HPP 0.0319 0.0170 1.88 0.061 -0.0014 0.0652 
HPI -0.0144 0.0127 -1.13 0.258 -0.0394 0.0106 
MR -5.9899 17.5482 -0.34 0.733 -40.3861 28.4063 
IC 1.6577 1.2485 1.33 0.184 -0.7894 4.1049 
W 2.9770 1.0673 2.79 0.005 0.8849 5.0690 
WE 0.8340 0.9182 0.91 0.364 -0.9657 2.6337 
FRW -0.1434 0.0525 -2.73 0.006 -0.2462 -0.0406 
FRWE 0.0717 0.0624 1.15 0.251 -0.0507 0.1940 
_cons -129.4946 20.4968 -6.32 0 -169.6705 -89.3188 
Notes: This table provides results of the first stage regression of IV-GMM. The null hypothesis is that 
instrumental variables have not relationship to the endogenous variable (instrumental variables are exogenous). 
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Table A.85: Results of Hausman Test for GMM (LR and LRFR as endogenous variables, W 
WE FRW and FRWE as instruments)  
  (b) (B) (b-B) 
  iv ols Difference 
LR 6.8788 3.1651 3.7137 
LRFR 0.6339 -0.1457 0.7796 
AS 0.0109 0.0551 -0.0442 
FR 13.3220 22.6862 -9.3641 
FR2 -0.2113 -0.3315 0.1201 
BR -7.3422 -1.8075 -5.5347 
HPP 99.4043 120.5410 -21.1367 
FRHPP -3.7615 -5.6960 1.9345 
FR2HPP 0.0575 0.0853 -0.0279 
HPI 0.2193 0.2031 0.0162 
MR -290.6159 -295.7416 5.1256 
IC 75.5826 77.2016 -1.6189 
_cons -715.0976 -822.7266 107.6290 
Hausman Test 
chi2(2) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
              = 6.45 
Prob>chi2 = 0.0397 
Notes: This table provides results of the Hausman test. b=consistent under null hypothesis and alternative 
hypothesis. B=inconsistent under alternative hypothesis, efficient under null hypothesis. The null hypothesis is 
that difference in coefficients not systematic, which means ols estimator is appropriate. 
 
Table A.86: Results of Sargan Test for GMM (LR and LRFR as endogenous variables, W 
WE FRW and FRWE as instruments) 
  Coef. Std. Err. t P-value [95% Conf. Interval] 
LR 5.9380 4.9725 1.19 0.232 -3.8079 15.6839 
LRFR 0.6167 0.2619 2.35 0.019 0.1033 1.1301 
AS 0.0141 0.0194 0.73 0.467 -0.0239 0.0521 
FR 13.9546 4.6339 3.01 0.003 4.8723 23.0369 
FR2 -0.2194 0.0804 -2.73 0.006 -0.3771 -0.0617 
BR -6.9760 2.2690 -3.07 0.002 -11.4231 -2.5288 
HPP 101.5377 13.0201 7.8 0 76.0188 127.0565 
FRHPP -3.9092 1.0608 -3.69 0 -5.9883 -1.8301 
FR2HPP 0.0594 0.0196 3.04 0.002 0.0211 0.0977 
HPI 0.2160 0.0266 8.12 0 0.1638 0.2682 
MR -291.7102 23.4907 -12.42 0 -337.7510 -245.6693 
IC 75.7580 1.9580 38.69 0 71.9204 79.5956 
_cons -724.0563 55.5669 -13.03 0 -832.9655 -615.1472 
Sargan Test 
chi2(1) =  2.0211 
  p = 0.364 
Notes: This table provides results of the Sargan test. The null hypothesis is that instrumental variables have not 
relationship to the error (instrumental variables are exogenous). 
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Table A.87: Results of Endogenous Test for GMM (LR and LRFR as endogenous variables, 
W WE FRW and FRWE as instruments) 
First-stage regression summary statistics 
Variable R-sq. Adjusted R-sq. Partial R-sq. F(2,17129) Prob > F 
LR 0.4345 0.434 0.003 12.7745 0 
LRFR 0.6523 0.652 0.0019 8.07706 0 
Shea's partial R-squared 
Variable Shea's Partial R-sq. Shea's Adj. Partial R-sq. 
LR 0.0095 0.0088 
LRFR 0.006 0.0053 
Wald test for weak instruments (Critical Values)  
  10% 15% 20% 25% 
Maximal IV Size 16.87 9.93 7.54 6.28 
Notes: This table provides results of the endogenous test. The null hypothesis is that instrumental variables are 
not relative to endogenous variables. For Wald test, the null hypothesis is that the instruments are weak. 
 
Table A.88 – Table A.143 are belonging to Chapter 5 The Spatial Analysis and Spill-over 
Effects of House Price in Beijing 
Table A.88: Variable List 
Name Variables Code 
P House Price price 
NP Number of projects newly started (excluding rural households) (unit) s2 
BS 
Floor space of buildings started this year of enterprises for real estate development, 
residential (10000 sq.m) 
s8 
AW Average wage of staff and workers (yuan) s9 
GDP Gross domestic product (100 million yuan) d1 
Tax 
Taxes and other charges on principal business of enterprises for real estate development 
(100 million yuan) 
d2 
UP Urban population (% of total) d4 
UR Unemployment, total (% of total labor force) (national estimate) d7 
IR Central Bank Interest Rates (%) d8 
Dist_air Distance between the region and Beijing Capital Airport Dist1 
Dist_CBD Distance between the region and Beijing CBD Dist3 
Region Chengnei district 1 
Region Chaoyang district 2 
Region Fengtai district 3 
Region Shijingshan district 4 
Region Haidian district 5 
Region Mentougou district 6 
Region Fangshan district 7 
Region Tongzhou district 8 
Region Shunyi district 9 
Region Changping district 10 
Region Daxing district 11 
Region Pinggu district 12 
Region Huairou district 13 
Region Miyun district 14 
Region Yanqing district 15 
Notes: All variables were downloaded from the Beijing municipal commission on house and urban-rural 
development website. Data is from 2003 to 2013. 
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Table A.89: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
House Price 165 3.95 0.38 3.04 4.78 
Number of New Projects 165 3.07 0.21 2.77 3.56 
Size of Building Started 165 3.28 0.08 3.14 3.41 
Average Wage 165 4.71 0.18 4.40 4.97 
Income 165 4.02 0.19 3.70 4.30 
Tax 165 2.23 0.28 1.72 2.60 
Urban Population 165 1.67 0.04 1.60 1.73 
Unemployment Rate 165 0.042 0.001 0.04 0.043 
Central Bank Interest Rate 165 0.064 0.005 0.058 0.073 
Distance to Beijing Capital 
Airport (km) 
165 35,759 15,025 6,912 67,652 
Distance to CBD (km) 165 33,303 19,788 6,303 74,130 
Notes: This table summarises descriptive statistics (number of observations, sample mean, standard deviation, 
minimum and maximum) of the full sample of variables. 
 
 
Table A.90: Models 
Model 1.1 
 
          
           
           
           
           
           
           
                    
Model 1.2 
 
  
 
                  
           
           
           
           
           
                    
Model 2.1 
 
  
 
                  
           
           
           
           
           
                    
Panel: 
         𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝑎1𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑁𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐵𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎3𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐴𝑊𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎4𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑟 +
+𝑎5𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝐶𝐵𝐷 + 𝑑1𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝑑2𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 
 
Spatial: 
          𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜌 ∑ 𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑃𝑖𝑡
𝑁
𝑗=1 + 𝑎1𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑁𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐵𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎3𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐴𝑊𝑖𝑡 +
𝑎4𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑟 + +𝑎5𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝐶𝐵𝐷 + 𝑖𝑡  
        
                 𝑖𝑡 = 𝜆 ∑ 𝑊𝑖𝑗 𝑖𝑡
𝑁
𝑗=1 + 𝜈𝑖𝑡 
Panel: 
               𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝜏𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑎1𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑁𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐵𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎3𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐴𝑊𝑖𝑡 +
𝑎4𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑟 + +𝑎5𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝐶𝐵𝐷 + 𝑑1𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝑑2𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟  
 
Spatial: 
               𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜏𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜌 ∑ 𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑖𝑡
𝑁
𝑗=1 + 𝑎1𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑁𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐵𝑆𝑖𝑡 +
𝑎3𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐴𝑊𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎4𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑟 + +𝑎5𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝐶𝐵𝐷 + 𝑖𝑡  
 
                      𝑖𝑡 = 𝜆 ∑ 𝑊𝑖𝑗 𝑖𝑡
𝑁
𝑗=1 + 𝜈𝑖𝑡  
Panel: 
                𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝑎1𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎2𝑈𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎3𝐼𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎4𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑟 + +𝑎5𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝐶𝐵𝐷 +
𝑑1𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝑑2𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟  
 
Spatial: 
                 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜌 ∑ 𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑖𝑡
𝑁
𝑗=1 + 𝑎1𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎2𝑈𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎3𝐼𝑅𝑖𝑡 +
𝑎4𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑟 + +𝑎5𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝐶𝐵𝐷 + 𝑖𝑡  
 
                        𝑖𝑡 = 𝜆 ∑ 𝑊𝑖𝑗 𝑖𝑡
𝑁
𝑗=1 + 𝜈𝑖𝑡  
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Model 2.2 
 
  
 
                  
           
           
           
           
           
           
                    
Model 3.1 
 
  
 
                  
           
           
           
           
           
                    
Model 3.2 
 
  
 
                  
           
           
           
           
           
                    
Model 4.1 
 
  
 
                  
           
           
           
           
           
                    
Model 4.2 
 
  
 
                  
           
           
           
           
           
                    
Notes: This table summarises the models in the investigation. 
 
  
Panel: 
           𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝜏𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑎1𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎2𝑈𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎3𝐼𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎4𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑟 +
+𝑎5𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝐶𝐵𝐷 + 𝑑1𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝑑2𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 
 
Spatial: 
            𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜏𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜌 ∑ 𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑖𝑡
𝑁
𝑗=1 + 𝑎1𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎2𝑈𝑅𝑖𝑡 +
𝑎3𝐼𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎4𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑟 + +𝑎5𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝐶𝐵𝐷 + 𝑖𝑡  
 
                   𝑖𝑡 = 𝜆 ∑ 𝑊𝑖𝑗 𝑖𝑡
𝑁
𝑗=1 + 𝜈𝑖𝑡   
Panel: 
           𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝑎1𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎2𝐼𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎3𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑟 + +𝑎4𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝐶𝐵𝐷 + 𝑑1𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛 +
𝑑2𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟  
 
Spatial: 
            𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜌 ∑ 𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑖𝑡
𝑁
𝑗=1 + 𝑎1𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎2𝐼𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎3𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑟 +
+𝑎4𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝐶𝐵𝐷 + 𝑖𝑡  
 
                   𝑖𝑡 = 𝜆 ∑ 𝑊𝑖𝑗 𝑖𝑡
𝑁
𝑗=1 + 𝜈𝑖𝑡   
Panel: 
             𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝜏𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑎1𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎2𝐼𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎3𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑟 + +𝑎4𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝐶𝐵𝐷 +
𝑑1𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝑑2𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 
  
Spatial: 
              𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜏𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜌 ∑ 𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑖𝑡
𝑁
𝑗=1 + 𝑎1𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎2𝐼𝑅𝑖𝑡 +
𝑎3𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑟 + +𝑎4𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝐶𝐵𝐷 + 𝑖𝑡 
  
𝑖𝑡 = 𝜆 ∑ 𝑊𝑖𝑗 𝑖𝑡
𝑁
𝑗=1 + 𝜈𝑖𝑡  
Panel: 
             𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝑎1𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑈𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎2𝑈𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎3𝐼𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎4𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑟 + +𝑎5𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝐶𝐵𝐷 +
𝑑1𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝑑2𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟  
 
Spatial: 
              𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜌 ∑ 𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑖𝑡
𝑁
𝑗=1 + 𝑎1𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑈𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎2𝑈𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎3𝐼𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎4𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑟 +
+𝑎5𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝐶𝐵𝐷 + 𝑖𝑡  
 
                     𝑖𝑡 = 𝜆 ∑ 𝑊𝑖𝑗 𝑖𝑡
𝑁
𝑗=1 + 𝜈𝑖𝑡   
Panel: 
             𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝜏𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑎1𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑈𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎2𝑈𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎3𝐼𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎4𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑟 +
+𝑎5𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝐶𝐵𝐷 + 𝑑1𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝑑2𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟  
 
Spatial: 
              𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜏𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜌 ∑ 𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑖𝑡
𝑁
𝑗=1 + 𝑎1𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑈𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎2𝑈𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎3𝐼𝑅𝑖𝑡 +
𝑎4𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑟 + +𝑎5𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝐶𝐵𝐷 + 𝑖𝑡  
 
                     𝑖𝑡 = 𝜆 ∑ 𝑊𝑖𝑗 𝑖𝑡
𝑁
𝑗=1 + 𝜈𝑖𝑡   
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Table A.91: Diagnostic Tests for Spatial Dependence in OLS Regression (Model 1.1) 
Test Statistic df p-value 
Spatial error:       
Moran's I 1.415 1 0.157 
Lagrange multiplier 10.607 1 0.001 
Robust Lagrange multiplier 8.062 1 0.005 
Spatial lag:       
Lagrange multiplier 15.885 1 0 
Robust Lagrange multiplier 13.34 1 0 
Notes: This table provides the diagnostic tests for spatial dependence in OLS regression. The null hypothesis of 
spatial error test is that there is no spatially lagged error term in the model. The null hypothesis of spatial lag test 
is that there is no spatially lagged dependent variable in the model. 
 
Table A.92: Diagnostic Tests for Spatial Dependence in OLS Regression (Model 1.2) 
Test Statistic df p-value 
Spatial error:       
Moran's I 2.35 1 0.019 
Lagrange multiplier 48.828 1 0 
Robust Lagrange multiplier 48.162 1 0 
Spatial lag:        
Lagrange multiplier 1.07 1 0.301 
Robust Lagrange multiplier 0.404 1 0.525 
Notes: This table provides the diagnostic tests for spatial dependence in OLS regression. The null hypothesis of 
spatial error test is that there is no spatially lagged error term in the model. The null hypothesis of spatial lag test 
is that there is no spatially lagged dependent variable in the model. 
 
Table A.93: Diagnostic Tests for Spatial Dependence in OLS Regression (Model 2.1) 
Test Statistic df p-value 
Spatial error:       
Moran's I 1.128 1 0.259 
Lagrange multiplier 4.415 1 0.036 
Robust Lagrange multiplier 2.859 1 0.091 
Spatial lag:       
Lagrange multiplier 15.857 1 0 
Robust Lagrange multiplier 14.302 1 0 
Notes: This table provides the diagnostic tests for spatial dependence in OLS regression. The null hypothesis of 
spatial error test is that there is no spatially lagged error term in the model. The null hypothesis of spatial lag test 
is that there is no spatially lagged dependent variable in the model. 
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Table A.94: Diagnostic Tests for Spatial Dependence in OLS Regression (Model 2.2) 
Test Statistic df p-value 
Spatial error:       
Moran's I 2.228 1 0.026 
Lagrange multiplier 41.746 1 0 
Robust Lagrange multiplier 40.964 1 0 
Spatial lag:       
Lagrange multiplier 1.592 1 0.207 
Robust Lagrange multiplier 0.81 1 0.368 
Notes: This table provides the diagnostic tests for spatial dependence in OLS regression. The null hypothesis of 
spatial error test is that there is no spatially lagged error term in the model. The null hypothesis of spatial lag test 
is that there is no spatially lagged dependent variable in the model. 
 
Table A.95: Diagnostic Tests for Spatial Dependence in OLS Regression (Model 3.1) 
Test Statistic df p-value 
Spatial error:       
Moran's I 1.085 1 0.278 
Lagrange multiplier 6.28 1 0.012 
Robust Lagrange multiplier 4.381 1 0.036 
Spatial lag:       
Lagrange multiplier 15.846 1 0 
Robust Lagrange multiplier 13.947 1 0 
Notes: This table provides the diagnostic tests for spatial dependence in OLS regression. The null hypothesis of 
spatial error test is that there is no spatially lagged error term in the model. The null hypothesis of spatial lag test 
is that there is no spatially lagged dependent variable in the model. 
 
Table A.96: Diagnostic Tests for Spatial Dependence in OLS Regression (Model 3.2) 
Test Statistic df p-value 
Spatial error:       
Moran's I 1.867 1 0.062 
Lagrange multiplier 30.986 1 0 
Robust Lagrange multiplier 30.269 1 0 
Spatial lag:       
Lagrange multiplier 1.763 1 0.184 
Robust Lagrange multiplier 1.046 1 0.306 
Notes: This table provides the diagnostic tests for spatial dependence in OLS regression. The null hypothesis of 
spatial error test is that there is no spatially lagged error term in the model. The null hypothesis of spatial lag test 
is that there is no spatially lagged dependent variable in the model. 
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Table A.97: Diagnostic Tests for Spatial Dependence in OLS Regression (Model 4.1) 
Test Statistic df p-value 
Spatial error:       
Moran's I 1.159 1 0.246 
Lagrange multiplier 4.959 1 0.026 
Robust Lagrange multiplier 3.297 1 0.069 
Spatial lag:       
Lagrange multiplier 15.85 1 0 
Robust Lagrange multiplier 14.188 1 0 
Notes: This table provides the diagnostic tests for spatial dependence in OLS regression. The null hypothesis of 
spatial error test is that there is no spatially lagged error term in the model. The null hypothesis of spatial lag test 
is that there is no spatially lagged dependent variable in the model. 
 
Table A.98: Diagnostic Tests for Spatial Dependence in OLS Regression (Model 4.2) 
Test Statistic df p-value 
Spatial error:       
Moran's I 2.247 1 0.025 
Lagrange multiplier 42.682 1 0 
Robust Lagrange multiplier 41.9 1 0 
Spatial lag:       
Lagrange multiplier 1.561 1 0.211 
Robust Lagrange multiplier 0.78 1 0.377 
Notes: This table provides the diagnostic tests for spatial dependence in OLS regression. The null hypothesis of 
spatial error test is that there is no spatially lagged error term in the model. The null hypothesis of spatial lag test 
is that there is no spatially lagged dependent variable in the model. 
 
Table A.99: Moran's I of Global Spatial Autocorrelation (Model 1.1) 
Variables I sd(I) z p-value* 
price 0.736 0.052 14.156 0 
s2 1 0.052 19.24 0 
s8 1 0.053 19.15 0 
s9 1 0.053 19.139 0 
Dist1 0.189 0.052 3.715 0 
Dist3 0.432 0.052 8.352 0 
Notes: This table provides the Moran's I of global spatial autocorrelation. I is the value of Moran's I, sd(I) is 
standard error of Moran's I, z is z-stats. 
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Table A.100: Moran's I of Global Spatial Autocorrelation (Model 1.2) 
Variables I sd(I) z p-value* 
price 0.736 0.052 14.156 0 
lag1_price 0.736 0.052 14.164 0 
s2 1 0.052 19.24 0 
s8 1 0.053 19.15 0 
s9 1 0.053 19.139 0 
Dist1 0.189 0.052 3.715 0 
Dist3 0.432 0.052 8.352 0 
Notes: This table provides the Moran's I of global spatial autocorrelation. I is the value of Moran's I, sd(I) is 
standard error of Moran's I, z is z-stats. 
 
Table A.101: Moran's I of Global Spatial Autocorrelation (Model 2.1) 
Variables I sd(I) z p-value* 
price 0.736 0.052 14.156 0 
d1 1 0.053 19.139 0 
d7 1 0.053 19.151 0 
d8 1 0.053 19.147 0 
Dist1 0.189 0.052 3.715 0 
Dist3 0.432 0.052 8.352 0 
Notes: This table provides the Moran's I of global spatial autocorrelation. I is the value of Moran's I, sd(I) is 
standard error of Moran's I, z is z-stats. 
 
Table A.102: Moran's I of Global Spatial Autocorrelation (Model 2.2) 
Variables I sd(I) z p-value* 
price 0.736 0.052 14.156 0 
lag1_price 0.736 0.052 14.164 0 
d1 1 0.053 19.139 0 
d7 1 0.053 19.151 0 
d8 1 0.053 19.147 0 
Dist1 0.189 0.052 3.715 0 
Dist3 0.432 0.052 8.352 0 
Notes: This table provides the Moran's I of global spatial autocorrelation. I is the value of Moran's I, sd(I) is 
standard error of Moran's I, z is z-stats. 
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Table A.103: Moran's I of Global Spatial Autocorrelation (Model 3.1) 
Variables I sd(I) z p-value* 
price 0.736 0.052 14.156 0 
d2 1 0.053 19.142 0 
d8 1 0.053 19.147 0 
Dist1 0.189 0.052 3.715 0 
Dist3 0.432 0.052 8.352 0 
Notes: This table provides the Moran's I of global spatial autocorrelation. I is the value of Moran's I, sd(I) is 
standard error of Moran's I, z is z-stats. 
 
Table A.104: Moran's I of Global Spatial Autocorrelation (Model 3.2) 
Variables I sd(I) z p-value* 
price 0.736 0.052 14.156 0 
lag1_price 0.736 0.052 14.164 0 
d2 1 0.053 19.142 0 
d8 1 0.053 19.147 0 
Dist1 0.189 0.052 3.715 0 
Dist3 0.432 0.052 8.352 0 
Notes: This table provides the Moran's I of global spatial autocorrelation. I is the value of Moran's I, sd(I) is 
standard error of Moran's I, z is z-stats. 
 
Table A.105: Moran's I of Global Spatial Autocorrelation (Model 4.1) 
Variables I sd(I) z p-value* 
price 0.736 0.052 14.156 0 
d4 1 0.053 19.138 0 
d7 1 0.053 19.151 0 
d8 1 0.053 19.147 0 
Dist1 0.189 0.052 3.715 0 
Dist3 0.432 0.052 8.352 0 
Notes: This table provides the Moran's I of global spatial autocorrelation. I is the value of Moran's I, sd(I) is 
standard error of Moran's I, z is z-stats. 
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Table A.106: Moran's I of Global Spatial Autocorrelation (Model 4.2) 
Variables I sd(I) z p-value* 
price 0.736 0.052 14.156 0 
lag1_price 0.736 0.052 14.164 0 
d4 1 0.053 19.138 0 
d7 1 0.053 19.151 0 
d8 1 0.053 19.147 0 
Dist1 0.189 0.052 3.715 0 
Dist3 0.432 0.052 8.352 0 
Notes: This table provides the Moran's I of global spatial autocorrelation. I is the value of Moran's I, sd(I) is 
standard error of Moran's I, z is z-stats. 
 
Table A.107: Measures of Local Spatial Autocorrelation for the House Prices 
Location Ii sd(Ii) z p-value* 
1 1.359 1.713 0.804 0.211 
2 0.722 1.713 0.432 0.333 
3 -0.036 1.713 -0.01 0.496 
4 -0.258 1.713 -0.14 0.444 
5 1.44 1.713 0.852 0.197 
6 0.472 1.713 0.286 0.387 
7 7.354 1.713 4.304 0 
8 9.211 1.713 5.388 0 
9 10.666 1.713 6.238 0 
10 11.656 1.713 6.816 0 
11 12.273 1.713 7.176 0 
12 6.174 2.584 2.406 0.008 
13 4.46 2.584 1.742 0.041 
14 2.211 2.584 0.872 0.192 
15 0.562 2.584 0.234 0.408 
16 0.037 2.584 0.031 0.488 
17 0.008 2.584 0.02 0.492 
18 6.483 2.584 2.525 0.006 
19 8.971 2.584 3.488 0 
20 12.887 2.584 5.004 0 
21 15.457 2.584 5.998 0 
22 20.24 2.584 7.849 0 
23 6 2.584 2.338 0.01 
24 4.319 2.584 1.688 0.046 
25 2.971 2.584 1.166 0.122 
26 0.404 2.584 0.173 0.431 
27 -0.02 2.584 0.009 0.496 
28 -0.011 2.584 0.012 0.495 
29 6.82 2.584 2.656 0.004 
30 10.632 2.584 4.131 0 
31 13.605 2.584 5.281 0 
32 15.165 2.584 5.885 0 
33 16.879 2.584 6.548 0 
34 5.695 1.713 3.335 0 
35 4.535 1.713 2.658 0.004 
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36 3.705 1.713 2.174 0.015 
37 1.057 1.713 0.628 0.265 
38 -0.839 1.713 -0.479 0.316 
39 -0.497 1.713 -0.279 0.39 
40 1.05 1.713 0.624 0.266 
41 2.446 1.713 1.439 0.075 
42 3.863 1.713 2.266 0.012 
43 4.695 1.713 2.752 0.003 
44 6.763 1.713 3.959 0 
45 5.227 2.4 2.193 0.014 
46 3.76 2.4 1.582 0.057 
47 2.792 2.4 1.178 0.119 
48 0.282 2.4 0.133 0.447 
49 -0.032 2.4 0.002 0.499 
50 -0.076 2.4 -0.016 0.493 
51 8.568 2.4 3.585 0 
52 11.527 2.4 4.818 0 
53 14.348 2.4 5.993 0 
54 15.964 2.4 6.667 0 
55 19.43 2.4 8.111 0 
56 4.16 2.198 1.907 0.028 
57 3.176 2.198 1.459 0.072 
58 1.732 2.198 0.802 0.211 
59 0.77 2.198 0.364 0.358 
60 0.251 2.198 0.128 0.449 
61 -0.016 2.198 0.007 0.497 
62 1.073 2.198 0.502 0.308 
63 3.158 2.198 1.451 0.073 
64 4.103 2.198 1.881 0.03 
65 4.617 2.198 2.114 0.017 
66 5.272 2.198 2.413 0.008 
67 2.346 1.713 1.38 0.084 
68 1.503 1.713 0.888 0.187 
69 0.897 1.713 0.534 0.297 
70 0.243 1.713 0.153 0.439 
71 0.026 1.713 0.026 0.49 
72 -0.027 1.713 -0.005 0.498 
73 -0.05 1.713 -0.019 0.493 
74 1.165 1.713 0.691 0.245 
75 1.545 1.713 0.913 0.181 
76 0.907 1.713 0.54 0.295 
77 1.878 1.713 1.107 0.134 
78 4.817 1.713 2.823 0.002 
79 4 1.713 2.346 0.009 
80 2.655 1.713 1.561 0.059 
81 1.643 1.713 0.97 0.166 
82 0.248 1.713 0.155 0.438 
83 0.016 1.713 0.02 0.492 
84 -0.162 1.713 -0.084 0.467 
85 -1.034 1.713 -0.593 0.277 
86 2.218 1.713 1.306 0.096 
87 3.586 1.713 2.104 0.018 
88 3.802 1.713 2.231 0.013 
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89 7.196 2.4 3.013 0.001 
90 5.512 2.4 2.312 0.01 
91 3.582 2.4 1.508 0.066 
92 2.558 2.4 1.081 0.14 
93 1.199 2.4 0.515 0.303 
94 0.695 2.4 0.305 0.38 
95 -0.142 2.4 -0.044 0.483 
96 1.502 2.4 0.641 0.261 
97 1.342 2.4 0.574 0.283 
98 2.597 2.4 1.097 0.136 
99 5.594 2.4 2.346 0.009 
100 4.791 2.4 2.011 0.022 
101 3.747 2.4 1.577 0.057 
102 2.412 2.4 1.02 0.154 
103 0.919 2.4 0.398 0.345 
104 0.204 2.4 0.1 0.46 
105 0.013 2.4 0.021 0.492 
106 1.953 2.4 0.829 0.204 
107 3.647 2.4 1.535 0.062 
108 4.706 2.4 1.976 0.024 
109 4.222 2.4 1.774 0.038 
110 8.491 2.4 3.553 0 
111 4.094 1.972 2.089 0.018 
112 3.09 1.972 1.579 0.057 
113 1.799 1.972 0.925 0.178 
114 0.806 1.972 0.421 0.337 
115 0.092 1.972 0.059 0.477 
116 -0.073 1.972 -0.025 0.49 
117 1.23 1.972 0.636 0.262 
118 1.758 1.972 0.904 0.183 
119 3.201 1.972 1.636 0.051 
120 3.756 1.972 1.917 0.028 
121 6.242 1.972 3.178 0.001 
122 2.266 1.403 1.624 0.052 
123 1.701 1.403 1.221 0.111 
124 1.362 1.403 0.98 0.164 
125 1.01 1.403 0.729 0.233 
126 0.695 1.403 0.504 0.307 
127 0.437 1.403 0.321 0.374 
128 -0.124 1.403 -0.08 0.468 
129 0.183 1.403 0.139 0.445 
130 0.089 1.403 0.072 0.471 
131 0.018 1.403 0.022 0.491 
132 0.474 1.403 0.347 0.364 
133 4.881 1.972 2.488 0.006 
134 3.139 1.972 1.604 0.054 
135 2.204 1.972 1.13 0.129 
136 0.809 1.972 0.422 0.336 
137 0.334 1.972 0.182 0.428 
138 0.011 1.972 0.018 0.493 
139 0.014 1.972 0.019 0.492 
140 0.549 1.972 0.291 0.386 
141 0.573 1.972 0.303 0.381 
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142 0.176 1.972 0.102 0.46 
143 1.552 1.972 0.799 0.212 
144 4.776 1.713 2.799 0.003 
145 3.451 1.713 2.025 0.021 
146 2.722 1.713 1.6 0.055 
147 1.771 1.713 1.045 0.148 
148 1.093 1.713 0.649 0.258 
149 0.632 1.713 0.38 0.352 
150 -0.112 1.713 -0.055 0.478 
151 -0.279 1.713 -0.152 0.44 
152 -0.173 1.713 -0.09 0.464 
153 -0.755 1.713 -0.43 0.333 
154 -0.031 1.713 -0.008 0.497 
155 2.897 1.403 2.074 0.019 
156 2.093 1.403 1.501 0.067 
157 1.627 1.403 1.169 0.121 
158 0.699 1.403 0.507 0.306 
159 0.339 1.403 0.251 0.401 
160 0.02 1.403 0.023 0.491 
161 -0.223 1.403 -0.151 0.44 
162 -0.236 1.403 -0.16 0.436 
163 -0.197 1.403 -0.132 0.448 
164 -0.757 1.403 -0.531 0.298 
165 -0.028 1.403 -0.011 0.495 
Notes: This table provides the Moran's I of local spatial autocorrelation. Ii is the value of local Moran's I, sd(Ii) 
is standard error of local Moran's I, z is z-stats. 
 
Table A.108: Spatial Lag Model Test in OLS Regression (Model 1.1) 
  Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
s2 0.0102 0.0811 0.13 0.9 -0.1487 0.1691 
s8 0.3361 0.2070 1.62 0.104 -0.0696 0.7418 
s9 1.5645 0.0982 15.93 0 1.3721 1.7569 
Dist1 1.65E-06 1.34E-06 1.22 0.221 -9.89E-07 4.28E-06 
Dist3 -5.30E-06 1.05E-06 -5.05 0 -7.36E-06 -3.24E-06 
_cons -4.6319 0.9624 -4.81 0 -6.5182 -2.7456 
rho 0.0115 0.0028 4.19 0 0.0061 0.0170 
Wald test of rho=0 
chi2(1) = 17.525 
p-value = 0 
Likelihood ratio test of rho=0 
chi2(1) = 16.655 
p-value = 0 
Lagrange multiplier test of rho=0 
chi2(1) = 15.885 
p-value = 0 
Acceptable range for rho: -1.678 < rho < 1.000 
Notes: This table provides the spatial model test in OLS regression. The null hypotheses of Wald test and 
likelihood ratio test are that the model is homoscedastic. The null hypothesis of Lagrange multiplier test is that 
there is no spatially lagged dependent variable in the model. 
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Table A.109: Spatial Error Model Test in OLS Regression (Model 1.2) 
  Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
lag1_price 0.8748 0.0364 24.01 0 0.8034 0.9463 
s2 0.1692 0.0898 1.88 0.06 -0.0068 0.3453 
s8 -0.0527 0.1032 -0.51 0.609 -0.2549 0.1495 
s9 0.0508 0.0981 0.52 0.605 -0.1415 0.2431 
Dist1 1.28E-07 9.45E-07 0.14 0.892 -1.72E-06 1.98E-06 
Dist3 -1.26E-06 8.37E-07 -1.5 0.133 -2.90E-06 3.84E-07 
_cons 0.0038 0.0127 0.3 0.765 -0.0211 0.0287 
lambda 0.1697 0.0208 8.17 0 0.1290 0.2105 
Wald test of lambda=0 
chi2(1) = 66.725 
p-value = 0 
Likelihood ratio test of lambda=0 
chi2(1) = 52.322 
p-value = 0 
Lagrange multiplier test of 
lambda=0 
chi2(1) = 48.828 
p-value = 0 
Acceptable range for lambda: -1.678 < lambda < 1.000 
Notes: This table provides the spatial model test in OLS regression. The null hypotheses of Wald test and 
likelihood ratio test are that the model is homoscedastic. The null hypothesis of Lagrange multiplier test is that 
there is no spatially lagged error term in the model. 
 
Table A.110: Spatial Lag Model Test in OLS Regression (Model 2.1) 
  Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
d1 1.5897 0.0978 16.26 0 1.3980 1.7814 
d7 -0.0471 0.2432 -0.19 0.847 -0.5237 0.4295 
d8 -12.0171 4.5765 -2.63 0.009 -20.9868 -3.0473 
Dist1 1.60E-06 1.30E-06 1.23 0.218 -9.47E-07 4.15E-06 
Dist3 -5.35E-06 1.02E-06 -5.27 0 -7.34E-06 -3.36E-06 
_cons -1.5512 1.3495 -1.15 0.25 -4.1961 1.0938 
rho 0.0112 0.0027 4.19 0 0.0059 0.0164 
Wald test of rho=0 
chi2(1) = 17.515 
p-value = 0 
Likelihood ratio test of rho=0 
chi2(1) = 16.646 
p-value = 0 
Lagrange multiplier test of rho=0 
chi2(1) = 15.857 
p-value = 0 
Acceptable range for rho: -1.678 < rho < 1.000 
Notes: This table provides the spatial model test in OLS regression. The null hypotheses of Wald test and 
likelihood ratio test are that the model is homoscedastic. The null hypothesis of Lagrange multiplier test is that 
there is no spatially lagged dependent variable in the model. 
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Table A.111: Spatial Error Model Test in OLS Regression (Model 2.2) 
  Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
lag1_price 0.8661 0.0369 23.45 0 0.7937 0.9385 
d1 0.2117 0.1092 1.94 0.052 -0.0022 0.4257 
d7 0.0449 0.0683 0.66 0.511 -0.0889 0.1787 
d8 -6.5319 4.0305 -1.62 0.105 -14.4315 1.3677 
Dist1 1.27E-07 9.24E-07 0.14 0.89 -1.68E-06 1.94E-06 
Dist3 -1.30E-06 8.17E-07 -1.59 0.112 -2.90E-06 3.01E-07 
_cons 0.0052 0.0139 0.38 0.705 -0.0219 0.0324 
lambda 0.1631 0.0217 7.53 0 0.1207 0.2056 
Wald test of lambda=0 
chi2(1) = 56.645 
p-value = 0 
Likelihood ratio test of lambda=0 
chi2(1) = 45.959 
p-value = 0 
Lagrange multiplier test of 
lambda=0 
chi2(1) = 41.746 
p-value = 0 
Acceptable range for lambda: -1.678 < lambda < 1.000 
Notes: This table provides the spatial model test in OLS regression. The null hypotheses of Wald test and 
likelihood ratio test are that the model is homoscedastic. The null hypothesis of Lagrange multiplier test is that 
there is no spatially lagged error term in the model. 
 
Table A.112: Spatial Lag Model Test in OLS Regression (Model 3.1) 
  Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
d2 1.0655 0.0635 16.77 0 0.9409 1.1900 
d8 -10.6515 3.6393 -2.93 0.003 -17.7844 -3.5186 
Dist1 1.62E-06 1.32E-06 1.23 0.22 -9.64E-07 4.20E-06 
Dist3 -5.33E-06 1.03E-06 -5.19 0 -7.35E-06 -3.32E-06 
_cons 2.1824 0.2162 10.09 0 1.7586 2.6063 
rho 0.0113 0.0027 4.18 0 0.0060 0.0166 
Wald test of rho=0 
chi2(1) = 17.493 
p-value = 0 
Likelihood ratio test of rho=0 
chi2(1) = 16.626 
p-value = 0 
Lagrange multiplier test of rho=0 
chi2(1) = 15.846 
p-value = 0 
Acceptable range for rho: -1.678 < rho < 1.000 
Notes: This table provides the spatial model test in OLS regression. The null hypotheses of Wald test and 
likelihood ratio test are that the model is homoscedastic. The null hypothesis of Lagrange multiplier test is that 
there is no spatially lagged dependent variable in the model. 
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Table A.113: Spatial Error Model Test in OLS Regression (Model 3.2) 
  Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
lag1_price 0.8270 0.0433 19.11 0 0.7422 0.9118 
d2 0.2462 0.0564 4.37 0 0.1358 0.3567 
d8 -6.2329 2.8276 -2.2 0.028 -11.7750 -0.6909 
Dist1 7.16E-07 7.25E-07 0.99 0.323 -7.04E-07 2.14E-06 
Dist3 -1.42E-06 6.30E-07 -2.25 0.025 -2.65E-06 -1.81E-07 
_cons 0.5739 0.2382 2.41 0.016 0.1070 1.0408 
lambda 0.0245 0.0156 1.57 0.116 -0.0061 0.0551 
Wald test of lambda=0 
chi2(1) = 2.465 
p-value = 0.116 
Likelihood ratio test of lambda=0 
chi2(1) = 7.238 
p-value = 0.007 
Lagrange multiplier test of 
lambda=0 
chi2(1) = 30.986 
p-value = 0 
Acceptable range for lambda: -1.678 < lambda < 1.000 
Notes: This table provides the spatial model test in OLS regression. The null hypotheses of Wald test and 
likelihood ratio test are that the model is homoscedastic. The null hypothesis of Lagrange multiplier test is that 
there is no spatially lagged error term in the model. 
 
Table A.114: Spatial Lag Model Test in OLS Regression (Model 4.1) 
  Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
d4 7.3602 0.4559 16.14 0 6.4667 8.2537 
d7 -0.0482 0.2442 -0.2 0.843 -0.5269 0.4305 
d8 -9.1223 4.5677 -2 0.046 -18.0747 -0.1698 
Dist1 1.61E-06 1.31E-06 1.23 0.219 -9.53E-07 4.16E-06 
Dist3 -5.35E-06 1.02E-06 -5.24 0 -7.34E-06 -3.35E-06 
_cons -7.5977 1.5670 -4.85 0 -10.6690 -4.5263 
rho 0.0112 0.0027 4.18 0 0.0060 0.0165 
Wald test of rho=0 
chi2(1) = 17.504 
p-value = 0 
Likelihood ratio test of rho=0 
chi2(1) = 16.636 
p-value = 0 
Lagrange multiplier test of rho=0 
chi2(1) = 15.85 
p-value = 0 
Acceptable range for rho: -1.678 < rho < 1.000 
Notes: This table provides the spatial model test in OLS regression. The null hypotheses of Wald test and 
likelihood ratio test are that the model is homoscedastic. The null hypothesis of Lagrange multiplier test is that 
there is no spatially lagged dependent variable in the model. 
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Table A.115: Spatial Error Model Test in OLS Regression (Model 4.2) 
  Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
lag1_price 0.8421 0.0418 20.13 0 0.7601 0.9241 
d4 1.5461 0.3993 3.87 0 0.7635 2.3287 
d7 0.1614 0.1297 1.24 0.213 -0.0928 0.4157 
d8 -4.7237 2.4272 -1.95 0.052 -9.4810 0.0335 
Dist1 1.74E-07 7.09E-07 0.25 0.806 -1.22E-06 1.56E-06 
Dist3 -1.74E-06 5.64E-07 -3.08 0.002 -2.84E-06 -6.34E-07 
_cons -2.2013 0.9162 -2.4 0.016 -3.9971 -0.4054 
lambda -0.0008 0.0028 -0.27 0.784 -0.0063 0.0047 
Wald test of lambda=0 
chi2(1) = 0.075 
p-value = 0.784 
Likelihood ratio test of lambda=0 
chi2(1) = 0.069 
p-value = 0.792 
Lagrange multiplier test of 
lambda=0 
chi2(1) = 42.682 
p-value = 0 
Acceptable range for lambda: -1.678 < lambda < 1.000 
Notes: This table provides the spatial model test in OLS regression. The null hypotheses of Wald test and 
likelihood ratio test are that the model is homoscedastic. The null hypothesis of Lagrange multiplier test is that 
there is no spatially lagged error term in the model. 
 
Table A.116: Results of Hausman Test in Panel Model (Model 1.1) 
  Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
s2 0.0105 0.0592 0.18 0.86 -0.1065 0.1274 
s8 0.3531 0.1510 2.34 0.021 0.0546 0.6516 
s9 1.6486 0.0701 23.51 0 1.5099 1.7872 
Dist1 2.38E-07 4.36E-06 0.05 0.956 -8.37E-06 8.85E-06 
Dist3 -6.79E-06 3.31E-06 -2.05 0.042 -1.3E-05 -2.51E-07 
_cons -4.7878 0.7142 -6.7 0 -6.1994 -3.3763 
Hausman LM Test  =   0.21    P-Value > Chi2(3)   1.0000 
Notes: This table provides results of the Hausman test. The null hypothesis is that difference in coefficients not 
systematic, which means random effect is appropriate. 
 
  
311 
 
Table A.117: Test Results for SAC Model (Model 1.1) 
  Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
s2 0.0127 0.0895 0.14 0.887 -0.1627 0.1881 
s8 0.3132 0.2237 1.4 0.162 -0.1253 0.7516 
s9 1.3673 0.1154 11.85 0 1.1411 1.5936 
Dist1 1.22E-06 1.39E-06 0.88 0.38 -1.50E-06 3.94E-06 
Dist3 -5.30E-06 1.11E-06 -4.79 0 -7.47E-06 -3.13E-06 
_cons -3.6888 1.0072 -3.66 0 -5.6628 -1.7147 
/Rho 0.0390 0.0102 3.82 0 0.0190 0.0590 
/Lambda 0.0284 0.0116 2.44 0.015 0.0055 0.0512 
/Sigma 0.1944 0.0107 18.14 0 0.1734 0.2154 
 LR Test (Rho=0):                        14.5798   P-Value > Chi2(1) 0.0001 
 LR Test (Lambda=0):                      5.9377   P-Value > Chi2(1) 0.0148 
 LR Test SAC vs. OLS (Rho+Lambda=0):     15.1605   P-Value > Chi2(2) 0.0005 
 Acceptable Range for Rho:               -0.4134   <  Rho  < 0.2020 
AIC 0.127 
Wooldridge LM 0.587 
p-value 0.443 
Breusch-Pagan 92 
p-value 0 
Notes: This table provides the spatial analysis test in panel model. The null hypothesis of LR Test (Lambda=0) 
is that there is no spatially lagged error term in the model. The null hypothesis of LR Test (Rho=0) is that there 
is no spatially lagged dependent variable in the model. AIC is Akaike Information Criterion. The null hypothesis 
is that there is no first-order autocorrelation in the model. The null hypothesis of Breusch-Pagan test is that there 
is a constant variance in the model. 
 
Table A.118: Test Results for SAR Model (Model 1.1) 
  Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
s2 0.0102 0.0811 0.13 0.9 -0.1487 0.1691 
s8 0.3362 0.2070 1.62 0.104 -0.0696 0.7419 
s9 1.5649 0.0982 15.94 0 1.3725 1.7574 
Dist1 1.64E-06 1.34E-06 1.22 0.223 -9.96E-07 4.27E-06 
Dist3 -5.31E-06 1.05E-06 -5.06 0 -7.37E-06 -3.25E-06 
_cons -4.6327 0.9624 -4.81 0 -6.5190 -2.7464 
/Rho 0.0115 0.0028 4.18 0 0.0061 0.0169 
/Sigma 0.1998 0.0110 18.17 0 0.1783 0.2214 
LR Test SAR vs. OLS (Rho=0):     17.4363   P-Value > Chi2(1)   0.0000 
 Acceptable Range for Rho:        -0.4134   <  Rho  < 0.2020 
AIC 0.091 
Wooldridge LM 0.587 
p-value 0.443 
Breusch-Pagan 81.02 
p-value 0 
Notes: This table provides the spatial analysis test in panel model. The null hypothesis of LR Test (Lambda=0) 
is that there is no spatially lagged error term in the model. The null hypothesis of LR Test (Rho=0) is that there 
is no spatially lagged dependent variable in the model. AIC is Akaike Information Criterion. The null hypothesis 
is that there is no first-order autocorrelation in the model. The null hypothesis of Breusch-Pagan test is that there 
is a constant variance in the model. 
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Table A.119: Test Results for SEM Model (Model 1.1) 
  Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
s2 0.0145 0.0798 0.18 0.856 -0.1420 0.1709 
s8 0.3881 0.1991 1.95 0.051 -0.0021 0.7783 
s9 1.6635 0.0934 17.82 0 1.4805 1.8464 
Dist1 1.57E-06 1.37E-06 1.15 0.25 -1.11E-06 4.25E-06 
Dist3 -5.81E-06 1.03E-06 -5.64 0 -7.82E-06 -3.79E-06 
_cons -5.1862 0.9225 -5.62 0 -6.9943 -3.3781 
/Lambda -0.0074 0.0025 -2.96 0.003 -0.0123 -0.0025 
/Sigma 0.2035 0.0112 18.17 0 0.1815 0.2254 
LR Test SEM vs. OLS (Lambda=0):   8.7369   P-Value > Chi2(1)   0.0031 
 Acceptable Range for Lambda:     -0.4134  < Lambda < 0.2020 
AIC 0.064 
Wooldridge LM 0.587 
p-value 0.443 
Breusch-Pagan 70.11 
p-value 0 
Notes: This table provides the spatial analysis test in panel model. The null hypothesis of LR Test (Lambda=0) 
is that there is no spatially lagged error term in the model. The null hypothesis of LR Test (Rho=0) is that there 
is no spatially lagged dependent variable in the model. AIC is Akaike Information Criterion. The null hypothesis 
is that there is no first-order autocorrelation in the model. The null hypothesis of Breusch-Pagan test is that there 
is a constant variance in the model. 
 
Table A.120: Test Results for SDM Model (Model 1.1) 
  Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
s2 0.0270 0.2034 0.13 0.894 -0.3715 0.4256 
s8 0.2482 0.3154 0.79 0.431 -0.3700 0.8664 
s9 1.3093 0.2038 6.42 0 0.9098 1.7088 
Dist1 -1.28E-06 3.63E-06 -0.35 0.725 -8.39E-06 5.84E-06 
Dist3 -2.64E-06 3.17E-06 -0.83 0.406 -8.85E-06 3.58E-06 
w1x_s2 -0.0043 0.0441 -0.1 0.922 -0.0907 0.0821 
w1x_s8 -0.0025 0.0546 -0.05 0.963 -0.1095 0.1045 
w1x_s9 -0.0543 0.0548 -0.99 0.322 -0.1618 0.0532 
w1x_Dist1 5.41E-07 1.37E-06 0.4 0.692 -2.13E-06 3.22E-06 
w1x_Dist3 -5.34E-07 1.09E-06 -0.49 0.626 -2.68E-06 1.61E-06 
_cons -3.1431 1.0369 -3.03 0.002 -5.1753 -1.1108 
/Rho 0.0784 0.0221 3.54 0 0.0350 0.1218 
/Sigma 0.1908 0.0107 17.91 0 0.1699 0.2117 
LR Test SDM vs. OLS (Rho=0):     12.5398   P-Value > Chi2(1)   0.0004 
 LR Test (wX's =0):               11.7681   P-Value > Chi2(5)   0.0381 
 Acceptable Range for Rho:        -0.4134   <  Rho  < 0.2020 
AIC 2.425 
Wooldridge LM 0.773 
p-value 0.379 
Breusch-Pagan 152.3 
p-value 0 
Notes: This table provides the spatial analysis test in panel model. The null hypothesis of LR Test (Lambda=0) 
is that there is no spatially lagged error term in the model. The null hypothesis of LR Test (Rho=0) is that there 
is no spatially lagged dependent variable in the model. AIC is Akaike Information Criterion. The null hypothesis 
is that there is no first-order autocorrelation in the model. The null hypothesis of Breusch-Pagan test is that there 
is a constant variance in the model. 
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Table A.121: Results of Hausman Test in Panel Model (Model 1.2) 
  Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
lag1_price 0.8966 0.0410 21.84 0 0.8154 0.9777 
s2 0.0882 0.0436 2.02 0.045 0.0020 0.1744 
s8 -0.2340 0.1142 -2.05 0.042 -0.4597 -0.0084 
s9 0.0685 0.0888 0.77 0.442 -0.1071 0.2440 
Dist1 1.07E-07 6.98E-07 0.15 0.879 -1.27E-06 1.49E-06 
Dist3 -1.46E-06 5.83E-07 -2.5 0.013 -2.61E-06 -3.08E-07 
_cons 0.7029 0.5736 1.23 0.222 -0.4309 1.8366 
Hausman LM Test = 4.73199 P-Value > Chi2(4) 0.3159 
Notes: This table provides results of the Hausman test. The null hypothesis is that difference in coefficients not 
systematic, which means random effect is appropriate. 
 
Table A.122: Test Results for SEM Model (Model 1.2) 
  Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
lag1_price 0.8875 0.0372 23.86 0 0.8145 0.9604 
s2 0.0897 0.0438 2.05 0.041 0.0038 0.1756 
s8 -0.2677 0.0542 -4.94 0 -0.3739 -0.1615 
s9 0.0699 0.0655 1.07 0.285 -0.0584 0.1982 
Dist1 5.52E-07 7.17E-07 0.77 0.441 -8.54E-07 1.96E-06 
Dist3 -1.16E-06 5.84E-07 -1.99 0.047 -2.30E-06 -1.55E-08 
/Lambda 0.0154 0.0063 2.44 0.015 0.0030 0.0278 
/Sigma 0.1031 0.0057 18.16 0 0.0920 0.1142 
LR Test SEM vs. OLS (Lambda=0):   5.9482   P-Value > Chi2(1)   0.0147 
 Acceptable Range for Lambda:     -0.4134  < Lambda < 0.2020 
AIC 0.014 
Wooldridge LM 9.05 
p-value 0.37 
Breusch-Pagan 16.7 
p-value 0 
Notes: This table provides the spatial analysis test in panel model. The null hypothesis of LR Test (Lambda=0) 
is that there is no spatially lagged error term in the model. The null hypothesis of LR Test (Rho=0) is that there 
is no spatially lagged dependent variable in the model. AIC is Akaike Information Criterion. The null hypothesis 
is that there is no first-order autocorrelation in the model. The null hypothesis of Breusch-Pagan test is that there 
is a constant variance in the model. 
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Table A.123: Test Results for SDM Model (Model 1.2) 
  Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
lag1_price 0.8803 0.0377 23.37 0 0.8065 0.9542 
s2 0.1676 0.0984 1.7 0.089 -0.0253 0.3605 
s8 -0.1213 0.1826 -0.66 0.506 -0.4791 0.2365 
s9 0.0023 0.1126 0.02 0.984 -0.2185 0.2231 
Dist1 -1.48E-07 1.74E-06 -0.09 0.932 -3.56E-06 3.26E-06 
Dist3 -9.20E-07 1.52E-06 -0.61 0.544 -3.90E-06 2.06E-06 
w1x_lag1_price -0.0923 0.0235 -3.93 0 -0.1384 -0.0463 
w1x_s2 -0.0268 0.0217 -1.23 0.219 -0.0694 0.0159 
w1x_s8 0.0014 0.0285 0.05 0.961 -0.0546 0.0573 
w1x_s9 -0.0005 0.0369 -0.01 0.989 -0.0729 0.0718 
w1x_Dist1 -5.82E-08 6.54E-07 -0.09 0.929 -1.34E-06 1.22E-06 
w1x_Dist3 1.09E-08 5.24E-07 0.02 0.983 -1.02E-06 1.04E-06 
_cons 0.4403 0.6911 0.64 0.524 -0.9142 1.7948 
/Rho 0.1116 0.0163 6.86 0 0.0798 0.1435 
/Sigma 0.0909 0.0051 17.76 0 0.0808 0.1009 
LR Test SDM vs. OLS (Rho=0):     47.0839   P-Value > Chi2(1)   0.0000 
 LR Test (wX's =0):               47.7953   P-Value > Chi2(6)   0.0000 
 Acceptable Range for Rho:        -0.4134   <  Rho  < 0.2020 
AIC 4.96 
Wooldridge LM 5.98 
p-value 0.14 
Breusch-Pagan 159.4 
p-value 0 
Notes: This table provides the spatial analysis test in panel model. The null hypothesis of LR Test (Lambda=0) 
is that there is no spatially lagged error term in the model. The null hypothesis of LR Test (Rho=0) is that there 
is no spatially lagged dependent variable in the model. AIC is Akaike Information Criterion. The null hypothesis 
is that there is no first-order autocorrelation in the model. The null hypothesis of Breusch-Pagan test is that there 
is a constant variance in the model. 
 
Table A.124: Results of Hausman Test in Panel Model (Model 2.1) 
  Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
d1 1.6718 0.0667 25.08 0 1.5401 1.8036 
d7 -0.0509 0.1692 -0.3 0.764 -0.3853 0.2835 
d8 -12.6387 3.1826 -3.97 0 -18.9291 -6.3484 
Dist1 2.38E-07 4.36E-06 0.05 0.956 -8.37E-06 8.85E-06 
Dist3 -6.79E-06 3.31E-06 -2.05 0.042 -1.3E-05 -2.51E-07 
_cons -1.5389 0.9483 -1.62 0.107 -3.4132 0.3355 
Hausman LM Test  =    0.00000    P-Value > Chi2(3)   1.0000 
Notes: This table provides results of the Hausman test. The null hypothesis is that difference in coefficients not 
systematic, which means random effect is appropriate. 
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Table A.125: Test Results for SAR Model (Model 2.1) 
  Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
d1 1.5901 0.0978 16.26 0 1.3984 1.7817 
d7 -0.0471 0.2432 -0.19 0.846 -0.5237 0.4295 
d8 -12.0201 4.5765 -2.63 0.009 -20.9898 -3.0503 
Dist1 1.59E-06 1.30E-06 1.23 0.22 -9.53E-07 4.14E-06 
Dist3 -5.36E-06 1.02E-06 -5.28 0 -7.35E-06 -3.37E-06 
_cons -1.5511 1.3495 -1.15 0.25 -4.1961 1.0939 
/Rho 0.0111 0.0027 4.18 0 0.0059 0.0163 
/Sigma 0.1931 0.0106 18.17 0 0.1723 0.2140 
LR Test SAR vs. OLS (Rho=0):     17.4324   P-Value > Chi2(1)   0.0000 
 Acceptable Range for Rho:        -0.4134   <  Rho  < 0.2020 
AIC 0.085 
Wooldridge LM 3.02 
p-value 0.08 
Breusch-Pagan 92.14 
p-value 0 
Notes: This table provides the spatial analysis test in panel model. The null hypothesis of LR Test (Lambda=0) 
is that there is no spatially lagged error term in the model. The null hypothesis of LR Test (Rho=0) is that there 
is no spatially lagged dependent variable in the model. AIC is Akaike Information Criterion. The null hypothesis 
is that there is no first-order autocorrelation in the model. The null hypothesis of Breusch-Pagan test is that there 
is a constant variance in the model. 
 
Table A.126: Test Results for SDM Model (Model 2.1) 
  Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
d1 1.3859 0.2277 6.09 0 0.9396 1.8322 
d7 0.0578 0.2828 0.2 0.838 -0.4965 0.6120 
d8 -11.3819 9.8538 -1.16 0.248 -30.6950 7.9311 
Dist1 -1.08E-06 3.58E-06 -0.3 0.763 -8.10E-06 5.94E-06 
Dist3 -2.79E-06 3.13E-06 -0.89 0.374 -8.92E-06 3.35E-06 
w1x_d1 -0.0343 0.0693 -0.5 0.62 -0.1701 0.1015 
w1x_d7 -0.0207 0.0368 -0.56 0.574 -0.0929 0.0515 
w1x_d8 0.4725 2.1156 0.22 0.823 -3.6741 4.6190 
w1x_Dist1 4.81E-07 1.35E-06 0.36 0.721 -2.16E-06 3.12E-06 
w1x_Dist3 -6.33E-07 1.08E-06 -0.58 0.559 -2.75E-06 1.49E-06 
_cons -1.1692 1.3314 -0.88 0.38 -3.7786 1.4402 
/Rho 0.0588 0.0262 2.24 0.025 0.0074 0.1102 
/Sigma 0.1883 0.0105 17.99 0 0.1678 0.2088 
 LR Test SDM vs. OLS (Rho=0):      5.0220   P-Value > Chi2(1)   0.0250 
 LR Test (wX's =0):                6.1921   P-Value > Chi2(5)   0.2880 
 Acceptable Range for Rho:        -0.4134   <  Rho  < 0.2020 
AIC 1.38 
Wooldridge LM 6.08 
p-value 0.01 
Breusch-Pagan 149.2 
p-value 0 
Notes: This table provides the spatial analysis test in panel model. The null hypothesis of LR Test (Lambda=0) 
is that there is no spatially lagged error term in the model. The null hypothesis of LR Test (Rho=0) is that there 
is no spatially lagged dependent variable in the model. AIC is Akaike Information Criterion. The null hypothesis 
is that there is no first-order autocorrelation in the model. The null hypothesis of Breusch-Pagan test is that there 
is a constant variance in the model. 
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Table A.127: Results of Hausman Test in Panel Model (Model 2.2) 
  Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
lag1_price 0.8435 0.0395 21.36 0 0.7655 0.9216 
d1 0.3313 0.0816 4.06 0 0.1700 0.4927 
d7 0.1554 0.1329 1.17 0.244 -0.1073 0.4181 
d8 -5.4230 2.5159 -2.16 0.033 -10.3959 -0.4500 
Dist1 1.14E-07 6.86E-07 0.17 0.868 -1.24E-06 1.47E-06 
Dist3 -1.78E-06 5.71E-07 -3.11 0.002 -2.90E-06 -6.47E-07 
_cons -0.8855 0.7362 -1.2 0.231 -2.3406 0.5697 
Hausman LM Test  =   16.14301    P-Value > Chi2(4)   0.0028 
Notes: This table provides results of the Hausman test. The null hypothesis is that difference in coefficients not 
systematic, which means random effect is appropriate. 
 
Table A.128: Test Results for SEM Model (Model 2.2) 
  Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
lag1_price 0.8638 0.0375 23.06 0 0.7904 0.9372 
d1 0.2432 0.0897 2.71 0.007 0.0673 0.4190 
d7 0.0194 0.0526 0.37 0.711 -0.0836 0.1224 
d8 -6.9021 2.9899 -2.31 0.021 -12.7623 -1.0420 
Dist1 1.94E-07 7.91E-07 0.25 0.806 -1.36E-06 1.74E-06 
Dist3 -1.42E-06 6.79E-07 -2.09 0.037 -2.75E-06 -8.52E-08 
_cons 0.0198 0.0301 0.66 0.511 -0.0393 0.0789 
/Lambda 0.1084 0.0167 6.48 0 0.0756 0.1412 
/Sigma 0.0912 0.0051 17.78 0 0.0811 0.1012 
LR Test SEM vs. OLS (Lambda=0):  41.9385   P-Value > Chi2(1)   0.0000 
 Acceptable Range for Lambda:     -0.4134  < Lambda < 0.2020 
AIC 0.012 
Wooldridge LM 13.2 
p-value 0 
Breusch-Pagan 27 
p-value 0 
Notes: This table provides the spatial analysis test in panel model. The null hypothesis of LR Test (Lambda=0) 
is that there is no spatially lagged error term in the model. The null hypothesis of LR Test (Rho=0) is that there 
is no spatially lagged dependent variable in the model. AIC is Akaike Information Criterion. The null hypothesis 
is that there is no first-order autocorrelation in the model. The null hypothesis of Breusch-Pagan test is that there 
is a constant variance in the model. 
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Table A.129: Test Results for SDM Model (Model 2.2) 
  Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
lag1_price 0.8651 0.0376 22.98 0 0.7914 0.9389 
d1 0.1892 0.1234 1.53 0.125 -0.0525 0.4310 
d7 0.1864 0.1391 1.34 0.18 -0.0862 0.4589 
d8 -4.5961 4.7869 -0.96 0.337 -13.9784 4.7861 
Dist1 1.75E-07 1.74E-06 0.1 0.92 -3.24E-06 3.59E-06 
Dist3 -1.23E-06 1.52E-06 -0.81 0.419 -4.20E-06 1.75E-06 
w1x_lag1_price -0.1119 0.0217 -5.15 0 -0.1544 -0.0693 
w1x_d1 0.0397 0.0468 0.85 0.397 -0.0521 0.1315 
w1x_d7 -0.0265 0.0203 -1.3 0.192 -0.0664 0.0134 
w1x_d8 0.1562 1.0553 0.15 0.882 -1.9121 2.2246 
w1x_Dist1 -1.46E-07 6.54E-07 -0.22 0.823 -1.43E-06 1.13E-06 
w1x_Dist3 -1.48E-07 5.27E-07 -0.28 0.779 -1.18E-06 8.85E-07 
_cons -0.6182 0.6476 -0.95 0.34 -1.8874 0.6511 
/Rho 0.0979 0.0186 5.28 0 0.0615 0.1342 
/Sigma 0.0909 0.0051 17.83 0 0.0809 0.1009 
LR Test SDM vs. OLS (Rho=0):     27.8260   P-Value > Chi2(1)   0.0000 
 LR Test (wX's =0):               39.5374   P-Value > Chi2(6)   0.0000 
 Acceptable Range for Rho:        -0.4134   <  Rho  < 0.2020 
AIC 3.81 
Wooldridge LM 8.16 
p-value 0 
Breusch-Pagan 159 
p-value 0 
Notes: This table provides the spatial analysis test in panel model. The null hypothesis of LR Test (Lambda=0) 
is that there is no spatially lagged error term in the model. The null hypothesis of LR Test (Rho=0) is that there 
is no spatially lagged dependent variable in the model. AIC is Akaike Information Criterion. The null hypothesis 
is that there is no first-order autocorrelation in the model. The null hypothesis of Breusch-Pagan test is that there 
is a constant variance in the model. 
 
Table A.130: Results of Hausman Test in Panel Model (Model 3.1) 
  Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
d2 1.1214 0.0440 25.47 0 1.0344 1.2084 
d8 -11.1940 2.5784 -4.34 0 -16.2898 -6.0983 
Dist1 2.38E-07 4.15E-06 0.06 0.954 -7.96E-06 8.43E-06 
Dist3 -6.79E-06 3.15E-06 -2.16 0.033 -1.3E-05 -5.67E-07 
_cons 2.3829 0.1956 12.19 0 1.9964 2.7693 
 Hausman LM Test  =   -0.00000    P-Value > Chi2(2)   1.0000 
Notes: This table provides results of the Hausman test. The null hypothesis is that difference in coefficients not 
systematic, which means random effect is appropriate. 
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Table A.131: Test Results for SAC Model (Model 3.1) 
  Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
d2 1.0928 0.0677 16.48 0 0.9829 1.2482 
d8 -11.1203 3.8599 -2.88 0.004 -18.6855 -3.5551 
Dist1 1.68E-06 1.37E-06 1.23 0.22 -1.01E-06 4.36E-06 
Dist3 -5.42E-06 1.05E-06 -5.15 0 -7.48E-06 -3.36E-06 
_cons 2.1740 0.2371 9.17 0 1.7093 2.6386 
/Rho 0.0060 0.0173 0.35 0.729 -0.0280 0.0400 
/Lambda 0.0092 0.0307 0.3 0.764 -0.0510 0.0694 
/Sigma 0.1956 0.0108 18.15 0 0.1745 0.2168 
LR Test (Rho=0):                         0.1200   P-Value > Chi2(1) 0.7290 
 LR Test (Lambda=0):                      0.0898   P-Value > Chi2(1) 0.7645 
 LR Test SAC vs. OLS (Rho+Lambda=0):     16.0048   P-Value > Chi2(2) 0.0003 
 Acceptable Range for Rho:               -0.4134   <  Rho  < 0.2020 
AIC 0.081 
Wooldridge LM 4.32 
p-value 0.04 
Breusch-Pagan 95.5 
p-value 0 
Notes: This table provides the spatial analysis test in panel model. The null hypothesis of LR Test (Lambda=0) 
is that there is no spatially lagged error term in the model. The null hypothesis of LR Test (Rho=0) is that there 
is no spatially lagged dependent variable in the model. AIC is Akaike Information Criterion. The null hypothesis 
is that there is no first-order autocorrelation in the model. The null hypothesis of Breusch-Pagan test is that there 
is a constant variance in the model. 
 
Table A.132: Test Results for SAR Model (Model 3.1) 
  Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
d2 1.0658 0.0635 16.78 0 0.9412 1.1903 
d8 -10.6541 3.6393 -2.93 0.003 -17.7870 -3.5213 
Dist1 1.61E-06 1.32E-06 1.22 0.221 -9.70E-07 4.19E-06 
Dist3 -5.34E-06 1.03E-06 -5.19 0 -7.36E-06 -3.33E-06 
_cons 2.1834 0.2162 10.1 0 1.7597 2.6072 
/Rho 0.0112 0.0027 4.17 0 0.0060 0.0165 
/Sigma 0.1957 0.0108 18.17 0 0.1745 0.2168 
LR Test SAR vs. OLS (Rho=0):     17.4088   P-Value > Chi2(1)   0.0000 
 Acceptable Range for Rho:        -0.4134   <  Rho  < 0.2020 
AIC 0.086 
Wooldridge LM 4.32 
p-value 0.04 
Breusch-Pagan 97.34 
p-value 0 
Notes: This table provides the spatial analysis test in panel model. The null hypothesis of LR Test (Lambda=0) 
is that there is no spatially lagged error term in the model. The null hypothesis of LR Test (Rho=0) is that there 
is no spatially lagged dependent variable in the model. AIC is Akaike Information Criterion. The null hypothesis 
is that there is no first-order autocorrelation in the model. The null hypothesis of Breusch-Pagan test is that there 
is a constant variance in the model. 
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Table A.133: Test Results for SEM Model (Model 3.1) 
  Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
d2 1.1156 0.0677 16.48 0 0.9829 1.2482 
d8 -10.7029 4.0077 -2.67 0.008 -18.5577 -2.8480 
Dist1 1.75E-06 1.37E-06 1.28 0.201 -9.35E-07 4.44E-06 
Dist3 -5.43E-06 1.08E-06 -5.04 0 -7.54E-06 -3.32E-06 
_cons 2.1127 0.2407 8.78 0 1.6409 2.5844 
/Lambda 0.0198 0.0053 3.71 0 0.0094 0.0303 
/Sigma 0.1954 0.0108 18.17 0 0.1743 0.2165 
LR Test SEM vs. OLS (Lambda=0):  13.7911   P-Value > Chi2(1)   0.0002 
 Acceptable Range for Lambda:     -0.4134  < Lambda < 0.2020 
AIC 0.072 
Wooldridge LM 4.32 
p-value 0.04 
Breusch-Pagan 91.58 
p-value 0 
Notes: This table provides the spatial analysis test in panel model. The null hypothesis of LR Test (Lambda=0) 
is that there is no spatially lagged error term in the model. The null hypothesis of LR Test (Rho=0) is that there 
is no spatially lagged dependent variable in the model. AIC is Akaike Information Criterion. The null hypothesis 
is that there is no first-order autocorrelation in the model. The null hypothesis of Breusch-Pagan test is that there 
is a constant variance in the model. 
 
Table A.134: Test Results for SDM Model (Model 3.1) 
  Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
d2 0.9414 0.1658 5.68 0 0.6165 1.2663 
d8 -1.4903 7.2158 -0.21 0.836 -15.6330 12.6524 
Dist1 -3.48E-07 3.61E-06 -0.1 0.923 -7.42E-06 6.72E-06 
Dist3 -3.08E-06 3.18E-06 -0.97 0.332 -9.31E-06 3.14E-06 
w1x_d2 -0.0183 0.0489 -0.37 0.708 -0.1141 0.0775 
w1x_d8 -1.6873 1.3816 -1.22 0.222 -4.3952 1.0206 
w1x_Dist1 1.55E-08 1.34E-06 0.01 0.991 -2.60E-06 2.63E-06 
w1x_Dist3 -5.98E-07 1.10E-06 -0.54 0.587 -2.76E-06 1.56E-06 
_cons 1.8793 0.3244 5.79 0 1.2435 2.5150 
/Rho 0.0522 0.0239 2.18 0.029 0.0053 0.0990 
/Sigma 0.1916 0.0106 18.06 0 0.1708 0.2124 
 LR Test SDM vs. OLS (Rho=0):      4.7618   P-Value > Chi2(1)   0.0291 
 LR Test (wX's =0):                5.2007   P-Value > Chi2(4)   0.2673 
 Acceptable Range for Rho:        -0.4134   <  Rho  < 0.2020 
AIC 1.07 
Wooldridge LM 5.36 
p-value 0.02 
Breusch-Pagan 147.1 
p-value 0 
Notes: This table provides the spatial analysis test in panel model. The null hypothesis of LR Test (Lambda=0) 
is that there is no spatially lagged error term in the model. The null hypothesis of LR Test (Rho=0) is that there 
is no spatially lagged dependent variable in the model. AIC is Akaike Information Criterion. The null hypothesis 
is that there is no first-order autocorrelation in the model. The null hypothesis of Breusch-Pagan test is that there 
is a constant variance in the model. 
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Table A.135: Results of Hausman Test in Panel Model (Model 3.2) 
  Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
lag1_price 0.8245 0.0369 22.36 0 0.7516 0.8974 
d2 0.2483 0.0509 4.88 0 0.1476 0.3489 
d8 -7.6861 1.9204 -4 0 -11.4816 -3.8905 
Dist1 1.17E-07 6.71E-07 0.17 0.862 -1.21E-06 1.44E-06 
Dist3 -1.89E-06 5.54E-07 -3.41 0.001 -2.98E-06 -7.93E-07 
_cons 0.7617 0.1326 5.75 0 0.4997 1.0237 
Hausman LM Test  =   20.88812    P-Value > Chi2(3)   0.0001 
Notes: This table provides results of the Hausman test. The null hypothesis is that difference in coefficients not 
systematic, which means random effect is appropriate. 
 
Table A.136: Test Results for SEM Model (Model 3.2) 
  Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
lag1_price 0.8235 0.0399 20.64 0 0.7453 0.9017 
d2 0.2494 0.0539 4.63 0 0.1438 0.3551 
d8 -6.5869 2.3830 -2.76 0.006 -11.2575 -1.9162 
Dist1 6.66E-07 7.06E-07 0.94 0.346 -7.19E-07 2.05E-06 
Dist3 -1.47E-06 5.98E-07 -2.45 0.014 -2.64E-06 -2.96E-07 
_cons 0.6103 0.1871 3.26 0.001 0.2436 0.9770 
/Lambda 0.0218 0.0114 1.91 0.056 -0.0005 0.0440 
/Sigma 0.0989 0.0054 18.16 0 0.0882 0.1096 
LR Test SEM vs. OLS (Lambda=0):   3.6648   P-Value > Chi2(1)   0.0556 
 Acceptable Range for Lambda:     -0.4134  < Lambda < 0.2020 
AIC 0.014 
Wooldridge LM 24.82 
p-value 0 
Breusch-Pagan 19.62 
p-value 0 
Notes: This table provides the spatial analysis test in panel model. The null hypothesis of LR Test (Lambda=0) 
is that there is no spatially lagged error term in the model. The null hypothesis of LR Test (Rho=0) is that there 
is no spatially lagged dependent variable in the model. AIC is Akaike Information Criterion. The null hypothesis 
is that there is no first-order autocorrelation in the model. The null hypothesis of Breusch-Pagan test is that there 
is a constant variance in the model. 
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Table A.137: Test Results for SDM Model (Model 3.2) 
  Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
lag1_price 0.8665 0.0367 23.59 0 0.7945 0.9385 
d2 0.1156 0.0872 1.33 0.185 -0.0554 0.2866 
d8 -5.7888 3.5679 -1.62 0.105 -12.7818 1.2041 
Dist1 2.91E-07 1.71E-06 0.17 0.865 -3.06E-06 3.64E-06 
Dist3 -1.29E-06 1.51E-06 -0.85 0.394 -4.24E-06 1.67E-06 
w1x_lag1_price -0.1045 0.0190 -5.51 0 -0.1417 -0.0674 
w1x_d2 0.0371 0.0272 1.37 0.172 -0.0161 0.0904 
w1x_d8 0.1072 0.6833 0.16 0.875 -1.2321 1.4466 
w1x_Dist1 -2.03E-07 6.34E-07 -0.32 0.749 -1.44E-06 1.04E-06 
w1x_Dist3 -1.83E-07 5.24E-07 -0.35 0.727 -1.21E-06 8.44E-07 
_cons 0.7270 0.1791 4.06 0 0.3759 1.0780 
/Rho 0.0840 0.0193 4.36 0 0.0462 0.1217 
/Sigma 0.0908 0.0051 17.93 0 0.0809 0.1007 
LR Test SDM vs. OLS (Rho=0):     19.0015   P-Value > Chi2(1)   0.0000 
 LR Test (wX's =0):               32.8753   P-Value > Chi2(5)   0.0000 
 Acceptable Range for Rho:        -0.4134   <  Rho  < 0.2020 
AIC 2.74 
Wooldridge LM 23.18 
p-value 0 
Breusch-Pagan 158.3 
p-value 0 
Notes: This table provides the spatial analysis test in panel model. The null hypothesis of LR Test (Lambda=0) 
is that there is no spatially lagged error term in the model. The null hypothesis of LR Test (Rho=0) is that there 
is no spatially lagged dependent variable in the model. AIC is Akaike Information Criterion. The null hypothesis 
is that there is no first-order autocorrelation in the model. The null hypothesis of Breusch-Pagan test is that there 
is a constant variance in the model. 
 
Table A.138: Results of Hausman Test in Panel Model (Model 4.1) 
  Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
d4 7.7421 0.3127 24.76 0 7.1240 8.3603 
d7 -0.0521 0.1710 -0.3 0.761 -0.3901 0.2858 
d8 -9.5965 3.1972 -3 0.003 -15.9156 -3.2774 
Dist1 2.38E-07 4.36E-06 0.05 0.956 -8.37E-06 8.85E-06 
Dist3 -6.79E-06 3.31E-06 -2.05 0.042 -1.3E-05 -2.51E-07 
_cons -7.8993 1.1041 -7.15 0 -10.0815 -5.7172 
Hausman LM Test  =   -0.00000    P-Value > Chi2(3)   1.0000 
Notes: This table provides results of the Hausman test. The null hypothesis is that difference in coefficients not 
systematic, which means random effect is appropriate. 
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Table A.139: Test Results for SAR Model (Model 4.1) 
  Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
d4 7.3621 0.4558 16.15 0 6.4686 8.2555 
d7 -0.0482 0.2442 -0.2 0.843 -0.5269 0.4304 
d8 -9.1246 4.5676 -2 0.046 -18.0770 -0.1721 
Dist1 1.60E-06 1.30E-06 1.22 0.221 -9.59E-07 4.16E-06 
Dist3 -5.35E-06 1.02E-06 -5.25 0 -7.35E-06 -3.35E-06 
_cons -7.5992 1.5670 -4.85 0 -10.6705 -4.5278 
/Rho 0.0112 0.0027 4.17 0 0.0059 0.0164 
/Sigma 0.1940 0.0107 18.17 0 0.1730 0.2149 
LR Test SAR vs. OLS (Rho=0):     17.4204   P-Value > Chi2(1)   0.0000 
 Acceptable Range for Rho:        -0.4134   <  Rho  < 0.2020 
AIC 0.086 
Wooldridge LM 2.85 
p-value 0.09 
Breusch-Pagan 92.1 
p-value 0 
Notes: This table provides the spatial analysis test in panel model. The null hypothesis of LR Test (Lambda=0) 
is that there is no spatially lagged error term in the model. The null hypothesis of LR Test (Rho=0) is that there 
is no spatially lagged dependent variable in the model. AIC is Akaike Information Criterion. The null hypothesis 
is that there is no first-order autocorrelation in the model. The null hypothesis of Breusch-Pagan test is that there 
is a constant variance in the model. 
 
Table A.140: Test Results for SDM Model (Model 4.1) 
  Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
d4 6.2721 0.9438 6.65 0 4.4224 8.1219 
d7 -0.0163 0.3732 -0.04 0.965 -0.7478 0.7153 
d8 -9.4287 10.6359 -0.89 0.375 -30.2746 11.4172 
Dist1 -1.10E-06 3.59E-06 -0.3 0.761 -8.14E-06 5.95E-06 
Dist3 -2.78E-06 3.14E-06 -0.88 0.376 -8.93E-06 3.37E-06 
w1x_d4 -0.1307 0.2665 -0.49 0.624 -0.6530 0.3917 
w1x_d7 -0.0035 0.0685 -0.05 0.959 -0.1378 0.1308 
w1x_d8 0.5507 2.3212 0.24 0.812 -3.9988 5.1002 
w1x_Dist1 4.87E-07 1.35E-06 0.36 0.719 -2.16E-06 3.14E-06 
w1x_Dist3 -6.30E-07 1.08E-06 -0.58 0.561 -2.76E-06 1.50E-06 
_cons -5.8585 1.7551 -3.34 0.001 -9.2985 -2.4185 
/Rho 0.0595 0.0249 2.39 0.017 0.0106 0.1084 
/Sigma 0.1888 0.0105 18 0 0.1683 0.2094 
LR Test SDM vs. OLS (Rho=0):      5.6906   P-Value > Chi2(1)   0.0171 
 LR Test (wX's =0):                6.6040   P-Value > Chi2(5)   0.2518 
 Acceptable Range for Rho:        -0.4134   <  Rho  < 0.2020 
AIC 1.41 
Wooldridge LM 4.86 
p-value 0.03 
Breusch-Pagan 149.1 
p-value 0 
Notes: This table provides the spatial analysis test in panel model. The null hypothesis of LR Test (Lambda=0) 
is that there is no spatially lagged error term in the model. The null hypothesis of LR Test (Rho=0) is that there 
is no spatially lagged dependent variable in the model. AIC is Akaike Information Criterion. The null hypothesis 
is that there is no first-order autocorrelation in the model. The null hypothesis of Breusch-Pagan test is that there 
is a constant variance in the model. 
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Table A.141: Results of Hausman Test in Panel Model (Model 4.2) 
  Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
lag1_price 0.8465 0.0395 21.42 0 0.7684 0.9247 
d4 1.5022 0.3794 3.96 0 0.7524 2.2521 
d7 0.1542 0.1332 1.16 0.249 -0.1091 0.4175 
d8 -4.7888 2.4942 -1.92 0.057 -9.7187 0.1412 
Dist1 1.14E-07 6.87E-07 0.17 0.869 -1.24E-06 1.47E-06 
Dist3 -1.76E-06 5.72E-07 -3.07 0.003 -2.89E-06 -6.27E-07 
_cons -2.1026 0.8936 -2.35 0.02 -3.8687 -0.3364 
Hausman LM Test  =   15.06596    P-Value > Chi2(4)   0.0046 
Notes: This table provides results of the Hausman test. The null hypothesis is that difference in coefficients not 
systematic, which means random effect is appropriate. 
 
Table A.142: Test Results for SEM Model (Model 4.2) 
  Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
lag1_price 0.8421 0.0418 20.13 0 0.7601 0.9241 
d4 1.5459 0.3993 3.87 0 0.7633 2.3285 
d7 0.1614 0.1297 1.24 0.213 -0.0929 0.4157 
d8 -4.7239 2.4274 -1.95 0.052 -9.4814 0.0336 
Dist1 1.74E-07 7.09E-07 0.25 0.806 -1.22E-06 1.56E-06 
Dist3 -1.74E-06 5.64E-07 -3.08 0.002 -2.84E-06 -6.34E-07 
_cons -2.2009 0.9164 -2.4 0.016 -3.9970 -0.4047 
/Lambda -0.0008 0.0028 -0.27 0.785 -0.0063 0.0047 
/Sigma 0.1032 0.0057 18.17 0 0.0921 0.1144 
LR Test SEM vs. OLS (Lambda=0):   0.0747   P-Value > Chi2(1)   0.7847 
 Acceptable Range for Lambda:     -0.4134  < Lambda < 0.2020 
AIC 0.012 
Wooldridge LM 13.8 
p-value 0 
Breusch-Pagan 25.8 
p-value 0 
Notes: This table provides the spatial analysis test in panel model. The null hypothesis of LR Test (Lambda=0) 
is that there is no spatially lagged error term in the model. The null hypothesis of LR Test (Rho=0) is that there 
is no spatially lagged dependent variable in the model. AIC is Akaike Information Criterion. The null hypothesis 
is that there is no first-order autocorrelation in the model. The null hypothesis of Breusch-Pagan test is that there 
is a constant variance in the model. 
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Table A.143: Test Results for SDM Model (Model 4.2) 
  Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
lag1_price 0.8668 0.0375 23.1 0 0.7933 0.9404 
d4 0.9179 0.5083 1.81 0.071 -0.0784 1.9141 
d7 0.2817 0.1995 1.41 0.158 -0.1093 0.6726 
d8 -2.8803 5.2263 -0.55 0.582 -13.1237 7.3631 
Dist1 1.75E-07 1.74E-06 0.1 0.92 -3.23E-06 3.58E-06 
Dist3 -1.21E-06 1.52E-06 -0.8 0.424 -4.19E-06 1.76E-06 
w1x_lag1_price -0.1118 0.0212 -5.28 0 -0.1533 -0.0703 
w1x_d4 0.1560 0.1696 0.92 0.358 -0.1763 0.4884 
w1x_d7 -0.0488 0.0407 -1.2 0.23 -0.1286 0.0309 
w1x_d8 -0.0721 1.1640 -0.06 0.951 -2.3534 2.2093 
w1x_Dist1 -1.52E-07 6.54E-07 -0.23 0.816 -1.43E-06 1.13E-06 
w1x_Dist3 -1.36E-07 5.25E-07 -0.26 0.795 -1.17E-06 8.94E-07 
_cons -1.8984 0.9666 -1.96 0.05 -3.7929 -0.0038 
/Rho 0.0995 0.0178 5.58 0 0.0646 0.1345 
/Sigma 0.0909 0.0051 17.83 0 0.0809 0.1009 
 LR Test SDM vs. OLS (Rho=0):     31.1807   P-Value > Chi2(1)   0.0000 
 LR Test (wX's =0):               40.4785   P-Value > Chi2(6)   0.0000 
 Acceptable Range for Rho:        -0.4134   <  Rho  < 0.2020 
AIC 3.94 
Wooldridge LM 9.37 
p-value 0 
Breusch-Pagan 158.9 
p-value 0 
Notes: This table provides the spatial analysis test in panel model. The null hypothesis of LR Test (Lambda=0) 
is that there is no spatially lagged error term in the model. The null hypothesis of LR Test (Rho=0) is that there 
is no spatially lagged dependent variable in the model. AIC is Akaike Information Criterion. The null hypothesis 
is that there is no first-order autocorrelation in the model. The null hypothesis of Breusch-Pagan test is that there 
is a constant variance in the model. 
 
Table A.144 – Table A.159 are belonging to Chapter 6 The Uncertainty of House Prices 
and Real Options in China 
Table A.144: Variable List 
Name Variables Unit 
price Average house prices yuan 
Landprice Average land prices yuan 
GDP Gross regional product 100 million yuan 
CPI Consumer price index preceding year=100 
une_r Unemployment rate in urban area % 
pop_den Population density of urban area person/sq.km 
num_edu Number of regular institutions of higher education unit 
num_heal Number of health care institutions unit 
num_lib Number of institutions in public libraries unit 
num_muse Number of museums unit 
size_building Floor space of residential buildings completed 10000 sq.m 
Notes: All variables were downloaded from the National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBS) website. Data is 
from 2000 to 2015. 
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Table A.145: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
price 496 3,722.77 3,029.72 854 22300 
GDP 496 11,336.02 12,327.25 117.8 72812.55 
CPI 496 102.34 2.13 96.7 110.1 
une_r 496 3.60 0.71 0.8 6.5 
pop_den 496 2,275.10 1,411.93 171 6307 
num_edu 496 64.25 36.08 3 162 
num_heal 496 19,014.57 18,239.52 1237 81403 
num_lib 496 92.28 43.92 1 203 
num_muse 496 71.67 56.00 1 312 
size_building 496 5,041.41 3,784.01 33.4 20477.12 
VIF 4.38         
Notes: This table summarises descriptive statistics (number of observations, sample mean, standard deviation, 
minimum and maximum) of the full sample of variables. VIF stands for variance inflation factor. 
 
Table A.146: Code of Regions 
Region ID Region ID 
Anhui 1 Jilin 17 
Beijing 2 Liaoning 18 
Chongqing 3 Nei Mongol 19 
Fujian 4 Ningxia Hui 20 
Gansu 5 Qinghai 21 
Guangdong 6 Shaanxi 22 
Guangxi 7 Shandong 23 
Guizhou 8 Shanghai 24 
Hainan 9 Shanxi 25 
Hebei 10 Sichuan 26 
Heilongjiang 11 Tianjin 27 
Henan 12 Xinjiang Uygur 28 
Hubei 13 Xizang 29 
Hunan 14 Yunnan 30 
Jiangsu 15 Zhejiang 31 
Jiangxi 16     
Notes: This table provides the code of regions in the investigation of shape files. 
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Table A.147: Results of Hausman Test in Panel Model 
  Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
GDP 0.8153 0.0290 28.11 0 0.7583 0.8723 
CPI 0.1167 0.3967 0.29 0.769 -0.6628 0.8962 
une_r -0.3213 0.0598 -5.37 0 -0.4388 -0.2038 
pop_den 0.0060 0.0143 0.42 0.676 -0.0221 0.0340 
num_edu -0.1394 0.0506 -2.76 0.006 -0.2388 -0.0401 
num_heal 0.0152 0.0189 0.8 0.421 -0.0220 0.0524 
num_lib -0.1918 0.0230 -8.34 0 -0.2370 -0.1467 
num_muse -0.0773 0.0257 -3.01 0.003 -0.1278 -0.0268 
size_building -0.1076 0.0207 -5.2 0 -0.1482 -0.0669 
_cons 1.3391 0.7928 1.69 0.092 -0.2188 2.8971 
Hausman LM Test  =  334.95985    P-Value > Chi2(9)   0.0000 
Notes: This table provides results of the Hausman test. b=consistent under null hypothesis and alternative 
hypothesis. B=inconsistent under alternative hypothesis, efficient under null hypothesis. The null hypothesis is 
that difference in coefficients not systematic, which means random effect is appropriate. 
 
Table A.148: Test Results for Choosing Between Spatial and Non-spatial Models 
  
Spatial fixed 
effect 
Time-period fixed 
effect 
Spatial and time-period fixed 
effect 
LM spatial lag (classic) 
46.93 22.93 34.8 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
LM spatial error (classic) 
70.82 16.69 23.96 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Robust LM spatial lag 
0.1171 7.012 33.02 
[0.732] [0.008] [0.000] 
Robust LM spatial error 
24 0.7752 22.18 
[0.000] [0.379] [0.000] 
Robust LM SAR 
21.4 9.84 24.88 
[0.011] [0.363] [0.003] 
Robust LM SEM 
27.53 18.28 27.29 
[0.001] [0.032] [0.001] 
LR tests for the joint 70.1 
Significance of spatial fixed effects [0.000] 
LR tests for the joint 664.64 
Significance of time-period fixed effects [0.000] 
Notes: This table provides the diagnostic tests for spatial dependence in panel model. The null hypothesis of LM 
spatial error test is that there is no spatially lagged error term in the model. The null hypothesis of LM spatial 
lag test is that there is no spatially lagged dependent variable in the model. LR tests for the joint stands for the 
selection of fixed effect or time-period effect. P values are in square brackets. 
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Table A.149: Test Results for Spatial and Time-Period Fixed Effect Model with Spill-over 
Effects 
  Spatial Durbin fixed effects model 
  Direct effect Indirect effect Total effect 
Rho(ρ) 0.232**     
  (2.22)     
GDP 0.466*** 0.365** 0.831*** 
  (5.24) (2.49) (4.93) 
CPI -2.470*** -0.713 -3.182 
  (-2.65) (-0.38) (-1.55) 
une_r -0.499*** -0.565* -1.064*** 
  (-4.06) (-1.96) (-3.06) 
pop_den -0.0498 -0.0854 -0.135 
  (-1.50) (-0.90) (-1.29) 
num_edu 0.0608 -0.665** -0.604** 
  (0.55) (-2.30) (-2.32) 
num_heal -0.174*** -0.0465 -0.221 
  (-4.15) (-0.25) (-1.12) 
num_lib -0.226*** -0.0668 -0.293** 
  (-3.52) (-0.52) (-1.99) 
num_muse -0.0312 0.0472 0.0161 
  (-0.80) (0.32) (0.10) 
size_building -0.125** 0.0839 -0.0412 
  (-2.04) (0.49) (-0.22) 
Observation 496 
Log-likelihood 533.82 
Time fixed effect Yes 
Wald test, spatial lag 24.88[0.003] 
Wald test, spatial 27.29[0.001] 
LR test, spatial lag 64.25[0.000] 
LR test, spatial 70.28[0.000] 
Notes: This table provides test results for spatial and time-period fixed effect model. The null hypothesis of LR 
spatial error test is that there is no spatially lagged error term in the model. The null hypothesis of LR spatial lag 
test is that there is no spatially lagged dependent variable in the model. The null hypothesis of Wald test is that 
the model is homoscedastic. 
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Table A.150: Test Results for Predict House Prices Estimation with Spatial Fixed Effect 
  Spatial fixed effect 
  Direct effect Indirect effect Total effect 
Rho(ρ) 0.606***     
  (10.56)     
GDP 0.325*** 0.408*** 0.734*** 
  (12.86) (11.08) (16.58) 
CPI -1.043*** 0.989*** -0.0538 
  (-8.07) (4.68) (-0.32) 
une_r -0.135*** -0.561*** -0.696*** 
  (-4.57) (-5.91) (-5.88) 
pop_den -0.0171*** -0.00512 -0.0222 
  (-4.65) (-0.32) (-1.37) 
num_edu 0.00906 0.297*** 0.306*** 
  (0.53) (3.98) (3.93) 
num_heal -0.0112*** 0.123*** 0.112*** 
  (-3.09) (7.77) (7.08) 
num_lib -0.0458*** -0.110*** -0.155*** 
  (-9.35) (-3.40) (-4.34) 
num_muse 0.0149* -0.249*** -0.234*** 
  (1.88) (-4.10) (-3.61) 
size_building -0.0401*** -0.267*** -0.307*** 
  (-3.73) (-5.43) (-6.00) 
Observation 496 
Log-likelihood 1622.95 
Time fixed effect No 
Wald test, spatial lag 24.88[0.003] 
Wald test, spatial 27.29[0.001] 
LR test, spatial lag 64.25[0.000] 
LR test, spatial 70.28[0.000] 
Notes: This table provides test results for spatial and time-period fixed effect model. The null hypothesis of LR 
spatial error test is that there is no spatially lagged error term in the model. The null hypothesis of LR spatial lag 
test is that there is no spatially lagged dependent variable in the model. The null hypothesis of Wald test is that 
the model is homoscedastic. 
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Table A.151: Test Results for Predict House Prices Estimation with Time-period Fixed Effect 
  Time-period fixed effect 
  Direct effect Indirect effect Total effect 
Rho(ρ) 0.232     
  (1.74)     
GDP 0.480*** 0.435*** 0.916*** 
  (5.65) (2.66) (4.93) 
CPI -2.497*** -0.422 -2.919 
  (-2.93) (-0.24) (-1.59) 
une_r -0.494*** -0.536* -1.030*** 
  (-4.61) (-1.84) (-2.98) 
pop_den -0.0462* -0.0423 -0.0885 
  (-1.70) (-0.57) (-1.16) 
num_edu 0.0500 -0.788*** -0.738*** 
  (0.45) (-2.65) (-2.72) 
num_heal -0.162*** 0.0693 -0.0927 
  (-3.82) (0.42) (-0.53) 
num_lib -0.237*** -0.120 -0.357** 
  (-3.56) (-0.97) (-2.33) 
num_muse -0.0360 0.0270 -0.00901 
  (-1.00) (0.25) (-0.07) 
size_building -0.124** 0.0747 -0.0497 
  (-2.52) (0.50) (-0.30) 
Observation 496 
Log-likelihood 615.46 
Time fixed effect Yes 
Wald test, spatial lag 43.55[0.056] 
Wald test, spatial 69.87[0.065] 
LR test, spatial lag 52.19[0.071] 
LR test, spatial 31.52[0.083] 
Notes: This table provides test results for spatial and time-period fixed effect model. The null hypothesis of LR 
spatial error test is that there is no spatially lagged error term in the model. The null hypothesis of LR spatial lag 
test is that there is no spatially lagged dependent variable in the model. The null hypothesis of Wald test is that 
the model is homoscedastic. 
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Table A.152: Test Results for Predict House Prices Estimation with Spatial and Time-period 
Fixed Effect 
  Spatial and time-period fixed effect 
  Direct effect Indirect effect Total effect 
Rho(ρ) 0.389***     
  (4.34)     
GDP 0.303*** 0.222*** 0.525*** 
  (10.96) (2.81) (5.81) 
CPI -1.008*** 0.950*** -0.0583 
  (-6.57) (2.78) (-0.15) 
une_r -0.137*** -0.457*** -0.595*** 
  (-5.74) (-4.94) (-5.32) 
pop_den -0.0238*** -0.0411** -0.0649*** 
  (-7.00) (-2.50) (-3.80) 
num_edu 0.0270 0.311*** 0.338*** 
  (1.30) (4.74) (4.32) 
num_heal -0.0140*** 0.0720*** 0.0580*** 
  (-4.05) (5.81) (4.71) 
num_lib -0.0408*** -0.0583** -0.0991*** 
  (-7.70) (-2.06) (-3.03) 
num_muse 0.0250*** -0.157*** -0.132*** 
  (3.55) (-3.69) (-2.86) 
size_building -0.0411*** -0.219*** -0.260*** 
  (-4.17) (-7.93) (-9.55) 
Observation 496 
Log-likelihood 1666.34 
Time fixed effect Yes 
Wald test, spatial lag 27.63[0.011] 
Wald test, spatial 39.17[0.013] 
LR test, spatial lag 78.71[0.000] 
LR test, spatial 55.32[0.000] 
Notes: This table provides test results for spatial and time-period fixed effect model. The null hypothesis of LR 
spatial error test is that there is no spatially lagged error term in the model. The null hypothesis of LR spatial lag 
test is that there is no spatially lagged dependent variable in the model. The null hypothesis of Wald test is that 
the model is homoscedastic. 
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Table A.153: Results of ARCH Family Regression 
  Arch L1. Coef. Garch L1. Coef. Constant Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
y2000 -0.2346 1.4877 -2.46E-04 9.12E-05 -2.7 0.007 -4.25E-04 -6.73E-05 
y2001 -0.2134 1.4317 1.18E-04 1.16E-03 0.1 0.919 -2.16E-03 2.40E-03 
y2002 -0.2377 1.4670 7.00E-04 7.06E-04 0.99 0.321 -6.84E-04 2.08E-03 
y2003 0.1061 -1.4696 3.93E-02 4.66E-03 8.44 0 3.02E-02 4.84E-02 
y2004 -0.2209 1.4625 -3.53E-04 1.48E-03 -0.24 0.812 -3.26E-03 2.55E-03 
y2005 -0.2572 1.4928 2.35E-04 7.54E-05 3.11 0.002 8.69E-05 3.83E-04 
y2006 -0.0995 0.2194 2.60E-02 7.07E-03 3.68 0 1.21E-02 3.98E-02 
y2007 -0.1008 0.4733 1.90E-02 2.04E-02 0.93 0.352 -2.10E-02 5.89E-02 
y2008 -0.1168 0.2944 2.73E-02 4.12E-02 0.66 0.507 -5.34E-02 1.08E-01 
y2009 0.0805 -1.2628 4.88E-02 2.06E-02 2.37 0.018 8.41E-03 8.91E-02 
y2010 -0.1217 0.0826 4.08E-02 6.54E-02 0.62 0.533 -8.74E-02 1.69E-01 
y2011 -0.1367 0.4306 2.79E-02 3.00E-02 0.93 0.351 -3.08E-02 8.67E-02 
y2012 -0.1500 0.4385 2.82E-02 3.52E-02 0.8 0.423 -4.08E-02 9.73E-02 
y2013 -0.1212 0.4148 2.37E-02 1.58E-12 1.50E+10 0 2.37E-02 2.37E-02 
y2014 0.1262 -1.4721 4.79E-02 3.77E-03 12.69 0 4.05E-02 5.53E-02 
y2015 -0.1129 0.1314 3.21E-02 4.97E-02 0.65 0.518 -6.53E-02 1.30E-01 
Notes: This table provides test results for ARCH family regression. yxxxx represents the house price in the year 
xxxx. 
 
Table A.154: LM Test for Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity (ARCH) 
  lags(p) chi2 df Prob>chi2 
y2000 1 0.77 1 0.3802 
y2001 1 0.657 1 0.4176 
y2002 1 0.718 1 0.3969 
y2003 1 0.774 1 0.379 
y2004 1 0.637 1 0.4249 
y2005 1 0.758 1 0.3839 
y2006 1 0.888 1 0.346 
y2007 1 0.832 1 0.3616 
y2008 1 0.991 1 0.3195 
y2009 1 1.088 1 0.2969 
y2010 1 1.033 1 0.3096 
y2011 1 1.17 1 0.2795 
y2012 1 1.212 1 0.2709 
y2013 1 1.222 1 0.269 
y2014 1 1.11 1 0.2922 
y2015 1 1.148 1 0.2841 
Notes: This table provides LM test for autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity. H0: no ARCH effects      
vs.  H1: ARCH(p) disturbance. 
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Table A.155: House Prices Forecasting Parameter Estimates by Year 
Year Intercept   Lagged 1 year price     
  
Parameter 
estimate 
Standard 
errors 
Parameter 
estimate 
Standard 
errors 
LM-test p-value 
2000 3.464 (0.021) -0.0002 (0.0001) 0.770 0.00 
2001 3.458 (0.021) 0.0001 (0.0012) 0.657 0.01 
2002 3.463 (0.018) 0.0007 (0.0007) 0.718 0.00 
2003 3.481 (0.021) 0.0393 (0.0047) 0.774 0.00 
2004 3.461 (0.020) -0.0004 (0.0015) 0.637 0.00 
2005 3.464 (0.018) 0.0002 (0.0001) 0.758 0.02 
2006 3.424 (0.049) 0.0260 (0.0071) 0.888 0.00 
2007 3.409 (0.015) 0.0190 (0.0204) 0.832 0.00 
2008 3.417 (0.040) 0.0273 (0.0412) 0.991 0.00 
2009 3.394 (0.014) 0.0488 (0.0206) 1.088 0.00 
2010 3.365 (0.017) 0.0408 (0.0654) 1.033 0.00 
2011 3.352 (0.025) 0.0279 (0.0301) 1.170 0.00 
2012 3.368 (0.052) 0.0282 (0.0352) 1.212 0.00 
2013 3.364 (0.023) 0.0237 (0.0021) 1.222 0.01 
2014 3.388 (0.029) 0.0479 (0.0038) 1.110 0.00 
2015 3.371 (0.062) 0.0321 (0.0497) 1.148 0.00 
Notes: This table summarises house prices forecasting parameter estimates by year. 
Table A.156: The Effect of House Prices Uncertainty in Neighbouring Regions on Timing of 
Development and Land Prices 
Explanatory variables 
Timing of development Land Prices 
Spatial OLS 
landprice Wx landprice 
fpriceh 2.984 1.428 0.576*** 
  (1.34) (1.20) (6.44) 
uncer -1.101*** 0.176 1.829*** 
  (-3.78) (0.27) (5.21) 
GDP 0.409 0.855 0.496*** 
  (-0.80) (-0.90) (16.10) 
CPI 1.875 5.029* 1.601 
  (-0.51) (1.69) (0.92) 
une_r -0.539** -1.423** -0.402*** 
  (2.06) (1.98) (-2.61) 
pop_den 0.101 0.298 0.219*** 
  (1.44) (1.40) (4.48) 
num_edu -0.465 -1.574** - 
  (-1.42) (-2.08)   
num_heal -0.00546 0.360** - 
  (-0.09) (2.00)   
num_lib 0.0264 -0.214 - 
  (0.36) (-0.63)   
num_muse -0.264* 0.174 - 
  (-1.87) (0.51)   
size_building 0.0335 0.495 - 
  (0.32) (1.14)   
Observation 496 496 
Log-likelihood 722.95   
Time fixed effect Yes Yes 
Wald test, spatial lag 26.16[0.021]   
Wald test, spatial 29.82[0.016]   
LR test, spatial lag 58.37[0.000]   
LR test, spatial 64.58[0.000]   
Notes: This table provides test results for spatial and time-period fixed effect model. The null hypothesis of LR 
spatial error test is that there is no spatially lagged error term in the model. The null hypothesis of LR spatial lag 
test is that there is no spatially lagged dependent variable in the model. The null hypothesis of Wald test is that 
the model is homoscedastic. 
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Table A.157: Regressions of Market Prices on Model Prices 
  Constant Std. Coeff. Std. 
R-square 
  a Error b Error 
2000 1.0577 0.0484 0.3901 0.0130 0.9679 
2001 1.0457 0.0514 0.3888 0.0135 0.9653 
2002 1.0827 0.0520 0.3784 0.0135 0.9634 
2003 1.0074 0.0406 0.3970 0.0099 0.9816 
2004 0.8819 0.0306 0.4045 0.0069 0.9914 
2005 0.9938 0.0368 0.3927 0.0081 0.9873 
2006 0.7548 0.0533 0.4431 0.0111 0.9814 
2007 0.8016 0.0368 0.4308 0.0072 0.9917 
2008 0.7537 0.0393 0.4343 0.0074 0.9915 
2009 0.9648 0.0454 0.4071 0.0083 0.9876 
2010 0.7696 0.0508 0.4315 0.0088 0.9876 
2011 0.7623 0.0496 0.4307 0.0084 0.9886 
2012 0.7718 0.0458 0.4300 0.0074 0.9912 
2013 0.4302 0.0057 0.7546 0.0359 0.9948 
2014 0.8770 0.0311 0.4166 0.0047 0.9962 
2015 0.7893 0.0325 0.4291 0.0047 0.9964 
Notes: This table provides regressions of maarket prices on model prices. The models are well specified if the 
coefficients are not significantly different from zero, and the constants are not significantly different from one. 
Option model: 
 
  
𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 = 𝑎 + 𝑏 ∗ 𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 +  
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Table A.158: Volatility of House Prices 
Region 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Anhui 18.38% 18.85% 19.32% 13.75% 19.02% 19.16% 17.35% 18.04% 18.37% 13.77% 19.79% 20.07% 19.91% 18.77% 9.77% 18.12% 
Beijing 22.12% 22.45% 23.49% 19.36% 22.83% 23.38% 18.04% 18.52% 19.29% 22.08% 20.96% 21.25% 21.35% 19.56% 21.86% 19.09% 
Chongqing 8.01% 8.80% 7.49% 11.69% 9.13% 9.30% 5.03% 9.00% 4.97% 12.76% 4.75% 9.39% 17.30% 15.21% 12.37% 14.46% 
Fujian 9.60% 10.50% 9.42% 13.88% 10.88% 11.46% 16.12% 13.77% 16.53% 16.80% 20.19% 16.71% 16.80% 15.38% 15.95% 17.93% 
Gansu 9.92% 10.59% 9.56% 11.48% 10.71% 11.05% 16.68% 15.33% 17.25% 13.36% 19.10% 17.48% 17.70% 16.19% 12.76% 17.32% 
Guangdong 11.54% 12.17% 11.43% 14.48% 12.51% 13.03% 17.77% 17.21% 18.73% 16.56% 20.68% 20.05% 20.21% 18.37% 15.91% 18.76% 
Guangxi 7.78% 7.85% 6.00% 12.52% 7.32% 6.98% 15.06% 14.76% 15.96% 15.27% 17.28% 16.93% 17.45% 15.77% 14.50% 16.20% 
Guizhou 9.32% 9.45% 7.72% 12.77% 8.63% 8.65% 17.59% 17.11% 18.66% 13.91% 20.79% 20.06% 20.39% 18.43% 13.06% 18.86% 
Hainan 8.68% 9.58% 7.69% 13.02% 8.56% 8.97% 17.78% 17.80% 19.02% 15.89% 20.79% 20.95% 21.27% 19.17% 15.68% 18.91% 
Hebei 5.69% 4.60% 3.01% 12.93% 5.63% 3.98% 16.77% 16.90% 17.97% 14.67% 19.10% 18.72% 19.04% 16.94% 14.08% 16.54% 
Heilongjiang 6.76% 5.61% 4.48% 12.22% 6.25% 4.76% 17.93% 18.02% 19.18% 14.70% 20.92% 20.74% 20.99% 18.85% 13.74% 18.90% 
Henan 7.56% 6.58% 5.82% 13.18% 7.04% 5.79% 18.17% 18.53% 19.52% 14.72% 21.03% 21.54% 21.74% 19.54% 14.28% 19.17% 
Hubei 7.67% 6.74% 6.21% 12.23% 6.84% 5.93% 18.13% 18.64% 19.49% 14.77% 20.95% 21.73% 21.91% 19.70% 13.78% 19.09% 
Hunan 9.19% 8.12% 7.97% 13.17% 8.06% 7.39% 18.19% 18.79% 19.60% 14.59% 21.03% 21.94% 22.16% 19.91% 14.12% 19.18% 
Inner Mongolia 8.81% 8.28% 8.06% 12.46% 8.04% 7.62% 18.05% 18.69% 19.44% 15.01% 20.90% 21.85% 22.09% 19.77% 14.22% 18.97% 
Jiangsu 9.60% 8.98% 8.14% 13.31% 8.14% 7.09% 17.60% 18.09% 18.64% 15.30% 19.75% 20.59% 21.18% 18.93% 14.48% 18.34% 
Jiangxi 7.69% 7.59% 6.45% 12.54% 7.50% 6.80% 17.88% 18.40% 19.20% 14.00% 20.87% 21.40% 21.71% 19.48% 13.51% 18.95% 
Jilin 9.24% 9.15% 8.20% 12.79% 8.76% 8.34% 18.14% 18.68% 19.51% 15.51% 21.06% 21.82% 22.09% 19.82% 14.55% 19.20% 
Liaoning 9.65% 9.32% 9.13% 12.54% 9.62% 9.33% 17.93% 18.59% 19.28% 13.81% 20.73% 21.63% 21.98% 19.71% 13.30% 18.84% 
Ningxia 9.18% 9.53% 9.27% 13.73% 10.15% 9.99% 17.92% 18.58% 19.24% 15.96% 20.88% 21.71% 21.88% 19.64% 15.29% 19.00% 
Qinghai 10.59% 11.22% 11.35% 11.06% 11.96% 12.08% 18.09% 18.73% 19.30% 13.07% 20.99% 21.88% 22.10% 19.83% 11.88% 19.15% 
Shaanxi 12.51% 13.15% 13.60% 14.84% 14.21% 14.42% 18.06% 18.73% 19.29% 16.88% 20.88% 21.86% 22.06% 19.84% 16.80% 19.09% 
Shandong 15.10% 15.77% 16.67% 8.34% 17.07% 17.66% 18.19% 18.84% 19.56% 11.30% 21.05% 22.02% 22.26% 19.99% 17.98% 19.21% 
Shanghai 18.34% 18.89% 20.34% 17.06% 20.54% 21.62% 18.16% 18.83% 19.59% 18.10% 21.02% 22.05% 22.31% 20.01% 19.64% 19.17% 
Shanxi 8.87% 8.67% 7.51% 14.22% 8.42% 8.05% 7.79% 8.33% 8.09% 18.02% 7.26% 6.26% 4.82% 5.19% 16.04% 6.86% 
Sichuan 10.10% 9.92% 9.07% 10.13% 9.61% 9.43% 16.47% 14.81% 16.97% 9.07% 20.18% 17.07% 16.98% 15.61% 10.42% 18.00% 
Tianjin 12.20% 11.87% 11.21% 15.57% 11.46% 11.61% 17.87% 17.13% 18.91% 19.64% 21.00% 20.10% 20.20% 18.35% 17.93% 19.07% 
Tibet 7.61% 8.53% 7.53% 9.35% 8.86% 8.64% 16.01% 15.79% 16.72% 8.92% 17.79% 17.62% 17.52% 15.79% 10.93% 15.59% 
Xinjiang 9.13% 10.19% 9.46% 16.27% 10.55% 10.59% 17.77% 17.53% 18.65% 19.80% 20.79% 20.22% 19.99% 18.16% 17.68% 18.77% 
Yunnan 10.88% 12.02% 11.62% 2.60% 12.56% 12.81% 17.97% 18.13% 19.21% 2.14% 20.81% 21.10% 21.06% 19.08% 5.74% 18.99% 
Zhejiang 12.97% 14.22% 14.20% 19.59% 15.05% 15.71% 18.18% 18.57% 19.53% 21.96% 21.06% 21.70% 21.81% 19.65% 20.86% 19.17% 
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Table A.159: Statistics of Option Premium 
Region 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Anhui 16.23% 18.10% 17.67% 18.73% 18.13% 17.73% 18.34% 15.00% 17.92% 17.18% 16.45% 16.69% 21.00% 12.71% 12.62% 13.85% 
Beijing 16.89% 11.85% 17.58% 17.66% 18.76% 17.50% 19.03% 18.34% 15.32% 18.32% 17.13% 16.52% 19.78% 17.28% 12.42% 13.97% 
Chongqing 17.34% 12.66% 12.51% 17.95% 16.57% 18.13% 18.77% 19.22% 17.74% 15.41% 18.19% 17.20% 16.56% 14.99% 17.14% 11.16% 
Fujian 14.20% 12.61% 13.29% 11.77% 17.99% 16.94% 19.24% 18.96% 18.59% 18.36% 15.61% 18.22% 17.25% 15.78% 14.79% 18.04% 
Gansu 20.37% 13.32% 13.22% 12.38% 12.06% 16.97% 17.02% 19.40% 18.50% 19.16% 18.27% 16.04% 18.35% 15.44% 15.57% 16.08% 
Guangdong 18.67% 17.19% 13.24% 12.29% 12.93% 11.49% 18.13% 16.96% 18.97% 18.93% 19.11% 18.28% 16.60% 17.18% 15.87% 16.47% 
Guangxi 16.19% 14.96% 17.53% 13.67% 12.66% 11.88% 11.74% 18.14% 17.10% 19.36% 18.83% 19.18% 18.34% 12.83% 17.08% 16.93% 
Guizhou 16.88% 11.80% 15.48% 16.92% 13.88% 12.11% 12.09% 12.11% 17.76% 17.12% 19.28% 18.92% 19.27% 17.94% 12.78% 18.18% 
Hainan 17.80% 13.21% 15.88% 14.47% 17.09% 13.54% 12.33% 12.50% 11.75% 18.15% 17.41% 19.37% 19.04% 17.00% 16.84% 11.79% 
Hebei 14.65% 13.49% 15.67% 15.15% 14.87% 16.83% 13.55% 12.76% 12.31% 12.41% 18.05% 18.02% 19.44% 16.56% 17.24% 18.24% 
Heilongjiang 17.76% 14.22% 17.31% 15.42% 16.39% 14.25% 16.88% 13.64% 12.37% 12.84% 12.77% 18.10% 19.23% 17.59% 16.80% 18.82% 
Henan 18.35% 12.43% 14.48% 16.75% 16.78% 16.45% 14.33% 17.01% 13.68% 13.08% 13.53% 14.70% 18.13% 15.71% 17.66% 18.44% 
Hubei 17.91% 14.02% 17.44% 15.30% 18.09% 16.88% 16.55% 14.58% 16.94% 13.68% 13.87% 15.46% 12.13% 17.61% 15.86% 19.04% 
Hunan 18.91% 16.70% 17.17% 16.60% 15.58% 18.16% 17.16% 16.51% 14.44% 17.28% 13.07% 16.12% 12.62% 13.42% 16.56% 14.82% 
Inner Mongolia 19.29% 17.43% 16.88% 16.93% 18.23% 15.05% 18.30% 17.18% 16.43% 14.97% 17.86% 12.08% 12.61% 13.79% 12.22% 18.05% 
Jiangsu 17.66% 16.33% 17.82% 16.77% 18.75% 18.29% 15.08% 18.28% 17.05% 16.46% 15.82% 19.60% 14.41% 13.82% 13.14% 13.75% 
Jiangxi 18.05% 16.10% 16.47% 17.66% 18.54% 18.66% 18.30% 15.19% 18.17% 17.14% 16.53% 18.03% 17.07% 15.02% 13.19% 14.78% 
Jilin 18.61% 12.39% 17.31% 17.10% 19.08% 18.41% 19.12% 18.28% 14.75% 18.21% 17.21% 16.58% 14.66% 17.73% 15.34% 15.03% 
Liaoning 19.34% 13.26% 13.15% 16.82% 17.57% 18.94% 18.85% 19.18% 18.27% 14.67% 18.22% 17.26% 12.36% 15.66% 17.49% 16.91% 
Ningxia 16.80% 13.17% 13.91% 12.29% 18.02% 16.82% 19.31% 18.93% 18.97% 18.20% 14.35% 18.34% 13.01% 16.43% 15.33% 18.86% 
Qinghai 21.97% 14.26% 13.90% 12.88% 11.26% 18.01% 16.83% 19.34% 18.75% 19.07% 18.33% 13.64% 13.97% 16.47% 16.38% 17.20% 
Shaanxi 20.59% 17.57% 14.52% 12.67% 11.76% 11.71% 18.10% 17.00% 19.21% 18.88% 19.19% 18.35% 16.56% 18.04% 16.65% 16.57% 
Shandong 16.51% 15.61% 18.02% 13.78% 12.07% 12.06% 12.24% 18.04% 16.73% 19.31% 18.94% 19.26% 12.83% 17.32% 17.93% 17.13% 
Shanghai 17.11% 15.62% 16.16% 17.10% 13.85% 12.26% 12.45% 12.39% 18.03% 16.66% 19.36% 19.01% 13.29% 18.33% 17.40% 18.32% 
Shanxi 18.21% 15.00% 16.38% 14.80% 16.80% 13.95% 12.73% 12.72% 12.26% 17.98% 16.16% 19.44% 12.57% 18.36% 18.23% 18.43% 
Sichuan 18.49% 16.99% 16.50% 16.30% 14.23% 16.89% 13.95% 12.78% 12.78% 12.24% 18.13% 18.51% 14.85% 18.04% 18.42% 18.36% 
Tianjin 18.31% 16.00% 17.96% 16.46% 15.92% 14.32% 17.01% 14.01% 12.80% 12.91% 13.56% 18.15% 17.71% 18.73% 17.94% 19.10% 
Tibet 18.90% 17.95% 15.89% 17.93% 16.37% 16.57% 14.53% 17.03% 13.78% 13.13% 14.32% 16.22% 13.67% 18.50% 18.64% 18.80% 
Xinjiang 18.58% 16.84% 18.18% 14.71% 17.62% 17.11% 16.58% 14.48% 17.12% 14.19% 14.77% 16.91% 12.58% 18.09% 18.39% 19.29% 
Yunnan 19.25% 16.48% 18.34% 18.23% 15.04% 18.32% 17.23% 16.30% 14.72% 17.40% 14.69% 17.83% 13.05% 11.72% 17.95% 19.77% 
Zhejiang 20.22% 17.50% 18.04% 18.35% 17.44% 15.06% 18.35% 16.91% 16.55% 15.15% 18.57% 15.71% 13.06% 12.58% 12.88% 18.13% 
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Appendix B 
 
Figure B.1: Measures of Local Spatial Autocorrelation for the House Prices (Chapter 5 The 
Spatial Analysis and Spill-over Effects of House Price in Beijing) 
 
 
Figure B.2: Measures of Local Spatial Autocorrelation for House Prices of the Previous Year 
(Chapter 5 The Spatial Analysis and Spill-over Effects of House Price in Beijing) 
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Figure B.3: Comparison between House Prices and Predict House Prices (Chapter 6 The 
Uncertainty of House Prices and Real Options in China) 
 
Notes: This figure provides test results for comparison between house prices and predict house prices. price is 
the real house prices. yhat is the predict house prices with reduced-form mean. Yhat1 is the predict house prices 
the naive-form prediction. 
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